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Abstract	  
This	   thesis	   is	   concerned	  with	   the	   problem	   of	   rectification	   in	   the	   theory	   of	  justice.	  We	  are	  faced	  with	  examples	  of	  great	  historical	  injustice	  over	  the	  last	  few	   centuries.	   A	   proper	   regard	   for	   the	   demands	   of	   rectification	   seems	  required	  of	  us	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  overwhelming	  importance	  that	  victims	  place	  on	   it;	   without	   it,	   no	   society	   can	   hope	   to	   sustain	  mutual	   respect	   among	   its	  citizens,	  the	  non-­‐victims	  and	  the	  victims,	  nor	  probably	  foster	  the	  self-­‐respect	  of	  the	  victims.	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  problem	  of	  rectification	  poses	  a	  distinctive	  and	  fundamental	  problem	  for	  classical	  theories	  of	  justice	  and	  specifically	  for	  John	  Rawls’s	  account	  of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	  Defenders	  of	  Rawls	  might	  claim,	   first,	  that	  rectification	  falls	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  theory	  of	   justice,	  since	  that	   is	  intended	   as	   ideal	   theory,	   and	   thus	   formulated	   against	   the	   fictional	  assumption	   that	   no	   historical	   wrongs	   have	   taken	   place.	   In	   this	   view,	  rectification	   is	   a	   concern	   of	   real	   political	   theory	   but	   not	   of	   ideal	   theory	   of	  justice.	   I	   argue	   that	   this	   defence	   is	  mistaken.	   Secondly,	   defenders	   of	   Rawls	  who	  concede	  that	  rectification	   is	  a	  proper	  part	  of	   the	   ideal	   theory	  of	   justice	  might	   claim	   that	   the	   principles	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   provide	   a	   basis	   for	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determining	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  justice	  requires	  rectification	  of	  wrongs.	  This	  too,	  I	  argue,	   is	  mistaken.	  In	   light	  of	  the	  demands	  that	  rectification	  places	  on	  us,	   I	   propose	   an	   alternative	   picture	   of	   equality	   as	   conceived	   of	   within	   the	  liberal	  tradition.	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Introduction	  
Most	  contemporary	  liberal	  societies	  are	  rife	  with	  civic	  divisions	  related	  to	  the	  past:	  there	  are	  always	  groups	  of	  citizens	  who	  in	  the	  past	  have	  been	  victims	  of	  some	   gross	   forms	   of	   distributive	   injustice;	   citizens,	   that	   is,	   who	   have	   been	  affected	   by	   flagrant	   violations	   of	   the	   liberal	   principles	   that	   are	   to	   regulate	  social	   cooperation.	   Among	   these	   injustices,	   particularly	   brutal	   are	   those	  characterised	   as	   forms	   of	   political	   violence	   or	   political	   terror.	   What	   makes	  these	   injustices	   of	   a	   similar	   kind	   is	   that	   they	   are	   perpetrated	   and	   directed	  either	  by	  the	  State	  (through	  one	  or	  more	  of	   its	   institutions)	  or	  by	  groups	  of	  citizens	   (with	   the	   institutional	   support	   or	   consent	   of	   the	   State)	   towards	  another	   particular	   and	   identifiable	   group	   of	   citizens.	   These	   injustices	   may	  vary	   in	   their	   targeted	   groups	   and	   gravity:	   first,	   they	   can	   involve	   the	  institutional	   promotion	   of	   the	   exploitation	   or	   extermination	   of	   a	   cultural,	  religious,	   or	   ethnic	   group;	   second,	   they	   can	   involve	   the	   persecution,	  imprisonment	  or	   abduction	  of	   citizens	  because	  of	   their	  political	  beliefs	   and	  actions.	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Examples	   of	   the	   first	   type	   of	   injustice	   include	   the	   exploitation	   of	  indigenous	  peoples	   by	  most	   Latin	  American	   states	   in	   the	  19th	   century	   and	  the	  extermination	  of	  Mayan	  persons	  by	  the	  Guatemalan	  State	  from	  1970	  up	  to	  2000.	  Examples	  of	  the	  second	  type	  of	   injustice	   include	  the	   imprisonment	  and	   abduction	   of	   individuals	   considered	   to	   be	   political	   dissidents	   or	  “subversive”	  elements	  by	  most	  Latin	  American	  states	  (especially,	  Argentina,	  Chile	  and	  Uruguay)	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s.	  	  An	   immense	   amount	   of	   evidence	   in	   psychology	   and	   the	   social	  sciences,	   as	  well	   as	   in	  moral	   and	  political	  philosophy	  bolsters	   the	   idea	   that	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  a	  past	  shaped	  by	  political	  violence	  is	  a	  phenomenon	  of	  the	  utmost	  importance	  for	  citizens	  and	  liberal	  societies.	  Most	  of	  the	  work	  on	  this	   phenomenon	   falls	   under	   the	   name	   of	   transitional,	   restorative,	   or	  compensatory	   justice.	   It	   seems	   to	   be	   an	   assumption	   of	   the	   debate	   that,	  however	   widespread	   and	   deep	   this	   phenomenon	   is,	   it	   falls	   out	   of	   the	  competence	   of	   the	   most	   prominent	   theory	   of	   liberal	   justice,	   i.e.	   Rawls’s	  theory.	  I	  think	  this	  is	  a	  mistake.	  	  In	  fact,	  I	  have	  come	  to	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  not	  immediately	  obvious	  that	  the	   full	   regulation	   of	   Rawls’s	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   in	   a	   given	   society	   would	  secure	  the	  rectification	  of	  important	  historical	  injustices	  such	  as	  the	  ones	  just	  mentioned.	   Since,	   as	   I	   will	   argue,	   the	   scope	   of	   justice	   needs	   to	   encompass	  historical	  rectification,	  Rawls’s	  description	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  might	  be	  depicting	  an	  incomplete	  ideal	  of	  justice	  to	  which	  we	  should	  try	  to	  arrive	  at	  in	  our	   actual	   social	   proceedings.	   If	   this	   claim	   is	   correct,	   then	   Rawls’s	   theory	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must	   show	   concern	   for	   historical	   injustice.	   This	   is	   the	   main	   claim	   that	   I	  defend	  throughout	  this	  work.	  	  To	  that	  end,	   in	  CHAPTER	  1	  I	   first	  present	  the	  empirical	  and	  normative	  evidence	   granting	   the	   significance	   of	   historical	   rectification.	   In	   particular,	   I	  claim	  that	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  a	  past	  shaped	  by	  political	  violence	  bears	  an	  extremely	  high	  importance	  to	  citizens	  and	  liberal	  societies	  in	  relation	  to	  (1)	  citizens’	   psychology	   and	   self-­‐respect,	   (2)	   citizens’	   mutual	   respect,	   and	   (3)	  society’s	  liberal	  integrity	  as	  well	  as	  the	  achievement	  of	  social	  stability	  for	  the	  right	  reasons.	  You	  may	  find	  this	  way	  of	  proceeding	  to	  be	  somewhat	  odd	  for	  a	  philosophical	  text	  —i.e.,	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  provided	  by	   psychological	   studies.	   However,	   sensitivity	   to	   psychological	   and	   social	  facts	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  features	  distinguishing	  Rawls’s	  conception	  of	  justice	  from	  others.	  In	  fact,	  such	  sensitivity	  is	  now	  regarded	  as	  a	  shared	  assumption	  and	   a	   cherished	   characteristic	   of	   the	   approach	   to	   political	   philosophy	  undertaken	  by	  all	  the	  so-­‐called	  practice-­‐based	  or	  practice-­‐dependent	  accounts	  of	   justice.	   My	   attempt	   to	   inform	   our	   normative	   assessment	   of	   historical	  rectification	   through	   psychology	   and	   not	   only	   through	   more	   independent	  philosophical	   considerations	   aligns	   with	   this	   way	   of	   doing	   political	  philosophy.	  	  Having	   defended	   the	   normative	   significance	   of	   past	   rectification,	   in	  
CHAPTER	   2	   I	   revise	   a	   first	   Rawlsian	   objection	   to	   my	   main	   claim	   (i.e.,	   that	  Rawls’s	  theory	  is	  to	  show	  concern	  for	  historical	   injustice).	  This	  objection	  —generally	  the	  default	  position	   in	  contemporary	  political	  philosophy—	  states	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that,	  regardless	  of	  the	  importance	  of	  historical	  injustice	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  its	  rectification	  is	  a	  problem	  that	  does	  not	  arise	  within	  Rawls’s	  theory.	  Three	   considerations	  may	   be	   given	   to	   support	   this	   objection.	   These	  considerations	  appeal,	  respectively,	  to	  the	  ideal,	  the	  forward-­‐looking,	  and	  the	  
non-­‐comprehensive	   character	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory.	   In	   particular,	   the	   ideal	  character	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  has	  a	  powerful	  effect	  on	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  debate	  on	   whether	   or	   not	   past	   wrongs	   hold	   normative	   significance	   for	   present	  justice.	   Like	   their	   opponents,	   a	   vast	   majority	   of	   authors	   defending	   the	  normative	  significance	  of	  past	  wrongs	  for	  present	  justice	  hold	  that,	   in	  order	  to	  address	  such	  preoccupations,	  we	  need	  to	  drop	  the	  assumptions	  of	  Rawls’s	  
ideal	   theory	   all	   together.	   Consequently,	   it	   is	   presumed	   that	   the	   work	   on	  historical	   injustice	   falls	  exclusively	  under	   the	  realm	  of	  non-­‐ideal	  theory	  and,	  thus,	  is	  outside	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory.	  Against	  this	  objection	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  ideal,	  forward-­‐looking,	  and	  non-­‐
comprehensive	  character	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  does	  not	  justify	  its	  lack	  of	  concern	  for	   historical	   injustice.	   There	   are	   two	  main	   reasons	   for	   this.	   First,	   victims’	  interest	   in	   coming	   to	   terms	  with	  a	  past	   shaped	  by	  political	  violence	   is	  on	  a	  par	  with	  other	  human	  psychological	   regularities	   that	   are	   already	   central	   to	  Rawls’s	   ideal	   theory.	   Thus,	   I	   hold	   that	   such	   a	   theory	   should	   consider	   the	  psychological	  regularities	  associated	  with	  the	  importance	  of	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	   an	   unjust	   past	   just	   as	   much	   as	   it	   considers	   other	   psychological	  regularities.	   Second,	   I	   argue	   that	   an	  unjust	  pre-­‐ordered	  past	   is	   a	   permanent	  feature	  of	  a	  liberal	  well-­‐ordered	  society,	  in	  the	  very	  same	  way	  that	  reasonable	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and	  cultural	  pluralism	  are.	  Considering	  these	  two	  reasons,	   I	  hold	   that	  we	  as	  theorists	  need	  to	  show	  that	  even	  under	  historical	  conditions	  marked	  by	  gross	  injustice	  —as	  is	  the	  case	  in	  all	  current	  liberal	  societies—	  the	  Rawlsian	  utopia	  of	  a	  stable	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  is	  still	  realistic.	  Accordingly,	  the	  conclusion	  of	  this	   chapter	   is	   that	   a	   correct	   ideal	   non-­‐comprehensive	   theory	   of	   liberal	  justice	  cannot	  be	  exclusively	  forward-­‐looking.	  	  Having	  defended	  that	  the	  first	  objection	  fails,	  in	  CHAPTER	  3	  I	  consider	  a	  second	   Rawlsian	   objection:	   the	   idea	   that,	   even	   when	   historical	   injustice	   is	  within	   the	   scope	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory,	   the	   effective	   regulation	   of	   the	   very	  principles	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   suffice	   to	   ensure	   its	   rectification	   in	   a	   given	  liberal	  society.	  For	  this	  second	  objection	  to	  succeed,	  it	  must	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  society	   in	  which	   relevant	   historical	   injustices	   remain	   un-­‐rectified	   does	   not	  fully	   realise	   at	   least	   one	  of	  Rawls’s	  principles.	  An	  obvious	   candidate	   in	   this	  respect	   is	   the	  principle	   of	   fair	   equality	   of	   opportunity.	  This	   is	   so	  because	   a	  non-­‐rectified	   historical	   wrong	   may	   have	   tremendous	   effects	   on	   victims’	  capacity	  to	  pursue	  their	  plan	  of	  life.	  These	  effects	  can	  introduce	  unfairness	  in	  the	  competition	  for	  social	  positions	  of	  advantage,	  affecting	  victims’	  prospects	  (and	   their	  descendants)	  but	  not	   those	  of	   the	  rest	  of	   the	  citizenry.	  Thus,	   the	  main	  idea	  behind	  this	  second	  objection	  is	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  would	  not	  effectively	  regulate	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  until	  the	  State	  had	  rectified	  all	  relevant	  historical	  injustices.	  Against	  conventional	  assumptions	  in	  current	  political	  philosophy,	  we	  will	  see	  how	  this	  second	  objection	  is	  more	  promising	  than	  the	  first	  one.	  If	  this	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work	   manages	   to	   persuade	   you	   this	   much,	   it	   will	   have	   already	   made	   a	  contribution	   (however	   modest)	   to	   contemporary	   discussion	   amongst	  Rawlsians.	  For	  such	  a	  discussion	  should	  not	  gravitate	  around	  the	  question	  of	  which	  aspect	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  justifies	  excluding	  concern	  for	  past	  injustice.	  Rather,	   it	   should	   centre	   on	   the	   question	   of	   whether	   Rawls’s	   theory	   as	   it	  stands	   right	  now	  contains	   the	  normative	  apparatus	   to	   response	   to	   them	  or	  not.	   As	  promising	   as	   the	   second	  objection	   first	   appears	   to	  be,	   however,	   I	  argue	  that	  it	  is	  not	  immediately	  clear	  that	  it	  succeeds.	  For	  while	  it	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	  relevant	  past	  wrongs	  have	  effects	  on	  the	  opportunity	  of	  victims	  to	  compete	  for	  positions	  of	  advantage	  in	  the	  present,	  this	  problem	  is	  not	  the	  only	   normatively	   salient	   consequence	   of	   a	   non-­‐rectified	   historical	   injustice.	  While	   such	   injustices	   affect	   (1)	   citizens’	   psychology	   and	   self-­‐respect,	   (2)	  citizens’	   mutual	   respect,	   and	   (3)	   society’s	   liberal	   integrity,	   the	   second	  objection	  incorrectly	  assumes	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  rectifying	  past	  wrongs	  is	  exhausted	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  citizens	  might	  otherwise	  compete	  under	  unfair	  circumstances.	   Furthermore,	   I	   argue	   that	   some	   mechanisms	   of	   historical	  rectification	   do	   not	   seem	   to	   follow	   directly	   neither	   from	   the	   correct	  regulation	  of	   the	   fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  principle	  nor	   from	  the	  correct	  regulation	  of	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  justice.	  Considering	   this,	   I	   explore	   in	   a	   more	   tentative	   fashion	   —also	   in	  
CHAPTER	  3—	  one	  way	  in	  which	  Rawls’s	  theory	  could	  respond	  to	  the	  challenge	  posed	  by	  historical	  injustice:	  adding	  a	  specific	  backward-­‐looking	  principle	  of	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historical	   rectification	   to	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	   This	   addition	   could	   clarify	   the	  commitment	  of	  Rawls’s	   theory	  to	   the	   ideal	   that	  no	  liberal	  society	  is	  fully	  just	  
until	   historical	   rectification	   has	   taken	   place,	   so	   that	   ‘closing	   the	   books’	   or	  drawing	  a	   ‘thick	   line’	   through	   the	  past	   is	  never	  an	  option	   from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	   justice.	   The	  principle	   could	   command	   that	   recent	  historical	  wrongs	  are	  to	  be	  rectified	  by	  the	  institutional	  provision	  of	  retribution,	  compensation,	  and	  recognition-­‐driven	  measures	  as	  appropriate.	  Also,	  it	  could	  establish	  that	  the	  institutions	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  liberal	  society	  promote	  what	  I	  call	  a	  critical	  
historical	  narrative	  (that	  is,	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  the	  past	  which	  not	  only	   celebrates	   the	   putative	   remarkable	   historical	   facts	   of	   the	   society	   in	  question	   but,	   also,	   one	   that	   acknowledges	   the	   past	   wrongdoing	   of	   such	   a	  society	  as	  a	  cultural	  and	  political	  continuum	  over	  time).	  These	  three	  chapters	  form	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  thesis.	  The	  second	  part	  includes	  two	  further	  chapters.	  In	  CHAPTER	  4	  I	  focus	  on	  a	  similar	  critique	  that	  is	  often	   made	   against	   Rawls’s	   theory:	   i.e.,	   its	   lack	   of	   concern	   for	   racial	   and	  gender	  relations.	  I	  explore	  three	  different	  ways	  in	  which	  this	  critique	  can	  be	  understood	   and	   conclude	   that	   one	   of	   them	   prompts	   the	   inclusion	   of	   an	  
egalitarian	   ethos	   within	   the	   description	   of	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society.	  Importantly,	  I	  defend	  that	  Rawls’s	  theory	  already	  contains	  all	  the	  normative	  elements	  required	  for	  establishing	  that	  such	  an	  ethos	  is	  informed	  by	  a	  norm	  commanding	   respect	   for	   citizens’	   moral	   equality.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	   also	  compare	  my	   claim	   that	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   should	   be	   complemented	  with	   a	  new	  backward-­‐looking	  principle	  with	  a	  similar	  claim	  made	  by	  Seana	  Shiffrin:	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to	   wit,	   that	   a	   specific	   anti-­‐discrimination	   principle	   with	   forward-­‐looking	  character	  should	  be	  included	  within	  such	  a	  conception.	  	  Finally,	  in	  CHAPTER	  5	  I	  defend	  the	  general	  practice-­‐dependent	  approach	  developed	  in	  this	  thesis	  from	  G.	  A.	  Cohen’s	  recent	  and	  powerful	  criticisms.	  As	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned,	  I	  support	  the	  idea	  of	  informing	  political	  philosophy	  in	   general	  —and	   liberal	   theories	   of	   distributive	   justice	   in	  particular—	  with	  the	  evidence	  and	  findings	  of	  psychology	  and	  the	  social	  sciences.	  In	  this	  work	  I	  press	   Rawls’s	   theory	   regarding	   the	   importance	   of	   historical	   rectification	  partly	   on	   this	   basis.	   For	   this	   reason,	   a	   defence	   against	   Cohen’s	   attack	   of	  
practice-­‐dependent	   conceptions	  of	   justice	   is	   in	  order.	   In	  particular,	   I	   defend	  three	  points:	  first,	  that	  Cohen	  is	  mistaken	  in	  presenting	  his	  critique	  of	  Rawls’s	  concept	   of	   justice	   as	   a	   critique	   of	   Rawls’s	   constructivism.	   Second,	   that	  Cohen’s	  first	  condition	  of	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  justice	  (stating	  that	  such	  principles	  must	  be	  fact-­‐insensitive)	  is	  trivial.	  And,	  third,	  that	  Cohen’s	  second	  condition	   of	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   justice	   (stating	   that	   such	   principles	  must	   be	   derived	   from	   considerations	   of	   justice	   alone)	   creates	   what	   I	   call	  
Cohen’s	   dilemma.	   I	   also	   defend	   in	   this	   final	   chapter	   that	   a	   proper	   political	  conception	   of	   justice	   should	   not	   endorse	   Rawls’s	   political	   constructivism	  neither	   as	   a	   view	   of	   the	   justification	   of	   principles	   of	   justice	   nor	   as	   a	  metaethical	  view	  about	  what	  constitutes	  correct	  principles	  of	  justice.	  For	  only	  a	  deflationist	  account	  of	  the	  original	  position	  —i.e.,	  an	  account	  in	  which	  the	  original	  position	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  mere	  heuristic	  device	  of	  argumentation—	  is	  compatible	  with	  the	  aims	  of	  political	  liberalism.	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This	   is	   the	   work	   that	   you	  will	   find	   in	   this	   thesis.	   Now	   let	  me	  make	  three	  caveats	  to	  clarify	  what	  you	  will	  not	  find	  in	  it.	  First,	  notice	  that	  when	  I	  speak	  of	  historical	  injustice,	  I	  only	  refer	  to	  non-­‐rectified	  cases	  of	  past	  political	  
violence.	   I	   do	   this	   for	   the	   following	   reason.	   Political	   violence	   constitutes	   a	  gross	  and	  clear	  violation	  to	  the	  precepts	  of	  liberal	  justice.	  Contrary	  to	  regular	  violence,	  political	  violence	   is	  always	   targeted:	  a	  person	   is	  victim	  of	   it	  either	  
because	  of	  her	  belonging	  to	  an	  ethnic,	  cultural,	  or	  religious	  group,	  or	  because	  of	   her	   political	   beliefs	   and	   actions.	   Thus,	   the	   very	   purpose	   of	   political	  violence	   (again,	   contrary	   to	   regular	   violence)	   is	   to	   undermine	   the	   equal	  moral	  status	  of	  persons.	  	  Importantly,	   defending	   a	   framework	   of	   past	   rectification	   focused	   on	  these	   cases	   does	   not	   commit	   oneself	   to	   a	   particular	   theory	   of	   property	   or	  entitlement	  —say,	   a	   la	  Robert	   Nozick.	   As	   it	   is	   well	   known,	   for	   Nozick	   any	  transaction	   violating	   either	   what	   he	   calls	   the	   principle	   of	   justice	   in	  acquisition	   or	   the	   principle	   of	   justice	   in	   transfer	   is	   in	   need	   of	   rectification.	  The	   theory	   of	   the	  moral	   assessment	   of	   the	   past	   that	   I	   defend	   here	   is	   only	  committed	   to	   the	   claim	   that	   unjust	   acquisitions	   and	   transfers	   constituting	  cases	  of	  political	  violence	  are	  in	  need	  of	  rectification.	  As	  I	  said,	  the	  reason	  for	  this	   is	   the	   very	   fact	   that	   such	   cases	   flagrantly	   undermine	   the	   equal	   moral	  status	   of	   their	   targeted	   victims.	   Contrarily,	   not	   all	   unjust	   property	  acquisitions	   and	   transfers	   that	   Nozick’s	   entitlement	   theory	   is	   set	   to	   rectify	  instantiate	  this	  quality.	  Another	  way	  of	  stating	  this	  caveat	  is	  the	  following:	  I	  defend	  that	  at	  least	  cases	  of	  past	  political	  violence	  are	  in	  need	  of	  rectification.	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In	   this	   way	   my	   proposal	   is	   compatible	   with	   the	   claim	   that	   less	   stringent	  rectificatory	  measures	  might	  be	  taken	  (if	  any	  at	  all)	  regarding	  other	  types	  of	  historical	   injustice,	  but	  also	  with	  a	  stronger	  theory	  of	  rectification	   for	  other	  historical	  wrongs	  defended	  on	  a	  different	  basis.	  A	   second	   caveat	   refers	   to	  my	   claim	   that	   adding	   a	   specific	   principle	   of	  historical	  rectification	  could	  fill	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness’s	  theoretical	  gap	  regarding	  the	  normative	   significance	  of	  historical	   injustice.	  While	   indeed	  a	  defence	  of	  the	  stated	  principle	  is	  offered	  throughout	  the	  thesis,	  a	  full	  development	  of	  it	  (and	  of	  its	  more	  general	  place	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory)	  is	  not	  provided.	  As	   important	  as	   this	   task	   is	  within	  Rawlsian	   theory,	   this	   thesis	   is	  mainly	  concerned	  with	  showing	  how	  the	  assumption	  that	  historical	  injustice	  is	  outside	  the	  scope	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  is	  unwarranted.	  If	  this	  thesis	  succeeds	  in	  showing	  that,	  it	  is	  up	  to	  further	  Rawlsian	  work	  either	  to	  fully	  develop	  the	  stated	  principle,	  and	  how	  it	  is	  to	  be	  placed	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  more	  generally	  or,	  alternatively,	   to	  explain	  how	  Rawls’s	   theory	  does	  address	   the	   normative	   significance	   of	   historical	   injustice	   without	   such	   a	  principle.	  I	  admit,	  then,	  that	  other	  Rawlsian	  strategies	  for	  securing	  historical	  rectification	  can	  be	  developed.	  Finally,	  a	  third	  caveat	  is	  that,	  although	  there	  will	  be	  several	  remarks	  on	  the	  implications	  of	  the	  principle	  I	  am	  proposing,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  intention	  of	  this	  thesis	   to	   offer	   a	   particular	   theory	   of	   rectification.	   I	   hold	   that	   all	   actions	   of	  historical	   rectification	   can	   be	   subsumed	   to	   particular	   retribution,	  
compensation	   or	   recognition-­‐driven	   measures.	   Which	   specific	   measures	   of	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rectification	   are	   to	   be	   deployed	  depends	   on	   the	   contextual	   elements	   of	   the	  case	   in	  question.	   It	   is	  not	  uncommon	  to	   find	   in	  the	   literature	  of	   transitional	  justice	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   three	   different	   measures	   just	   mentioned	   tend	   to	  clash	  with	  one	  other.	  One	  thing	  that	  I	  defend	   is	  that	  such	  putative	  tension	  is	  often	  overstated	  and	  misplaced.	  Relevantly,	  I	  hold	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  third	  one	  cannot	  be	  underestimated	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  first	  two.	  For	  in	  doing	  
justice	   to	   victims,	   recognition	   is	   as	   important	   as	   retribution	   and	  compensation.	   I	   also	   argue	   that	   rectifying	   cases	   of	   recent	   political	   violence	  requires	  of	  transitional	  frameworks	  including	  elements	  of	  the	  three	  types	  of	  rectificatory	   measures.	   When	   only	   one	   type	   of	   these	   measures	   is	  implemented	  most	  of	  the	  time	  rectification	  fails.	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  said,	  it	  is	  not	   the	  purpose	  of	  my	   thesis	   to	  develop	  a	  particular	   theory	  of	   rectification.	  Such	   theories	   must	   necessarily	   be	   sensitive	   to	   the	   particular	   contexts	   for	  which	  they	  are	  framed,	  and	  that	  is	  certainly	  out	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  a	  general	  philosophical	   account	   of	   historical	   rectification	   within	   liberal	   societies	   is	  meant	  to	  provide.	  Furthermore,	   all	   strategies	   that	   deal	   with	   specific	   cases	   of	   historical	  injustice	   are	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   what	   an	   ideal	   liberal	   theory,	   such	   as	  Rawls’s,	   is	  meant	   to	   provide.	   Rather,	  what	   I	   intend	   to	   show	   is	   that	  Rawls’s	  ideal	   theory,	   and	  especially	  his	  description	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society,	  might	  be	   incomplete	   until	   a	   new	   principle	   concerned	   with	   historical	   injustice	   is	  added	   to	   it.	   This	   does	   not	   require	   showing	   how	   we	   can	   arrive	   from	   our	  current	  societies	  (in	  which	  most	  historical	  injustices	  remain	  un-­‐rectified)	  to	  a	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well-­‐ordered	  liberal	  society	  (in	  which	  no	  relevant	  historical	  injustice	  remains	  un-­‐rectified).	   Asking	   that	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   tantamount	   to	   asking	   of	   Rawls’s	  theory	  that	  it	  offer	  a	  particular	  strategy	  as	  to	  how,	  say,	  the	  basic	  institutions	  of	  the	  Mexican	  State	  can	  be	  effectively	  regulated	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	  You	  might	  find	  this	  task	  more	  important	  than	  merely	  discussing	  how	  an	  ideal	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  should	  look.	  However,	   I	  do	  believe	  that	  a	  first	  step	  in	  guiding	  our	  real-­‐world	  proceedings	  requires	  achieving	  normative	  clarity	   on	  what	  we	  want	   to	   accomplish.	   I	   think	   this	   is	   the	   spirit	   of	   Rawls’s	  theoretical	  exercise	  to	  begin	  with.	  The	  relevance	  of	  my	  thesis	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  to	  show	  how	  current	  liberal	  theory,	  due	  to	  fashionable	  confusions,	  has	  failed	  to	  conceptualise	  correctly	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  public	  dimension	  of	  citizens’	  and	  liberal	  societies’	  pasts.	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1	  
The	  Normative	  Significance	  of	  Historical	  Injustice	  
Past	   political	   violence	   has	   a	   tremendous	   impact	   on	   persons	   and	   liberal	  societies.	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  present	  the	  empirical	  and	  normative	  evidence	  that	  confer	  relevance	  to	   its	  rectification.	  Attending	  both	  to	  what	  psychology	  and	  moral	  philosophy	  have	  to	  say,	   in	  §	  1.1	   I	  will	  present	  evidence	  granting	  the	   normative	   significance	   of	   historical	   rectification	   at	   a	   personal	   level.	   In	  particular,	  I	  claim	  that	  a	  non-­‐rectified	  historical	  wrong	  may	  drastically	  hinder	  victims’	   capacities	   to	   achieve	   a	   healthy	   psychological	   life	   and	   self-­‐respect.	  Attending	  both	   to	  what	   the	   social	   sciences	  and	  political	  philosophy	  have	   to	  say,	   in	   § 1.2	   and	   § 1.3	   I	   will	   present	   evidence	   granting	   the	   normative	  significance	   of	   historical	   rectification	   at	   a	   social	   level.	   In	   particular,	   I	   will	  claim	  that	  the	  rectification	  of	  recent	  as	  well	  as	  distant	  past	  wrongs	  is	  needed	  in	   order	   to	   restore	   citizens’	   moral	   relations	   and	   to	   safeguard	   the	   liberal	  integrity	  of	  social	  institutions.	  
1.1	  Victims’	  Psychology	  and	  Self-­‐Respect	  Political	   violence	   is	   an	   institutional	   way	   of	   undermining	   the	   equal	   moral	  worth	   of	   persons.	   A	   person	   is	   selected	   as	   the	   target	   of	   this	   form	   of	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wrongdoing	  because	  of	  her	  ethnicity,	  religion,	  culture,	  or	  political	  beliefs	  and	  actions.	  She	  can	  also	  be	  targeted	  for	  more	  than	  one	  of	  these	  characteristics	  at	  once	  (see	  Jones	  2004:	  2-­‐10	  and	  Verdeja	  2006:	  123).	  Through	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  aggressor,	  the	  victim	  is	  not	  worthy	  of	  equal	  moral	  consideration	  —if	  worthy	  of	   any	   moral	   consideration	   at	   all.	   The	   infliction	   of	   harm	   against	   her	   is	   an	  expression	  of	  this.	  This	   form	  of	  wrongdoing	   is	   always	   directed,	   promoted	   or	   facilitated	  institutionally.	  Just	  as	  human	  rights	  cannot	  be	  violated	  by	  a	  single	  individual	  (see	   Pogge	   2000:	   47),	   a	   person	   committing	   an	   isolated	   hate	   crime	   is	   not	  thereby	   bringing	   about	   political	   violence.	   However,	   if	   the	   State	   fails	   to	  sanction	   several	   instances	   of	   similar	   hate	   crimes,	   this	   further	   failure	   does	  constitute	   political	   violence.	   In	   this	   case,	   while	   the	   State	   is	   not	   targeting	  wrongdoing	  against	  specific	  citizens	  directly,	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  allowing	  those	  citizens	  to	  be	  targeted	  without	  any	  consequences	  for	  aggressors.	  Since	   political	   violence	   is	   an	   institutional	   way	   of	   undermining	   the	  equal	   moral	   worth	   of	   persons,	   it	   disrupts	   the	   most	   fundamental	   moral	  premises	  behind	  a	  liberal	  democracy.	  Regardless	  of	  the	  different	  theoretical	  approaches	  available	  to	  understand	  and	  justify	  such	  a	  political	  system,	  all	  of	  them	  agree	  that	   liberal-­‐democratic	   institutions	  must	  guarantee	  that	  citizens	  are	  treated	  as	  persons	  with	  equal	  moral	  worth.	  John	  Rawls’s	  theory	  of	  justice,	  for	   instance,	  begins	  by	  affirming	  this	  claim	  without	  further	  defence	  (see	  PL:	  18-­‐19,	  JF:	  5).	  According	  to	  Rawls,	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  should	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  system	  of	  social	  cooperation	  between	  free	  and	  equal	  persons.	  Respect	  for	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citizens’	  moral	  equality	   is	   thus	  assumed	  as	  one	  of	   the	   intrinsic	   features	  of	  a	  system	  of	   cooperation	   in	  order	   for	   it	   to	   count	   as	   liberal	   and	  democratic.	   In	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  follow	  Rawls	  in	  this	  regard.	  No	  argument	  will	  be	  provided	  in	  support	  of	  this	  basic	  liberal-­‐egalitarian	  premise.	  In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   try	   to	   show	   how	   non-­‐rectified	   cases	   of	   past	  political	  violence	  (or,	  as	  I	  will	  refer	  to	  them,	  historical	  injustices)	  also	  disrupt	  the	  fundamental	  moral	  premises	  behind	  a	  liberal	  democracy.	  In	  this	  section,	  I	  will	  start	  by	  describing	  the	   importance	  of	  historical	  rectification	  on	  victims’	  individual	   lives.	   In	   the	   following	   sections,	   I	  will	   focus	  on	   the	   importance	  of	  historical	  rectification	  for	  liberal	  societies	  as	  a	  whole.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  being	  a	  victim	  of	  political	  violence	  has	  severe	  effects	  on	  persons’	  capacity	  to	  achieve	  a	  healthy	  psychological	  adjustment	  as	  well	  as	  to	   develop	   successfully	   a	   plan	   of	   life.	   This	   is	   vastly	   documented	   by	  psychological	  studies.	  Studies	  also	  document	  the	  inverse	  effect:	  the	  beneficial	  impact	  of	  public	   rectification	  of	  historical	   injustice	  on	  victims’	   lives.	  During	  the	   1990s,	  many	   psychologist	   and	  mental	   health	  workers	   thought	   that	   the	  positive	   effect	   of	   historical	   rectification	   was	   mainly	   due	   to	   the	   powerful	  therapeutic	   impact	   of	   testimony	   (see	   Agger	   &	   Jenssen	   1996	   —whose	  fieldwork	   took	   place	   during	   the	   Chilean	   transition	   to	   democracy	   in	   1989-­‐1991—	   and	  Wine	   2006	  —whose	   fieldwork	   took	   place	   in	   the	   aftermath	   of	  political	  violence	  in	  the	  Balkans	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  collapse	  of	  Yugoslavia).	  However,	   further	  field	  studies	  have	  revealed	  that	  testimony	  is	  but	  one	  of	   many	   elements	   that	   help	   in	   the	   process	   of	   psychological	   recovery	   from	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‘political	   trauma’.	   Psychologist	   Brandon	  Hamber	   2006:	   564,	   2010:	   97	  —by	  focusing	  on	  post-­‐apartheid	  cases	  in	  South	  Africa—	  stresses	  the	  positive	  effect	  that	   programs,	   objects,	   and	   actions	   of	   reparation	   in	   general	   (what	   he	   calls	  
reparations	   in	   plural)	   have	   on	   citizens’	   capacity	   for	   achieving	   a	   healthy	  psychological	   adjustment	   (what	   he	   calls	   reparation	   in	   singular)	   in	   the	  aftermath	   of	   political	   violence.	   These	   reparations	   go	   beyond	   the	   use	   of	  testimony:	  The	   integral	   importance	   of	   reparations,	   remorse,	   restitutions,	   truth	   and	  acknowledgement	  to	  victims	  […]	  I	  have	  found	  that	  participation	  by	  victims	  and	  survivors	   in	   processes	   aimed	   at	   achieving	   such	   elusive	   goals	   as	   truth	   and	  justice	   is	   an	   important	   component	   of	   healing	  —many	   survivors	   want	   to	   feel	  they	   are	   taking	   some	   action,	   even	   if	   they	   know	   it	   will	   not	   deliver	   complete	  justice	   or	   absolute	   truth.	   This	   gives	   survivors	   some	   control	   over	   their	  environment,	   something	  which	   political	   trauma	   normally	   overrides.	   (Hamber	  2010:	  194).	  Each	   of	   these	   acts	   of	   rectification	   serves	   the	   purposes	   of	   retribution,	  
compensation,	   or	   recognition	   for	   the	   victim	   of	   a	   past	   wrong.	   Bringing	  aggressors	  to	  justice	  may	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  retribution.	  Restitutions	  may	  serve	   the	  purpose	  of	   compensation.	  Testimony,	   remorse,	   and	   truth-­‐seeking	  may	  serve	  the	  purpose	  of	  recognition.	  These	  three	  types	  of	  measures	  are	  now	  well	   regarded	   as	   highly	   effective	   on	   victims’	   mental	   health.	   Socio-­‐psychologists	  Brinton	  Lykes	  and	  Marcie	  Mersky	  state:	  There	   is	   a	   general	   sense	   among	   mental	   health	   workers,	   psychosocial	  researchers	  and	  practitioners	  that	  all	  of	  these	  forms,	  including	  those	  that	  focus	  on	   material	   well-­‐being,	   restoration	   of	   legal	   rights	   and	   property,	   judicial	  associations,	   truth-­‐seeking	   processes,	   apologies,	   or	   institutional	   reform,	   can	  have	   important	   effects	   on	   psychosocial	   conditions	   at	   the	   individual	   and	  national	  or	  collective	  levels.	  (Lykes	  &	  Mersky	  2006:	  590-­‐591).	  It	   is	   essential	   to	   stress	   the	  public	  nature	  of	   all	   these	   strategies	  of	  historical	  rectification.	  Hamber	  2006:	  567	  even	  states:	  ‘from	  an	  individual	  perspective,	  
1	  	  	  The	  Normative	  Significance	  of	  Historical	  Injustice	  
	  
	   28	  
reparations	  for	  human	  rights	  violations	  are	  trying	  to	  repair	  the	  irreparable’.	  But	   Hamber	   is	   not	   the	   first	   one	   to	   underscore	   the	   importance	   of	   active	  participation	  of	  society	  for	  the	  process	  of	  psychological	  healing.	  Many	  other	  studies	  now	  suggest	  that	  these	  public	  strategies	  to	  rectify	  historical	  injustice	  tend	   to	   have	   a	   good	   effect	   on	   victims’	   healing	   process	   precisely	   because	  political	   trauma	   itself	   has	   a	   social	   dimension,	   a	   dimension	   that	   is	   usually	  overlooked	   by	   the	   typical	   post-­‐traumatic	   stress	   disorder	   (PTSD)	   clinical	  approach.	  This	  latter	  clinical	  approach	  focuses	  on	  the	  individual,	  diagnosing	  the	  pathology	   and	   then	  proposing	   therapy	   often	  based	  on	   the	  use	   of	   drugs	  and	  cognitive-­‐behavioural	  interventions.	  By	  overlooking	  the	  social	  nature	  of	  political	   trauma,	   this	   type	   of	   therapeutic	   intervention	   fails	   to	   explain	   the	  efficacy	   of	   socially	   oriented	   therapeutic	   models.1	  Ignacio	   Martín-­‐Baró	   —whose	  fieldwork	  took	  place	   in	  El	  Salvador	  during	   its	  entire	  civil	  war	  period	  (1980-­‐1992)—	  summarises	  the	  roots	  of	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  PTSD	  therapeutic	  intervention:	  The	  problem	  is	  rooted	  in	  the	  limited	  conception	  of	  human	  beings	  [of	  the	  PTSD	  clinical	  approach]	  […]	  that	  denies	  their	  existence	  as	  historical	  beings	  whose	  life	  is	   developed	   and	   fulfilled	   in	   a	   complex	   web	   of	   social	   relations	   […]	   To	   put	   it	  more	   plainly,	  mental	   health	   is	   a	   dimension	   of	   the	   relations	   between	   persons	  and	  groups	  more	  than	  an	  individual	  state.	  (Martin-­‐Baró	  1994:	  109-­‐11).	  Martin-­‐Baró’s	   claim	   on	   the	   profoundly	   public	   character	   of	   mental	   health	  elucidates	   the	   public	   nature	   of	   political	   trauma.	   We	   can	   find	   similar	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  Judith	  Herman	  herself	  may	  be	  an	  exception	  to	  this.	   In	   the	  work	  that	   inaugurated	  the	  new	  wave	   in	   psychological	   studies	   on	   political	   trauma,	   post-­‐traumatic	   stress	   disorder,	   and	  recovery,	   she	  already	  notes	  how	   important	   it	   is	   for	  victims	   to	  actively	  engage	   in	   the	  social	  recognition	   of	   the	   harm	   done	   to	   them.	   Herman	   identifies	   three	   basic	   stages	   of	   recovery:	  establishing	   safety	   (Herman	   1992:	   155),	   reconstructing	   the	   trauma	   story	   (Herman	   1992:	  175),	   and	   restoring	   the	   connection	  between	   survivors	   and	   the	   community	   (Herman	  1992:	  196).	  In	  cases	  of	  political	  violence,	  all	  these	  stages	  require	  not	  only	  the	  active	  participation	  of	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conclusions	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  rectifying	  historical	  injustice	  as	  a	  way	  of	  pursuing	  communally	  oriented	  goals	  in	  the	  process	  of	  psychological	  healing	  in	  Backer	  et	  at	  1995,	  Angger	  &	  Jensen	  1996,	  Minow	  2002,	  and	  Lykes	  &	  Mersky	  2006.	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  the	  public	  nature	  of	  political	  trauma	  in	  § 
1.2.	   For	   now,	   we	   only	   need	   to	   note	   the	   general	   tendency	   in	   psychological	  studies	   to	   regard	  methods	   of	   public	   historical	   rectification	   as	   beneficial	   for	  victims’	  mental	  health.	  In	  particular,	  from	  all	  these	  psychological	  studies,	  we	  can	  extract	  the	  following	  basic	  thesis:	  both	  the	  social	  acknowledgement	  of	  the	  terrible	  wrongs	  infringed	  upon	  victims	  as	  well	  as	  victims’	  mere	  participation	  in	   public	   processes	   of	   retribution,	   compensation,	   and	   recognition	   of	   such	  wrongs	  tend	  to	  be	  strongly	  beneficial	  to	  them	  in	  the	  struggle	  for	  achieving	  a	  healthy	  psychological	  adjustment.	  By	   considering	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   rectification	   of	   historical	  injustice	  at	  this	  descriptive	  level,	  there	  are	  sufficient	  reasons	  for	  taking	  some	  public	  provisions	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  an	  unjust	  past	  as	  one	  the	  social	  bases	  of	   citizens’	   self-­‐respect	   that	   the	  State	  must	  supply.	  As	   is	  well	  known,	  Rawls	  (TJ:	   54,	   386)	   refers	   to	   the	   social	   bases	   of	   self-­‐respect	   as	   ‘perhaps	   the	  most	  important	   primary	   good’.	   However,	   various	   authors	   have	   pointed	   out	   that	  Rawls	  seems	  to	  be	  ambiguous	  on	  whether	  self-­‐respect	  is	  a	  psychological	  or	  a	  moral	   attitude	   (see	   Sach	  1981,	  Massey	   1983,	   Thomas	  1983,	   Eyal	   2005,	  PL:	  404n),	  and	  on	  whether	  his	  notion	   is	  closer	   to	  an	  Aristotelian-­‐oriented	  view	  related	   to	   the	   shame	   that	   a	   person	   may	   experience	   by	   failing	   to	   acquire	  excellence	   (as	   Rawls	   TJ:	   386-­‐391	   himself	   notes)	   rather	   than	   to	   a	   Kantian-­‐
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oriented	   view	   related	   to	   persons’	   intrinsic	   worth	   as	   human	   beings	   (see	  Darwall	  1977).	  This	  is	  not	  the	  place	  to	  consider	  at	   length	  such	  a	  notion	  and	  the	   debate	   it	   has	   generated.	   However,	   I	   would	   like	   to	   mention	   that	   an	  effective	   Rawlsian	   notion	   of	   self-­‐respect	   (i.e.,	   one	   that	   links	   the	   capital	  importance	   of	   self-­‐respect	   to	   the	   capacity	   to	   pursue	   a	   plan	   of	   life)	   must	  include	  four	  elements.	  The	   model	   I	   propose	   requires	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   four	   conditions	   in	  order	  to	  display	  self-­‐respect.	  The	  first	  one,	  call	  it	  the	  psychological	  condition,	  states	   that	   the	   person	   must	   have	   a	   healthy	   self-­‐esteem;	   that	   is,	   a	   positive	  evaluation	  of	  herself	  (see	  Constant	  &	  Foxx	  2003).	  The	  second	  one,	  call	  it	  the	  
Kantian	  condition,	  states	  that	  the	  person	  must	  value	  her	  status	  of	  equal	  worth	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   agents	   (see	   Hill	   1973,	   Darwall	   1977,	   and	  Meyers	   1989).	   The	   third	   one,	   call	   it	   the	  Rawlsian	   condition,	   states	   that	   the	  person	  must	   try	   to	   realise	   the	   system	  of	   ends	   that	   she	  adopts	   (see	  TJ:	   386,	  Hill	  1985,	  and	  Raz	  1986:	  426).	  Finally,	  the	  fourth	  one,	  call	  it	  the	  Aristotelian	  
condition,	   states	   that	   the	   person	   must	   demand	   that	   both	   her	   status	   as	   an	  agent	  with	  equal	  worth,	  as	  well	  as	  her	  own	  plan	  of	  life,	  are	  not	  devaluated	  by	  others	  (see	  Boxill	  1976,	  Thomas	  1983,	  Moody-­‐Adams	  1992,	  and	  JF:	  85).	  These	   conditions	   relate,	   respectively,	   to	   self-­‐esteem,	   moral	   status,	  personal	   aspirations,	   and	   moral	   character.	   Because	   of	   this,	   none	   of	   them	  ensure	  that	  a	  person	  shows	  respect	  for	  herself	  when	  taken	  separately.	  This	  is	  manifest	  when	  we	  analyse	  the	  relation	  of	  self-­‐respect	  with	  a	  person’s	  system	  of	  ends.	  	  
1	  	  	  The	  Normative	  Significance	  of	  Historical	  Injustice	  
	  
	   31	  
The	  psychological	  condition	  states	  that	  the	  person	  must	  ascribe	  value	  to	  the	  plan	  of	  life	  that	  she	  adopts.	  For	  only	  when	  a	  person	  finds	  value	  in	  such	  a	  plan	  can	  she	  have	  a	  positive	  evaluation	  of	  herself.	  Conversely,	  a	  person	  who	  thinks	  that	  the	  ends	  she	  pursues	  are	  trivial	  might	  feel	  that	  her	  life	  as	  a	  whole	  has	   no	   real	   importance.	   This	   feeling	   can	   be	   exacerbated	   by	   the	   repeated	  experience	  of	   shame	  and	   failure	   in	   achieving	  previous	  and	  now	  abandoned	  key	  ends.	  Hill’s	  famous	  self-­‐deprecator	  case	  exemplifies	  this	  (see	  Hill	  1973:	  88	  and	  Dillon	  1992:	  126-­‐127).	  	  The	  fulfilment	  of	   the	  psychological	  condition	  would	  prevent	  this	   from	  happening.	   However,	   since	   an	   agent	   can	   endorse	   a	   plan	   of	   life	   highly	  damaging	   for	   herself,	   having	   a	   positive	   evaluation	   of	   such	   a	   plan	   is	   not	  sufficient	   for	   displaying	   self-­‐respect.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   of	   ways	   of	   living	   in	  which	   a	   person	   positively	   endorses	   systematic	   humiliation	   (for	   instance,	   a	  beggar	  who	  walks	  around	  the	  street	  targeting	  persons	  and	  then	  strategically	  focuses	  on	  her	  multiple	  misfortunes	  up	   to	   the	  point	  of	   sincere	  crying	  every	  time	   she	   asks	   for	   money).	   Such	   a	   life	   style	   is	   based	   on	   the	   systematic	  undermining	   of	   self-­‐respect,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   agents	   can	   positively	  endorse	  it	  in	  some	  circumstances.	  Here	   the	  Kantian	  condition	   complements	   the	  psychological	  condition,	  since	   it	  prescribes	   that	   the	  person	  must	   refrain	   from	   following	  plans	  of	   life	  that	   diminish	  her	   equal	  moral	  worth.	  However,	   since	   the	  Kantian	  condition	  only	   highlights	   a	   negative	   aspect	   in	   the	   election	   of	   plans	   (by	   stating	  which	  plans	  should	  not	  be	  endorsed),	  there	  is	  still	  the	  possibility	  that	  even	  when	  the	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person	  positively	  endorses	  a	  plan	  of	  life	  which	  respects	  her	  equal	  worth,	  she	  does	  nothing	  to	  achieve	  it.	  Hill’s	   famous	  deferential	  wife	  case	  (see	  Hill	  1973:	  88)	  is	  an	  illustration	  of	  this.	  In	  this	  case,	  despite	  the	  tremendous	  importance	  that	  the	  person	  ascribes	  to	  her	  ends,	  she	  simply	  feels	  incapable	  of	  achieving	  them.	   Because	   of	   this	   putative	   incapacity,	   the	   deferential	   wife	   ends	   up	  believing	  that	  she	  should	  sacrifice	  all	  of	  her	  ends	  in	  support	  of	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  her	  husband’s	  ends.	  Here	   the	  Rawlsian	   condition	   complements	   the	   previous	   two,	   since	   it	  highlights	   a	  positive	   aspect	   in	   the	   election	  of	   plans:	   the	  person	  must	   try	   to	  achieve	  the	  plans	  she	  adopts.	  However,	  as	  in	  the	  former	  cases,	  even	  when	  the	  
Rawlsian	  condition	  is	  taken	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  previous	  two,	  there	  is	  still	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  person	  displaying	  a	  deficit	  in	  self-­‐respect.	  For,	  even	  when	  she	  adopts	  a	  plan	  of	   life	  to	  which	  she	  ascribes	  value	  that	  respects	  her	  equal	  moral	  worth,	  and	  when	  she	   tries	   to	  achieve	   such	  a	  plan,	   it	  may	  be	   that	   she	  cannot	  effectively	  do	  so	  because	  of	   the	   interference	  of	  external	   factors	  such	  as	   the	   direct	   action	   of	   other	   agents	   or	   through	   the	  mediation	   of	   the	   State.	  Here	   the	  Aristotelian	  condition	   complements	   the	  previous	  ones,	   for	   it	   states	  that	  the	  person	  must	  demand	  of	  others	  respect	  for	  her	  plan	  of	  life.	  Note	   three	   things	  on	   the	  account	  of	   self-­‐respect	   just	  proposed.	   First,	  that	   the	   account	   is	   descriptive:	   it	   tells	   when	   a	   person	   shows	   respect	   for	  herself	   and	   not	   that	   a	   person	   ought	   to	   respect	   herself	   or	   that	   she	   is	   to	   be	  
blamed	  for	  not	  displaying	  self-­‐respect	  (see	  Dillon	  1992:	  125).	  Second,	  while	  I	  do	   believe	   that	   each	   of	   the	   four	   conditions	   is	   necessary	   for	   displaying	   self-­‐
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respect,	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  they	  are	  jointly	  sufficient.	  Thus,	  the	  account	  leaves	  it	  open	  as	  to	  whether	  a	  person	  who	  disrespects	  others	  shows	  thereby	  a	  lack	  of	  self-­‐respect	  (see	  Buss	  1999:	  540).	  Third,	  the	  account	  also	  leaves	  it	  open	  as	  to	   whether	   only	   a	   person	   that	   respects	   herself	   can	   respect	   others	   (see	  Verdeja	  2006:	  118).	  One	   thing	   that	   is	   quite	   clear	   in	   Rawls’s	   notion	   of	   self-­‐respect	   is	   its	  relation	   to	   the	   effective	   pursuit	   of	   a	   plan	   of	   life	   —see	   (TJ:	   386).	   By	  complementing	  such	  a	  notion	  with	   the	  conditions	   that	   I	  have	  described,	  we	  can	  see	  why	  the	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐respect	  are	  the	  most	  important	  primary	  good.	  For	  instance,	  when	  the	  State	  offers	  provisions	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  a	  past	  shaped	  by	  political	  violence,	  it	  is	  thereby	  helping	  victims	  to	  achieve	  self-­‐respect	   in	   each	   of	   these	   four	   levels:	   self-­‐esteem,	   moral	   status,	   personal	  aspirations,	  and	  moral	  character.	  	  However,	  as	  Rawls	  (JF:	  60n)	  himself	  does,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	   primary	   good	   in	   question	   is	   the	   social	   bases	   for	   achieving	   self-­‐respect,	  rather	  than	  self-­‐respect	   itself.	  The	  rationale	   for	  this	   is	   twofold.	  First,	  as	   it	   is	  well	   known,	   the	   metric	   of	   primary	   goods	   must	   provide	   a	   public	   basis	   of	  interpersonal	   comparisons	   —see	   (PL:	   178-­‐187)—	   and	   only	   the	   objective	  
means	   to	  achieve	   self-­‐respect	   can	  have	   this	   characteristic.	   Second,	   although	  the	   State	   can	   provide	   the	   necessary	   means	   for	   citizens	   to	   being	   able	   to	  achieve	  self-­‐respect,	  it	  cannot	  guarantee	  that	  every	  single	  citizen	  will	  respect	  herself.	  This	  is	  particularly	  clear	  with	  the	  social	  basis	  I	  am	  proposing:	  even	  if	  the	   State	  was	   to	   engage	   in	   the	   rectification	   of	   past	  wrongs,	   that	  would	   not	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guarantee	   a	   full	   recovery	   of	   their	   victims	   (see	   Minow	   2002	   and	   Hamber	  2006).	  	   The	  fact	  that	  Rawls	  does	  not	  regard	  rectification	  of	  historical	  injustice	  as	   a	   key	   element	   for	   achieving	   self-­‐respect	   highlights	   a	   limitation	   in	   his	  conception	  of	  the	  person:	  that	  such	  a	  conception	  is	  mainly	  forward-­‐looking	  in	  character.	  Very	  few	  Rawlsian	  passages	  relate	  to	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  past	  in	  persons’	   life.	   Consider,	   for	   instance,	   what	   Rawls	   claims	   in	   the	   context	   of	  explaining	  why	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  ‘social	  union	  of	  social	  unions’	  (TJ:	  462)	  —that	  is,	  as	  an	  institutional	  arrangement	  in	  which	  the	  good	  related	  to	  the	  sociability	  of	  humankind	  is	  realised:	  To	  say	  that	  man	  is	  a	  historical	  human	  being	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  realizations	  of	  the	  powers	  of	  human	  individuals	  living	  at	  any	  given	  time	  takes	  the	  cooperation	  of	  many	  generations	  (or	  even	  societies)	  over	  a	  long	  period	  of	  time.	  It	  also	  implies	  that	  this	  cooperation	  is	  guided	  at	  any	  moment	  by	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  has	  been	  done	  in	  the	  past	  as	  it	  is	  interpreted	  by	  social	  tradition.	  (TJ:	  460)	  While	   this	   passage	   explicitly	   emphasises	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   past	   for	   a	  person’s	   life,	   it	   does	   so	   more	   in	   the	   way	   of	   showing	   how	   every	   human	  endeavour	  is	  historically	  placed	  and	  thus	  dependant	  on	  the	  social	  tradition	  to	  which	  each	  person	  belongs.	   It	   is	  rare	  to	   find	  more	  specific	  claims	  regarding	  the	  importance	  that	  the	  particular	  and	  individual	  past	  of	  a	  given	  person	  holds	  for	  herself.	  Concerned	  with	  persons’	  capacity	  to	  effectively	  achieve	  a	  plan	  of	  life,	  for	  the	  most	  part,	  Rawls’s	  conception	  of	  the	  person	  has	  a	  strong	  forward-­‐looking	  orientation.	  	  However,	   the	   evidence	   against	   the	   plausibility	   of	   adopting	   such	   an	  exclusive	  orientation	  is	  abundant.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  individual	  past	  in	  a	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person’s	  life	  is	  also	  well	  documented	  beyond	  the	  literature	  on	  recovery	  from	  political	   trauma.	   For	   instance,	   numerous	   psychological	   studies	   —ranging	  from	   empirical	   psychology	   (see	   Neimeyer	   &	   Metzler	   1994)	   to	   cognitive	  psychology	   (see	   Neisser	   1994	   and	   Conway	   &	   Pleydell-­‐Pearce	   2000)	   to	  neuroscience	  (see	  McGaught	  2003,	  Fivush	  &	  Nelson	  2004,	  Svobova,	  E.	  et	  al.	  2006)—	   emphasise	   the	   mechanisms	   of	   autobiographical	   memory	   (i.e.	  recollection	  of	  personal	  past	  events)	  in	  a	  person’s	  self-­‐understanding.	  Neuroscientist	   James	   McGaught	   says	   in	   the	   opening	   passages	   of	   his	  most	  recent	  book:	  ‘All	  of	  our	  knowledge	  of	  the	  world,	  and	  our	  skills	  in	  living	  in	  it,	  are	  based	  on	  memories	  of	  our	  experiences.	  So,	  too,	  are	  all	  of	  our	  plans	  and	   dreams.	   Life	  without	  memory	   is	   difficult	   to	   imagine	   […]	   A	   life	  without	  memory	  would	   be	   no	   life	   at	   all’	   (McGaught	   2003:	   ix).	  McGaught’s	   remarks	  here	  may	  seem	  even	  platitudinous.	  This	   stresses	  how	  we	   tend	   to	   regard	  as	  completely	  inaccurate	  a	  forward-­‐looking	  conception	  of	  the	  person;	  for,	  as	  he	  says,	   ‘memory	   is	   the	   “glue”	   of	   our	   existence’	   (McGaught	   2003:	   2).	   In	   this	  sense,	   some	   experimental	   work	   on	   autobiographical	   memory	   shows	   the	  intricate	   relationship	   between	   personal	   identity	   (characterised	   as	   self-­‐appreciation)	   and	   memory,	   illustrating	   that,	   as	   Neimeyer	   &	   Metzler	   1994:	  105	   hold,	   ‘our	   identities	   and	   memories	   are	   two	   sides	   of	   the	   same	   coin’.	  Conway	  &	  Pleydell-­‐Pearce	  state:	  Autobiographical	   memory	   is	   of	   fundamental	   significance	   for	   the	   self,	   for	  emotions,	   and	   for	   the	   experience	   of	   personhood,	   that	   is,	   the	   experience	   of	  enduring	   as	   an	   individual,	   in	   a	   culture	   over	   time.	   (Conway	  &	   Pleydell-­‐Pearce	  2000:	  261)	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The	   processes	   of	   self-­‐identification	   and	   autobiographical	   memory	   are	   also	  developmental.	  Some	  developmental	  psychologists	  even	  think	  that	  the	   links	  between	   self-­‐identification	   and	   autobiographical	  memory	   go	   as	   far	   back	   as	  the	   preschool	   years	   (see	   Fivush	   &	   Nelson	   2004:	   486-­‐487).	   From	   all	   this	  psychological	   work	   we	   can	   extract	   the	   following	   basic	   thesis:	   without	  bringing	   recollections	   of	   our	  past	   into	   a	   somewhat	  particular	   and	   coherent	  form,	  we	  would	  simply	  not	  see	  ourselves	  as	  we	  do.	  In	  other	  words,	  our	  self-­‐understanding	  at	  any	  given	  time	  has	  a	  strong	  backward-­‐looking	  component.	  The	  work	   of	   some	  philosophers	   also	   adds	   to	   the	   case	   against	   Rawls’s	  forward-­‐looking	   conception	   of	   the	   person.	   Christine	   Korsgaard	   (see	  Korsgaard	   1996a:	   363-­‐398),	   for	   instance,	   points	   at	   two	   presuppositions	   of	  effective	  agency:	  in	  order	  to	  elect	  any	  given	  course	  of	  action,	  the	  agent	  must	  think	  of	  herself	  both	  as	  a	  synchronic	  unity	  (at	  a	  given	  time)	  and	  a	  diachronic	  
unity	  (over	  time)	  of	  concern.	  Regarding	  the	  former,	  the	  agent	  must	  suppose	  that	   at	   the	   time	  of	   an	   election	   she	   is	   one	   single	   unity	  who	   can	  bring	   about	  choices	   and	   actions	   that	   may	   be	   beneficial	   or	   prejudicial	   to	   such	   a	   unity.	  Regarding	  the	  latter,	  Korsgaard	  says:	  [M]ost	  of	  the	  things	  we	  do	  that	  matter	  to	  us	  take	  up	  time.	  Some	  of	  the	  things	  we	  do	  are	  intelligible	  only	  in	  the	  context	  of	  projects	  that	  extend	  over	  long	  periods.	  This	   is	   especially	   true	   of	   the	   pursuit	   of	   our	   ultimate	   ends.	   In	   choosing	   our	  careers,	  and	  pursuing	  our	  friendships	  and	  family	  lives,	  we	  both	  presuppose	  and	  construct	  a	  continuity	  of	  identity	  and	  of	  agency.	  (Korsgaard	  1996a:	  371)2	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  Many	   other	   authors	   have	   defended	   the	   diachronic	   character	   of	   agency.	   Harry	   Frankfurt	  1999:	   139	   holds:	   ‘there	   is,	   I	   believe,	   a	   quite	   primitive	   human	   need	   to	   establish	   and	   to	  maintain	  volitional	  unity.	  Any	  threat	  to	  that	  unity	  —that	  is,	  any	  treat	  to	  the	  cohesion	  of	  the	  self—	   tends	   to	   alarm	   a	   person,	   and	   to	  mobilize	   him	   for	   an	   attempt	   to	   “self-­‐preservation”’.	  Charles	  Taylor	  1989:	  52	  states	  that	  unity	  over	  time	  ‘is	  an	  inescapable	  structural	  requirement	  of	  agency’.	  John	  Campbell	  1994:	  190	  holds	  that	  temporal	  ‘identity	  is	  central	  to	  what	  we	  care	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These	   remarks	   about	   the	   diachronic	   unity	   of	   agency	   take	   place	   in	   a	  discussion	  with	  Derek	  Parfit	  on	  the	  implications	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  personal	  identity	  may	  have	  for	  rational	  and	  moral	  choices	  —see	  Parfit	  1984:	  307-­‐345.	  This	   may	   explain	   why	   Korsgaard	   only	   points	   at	   the	   forward-­‐looking	  component	  of	   such	  a	  diachronic	  unity:	   in	  order	   to	  make	  choices	  and,	  at	   the	  limit,	  to	  elect	  a	  Rawlsian	  plan	  of	  life,	  an	  agent	  must	  suppose	  that	  she	  will	  be	  the	   same	   person	   as	   the	   one	   who	   in	   the	   future	   will	   enjoy	   such	   a	   plan.	  However,	  there	  is	  also	  a	  clear	  backward-­‐looking	  component	  of	  the	  diachronic	  unity	   of	   agency:	   for	   the	  agent’s	  past	   life	   is	   the	  basis	  of	  all	  of	  her	  elections.	   In	  order	  to	  elect	  a	  plan	  of	   life,	   the	  agent	  must	   take	   into	  account	  the	  aspiration	  she	   has	   previously	   formed	   for	   herself,	   and	   more	   generally,	   her	   past	  experiences,	  decisions,	  attachments,	  commitments,	  etc.	  There	  is	  no	  other	  way	  of	  electing	  one	  plan	  of	  life	  over	  others.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  even	  when	  the	  agent	  wants	  to	  undergo	  a	  radical	  personal	  transformation	  by	  committing	  herself	  to	  a	  completely	  renewed	  plan	  of	   life.	  We	  think	  that	  such	  a	  new	  plan	  of	   life	  is	  a	  
radical	  transformation	  precisely	  because	  of	  a	   comparison	  with	   the	  previous	  personal	  path.	  The	   backward-­‐looking	   components	   of	   self-­‐understanding	   —on	   the	  one	  hand—	  and	  of	  agency	  —on	  the	  other—	  highlight	  an	  important	  deficit	  in	  Rawls’s	   forward-­‐looking	   conception	   of	   the	   person.	   Moreover,	   as	   we	   have	  seen,	   the	   relation	   of	   the	   backward-­‐looking	   component	   of	   agency	   to	   self-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  about:	  one	  thing	  I	  care	  about	  is	  what	  I	  have	  made	  of	  my	  life’.	  Alasdair	  MacIntyre	  1981:	  203	  states	  that,	  ‘the	  unity	  of	  an	  individual	  life	  is	  the	  unity	  of	  a	  narrative	  embodied	  in	  a	  single	  life.	  To	   ask	   “What	   is	   good	   for	   me”	   is	   to	   ask	   how	   best	   I	   live	   out	   that	   unity	   and	   bring	   it	   to	  completion.’	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respect	   is	  patent.	   For	   a	  past	  marked	  by	  extreme	  abuse	  and	  unfairness	  may	  have	  severe	  effects	  on	  the	  capacity	  to	  successfully	  achieve	  a	  plan	  of	  life.	  As	  we	  saw,	   such	   a	   past	  may	   strongly	   diminish	   agents’	   present	   self-­‐esteem,	  moral	  status,	  personal	  aspirations,	  and	  moral	  character.3	  Notice,	  however,	   that	  I	  am	  not	  claiming	  that	  there	   is	  no	  single	  victim	  who	  may	  achieve	  a	  healthy	  psychological	  adjustment	  and	   live	  a	  meaningful	  and	  cooperative	  life	  in	  society	  without	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  past.	  This	  is	  already	   documented	   in	   Hamber	   2006:	   568:	   ‘Degrees	   of	   dealing	   with	   the	  consequences	   of	   extreme	   political	   violence	   and	   trauma	   are	   possible.	   Many	  victims	  are	   indeed	   survivors	  and	  highly	   resilient’.	  An	   incredible	  example	   in	  this	   regard	   is	   that	   of	   the	   current	   president	   of	   Uruguay,	   José	   Mujica,	   who	  during	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  spent	  a	  total	  of	  fourteen	  years	  in	  prison,	  eleven	  of	   them	  in	  constant	   torture	  and	  strict	  seclusion	  as	  one	  of	   the	  chief	  guerrilla	  ‘hostages’	   of	   the	  military	   junta	   that	   governed	  Uruguay	   from	   1973	   to	   1985.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  I	   have	  defended	   that	   both	  psychology	   and	  moral	   philosophy	   grant	   the	   importance	   of	   the	  past	  in	  a	  person’s	  self-­‐understanding	  and	  agency.	  Galen	  Strawson	  attacks	  a	  characterisation	  of	   both	   claims	   (see	   Strawson	   2004).	   Although	   I	   cannot	   develop	   this	   in	   depth	   here,	   I	   find	  Strawson’s	  attacks	   implausible.	  There	  seem	  to	  be	   two	  main	  motivations	  behind	  Strawson’s	  critiques.	  First,	   that	   it	   is	  not	  a	  metaphysical	   indisputable	   truth	   that	  persons	  are	  diachronic	  units	  of	  concern	  (see	  Strawson	  2004;	  428).	  Second,	  that	  there	  are	  good	  ways	  to	  live	  in	  which	  not	   much	   weigh	   is	   assigned	   to	   the	   past	   (see	   Strawson	   2004:	   429).	   My	   remarks	   on	   the	  diachronic	   unity	   of	   self-­‐understanding	   and	   agency	   are	   compatible	   with	   these	   two	   claims.	  While	  I	  will	  take	  issue	  with	  the	  former	  in	  §	  2.3,	  I	  will	  concede	  the	  latter	  by	  mentioning	  cases	  of	  highly	  resilient	  people	  that	  in	  fact	  seem	  to	  enjoy	  living	  a	  forward-­‐looking	  life.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Strawson	  does	  not	  consider	   that	  psychological	   facts	   tend	  to	  work	  as	  human	  regularities	  or	  tendencies,	   not	   as	   necessary	   phenomena	   experienced	   by	   every	   single	   human	   being	   (see	  Baldwin	  2008).	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  somewhat	  surprising	  that	  Strawson	  does	  not	  mention	  one	  single	  psychological	  study	  on	  autobiographical	  memory,	  despite	  the	   fact	   that	  one	  of	  his	   two	  main	  targets	   is	   a	   thesis	   held	   by	   researchers	   in	   that	   area	   of	   psychology.	   The	   two	   putative	  motivations	   of	   Strawson’s	   critiques	   are	   explicitly	   addressed	   by	  Neimeyer	  &	  Metzler	   1994.	  These	  authors	  note	  correlation	  patterns	  between	  different	  personal	  characters	  and	  different	  forms	   of	   personal	   recollection:	   just	   as	   Strawson	   is	   so	   eager	   to	   prove,	   some	   people	  whose	  identity	   is	   less	   steady	   at	   a	   given	   time	   tend	   to	   be	   much	   more	   flexible	   regarding	   the	  understanding	  and	   significance	  of	   certain	   facts	   about	   their	  past	  —see	  Neimeyer	  &	  Metzler	  1994:	  128.	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Despite	   this	   past	   shaped	   by	   extreme	   brutality,	   Mujica	  managed	   to	   become	  president	  of	  his	  country	  about	  twenty	  years	   later	  and	  has	  repeatedly	  stated	  that	   it	   is	   not	   his	   personal	   goal	   to	   open	   processes	   of	   retribution,	  compensation,	  and	  recognition	  for	  such	  and	  similar	  past	  injustices.4	  	  I	  will	  come	  back	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Uruguay	  and	  Mujica	  in	  §	  3.1.	  For	  now,	  my	   claim	   is	   simply	   that	   even	   when	   some	   victims	   can	   achieve	   a	   forward-­‐looking	   life	   like	  Mujica’s,	   a	   theory	   of	   liberal	   justice	   cannot	   ask	   (due	   to	   the	  evidence	  reported	  here)	  of	  all	  victims	  to	  live	  their	  lives	  in	  a	  strictly	  forward-­‐looking	   way.	   In	   this	   sense,	   my	   argument	   is	   very	   similar	   to	   one	   analogical	  argument	  offered	  by	  Will	  Kymlicka	  for	  taking	  as	  a	  primary	  good	  the	  access	  to	  the	  liberally	  compatible	  ways	  of	  life	  available	  in	  one’s	  culture:	  Liberals	   rightly	   assume	   that	   the	   desire	   for	   nonsubsistence	   resources	   is	   so	  normal	  —and	  the	  cost	  of	  forgoing	  them	  so	  high	  for	  most	  people’s	  way	  of	  life—	  that	  people	  cannot	  reasonably	  be	  expected	  to	  go	  without	  such	  resources,	  even	  if	  a	   few	   people	   voluntary	   choose	   to	   do	   so	   […]	   Similarly,	   I	   believe	   that,	   in	  developing	   a	   theory	   of	   justice,	   we	   should	   treat	   access	   to	   one’s	   culture	   as	  something	  that	  people	  can	  be	  expected	  to	  want,	  whatever	  their	  more	  particular	  conception	   of	   the	   good.	   Leaving	   one’s	   culture,	  while	   possible,	   is	   best	   seen	   as	  renouncing	  something	  to	  which	  one	  is	  reasonably	  entitled.	  (Kymlicka	  1995:	  86.	  Italics	  in	  the	  original)	  Just	   as	   Kymlicka	   claims	   that	   the	   cost	   of	   adapting	   to	   a	   different	   context	   of	  choice	  cannot	  be	   imposed	  over	  citizens	  of	  minority	  cultures,	   so	   I	   think	   that	  the	  cost	  of	  trying	  to	  live	  a	  forward-­‐looking	  life	  cannot	  be	  imposed	  on	  citizens	  that	  were	  victim	  of	  past	  injustice.5	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Mujica	  recently	  said	  in	  an	  interview:	  ‘As	  a	  person,	  I	  do	  not	  like	  to	  live	  looking	  back,	  because	  life	  is	  always	  to	  come	  and	  every	  day	  dawns.	  But	  that	  is	  the	  way	  I	  am.	  I	  cannot	  impose	  that	  on	  my	  co-­‐citizens’.	  See	  “Entrevista	  a	  José	  Mujica”,	  El	  País	  17/04/2011.	  (Translation	  mine)	  5	  The	  pertinence	   of	   this	   analogical	   claim	  does	  not	   depend	  on	  whether	  Kymlicka	   is	   right	   in	  thinking	  that	  the	  access	  to	  the	  liberally	  compatible	  ways	  of	  life	  of	  one’s	  culture	  should	  count	  as	   a	   primary	   good.	   I	   bring	   this	   passage	   to	   attention	   because	   of	   the	   structural	   similarity	   of	  Kymlicka’s	  claim	  and	  mine.	  For	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis	  it	  is	  irrelevant	  whether	  Kymlicka’s	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1.2	  Restoring	  Mutual	  Respect	  and	  Recent-­‐Past	  Rectification	  Liberal	  societies	  observe	  a	  social	  regularity:	  they	  tend	  to	  eventually	  engage	  in	  processes	   of	   recent-­‐past	   rectification.	   Almost	   all	   contemporary	   transitional	  liberal	   societies	  embark	  on	  processes	  aiming	  at	   coming	   to	   terms	  with	   their	  recent	  unjust	  past.	  	  José	   Zalaquett	   —ex-­‐president	   of	   the	   Inter-­‐American	   Commission	   of	  Human	  Rights,	  of	  Amnesty	  International,	  and	  a	  member	  of	  the	  Chilean	  Truth	  and	   Reconciliation	   National	   Commission	   in	   1990—,	   has	   detailed	   over	   the	  years	  how,	  ever	  since	  the	  reestablishment	  of	  civil	  government	  in	  Argentina	  in	  1983,	   the	   world	   has	   seen	   a	   wave	   of	   truth	   and	   reconciliation	   commissions	  dealing	  with	  past	   injustices	  on	  all	   continents.	  Truth	   commissions	  or	   similar	  institutional	   bodies	   have	   been	   formed	   in	   Bolivia,	   Brazil,	   Chile,	   East	   Timor,	  Ecuador,	   El	   Salvador,	   Fiji,	   Ghana,	   Greece,	   Guatemala,	   Haiti,	   Liberia,	  Mexico,	  Morocco,	   Panama,	   Peru,	   The	   Philippines,	   Sierra	   Leone,	   Solomon	   Islands,	  South	  Africa,	  South	  Korea,	  Sri	  Lanka,	  and	  Uganda	  (see	  Zalaquett	  1998,	  1999,	  and	  Grandin	  &	  Miller	  2007).	  Of	  course,	   it	  would	  be	  a	  mistake	  to	   think	  that	   this	  regularity	   in	   liberal	  societies	   has	   so	   far	   ensured	   retribution,	   compensation,	   and	   recognition	   for	  victims.	  Rather,	  the	  work	  of	  truth	  commissions	  and	  similar	  bodies	  around	  the	  world	   appears	   as	   an	   unfinished	   business	   in	   the	   great	  majority	   of	   cases.	   To	  begin	  with,	  most	  of	   these	  commissions	  have	  strict	   limits	   in	   their	   capacities.	  They	   tend	   to	   lack	   the	   judicial	   capacity	   to	   prosecute	   and	   convict	   past	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  claim	  on	  access	  to	  culture	  as	  a	  primary	  good	  is	  incorrect	  or	  incorrect.	  I	  will	  say	  more	  about	  the	  stated	  structural	  similarity	  at	  the	  very	  end	  of	  §	  2.1.	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aggressors.	  Moreover,	  when	  they	  do	  have	  this	  capacity,	  or	  when	  independent	  judicial	   procedures	   are	   undertaken,	   the	   results	   tend	   to	   be	   highly	  questionable	  (see	  Elster	  2004:	  47-­‐66).	  	  Sometimes	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  these	  poor	  results	  are	  in	  part	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	   retributive	   and	   recognition-­‐driven	   measures	   clash	   with	   each.	   It	   is	   not	  uncommon	  to	  find	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  transitional	   justice	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  aims	   of	   retributive	   justice	   and	   truth	   grow	   apart	   (see	   Van	   Zyl	   1999,	   Elster	  2004:	   116,	   Lutz	   2007:	   326,	   Smyth	   2007:	   6-­‐21,	   Roper	   and	   Barria	   2009).	  Scholar	  Marie	  Breen	  Smyth	  states:	  Whilst	  the	  provisions	  of	  amnesty	  may	  be	  a	  valuable	  incentive	  to	  perpetrators	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  truth	  recovery	  process,	  the	  provision	  of	  amnesty	  precludes	  the	  achievement	   of	   justice	   for	   victims	   […]	  Victims	   in	   general	   are	   seemingly	   faced	  with	  a	  choice	  between	  more	  information	  or	  ‘truth’	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  justice	  on	  the	  other.	  (Smyth	  2007:	  13)	  The	   putative	   conflict	   between	   justice	   and	   truth	   is	   often	   overstated	   and	  misplaced.	   We	   should	   not	   think	   that	   the	   focus	   on	   truth	   of	   rectificatory	  institutional	  bodies	  is	  solely	  based	  on	  aggressors’	  political	  hopes	  for	  a	  lack	  of	  real	   accountability.	   For	   the	   importance	   of	   truth-­‐seeking	   relates	   to	   the	  acknowledgment	   of	   past	   wrongs	   as	   such	   and	   thus	   to	   the	   recognition	   that	  terrible	   things	   were	   perpetrated	   directly	   on	   victims.	   We	   should	   thus	   note	  that	   in	   past	   injustice	   rectification,	   that	   is,	   in	   doing	   justice	   to	   victims,	  recognition	  is	  just	  as	  important	  as	  retribution.6	  Likewise,	  another	  frequent	  way	  of	  understanding	  the	  work	  of	  recent-­‐past	   rectification	  programs	   is	   through	  distinguishing	  between	  material	   and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  The	  conflict	  between	  retribution	  and	  recognition-­‐driven	  measures	  will	  be	  the	  focus	  of	  § 3.3.	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symbolic	  forms	  of	  reparation	  (see	  Elster	  2004:	  329,	  de	  Grieff	  2006:	  467-­‐471,	  Lira	   2006:	   65-­‐66,	   Verdeja	   2006:	   123).	   Whereas	   compensatory	   schemes	  providing	  direct	   economic	   remuneration	   to	   victims	  of	  past	  wrongdoing	   are	  usually	   listed	   as	   the	   most	   clear	   forms	   of	   material	   reparation,	   truth	   telling	  mechanisms	   and	   public	   apologies	   are	   listed	   as	   some	   of	   the	   most	   common	  forms	   of	   symbolic	   reparation.	   Yet	   two	   reasons	   show	   how	   this	   is	   another	  mistake	  in	  the	  literature	  on	  transitional	  justice.	  First,	   as	   Margaret	   Walker	   2010:	   530	   has	   defended,	   all	   acts	   of	  rectification	   are	   symbolic.	   When	   one	   has	   been	   tortured	   and	   imprisoned	  because	  of	  one’s	  political	  beliefs,	  as	  was	  the	  case	  for	  thousands	  of	  citizens	  in	  Argentina	  during	  the	  military	  rule	  of	  1976-­‐1983	  (see	  Guembe	  2006:	  25-­‐47),	  economic	   compensation	   is	   nothing	   more	   than	   a	   symbolic	   and	   extremely	  limited	  measure	  of	  institutional	  acknowledgment	  of	  wrong.	  	  Second,	   the	   stated	   division	   suggests	   that	   economic	   compensation	  constitutes	  the	  only	  tangible	  way	  of	  rectifying	  past	  political	  violence,	  as	  if	  the	  public	  acknowledgment	  of	  wrongdoing	  were	  an	  intangible,	  immaterial,	  fake,	  way	  of	  rectification.	  However,	  this	  characterisation	  conflicts	  with	  the	  way	  in	  which	   several	   victims	   respond	   to	   economic	   compensation	   for	   past	   political	  violence.	  Victims	  sometimes	  perceive	  that	  this	  rectificatory	  measure	  is	  a	  form	  of	   ‘blood	   money’;	   that	   is,	   a	   way	   of	   silencing	   their	   claims	   for	   justice	   in	  exchange	   for	   economic	   advantage.	   In	   fact,	   this	   is	   the	   case	   of	  many	   Chilean	  citizens	   who,	   after	   losing	   their	   relatives	   in	   illegal	   detentions	   and	   forced	  disappearances	   under	   Chile’s	   brutal	   military	   rule	   of	   1973-­‐1990,	   qualify	   as	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being	   the	  beneficiaries	   of	   a	   life-­‐long	  monthly	  pension.	  While	   some	  of	   these	  citizens	  refuse	  to	  accept	  the	  pensions	  (see	  Elster	  2004:	  166n,	  Lira	  2006:	  93),	  many	  of	   them	  now	  forcefully	  complaining	  about	   the	  government’s	  proposal	  to	  stop	  referring	  to	  Augusto	  Pinochet’s	  regime	  as	  a	  ‘Dictatorship’	  in	  primary-­‐school	   textbooks. 7 	  So,	   again,	   we	   should	   note	   that	   in	   past	   injustice	  rectification,	   that	   is,	   in	   doing	   justice	   to	   victims,	   recognition	   is	   just	   as	  important	  as	  compensation.	  But	  regardless	  of	  the	  stated	  problems	  in	  most	  processes	  of	  recent-­‐past	  rectification	   —which	   include	   questionable	   or	   insufficient	   retribution,	  
compensation	   or	   recognition-­‐driven	   measures—,	   it	   is	   a	   well-­‐documented	  social	   regularity	   that	   most	   liberal	   societies	   eventually	   undertake	   such	  processes.	  	  In	   this	   sense,	   recent-­‐past	   rectification,	   when	   successful,	   serves	   very	  important	  normative	  goals.	  Aside	  from	  the	  more	  personal	  benefits	  reported	  in	  § 1.1,	  processes	  aimed	  at	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  a	  recent	  unjust	  past	  also	  accomplish	   important	   public	   goals.	   This	   is	   linked	   to	   the	   public	   nature	   of	  political	   violence.	   Lykes	   and	  Mersky	   2006:	   591-­‐592	   hold	   that:	   ‘repair	   from	  political	   violence	  must	  be	  distinguished	   from	  repair	   from	   the	  psychological	  distresses	   caused	   by	   severe	   natural	   disasters	   or	   even	   as	   the	   result	   of	   an	  individual	  criminal	  action.	  The	  former	  has	  a	  singular	  moral	  dimension’.	  The	  singular	  moral	  dimension	  of	  repair	  from	  political	  violence	  has	  to	  do	  with	  two	  things:	  contrary	  to	  natural	  disasters	  and	  individual	  criminal	  action,	  political	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7 See	   ‘Pinochet	   “dictatorship”	   textbook	   row	   erupts	   in	   Chile’,	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐latin-­‐america-­‐16420413.	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violence	   is	   always	   targeted.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   a	   person	   is	   selected	   as	   the	  target	  of	   this	   form	  of	  wrongdoing	  because	  of	  her	  ethnicity,	  religion,	  culture,	  or	   political	   beliefs	   and	   actions.	   Also,	   and	   very	   important	   for	   the	   social	  dimension	   of	   rectification,	   contrary	   to	   individual	   criminal	   action,	   political	  violence	  breaks	  the	  moral	  standing	  of	  the	  victim	  not	  only	  with	  regard	  to	  her	  aggressor,	  but	  also	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  her	  community.	  Considering	  these	  two	  elements,	  the	  normative	  significance	  rectifying	  past	  political	  violence	  can	  be	  framed	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  respect	  that	  society	  owes	  to	   its	   victims.	   Showing	   respect	   for	   a	   person	   requires	   acknowledging	   her	  equal	  moral	  worth;	  that	  is,	  recognising	  that	  her	  life	  and	  system	  of	  ends	  is	  due	  equal	  consideration	  because	  of	  the	  simple	  fact	  that	  she	  is	  a	  person.	  Since,	  as	  we	   have	   seen,	   political	   violence	   is	   an	   institutional	   way	   of	   undermining	  victims’	  equal	  moral	  worth,	  full	  respect	  for	  such	  victims	  can	  only	  be	  restored	  by	  the	  adoption	  of	  institutional	  measures	  directed	  to	  rectify	  this	  past	  failure	  (see	  Kutz	  2004:	  284).	  	  In	   this	   sense,	   all	   rectificatory	   measures	   are	   primarily	   a	   way	   of	  acknowledging	  that	  institutions	  have	  failed	  to	  show	  respect	  for	  some	  of	  their	  citizens	   in	   the	   past.	   The	   first	   thing	   needed	   to	   achieve	   this	   goal	   is	   to	   assert	  publicly	  and	  with	  no	  reservation	  that	  what	  victims	  have	  suffered	  was	  wrong	  and	  should	  not	  have	  occurred.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  this	  is	  already	  known	  in	  a	  society	  that	  has	  suffered	  from	  political	  violence	  in	  the	  past,	  and	  thus	  that	  no	  new	  knowledge	  would	  be	  gained	  by	  establishing	  public	  mechanisms,	  such	  as	   truth	   commissions,	   for	   stating	   it.	   Yet	   we	   should	   notice	   the	   difference	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between	   knowledge	   and	   acknowledgement	   proposed	   by	   Thomas	   Nagel:	  ‘acknowledgment	   […]	   is	   what	   happens	   and	   can	   only	   happen	   to	   knowledge	  when	   it	   becomes	   officially	   sanctioned,	   when	   it	   is	   made	   part	   of	   the	   public	  cognitive	   scene’	   (quoted	   in	  Weschler	   1989).	  Making	   the	   knowledge	   of	   past	  injustice	  part	  of	  the	  public	  cognitive	  scene,	  as	  I	  have	  been	  arguing,	  is	  a	  crucial	  step	  in	  restoring	  respect	  for	  victims.	  	  Now,	  when	   a	   society	   radically	   fails	   to	   respect	   some	   of	   its	  members,	  public	  trust	  in	  its	  institutions	  is	  shattered	  (see	  de	  Grieff	  2006b:	  460).	  Victims	  might	   not	   deposit	   trust	   in	   a	   social	   arrangement	   that	   does	   not	   condemn	   its	  own	  failure	  to	  safeguard	  their	  equal	  moral	  worth.	  Furthermore,	  non-­‐victims	  can	   develop	   this	   attitude	   as	   well.	   So	   long	   as	   no	   explicit	   disapproval	   is	  expressed	   regarding	   the	   previous	   deprivations	   conducted	   or	   facilitated	   by	  the	  State,	  citizens	  in	  general	  might	  believe	  that	  their	  institutions	  do	  not	  hold	  a	  real	  commitment	  to	  the	  fundamental	  moral	  premises	  of	  liberal	  justice.	  	  Indeed,	   this	   is	   the	   case	   of	   many	   Latin	   American	   countries	   in	   the	  present	  (see	  Verdeja	  2006:	  134).	  In	  these	  countries,	  the	  incredibly	  low	  trust	  deposited	   in	   social	   institutions	   is	   not	   only	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   numerous	  irregularities	  are	  committed	  by	  present	  political	  actors,	   it	   is	  also	  due	  to	  fact	  that	  it	  has	  always	  been	  this	  way.	  Some	  perpetrators	  of	  gross	  past	  crimes	  walk	  with	  full	   impunity	  and	  continue	  to	  enjoy	  life-­‐long	  pensions	  for	  their	  term	  in	  office—as	   it	   is	   the	   case,	   for	   instance,	   of	   the	   Mexican	   ex-­‐president	   Luis	  Echeverría	   (1970-­‐1976),	  who	  has	  been	  repeatedly	   identified	  as	   responsible	  for	   the	  direct	   persecution	   and	   assassination	  of	  Marxist	  militants,	   organised	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indigenous	   groups,	   and	   students	   during	   his	   term	   in	   office	   (see	   Acosta	   &	  Elennin	  2006:	  108).	  Against	  this	  scenario,	  historical	  rectification	  is	  a	  way	  of	  encouraging	   trust	   in	   the	   liberal	   commitment	  of	   current	   institutions.	  For,	  by	  acknowledging	   the	   wrong	   done	   to	   victims	   as	   a	   wrong,	   as	   something	   that	  should	  not	  have	  occurred,	  institutions	  make	  it	  clear	  they	  reject	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  form	  of	   social	   interaction;	   that	   is,	   that	   they	   reject	   a	   social	   context	   in	  which	  persons	   are	   not	   treated	   as	   equals	   due	   to	   such	   characteristics	   as	   political	  beliefs	  or	  cultural,	  ethnic	  or	  religious	  belonging.	  	  	  Because	  of	  the	  aforementioned	  reasons,	  a	  historical	  injustice	  not	  only	  affects	  victims’	  psychology	  and	  self-­‐respect	  (as	  we	  saw	  in	  §	  1.1),	  but	  also	  the	  
mutual	   respect	   that	   citizens	   owe	   to	   each	   other	   in	   line	   with	   the	   proper	  morality	   behind	   social	   interactions	   in	   a	   liberal	   society.	   In	   this	   sense,	   a	  historical	   injustice	   follows	   the	   description	   given	   by	   Thomas	   Scanlon	  regarding	   the	   two	   different	   ‘evils’	   that	   an	   unjust	   inequality	   might	   create.	  Scanlon	  holds:	  “It	   is	   an	  evil	   to	  be	   treated	  as	   inferior”	   […]	  The	  experiential	   evil	   involved	  here	  can	  be	  characterized	  in	  several	  different	  ways	  […]	  Let	  me	  distinguish	  two	  broad	  categories.	  The	   first,	  more	   “individualistic”,	   characterization	  emphasizes	  what	  might	   be	   called	   damage	   to	   individuals’	   sense	   of	   self-­‐worth:	   	   such	   things	   as	  feelings	  of	   inferiority	  and	  even	  shame	  resulting	   from	  the	  belief	   that	  one’s	   life,	  abilities	   and	   accomplishments	   lack	   worth	   or	   are	   greatly	   inferior	   to	   those	   of	  others.	  The	  second	  category	  emphasizes	  damage	  to	  the	  bonds	  between	  people:	  	  what	  might	  be	   called	   the	   loss	  of	   fraternity	   resulting	   from	  great	  differences	   in	  material	  circumstances,	  accomplishments	  and	  the	  social	  importance	  according	  to	  them.	  (Scanlon	  2003:	  212)	  Scanlon’s	   description	   of	   the	   two	   types	   of	   evils	   that	   an	   unjust	   inequality	  produces	   is	   quite	   significant.	   While	   the	   first	   one	   relates	   to	   the	   damage	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inflicted	   on	   the	   self-­‐respect	   of	   the	   person	   affected	   by	   the	   inequality,	   the	  second	  one	  has	  to	  do	  with	  to	  the	  relation	  between	  that	  person	  and	  the	  rest.	  The	   fact	   that	   unjust	   inequalities,	   just	   as	   historical	   injustices,	   create	  these	   two	  distinct	  normative	  affections	  reflects	   that	  self-­‐respect	  and	  mutual	  respect	   (or	   fraternity,	   as	   Scanlon	   calls	   it)	   must	   be	   distinguished.	   At	   times	  Rawls	  seems	   to	  collapse	   the	  second	  one	   into	   the	   first	  one	  (see	  TJ:	  155-­‐156,	  297,	  478),	   as	   if	   all	   deficits	   in	  mutual	   respect	  would	  bring	  about	   a	  deficit	   in	  self-­‐respect.	  Colin	   Bird	   2008:	   17	   refers	   to	   this	   latter	   claim	   as	   ‘the	   dependency	  thesis’	  —i.e.,	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  deficits	  in	  mutual	  respect	  bring	  about	  a	  deficit	  in	  self-­‐respect.	  However,	  the	  dependency	  thesis	  should	  be	  rejected.	  For	  once	  we	  follow	  Rawls	  on	  the	  main	  idea	  that	  a	  healthy	  self-­‐respect	  is	  connected	  to	  the	   successful	   pursuing	   of	   a	   plan	   of	   life	   (see	   TJ:	   386),	   the	   independence	  between	  the	  two	  forms	  of	  ‘respect’	  is	  evident:	  one	  might	  successfully	  achieve	  a	   plan	   of	   life	   even	   while	   experiencing	   some	   important	   deficits	   in	   mutual	  respect.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   of	  many	   victims	   of	   historical	   injustice.	  Despite	   the	  fact	   that	   the	   State	   fails	   to	   show	   respect	   for	   them	   (by	   failing	   to	   offer	  institutional	  provisions	  for	  historical	  rectification),	  they	  nevertheless	  manage	  to	   successfully	   develop	   a	   meaningful	   plan	   of	   life	   with	   which	   they	   fully	  identify.	  	  Conversely,	   a	   person	   might	   fail	   to	   display	   self-­‐respect	   even	   when	  experiencing	  full	  respect	  by	  society.	  This	  is	  part	  of	  the	  rationale	  for	  taking	  the	  
social	  bases	  for	  self-­‐respect	  as	  a	  primary	  good	  rather	  than	  self-­‐respect	  itself.	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When	   these	   social	   bases	   are	   secured,	   the	   State	   meets	   its	   obligation	   of	  showing	  respect	  for	  citizens.	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  said,	  it	  might	  still	  be	  the	  case	  that	  a	  person	  experiences	  a	  deficit	  in	  self-­‐respect	  even	  when	  these	  bases	  are	  provided.	  This	  can	  have	  many	  causes.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  victims	  of	  past	  political	  violence,	   the	  distress	  of	  having	  experienced	  gross	   forms	  of	  wrongdoing	  can	  simply	  be	  unbearable	  (see	  Hamber	  2006:	  567),	  even	  if	  rectificatory	  measures	  including	  full	  and	  proper	  psychological	  counselling	  are	  in	  place	  (as	  part	  of	  the	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐respect	  that	  the	  State	  provides).	  This	  shows	  that,	  pace	  Margalit	  1994:	  124,	  whether	  a	  person	  displays	  respect	   for	  herself	   or	  not	   is	  ultimately	   dependent	  on	  her	  own	   strength	  and	  capacities.	   It	   depends	  on	  whether	   she	  manages	   to	   fulfil	   the	   four	   conditions	  proposed	   in	   the	   previous	   section:	   having	   a	   positive	   evaluation	   of	   herself	  (psychological	   condition),	   endorsing	   a	   system	   of	   ends	   compatible	  with	   her	  equal	  moral	  worth	   (Kantian	   condition),	   trying	   to	   fulfil	   such	  ends	   (Rawlsian	  condition),	  and	  demanding	  that	  others	  not	  prevent	  her	  from	  achieving	  them	  (Aristotelian	  condition).	  	  Conversely,	  whether	  a	  person	  is	  treated	  as	  an	  equal,	  as	  mutual	  respect	  commands,	  is	  not	  ultimately	  dependent	  on	  her.	  In	  the	  case	  of	  victims	  of	  past	  political	   violence,	   as	  we	  have	   seen,	   this	  ultimately	  depends	  on	  whether	   the	  institutions	  of	  the	  State	  provides	  means	  for	  historical	  rectification	  or	  not.	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1.3	  Liberal	  Integrity	  and	  Critical	  Historical	  Narratives	  Liberal	   societies	   observe	   a	   further	   regularity:	   all	   of	   them	   embark	   on	   the	  creation	   of	   historical	   narratives.	   Official	  history	   is	   always	   told,	   taught,	   and	  promoted	  by	  the	  institutional	  means	  of	  the	  State	  in	  a	  specific	  way.	  Although	  there	  is	  a	  plurality	  of	  competing	  versions	  of	  a	  given	  society’s	  history,	  some	  of	  them	  created	  for	  instance	  at	  academic	  institutions	  or	  political	  think	  tanks,	  no	  
liberal	   society	   leaves	   this	   job	   exclusively	   in	   private	   hands.	   Inevitably,	   certain	  facts	   about	   the	   putative	   origin,	   distant,	   and	   recent	   past	   of	   society	   are	  highlighted	  and	  others	  omitted	  by	  the	  use	  of	  public	  institutional	  means.	  	   	  One	   initial	   reason	   why	   this	   is	   so	   is	   that	   there	   are	   practical	   limits	  regarding	   the	   means	   for	   registering	   the	   past:	   no	   historical	   narrative	   can	  include	   all	   facts,	   since	   there	   are	   simply	   not	   sufficient	   historiographical	  elements	  to	  do	  so.	  Most	  parts	  of	  the	  past	  as	  such	  are	  lost.8	  More	  importantly,	  the	   selectivity	   of	   historical	   narratives	   regarding	   the	   inclusion	   of	   facts	   is	  connected	  to	  the	  main	  reason	  why	  liberal	  societies	  construct	  such	  narratives	  in	  the	  first	  place:	  i.e.,	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  society	  is	  both	  a	  cultural	  and	  a	  political	  continuum	  over	  time.	  	  That	  liberal	  societies	  are	  cultural	  communities	  extended	  through	  time	  has	   been	   defended	   by	   authors	   sometimes	   identified	   as	   ‘liberal	   nationalists’	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Arthur	   Danto	   1985	   offers	   an	   alternative	   defence	   of	   this	   thesis	   by	   stating	   that	   all	   true	  descriptions	   of	   historical	   facts	   are	   also	   historical	   facts.	   As	   some	   of	   these	   descriptions	   of	  historical	  facts	  can	  be	  about	  events	  yet	  to	  come	  (what	  Danto	  calls	  narrative	  sentences	  such	  as	  —supposing	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  the	  argument	  that	  the	  following	  is	  true—	  ‘Barack	  Obama	  will	  be	  re-­‐elected	   in	   2012	   and	   will	   repeat	   his	   de	   facto	   amnesty	   policy	   towards	   massive	   financial	  fraudsters’),	  it	  is	  impossible	  at	  any	  given	  time	  to	  offer	  a	  complete	  account	  of	  historical	  facts.	  Following	   this	   rationale,	   Danto	   1985:	   17-­‐18	   states:	   ‘Any	   account	   of	   the	   past	   is	   essentially	  incomplete’	  because	  ‘a	  complete	  account	  of	  the	  past	  will	  suppose	  a	  complete	  account	  of	  the	  future’.	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(such	  as	  Yael	  Tamir	  1993,	  David	  Miller	  1995	  and	  Will	  Kymlicka	  1989,	  1995,	  2007).9 	  These	   authors	   have	   emphasised	   how	   liberal	   societies	   form	   and	  promote	  a	  collective	  cultural	  identity	  through	  the	  State’s	  institutional	  means	  (i.e.,	  by	   the	   implementation	  of	  official	   languages,	  official	  dates	  and	  holidays,	  forms	  of	  civic	  education,	  and	  historical	  narratives).	  This	  is	  a	  claim	  with	  vast	  empirical	  support.	  	  That	  liberal	  societies	  are	  political	  communities	  extended	  through	  time	  has	  been	  defended	  by	  Rawls	  himself.	  In	  fact,	  this	  commitment	  is	  expressed	  in	  what	  Rawls	  calls	  the	  ‘most	  fundamental	  idea’	  of	  his	  conception	  of	  justice:	  i.e.,	  that	   a	   liberal	   society	   must	   be	   understood	   as	   a	   ‘fair	   system	   of	   social	  cooperation	   over	   time	   from	   one	   generation	   to	   the	   next’	   (JF:	   5).	   Rawls	  repeatedly	  states	  this	  idea:	  ‘Recall	  that	  a	  political	  society	  is	  always	  regarded	  as	   a	   schema	   of	   cooperation	   over	   time	   indefinitely’	   (JF:	   162).	   In	   similar	  fashion,	   Janna	   Thompson	   defends	   that	   political	   communities	   have	  intergenerational	   span:	   ‘a	   polity	   is	   by	   nature	   intergenerational.	   It	   has	  intergenerational	   responsibilities.	   It	   has	   institutions	   that	   are	   essentially	  intergenerational’	  (Thompson	  2009:	  12).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Several	   (usually	   overlooked)	   passages	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   support	   the	   claim	   that	   liberal	  societies	   are	   cultural	   communities	   extended	   through	   time.	   For	   instance:	   ‘For	   normally	  leaving	  one’s	  country	  is	  a	  grave	  step.	  It	  involves	  leaving	  the	  society	  and	  culture	  in	  which	  we	  have	  been	  raised,	   the	  society	  and	  culture	  whose	   language	  we	  use	   in	  speech	  and	  thought	  to	  express	   ourselves,	   our	   aims,	   goals,	   and	   values;	   the	   society	   and	   culture	   whose	   history,	  customs,	  and	  conventions	  we	  depend	  on	  to	   find	  our	  place	   in	  the	  social	  world.	   In	   large	  part	  we	  affirm	  our	  society	  and	  culture,	  and	  have	  an	   intimate	  and	   inexpressible	  knowledge	  of	   it,	  even	  though	  much	  of	  it	  we	  may	  question,	  if	  not	  reject’	  (PL:	  222).	  	  Consider	  also	  the	  passage	  quoted	  in	  § 1.1:	  ‘To	  say	  that	  man	  is	  a	  historical	  human	  being	  is	  to	  say	  that	  the	  realizations	  of	  the	   powers	   of	   human	   individuals	   living	   at	   any	   given	   time	   takes	   the	   cooperation	   of	   many	  generations	   (or	   even	   societies)	   over	   a	   long	   period	   of	   time.	   It	   also	   implies	   that	   this	  cooperation	  is	  guided	  at	  any	  moment	  by	  an	  understanding	  of	  what	  has	  been	  done	  in	  the	  past	  as	  it	  is	  interpreted	  by	  social	  tradition’	  (TJ:	  460).	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These	  two	  features	  explain	  the	  creation	  of	  historical	  narratives	  by	  the	  use	   of	   institutional	   means:	   such	   narratives	   are	   the	   way	   in	   which	   societies	  make	  sense	  of	  their	  temporal	  span	  as	  cultural	  and	  political	  continuums.	  The	  importance	  of	  a	  historical	  narrative	   is	   thus	  directly	  connected	  with	   its	   links	  to	  the	  present:	  society’s	  own	  sense	  of	  identity	  throughout	  time	  is	  dependent	  on	  it.	  Therefore,	  focusing	  on	  certain	  facts	  while	  omitting	  others	  is	  never	  left	  to	  chance.	  	  I	   believe	   that	   this	   institutional	   exercise	   should	   meet	   a	   normative	  standard:	  the	  narrative	  promoted	  by	  the	  State	  must	  be,	  as	  I	  will	  call	  it,	  critical.	  A	   critical	   historical	   narrative	   —for	   short,	   CHN—	   is	   a	   particular	  understanding	  of	  the	  past	  that	  is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  relevant	  historical	  injustices	  that	  occurred	  within	  the	  temporal	  span	  that	  the	  narrative	  comprehends.	  There	   is	   one	   fundamental	   reason	   to	   support	   the	   claim	   that	   a	   liberal	  society	  should	  promote	  a	  CHN.	  Remember,	  once	  again,	  that	  political	  violence	  is	  an	  institutional	  way	  of	  undermining	  the	  moral	  worth	  of	  persons.	  Since,	  in	  turn,	  a	  liberal	  democracy	  is	  strongly	  committed	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  persons’	  equal	   moral	   status,	   an	   institutional	   account	   of	   the	   past	   that	   systematically	  
celebrates	   or	  omits	   the	  occurrence	  of	  past	  political	   violence	   is	   incompatible	  with	   a	   liberal	   democracy.	   Narratives	   so	   constructed,	   regardless	   of	   how	  common	   they	   are	   in	   the	   present	   day,	   shatter	   the	   liberal	   integrity	   of	   the	  societies	   adopting	   them	   (see	   Abizadeh	   2004:	   309).	   Contrarily,	   a	   CHN	   is	   a	  form	   of	   historical	   rectification	   that	   promotes	   such	   integrity.	   Just	   as	   official	  provisions	   for	   recent-­‐past	   rectification,	   a	   CHN	   is	   a	   way	   for	   institutions	   to	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state	   their	   condemnation	  of	   the	   non-­‐liberal	   social	   context	   that	   allowed	   the	  perpetration	  of	  political	  violence	  in	  the	  past.	  Considering	   this,	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   part	   of	   the	   duty	   that	   —according	  to	  Rawls	  (TJ:	  99)—	  citizens	  have	  to	  uphold,	  perpetuate,	  and	  defend	  just	  institutions,	  requires	  that	  citizens	  support	  institutions	  which	  promote	  a	  CHN	  (see	  Thompson	  2006:	  162-­‐163).	  Since,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  liberal	  societies	  are	  institutionally	  continuous	  over	  time,	  citizens	  may	  not	  only	  be	  concerned	  with	   their	   institutions’	   performance	   in	   the	   present.	   For	   instance,	   they	  may	  find	   it	  disturbing	   that	   in	   the	  evolution	  of	  such	  structures	  up	   to	   the	  present,	  several	  departures	  from	  the	  principles	  that	  are	  to	  guide	  just	  institutions	  took	  place.	  Of	  course,	   they	  cannot	  set	  the	  course	  of	  their	  society’s	  distant	  past	   in	  line	  with	  the	  precepts	  of	  justice.	  However,	  since	  their	  present	  institutions	  will	  promote	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  such	  a	  past	  by	  means	  of	  the	  creation	  of	   a	  historical	  narrative,	   they	   can	  nevertheless	  demand	  such	  a	  narrative	  be	  critical.	   This,	   it	   seems	   to	   me,	   is	   the	   best	   way	   of	   discharging	   their	   duty	   to	  uphold	  just	  institutions	  in	  this	  case.	  Sometimes	  the	  existence	  of	  a	  similar	  duty	  is	  vindicated	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  citizens	   take	  pride	   on	   the	   achievements	   of	   their	   cultural	   group	   even	   as	   far	  back	   as	   its	   putative	   historical	   origins;	   they	   also	   tend	   to	   resent	   offences	   to	  national	   ancestors	   committed	   by	   other	   nations	   as	   their	   own.10	  Considering	  this,	  Farid	  Abdel-­‐Nour	  has	  recently	  defended	  that:	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  10	  Michael	  Ignatieff	  offers	  a	  neat	  example	  in	  this	  regard:	  ‘reporters	  in	  the	  Balkan	  wars	  often	  observed	   that	   when	   they	   were	   told	   atrocity	   stories	   they	   were	   occasionally	   uncertain	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We	   can	   then	   state	   that	   to	  national	  belonging,	   the	  dominant	   form	  of	   collective	  political	  identification	  in	  the	  last	  two	  hundred	  years,	  is	  attached	  a	  concomitant	  responsibility.	   The	   agent	   who	   participates	   in	   this	   form	   of	   belonging	   incurs	   a	  responsibility	   for	   that	   part	   of	   herself	   that	   is	   caught	   up	   in	   the	   nation.	   This	  responsibility	   she	   incurs	   by	   means	   of	   her	   national	   identity	   alone	   […]	   My	  conclusion	   is	   simple.	   Where	   there	   is	   national	   pride,	   there	   is	   national	  responsibility.	   The	   latter	   can	   only	   disappear	   in	   a	   world	   devoid	   of	   national	  identity.	  Until	  then,	  let	  the	  participants	  in	  national	  identity	  recognize	  that	  their	  fantasy	  opens	  the	  door	  to	  “the	  guilt	  of	  the	  fathers.”	  (Abdel-­‐Nour	  2003:	  712-­‐713)	  Abdel-­‐Nour	   holds	   that	   national	   identification	   gives	   rise	   to	   national	  responsibility	  —similar	  remarks	  have	  been	  defended	  by	  Kutz	  2004:	  279-­‐285	  and	  Butt	  2009:	  178-­‐188.	  In	  contrast,	  Thompson	  2006:	  157	  has	  criticised	  this	  approach	  by	  highlighting	  the	  conditionality	  of	  Abdel-­‐Nour’s	  claim:	  even	  when	  a	  great	  amount	  of	  citizens	  tend	  to	  experience	  national	  pride,	  some	  simply	  do	  not.	   These	   citizens	   might	   not	   identify	   at	   all	   with	   the	   putative	   historical	  landmarks	  of	  the	  cultural	  group	  they	  belong	  to.	  	  	   While	   I	   think	  Thompson	   is	  right	   in	  emphasising	   the	  conditionality	  of	  this	   ‘nationalist’	  way	   of	   defending	   the	   need	   of	   a	   CHN,	   she	   fails	   to	   see	   that,	  regardless	  of	  whether	  citizens	  identify	  on	  a	  personal	  level	  with	  the	  history	  of	  their	  cultural	  group,	  the	  State	  will	  nevertheless	  promote	  a	  historical	  account	  of	   the	   past	   highlighting	   not	   only	   society’s	   institutional	   continuity	   through	  time	   but	   also	   strong	   forms	   of	   cultural	   continuity.	   This	   is,	   precisely,	   what	  liberal	  nationalists	  repeatedly	  underscore.	  Now,	  since	  the	  State	  is	  a	  figure	  for	  citizens’	   institutional	   representation,	   when	   it	   promotes	   a	   particular	  understanding	  of	  the	  past	  that	  is	  blind	  to	  the	  relevant	  cases	  of	  past	  political	  violence,	   it	  does	  so	   in	  the	  name	  of	  its	  own	  citizens.	  The	  State	  thereby	  makes	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  whether	   these	   atrocities	   had	   occurred	   yesterday	   or	   in	   1941,	   or	   1841,	   or	   1441’	   (quoted	   in	  Minow	  1998:	  14).	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all	  citizens	  collaborators	   in	  the	  process	  of	  normative	   irregularity	  affecting	  a	  society	   that	   lacks	   a	   CHN,	   regardless	   of	   whether	   they	   identify	   with	   such	   a	  narrative	   or	   not.11	  This	   is,	   thus,	   a	   further	   reason	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   idea	   that	  citizens	   should	   support	   institutions	   that	   promote	   a	   CHN:	   their	   own	   liberal	  integrity	   is	   compromised	   when	   the	   State	   adopts	   a	   non-­‐critical	   historical	  narrative.	  	  Sometimes	   it	   is	   suggested	   that	   historical	   narratives	   should	   not	   be	  informed	  by	  a	  criterion	  of	  truth	  because	  only	  in	  this	  way	  they	  can	  achieve	  the	  goal	  of	  enhancing	  solidarity,	  stability,	  or	  even	  civic	  education.	  Let	  me	  address	  these	  concerns	  in	  turn.	  Consider	  what	  Miller	  says:	  Once	  we	  discover	  that	  national	  identities	  contain	  elements	  of	  myth,	  we	  should	  ask	  what	  part	   these	  myths	  play	   in	  building	  and	  sustaining	  nations.	  For	   it	  may	  not	  be	  rational	  to	  discard	  beliefs,	  even	  if	  they	  are,	  strictly	  speaking,	  false	  when	  they	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  contribute	  significantly	  to	  the	  support	  of	  valuable	  social	  relations.	  (Miller	  1995:	  35-­‐36)	  According	  to	  Miller,	  constructing	  a	  historical	  narrative	  without	  the	  constraint	  of	   a	   criterion	   of	   truth	  might	   help	   to	   enhance	   social	   unity	   and	   stability.	   He	  nevertheless	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  this	  might	  not	  hinder	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  CHN	  since,	   according	   to	   him,	   the	   construction	   of	   a	   historical	   narrative	   must	   be	  open	  to	  a	  ‘process	  of	  debate	  and	  discussion	  to	  which	  everyone	  is	  potentially	  a	  contributor’	   (Miller	   1995:	   36).	   This	   ensures	   that	   historically	   oppressed	  groups	  could	  participate	  in	  such	  debate	  and	  thus	  demand	  that	  the	  injustices	  that	  their	  forebears	  suffered	  are	  included	  in	  the	  narrative.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  11	  In	  this	  sense,	  Rawls	  (PL:	  216)	  holds	  that	  ‘in	  a	  democratic	  political	  power,	  which	  is	  always	  coercive	  power,	   is	   the	  power	  of	   the	  public,	   that	   is,	  of	   free	  and	  equal	  citizens	  as	  a	  collective	  body’.	   In	   a	   liberal	   society,	   the	   coercive	   use	   of	   the	   State’s	   power	   is	   thus	   connected	   to	   each	  citizen.	   For	   an	   interesting	   analysis	   on	   the	   relationship	   between	   institutional	   injustice	   and	  citizens’	  individual	  responsibility	  see	  Pasternak	  2011.	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   But	   even	   if	   we	   assume	   that	   something	   close	   to	   a	   CHN	   can	   still	   be	  produced	  without	  a	  criterion	  of	  truth,	  Miller’s	  rejection	  of	  such	  a	  criterion	  is	  highly	  problematic.	   For	  Miller	  makes	   the	  adoption	  of	   a	  particular	  historical	  narrative	  a	  matter	  of	  political	  compromise	  between	  different	  social	  groups	  —that	   is,	   what	   Rawls	   (PL:	   147)	   calls	   a	   modus	   vivendi.	   In	   contrast,	   the	  importance	  of	  adopting	  a	  CHN	  is	  not	  that	  such	  an	  understanding	  of	  the	  past	  would	  please	  every	  relevant	  cultural	  group	  in	  society	  but,	  rather,	   that	  some	  extremely	  important	  cases	  of	  past	  political	  violence	  occurred	  in	  the	  past	  and	  that	  this	  is	  need	  of	  acknowledgement.	  A	  criterion	  of	  truth	  is	  thus	  a	  necessary	  constraint	   of	   a	   CHN.	  Ultimately,	   a	   CHN	   is	   an	   institutional	   form	  of	   historical	  rectification,	   and	   rectification	   for	   an	   injustice	   that	   did	   not	   occur	   is	  nonsensical.	  So,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	  a	  CHN	  will	  promote	  social	  stability	   in	   a	  highly	  plural	   and	  multicultural	   society,	   the	  adoption	  of	   such	  a	  narrative	   should	   be	   based	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   acknowledging	   past	  wrongdoing.	   This	   shows	   that	   a	   CHN	   promotes	   social	   stability	   for	   the	   right	  
reasons.	  	  As	  it	  is	  well	  known,	  the	  goal	  of	  social	  stability	  has	  a	  prominent	  role	  in	  Rawls’s	   theory.	   The	   body	   of	   ideas	   compiled	   in	   his	   political	   liberalism	   was	  introduced	  into	  his	  original	  theory	  as	  a	  way	  of	  dealing,	  precisely,	  with	  what	  he	  saw	  as	  a	  problem	  with	  the	  stability	  of	  a	  society	  regulated	  by	  the	  principles	  of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   (see	   PL:	   xvi).	   The	   prominence	   of	   this	   goal	   is	   also	  stressed	  by	  Rawls’s	   famous	  dictum:	   ‘Let	  us	  agree	  that	  a	  political	  conception	  must	  be	  practicable,	  fall	  under	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  possible.	  This	  contrasts	  with	  a	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moral	  conception	  that	  is	  not	  political:	  a	  moral	  conception	  may	  condemn	  the	  world	   and	   human	   nature	   as	   too	   corrupt	   to	   be	   moved	   by	   its	   precepts	   and	  ideas’	  (JF:	  185).	  In	  light	  of	  this,	  Rawls	  defends	  that	  social	  stability	  for	  the	  right	  reason	  requires	  the	  moral	  acceptance	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	  In	  similar	  fashion,	  I	  hold	  that	  social	  stability	  for	  the	  right	  reasons	  requires	  the	  promotion	  of	  a	  CHN.	  The	  importance	  of	  this	  latter	  claim	  is	  manifest	  by	  considering	  the	  fact	  that,	  as	  Kymlicka	  has	  consistently	  defended,	  no	  contemporary	  liberal	  society	  is	   a	   culturally	   homogeneous	   political	   community	   (see	  Kymlicka	   1989:	   206-­‐220,	   1995:	   10-­‐26).	   All	   liberal	   societies,	   aside	   from	   observing	   pluralism	   of	  comprehensive	   doctrines,	   observe	   strong	   forms	   of	   cultural	   pluralism:	   they	  contain	   national	  minorities	   (such	   as	   Scotland	  within	   the	   United	   Kingdom),	  indigenous	   communities	   (such	   as	   the	   Inuit	   in	   Canada),	   and	   immigrant	  populations	   (such	   as	   the	   vast	  Mexican	   community	   in	   the	   United	   States).	   A	  historical	   narrative	   publicised	   with	   shared	   institutional	   means	   that	   is	  unresponsive	   to	   the	   facts	   regarding	   these	   groups’	   past	   interactions	   might	  damage	  the	  social	  bonds	  between	  them.	  However,	  as	  I	  have	  said,	  we	  need	  to	  keep	  in	  mind	  that	  a	  CHN	  promotes	  such	  bonds	  because	  of	  the	  right	  reasons	  (i.e.,	  acknowledgement	  of	  past	  mistreatment	  according	  to	  liberal	  standards).	  	   Let	   me	   turn	   to	   the	   relation	   between	   historical	   narratives	   and	   civic	  education.	   Very	   few	   liberals	  would	   hold	   that	   civic	   education	   should	   not	   be	  provided	   by	   the	   State.	   According	   to	   Rawls,	   for	   instance,	   the	   State	   should	  promote	  the	  political	  virtues	  that	  must	  shape	  citizens’	  moral	  character.	  These	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include	   ‘the	   virtues	   of	   social	   cooperation	   such	   as	   civility	   and	   tolerance,	   of	  reasonableness	   and	   the	   sense	   of	   fairness’	   (PL:	   194).	  Other	   scholars	   believe	  that	  such	  an	  education	  should	  be	  far	  more	  comprehensive	  than	  what	  Rawls’s	  political	   liberalism	   is	  willing	   to	  concede.	  This	   is	   the	  case	  of	  William	  Galston	  1994.	   Oddly,	   Galston	   thinks	   that	   this	   more	   comprehensive	   civic	   education	  demands,	  amongst	  many	  other	   things,	   the	   institutional	  promotion	  of	  a	  non-­‐critical	  historical	  narrative:	  	  Rigorous	   historical	   research	   will	   almost	   certainly	   vindicate	   complex	  “revisionist”	   accounts	   of	   key	   figures	   in	   American	   history.	   Civic	   education,	  however,	   requires	   a	   nobler,	   moralizing	   history:	   a	   pantheon	   of	   heroes	   who	  confer	  legitimacy	  on	  central	  institutions	  and	  are	  worthy	  of	  emulation.	  (Galston	  1991:	  244)	  I	   think	   that	   Galston	   is	   mistaken.	   Teaching	   and	   publicising	   civic	   respect,	  solidarity,	  and	  tolerance	  cannot	  depend	  on	  the	  systematic	  celebration	  of	  the	  past	   infringements	   of	   liberal	   standards.	   Rather,	   condemning	   society’s	   past	  infringements,	   abstaining	   from	   showing	   pride	   in	   them,	   is	   a	   fundamental	  component	   of	   civic	   education;	   liberal	   education	   is	   incompatible	   with	   the	  public	  celebration	  of	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  history.	  Moreover,	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  believe	  that	  the	   legitimacy	  of	   liberal	   institutions	  must	  be	  defended	  at	   least	  partly	  by	  the	  promotion	  of	  gross	  lies.	  	  In	  contrast,	  Rawls	  offers	  a	  neat	  reason	   for	   the	  adoption	  of	  a	  CHN	  for	  educational	  purposes:	  If	   citizens	   of	   a	  well-­‐ordered	   society	   are	   to	   recognize	   one	   another	   as	   free	   and	  equal,	  basic	  institutions	  must	  educate	  them	  to	  this	  conception	  of	  themselves,	  as	  well	  as	  publicly	  exhibit	  and	  encourage	  this	  ideal	  of	  political	  justice.	  This	  task	  of	  education	  belongs	  to	  what	  we	  may	  call	  the	  wide	  role	  of	  a	  political	  conception.	  In	  this	   role	   such	   a	   conception	   is	   part	   of	   the	   public	   political	   culture.	   (JF:	   56.	  Footnote	  omitted)	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Aside	  from	  the	  direct	  regulation	  of	  the	  basic	  structure,	  a	  conception	  of	  justice	  has	  a	  wider	  educational	  role	  amongst	  citizens.	  In	  such	  a	  role,	  a	  conception	  of	  justice	  promotes	  the	   fundamental	   idea	  that	  persons	  are	   free	  and	  equal.	  The	  institutional	  promotion	  of	  a	  non-­‐critical	  historical	  narrative	  goes	  against	  this	  very	  role,	  for	  such	  a	  narrative	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  systematic	  omission	  of	  past	  infringements	  to	  the	  ideal	  of	  political	  justice.	  As	   we	   have	   seen,	   adopting	   a	   CHN	   holds	   normative	   significance	  because	  of	  three	  interconnected	  reasons.	  First,	  a	  CHN	  is	  a	  way	  for	  institutions	  to	  state	  their	  condemnation	  of	  the	  non-­‐liberal	  social	  context	  that	  allowed	  the	  perpetration	  of	  political	  violence	  in	  the	  past,	  considering	  that	  a	  liberal	  society	  is	   a	   cultural	   and	  political	   continuum	  over	   time.	  Thus,	   by	  promoting	   a	  CHN,	  institutions	  reaffirm	  their	   liberal	   integrity.	   In	  similar	   fashion,	  by	  demanding	  that	   their	   institutions	   promote	   a	   CHN,	   citizens	   also	   reaffirm	   their	   liberal	  integrity	  —for	  this	  is	  one	  of	  the	  ways	  in	  which	  they	  must	  discharge	  their	  duty	  to	  uphold	  just	  institutions.	  Second,	  in	  highly	  plural	  and	  multicultural	  societies	  —as	  it	  is	  the	  case	  of	  all	  current	  liberal	  societies—,	  a	  CHN	  helps	  to	  foster	  social	  stability	  for	  the	  right	  reasons.	  And,	  third,	  a	  CHN	  encourages	  a	  correct	  account	  of	  civic	  education.	  These	   three	  reasons	  grant	   the	  normative	  significance	  of	  a	  CHN.	  Such	  significance	  anticipates	  a	  response	  to	  an	  objection	  with	  which	  I	  would	  like	  to	  finish	  this	  section.	  It	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  it	  should	  simply	  not	  be	  one	  of	  the	  tasks	   of	   the	   State	   to	   promote	   one	   official	   historical	   narrative	   over	   others.	  Rather,	  the	  objection	  continues,	  the	  diffusion	  of	  the	  different	  understandings	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of	   the	   past	   should	   be	   placed	   completely	   on	   the	   hands	   of	   civil	   society	   and	  citizens	  as	  such.	  Let	  me	  call	  this	  position	  the	  libertarian	  view	  of	  history,	  since	  it	   advocates	   for	   leaving	   exclusively	   to	   citizens	   the	   creation	   of	   historical	  narratives	  within	  a	  liberal	  State.	  	  I	   find	   the	   libertarian	   view	   of	   history	   implausible	   for	   at	   least	   two	  reasons.	   First,	   it	   goes	   against	   empirical	   evidence.	   All	   liberal	   societies	   we	  know	  and	  have	  known	  create	  historical	  narratives.	  Second,	  it	  seems	  unlikely	  that	   a	   liberal	   society	   could	   endure	   over	   time	   without	   the	   public	  dissemination	  of	  a	  particular	  historical	  narrative.	  Admittedly,	  the	  last	  point	  is	  an	   open	   empirical	   question.	  However,	   as	   I	   already	   said,	   it	   is	   not	   accidental	  that	   liberal	   States	   create	   these	   narratives.	   The	   goals	   mentioned	   before	  depend	  on	   them	  to	  a	  great	  extent.	   In	   the	  end,	   the	   libertarian	  view	  of	  history	  seems	  concomitant	  to	  a	  much	  more	  minimal	  understanding	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  State	  —e.g.,	  a	  State	  that	  should	  not	  provide	  civic	  education,	  or	  finance	  history	  museums,	  or	  name	  public	  places	  and	  political	  units,	  or	  create	  public	  monuments,	   or	   adopt	   days	   of	   historical	   commemoration,	   or	   implement	   an	  official	  holiday	  calendar,	  etc.	  Defending	  a	  liberal-­‐egalitarian	  understanding	  of	  the	  State	  against	  this	  alternative	  minimalist	  framework	  is	  out	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  work.	  Note,	  nevertheless,	  that	  as	  long	  as	  institutions	  assume	  that	  society	  has	   an	   intergenerational	   span,	   and	   thus	   use	   their	   resources	   to	   publicise	   a	  particular	  view	  of	  society’s	  history,	  the	  need	  for	  adopting	  a	  CHN	  as	  opposed	  to	  a	  non-­‐critical	  historical	  narrative	  will	  arise.	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1.4	  Concluding	  Remarks	  This	   concludes	   my	   assessment	   of	   the	   normative	   significance	   of	   historical	  rectification.	  Regarding	  rectification	  of	  recent	  historical	  wrongs,	  we	  saw	  that	  public	  provisions	  for	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  an	  unjust	  past	  are	  important	  for	  (1)	  citizens’	  psychology	  and	  self-­‐respect	  and	  for	  (2)	  balancing	  citizens’	  moral	  relations	  to	  one	  another	  —that	  is,	  for	  ensuring	  their	  mutual	  respect	  as	  equal	  citizens.	   Finally,	   regarding	   historical	   rectification	   related	   to	   distant	   past	  wrongs,	   we	   saw	   that	   a	   critical	   historical	   narrative	   promotes	   (3)	   society’s	  liberal	   integrity.	   In	   the	   following	   chapter	   I	   will	   address	   the	   view	   that,	  regardless	  of	   the	  stated	   importance	  of	  historical	   injustice	   in	   the	   real	  world,	  ensuring	   its	   rectification	   is	   a	   problem	   that	   does	   not	   arise	   within	   Rawls’s	  theory.	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2	  
Is	  Historical	  Injustice	  outside	  the	  Scope	  of	  Rawls’s	  Theory?	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  we	  saw	  that	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  a	  past	  shaped	  by	  political	  violence	  is	  of	  the	  utmost	  importance	  for	  citizens	  and	  liberal	  societies	  in	   relation	   to	   (1)	   citizens’	   psychology	   and	   self-­‐respect,	   (2)	   citizens’	  mutual	  respect,	   and	   (3)	   society’s	   liberal	   integrity.	   In	   this	   chapter	   I	  will	   address	   the	  view	   that,	   regardless	   of	   the	   stated	   importance	   of	   historical	   injustice	   in	   the	  real	  world,	   its	   rectification	   is	   a	   problem	   that	   does	   not	   arise	  within	  Rawls’s	  theory.	   By	   far,	   this	   is	   the	   default	   position	   in	   contemporary	   political	  philosophy.	  Both	  defenders	   and	  opponents	  of	   the	  normative	   significance	  of	  past	  wrongs	  for	  present	  justice	  tend	  to	  reiterate	  this	  idea.	  The	  ideal	  character	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  has	  a	  powerful	  and	  misleading	  effect	  in	  this	  regard	  (§	  2.1).	  However,	  two	  other	  considerations	  may	  also	  be	  given	  in	  favour	  of	  this	  default	  position.	   These	   point,	   respectively,	   to	   the	   forward-­‐looking	   (§	   2.2)	   and	   the	  
non-­‐comprehensive	   character	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   (§	   2.3).	   In	   the	   next	   three	  sections	  I	  will	  show	  how	  each	  of	  these	  three	  considerations	  fail	   to	  establish	  that	  Rawls’s	  theory	  is	  warranted	  in	  avoiding	  concern	  for	  historical	  injustice.	  Since	   the	   first	   of	   these	   three	   considerations	   (i.e.,	   the	   ideal	   character	   of	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Rawls’s	   theory)	   is	   the	   one	  most	   often	   given	   to	   support	   this	   position,	   I	  will	  spend	  nearly	  half	  of	  this	  chapter	  evaluating	  it.	  I	  will	  defend	  two	  main	  claims	  in	   this	   regard.	   First,	   that	   victims’	   interest	   in	   coming	   to	   terms	   with	   a	   past	  shaped	   by	   political	   violence	   is	   on	   a	   par	   with	   other	   human	   psychological	  regularities	  which	   are	   already	   central	   to	   Rawls’s	   ideal	   theory.	   Thus,	   I	   hold	  that	  such	  a	   theory	  should	  consider	  the	  psychological	  regularities	  associated	  with	  the	  importance	  of	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  an	  unjust	  past	  just	  as	  much	  as	  it	  considers	  other	  psychological	  regularities.	  Second,	  that	  an	  unjust	  pre-­‐ordered	  
past	  is	  a	  permanent	  feature	  of	  a	  liberal	  well-­‐ordered	  society,	  in	  the	  very	  same	  way	  as	  reasonable	  and	  cultural	  pluralism	  are.	  Thus,	  I	  hold	  that	  we	  as	  theorists	  need	  to	  show	  that	  even	  under	  historical	  conditions	  marked	  by	  gross	  injustice	  —as	   is	   the	   case	   of	   all	   current	   liberal	   societies—	   the	   Rawlsian	   utopia	   of	   a	  stable	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  is	  still	  realistic.	  
2.1	  The	  Ideal	  Character	  of	  Rawls’s	  Theory	  The	  first	  thing	  that	  comes	  to	  mind	  when	  confronted	  with	  the	  question	  of	  why	  historical	  injustice	  is	  not	  of	  the	  concern	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  is	  the	  idea	  that	  such	  a	  task	  is	  out	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  an	  ideal	  theory	  of	  justice	  is	  to	  provide.	  For,	  according	  to	  this	  idea,	  dealing	  with	  historical	  injustice	  falls	  exclusively	  under	  the	  realm	  of	  non-­‐ideal	  theory.	  Even	  defenders	  of	  the	  normative	  significance	  of	  past	  wrongs	   for	  present	   justice	  share	   this	  opinion.	   Janna	  Thompson,	  one	  of	  the	  scholars	  that	  has	  defended	  most	  thoroughly	  the	  rectification	  of	  historical	  wrongs,	  states:	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We	  have	  to	  drop	  the	  assumption	  that	  there	  is	  strict	  compliance	  with	  principles	  of	  justice	  in	  order	  to	  consider	  how	  representatives	  of	  family	  lines	  would	  regard	  claims	  for	  reparation	  for	  historical	  injustice.	  (Thompson	  2001:	  129)	  Similarly,	  George	  Sher,	  by	   titling	  his	  book	  on	   the	   issue	   ‘Approximate	  Justice:	  
Studies	   in	   Non-­‐Ideal	   Theory’	   (Sher	   1997),	   states	   his	   view	   that	   historical	  injustice	   is	   the	  exclusive	  concern	  of	  non-­‐ideal	   theory.	  More	  recently,	  Daniel	  Butt,	   in	   one	   of	   the	   few	   philosophy	   books	   that	   addresses	   rectification	   of	  historical	   injustice	   at	   the	   international	   level,	   holds:	   ‘In	   dealing	   with	   the	  rectification	   of	   historical	   injustice,	   then,	   this	   is	   an	   exercise	   of	   non-­‐ideal	  theory’	  (Butt	  2009:	  6-­‐7).	  There	  are	  many	  more	  examples.	  In	  fact,	  all	  of	  these	  authors	  are	  following	  the	  spirit	  of	  Rawls’s	  first	  remarks	  on	  ideal	  theory	  in	  A	  
Theory	  of	  Justice:	  [F]or	  the	  most	  part	  I	  examine	  the	  principles	  that	  would	  regulate	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society.	  Everyone	  is	  presumed	  to	  act	  justly	  and	  to	  do	  his	  part	  in	  upholding	  just	  institutions	   […]	   Thus	   I	   consider	   primarily	   what	   I	   call	   strict	   compliance	   as	  opposed	   to	   partial	   compliance	   theory.	   The	   latter	   studies	   the	   principles	   that	  govern	  how	  we	  are	  to	  deal	  with	  injustice.	  It	  comprises	  such	  topics	  as	  the	  theory	  of	   punishment,	   the	   doctrine	   of	   just	   war,	   and	   the	   justification	   of	   the	   various	  ways	   of	   opposing	   unjust	   regimes,	   ranging	   from	   civil	   disobedience	   and	  conscientious	   objection	   to	   militant	   resistance	   and	   revolution.	   Also	   included	  here	   are	   questions	   of	   compensatory	   justice	   and	   of	   weighing	   one	   form	   of	  institutional	  injustice	  against	  another.	  (TJ:	  7-­‐8)	  In	   this	   passage	   Rawls	   lists	   compensatory	   justice	   (i.e.,	   specific	   acts	   of	  
reparation	  of	  injustices	  committed	  in	  the	  past)	  as	  part	  of	  non-­‐ideal	  theory.	  In	  other	  places	   (e.g.,	  LP:	   89-­‐90)	  he	   claims	   that	   transitional	   justice	   (i.e.,	  how	   to	  arrive	  from	  contemporary	  societies	  to	  well-­‐ordered	  societies)	  is	  also	  part	  of	  non-­‐ideal	   theory.	  While	   I	   agree	  with	  Rawls	   in	   that	   both	   compensatory	   and	  transitional	  justice	  are	  out	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  an	  ideal	  theory	  is	  to	  provide,	  I	  believe	  that	  the	   importance	  of	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  a	  past	  shaped	  by	  gross	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injustice	   is	  of	   the	  competence	  of	   ideal	  theory.	  To	  be	  clear,	  my	  claim	  is	  not	  a	  direct	  attack	  on	  the	  main	  way	  Rawls	  draws	  the	  distinction	  between	  ideal	  and	  non-­‐ideal	   theory	   or	   to	   the	   importance	   that	   Rawls	   ascribes	   to	   ideal	   theory.	  These	  are	  the	  quarrels	  of	  Mills	  2005,	  Farrelly	  2007,	  Robeyns	  2008,	  Boettcher	  2009,	   Sen	   2006,	   2009,	   Mason	   2010	   and	   Wiens	   2012	   (attacking	   the	  importance	   of	   ideal	   theory),	   as	   well	   as	   of	   Stemplowska	   2008,	   Swift	   2008,	  Valentini	   2009,	   Lawford-­‐Smith	   2010,	   and	   Simmons	   2010	   (defending	   the	  importance	  of	  ideal	  theory).	  Likewise,	  my	  claim	  should	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  way	  of	  improving	  a	  non-­‐ideal	  Rawlsian	  theory	  of	   justice	  —as	  Taylor	  2009	  and	   Fuller	   2011	   take	   as	   their	   task.	   Rather,	   I	   am	   suggesting	   that	   given	   the	  main	  way	  in	  which	  Rawls	  distinguishes	  the	  two	  forms	  of	  theorizing,	  historical	  injustice	   is	   also	   of	   the	   competence	   of	   the	   ideal	   part	   of	   a	   theory	   of	   liberal	  justice.	  But	  let	  me	  first	  make	  a	  few	  comments	  regarding	  the	  divide	  itself.	  	  First,	  notice	  that	  Rawls’s	  theory	  (as	  many	  others)	  seems	  to	  be	  ‘ideal’	  in	  a	  non-­‐technical	  sense	  (see	  Valentini	  2009:	  6	  and	  Lawford-­‐Smith	  2010:	  361):	  it	  proposes	  an	   ideal	   society	  at	  which	  we	  should	  aim	   for.	  This	  non-­‐technical	  sense	   is	   captured	   by	   Rawls’s	   famous	   characterisation	   of	   his	   theory	   as	  presenting	  a	  ‘realistic	  utopia’:	  	  Political	  philosophy	  is	  realistically	  utopian	  when	  it	  extends	  what	  we	  ordinarily	  thought	  of	  as	   the	   limits	  of	  practical	  possibility.	  Our	  hope	   for	   the	   future	  of	  our	  society	   rest	   on	   the	   belief	   that	   the	   social	   world	   allows	   for	   just	   constitutional	  societies	  […]	  The	  idea	  of	  this	  society	  is	  realistically	  utopian	  in	  that	  it	  depicts	  a	  social	  world	  that	  combines	  political	  right	  and	  justice.	  (LP:	  5-­‐6)	  	  This	  non-­‐technical	   sense	   is	   then	   complemented	  by	   a	   technical	   one:	  Rawls’s	  theory	  is	  ideal	  so	  long	  as	  it	  works	  under	  the	  assumptions	  of	  strict-­‐compliance	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with	   the	  principles	  of	   justice	  and	   favourable	  conditions	  (see	  TJ:	  8,	  214,	  308-­‐309,	  LP:	  4-­‐10,	  JF:	  13,	  66,	  Simmons	  2010:	  8,	  Valentini	  2009:	  1n).	  Now,	  a	  crucial	  ambiguity	  with	  this	  simple	  definition	  of	  the	  technical	  sense	  comes	  up	  when	  it	  is	  confronted	  with	  what	  Rawls	  says	  about	  non-­‐ideal	  theory:	  so	   long	  as	  non-­‐ideal	   theory	   deals	   with	   partial	   compliance	   and	   non-­‐favourable	   conditions,	  non-­‐ideal	   theory	   is	   to	  work	  with	   cases	  of	   injustice	   (see	  TJ:	   8).	  As	   the	  quote	  above	   from	   the	   opening	   passages	   of	   Theory	   of	   Justice	   states,	   those	   cases	  include	   punishment,	   war,	   opposing	   unjust	   regimes,	   civil	   disobedience,	   etc.	  What	   Rawls	   may	   have	   had	   in	   mind	   is	   that	   non-­‐ideal	   theory	   is	   to	   provide	  guidance	  as	  how	   to	  proceed	   in	   those	  scenarios	   in	  which	   there	   is	   injustice.	   I	  fully	  agree	  with	  such	  an	   idea;	  however,	   claiming	   that	  non-­‐ideal	   theory	   is	   to	  deal	  with	  injustice	  obscures	  two	  important	  things.	  	  First,	  and	  most	  importantly,	  it	  obscures	  the	  fact	  that	  injustices	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  cases	  of	  past	  injustice	  and	  cases	  of	  present	  injustice.	  By	  assuming	  strict-­‐compliance	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   justice	   in	   the	   present,	   ideal	   theory	  rules	   out	   that	   cases	   of	   present	   injustice	   would	   arise	   in	   a	   liberal	   society.	  However,	   assuming	   strict-­‐compliance	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   justice	   in	   the	  
present	   tells	   nothing	   about	   whether	   past	   injustices	   have	   been	   rectified.	  Second,	  claiming	  that	  non-­‐ideal	  theory	  is	  to	  deal	  with	  injustice	  also	  obscures	  the	   fact	   that	   one	   plausible	  way	   of	   understanding	   an	   ideal-­‐theory	   of	   liberal	  justice	  is	  by	  saying	  that	  it	  offers	  a	  description	  of	  what	  is	  required	  in	  order	  to	  prevent	  injustices	  from	  arising	  in	  a	  liberal	  society.	  Rawls’s	  theory	  offers	  such	  a	   description:	  making	   a	   long	   story	   short,	   a	   society	  will	   be	   free	   of	   injustice	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once	  its	  basic	  structure	  is	  successfully	  regulated	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	  Because	  of	  its	  ideal	  character,	  however,	  his	  theory	  does	  not	  state	  
how	   we	   can	   arrive	   from	   our	   contemporary	   liberal	   societies	   to	   such	   an	  injustice-­‐free	   society.	   That,	   according	   to	   the	   divide,	   is	   the	   job	   of	   non-­‐ideal	  theory	  —see	  LP:	  89-­‐90.	  My	  claim	  is	  that,	  in	  just	  the	  same	  way	  in	  which	  ideal	  liberal	   theory	   offers	   the	   principles	   to	   prevent	   injustices	   from	   arising	   in	   a	  liberal	   society,	   it	  might	   need	   to	   offer	   a	   principle	   to	   prevent	   past	   injustices	  from	  remaining	  un-­‐rectified.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  job	  of	  ideal	  liberal	  theory	  to	  tell	  how	  we	  can	  arrive	  from	  our	  contemporary	   liberal	  societies	  to	  a	  society	   in	  which	  such	  a	  principle	  effectively	  guides	  the	  institutions	  of	  the	  basic	  structure.	  That,	  according	   to	   the	   divide	   with	   which	   I	   have	   agreed,	   is	   the	   job	   of	   non-­‐ideal	  theory.	  There	   are	   two	   types	   of	   reasons	   for	   including	   concern	   for	   historical	  injustice	  as	  part	  of	  ideal	  theory.	  The	  first	  type	  springs	  from	  the	  importance	  of	  historical	   rectification	   at	   a	   personal	   level	   (see	   §	   1.1).	   These	   are	   manifest	  when	  we	  attend	  to	  the	  reasons	  that	  Rawls	  offers	  to	  justify	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  the	   importance	   of	   the	   coercive	   power	   of	   the	   State	   even	   in	   a	   well-­‐ordered	  society.	   Here	   Rawls	   is	   clear	   that,	   despite	   the	   fact	   that	   his	   description	   of	   a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  supposes	  both	  strict-­‐compliance	  with	   the	  principles	  of	  justice	  and	  favourable	  conditions	  (assumptions	  that,	  as	  we	  know,	  make	  such	  a	   description	   ideal),	   the	   ‘normal	   conditions	   of	   human	   life’	   (TJ:	   212)	   render	  such	   coercive	   power	   and	   an	   account	   of	   penal	   sanctions	   necessary.	   Rawls	  says:	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It	   is	   reasonable	   to	   assume	   that	   even	   in	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society	   the	   coercive	  powers	   of	   government	   are	   to	   some	   degree	   necessary	   […]	   [e]ven	   under	  
reasonable	   ideal	   conditions,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   imagine,	   for	   example,	   a	   successful	  income	  tax	  scheme	  on	  voluntary	  basis.	  (TJ:	  211.	  Italics	  added)	  The	   idea	   behind	   this	   claim	   is	   that	   the	   ‘normal	   conditions	   of	   human	   life’	  include	   the	   fact	   that	   normal	   persons	   cannot	   be	   motivated	   to	   endorse	   and	  comply	  with	  a	  conception	  of	   justice	  exclusively	  through	  the	  appeal	  to	  moral	  considerations.	   Citizens	   are	   also	  motivated	  by	  what	   one	  might	   call	   positive	  stimuli	   (complying	   with	   the	   conception	   of	   justice	   will	   benefit	   them)	   and	  negative	   stimuli	   (not	   complying	  with	   the	   conception	   of	   justice	  will	   lead	   to	  sanctions).	   Rawls	   acknowledges	   that	   these	   three	   elements	   (moral	   reasons,	  positive	   stimuli,	   and	   negative	   stimuli)	   are	   the	   normal	   sources	   of	   the	  motivation	   to	   endorse	   and	   comply	  with	   a	   conception	  of	   justice.	   Even	  when	  Rawls	   is	   doing	   ideal	   theory,	   he	   does	   not	   list	   as	   part	   of	   the	   favourable	  conditions	   a	   tendency	   to	   go	   against	   normal	   psychology.	   Being	   motivated	  intermittently	   by	   these	   three	   “forces”	   is	   a	   normal	   condition	   of	   persons’	  motivation,	  and	  an	  ideal	  theory	  must	  take	  this	  into	  account	  when	  proposing	  a	  conception	  of	  justice:	  It	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   preceding	   remarks	   that	   we	   need	   an	   account	   of	   penal	  sanctions	  however	   limited	  even	  for	  ideal	  theory.	  Given	  the	  normal	  conditions	  of	  
human	  life,	  some	  such	  arrangements	  are	  necessary.	  (TJ:	  212.	  Italics	  added)	  Thus,	   Rawls’s	   theory	   takes	   into	   account	   a	   psychological	   fact	   about	   human	  motivation	  in	  order	  to	  include	  in	  his	  description	  of	  an	  ideally	  just	  society	  the	  claim	   that	   the	   government	   is	   to	   have	   coercive	   powers	   to	   impose	   the	  directives	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice.	  Similarly,	  the	  evidence	  I	  have	  provided	  regarding	  the	  importance	  in	  a	  person’s	  life	  of	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  an	  unjust	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past	   suggests	   that	   this	   is	   another	   permanent	   feature	   of	   normal	   human	  psychology.	  A	  person	  who	  has	  been	  the	  victim	  of	  political	  violence	  has	  a	  great	  interest	   in	  having	  both	   the	  State	  and	  society	   to	  recognise	   the	  gravity	  of	   the	  injustice	  that	  has	  occurred	  to	  her.	  My	  suggestion,	  then,	  is	  that	  the	  interest	  of	  
coming	   to	   terms	   with	   the	   past	   is	   on	   a	   par	   with	   other	   human	   psychological	  
regularities	  similar	  to	  the	  ones	  Rawls’s	  ideal	  theory	  is	  sensitive	  to.	  I	  do	  not	  see	  any	  reason	  for	  Rawls	  to	  include	  in	  his	  theory	  the	  psychological	  regularities	  he	  does	  but	  not	  those	  related	  to	  the	  need	  of	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  an	  unjust	  past.	  The	   fact	  of	   the	  normal	   sources	  of	  motivation	  has	  dramatic	   results	   in	  Rawls’s	   theory:	   even	   under	   the	   best	   conditions	   we	   can	   imagine,	   a	   liberal	  society	  will	   always	   need	   of	   a	   State	  with	   coercive	   powers.	   This	   shows	   how	  serious	  Rawls	   takes	  psychological	   facts	   to	  be	   in	  determining	   the	   content	  of	  his	   theory.	   I	   suggest	   that	   the	  psychological	   facts	  described	   in	  §	   1.1	   prompt	  similar	  important	  results:	  even	  under	  the	  best	  conditions	  we	  can	  imagine	  for	  a	  liberal	  society,	  citizens	  will	  always	  feel	  the	  need	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  their	  past.	  	   But	  some	  may	  want	  to	  dispute	  the	  analogy	  I	  have	  made	  between	  some	  salient	  psychological	  facts	  that	  Rawls	  considers	  in	  determining	  the	  content	  of	  his	  theory	  and	  the	  psychological	  facts	  that	  grant	  the	  importance	  of	  coming	  to	  terms	   with	   the	   past.	   For,	   indeed,	   Rawls	   explicitly	   leaves	   out	   some	   other	  important	   psychological	   facts	   of	   normal	   citizens.	   In	   particular,	   Rawls	   (TJ:	  123-­‐125,	   465)	   states	   that	   envy,	   non-­‐risk	   aversion	   and	   other	   ‘special	  psychologies’	   are	   not	   part	   of	   the	  motivations	   of	   the	   parties	   in	   the	   original	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position.	   Thus,	   this	   objection	   may	   go,	   just	   as	   these	   ‘special’	   psychological	  regularities	   are	   not	   to	   motivate	   the	   parties,	   so	   do	   those	   related	   to	   the	  importance	  of	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  past.	  	  I	  see	  two	  main	  problems	  with	  this	  objection.	  In	  the	  jargon	  of	  the	  moral	  psychology	   done	   in	   contemporary	   philosophy,	   it	   may	   be	   said	   that	   the	  psychological	   facts	   associated	   with	   a	   non-­‐rectified	   past	   wrong	   create	   in	  victims	  (amongst	  other	  things)	  a	  form	  resentment.	  We	  can	  then	  say	  that	  the	  objection	   analogises	   envy	   to	   this	   form	   of	   resentment	   as	   equal	   feelings	   or	  emotions.	   However,	   Rawls	   (TJ:	   467)	   explicitly	   denies	   that	   envy	   is	   a	  moral	  emotion.12	  Conversely,	   it	   seems	   clear	   that	   the	   resentment	   originated	   by	   a	  non-­‐rectified	   past	   wrong	   is	  a	  moral	   emotion.	   Aaron	   Ben-­‐Ze’ev	   2002	   offers	  two	  conditions	  to	  consider	  an	  emotion	  as	  moral:	  (1)	  whether	  the	  core	  of	  the	  evaluative	   concern	   of	   the	   emotion	   is	   moral	   and	   (2)	   whether	   the	   emotion	  tends	   to	   lead	   to	   beneficial	   moral	   consequences	   (see	   Ben-­‐Ze’ev	   2002:	   148-­‐149).	  The	  resentment	  originated	  by	  a	  non-­‐rectified	  past	  wrong	   satisfies	   the	  two.	  First,	   the	  evaluative	  concern	  of	  this	  form	  of	  resentment	  is	  that	  one	  has	  been	   mistreated	   according	   to	   the	   prerogatives	   that	   justice	   is	   supposed	   to	  protect.	   When	   a	   violation	   of	   such	   prerogatives	   occurs,	   one	   may	   correctly	  resent	   its	   lack	  of	   restoration.	  Second,	  expression	  of	   this	   type	  of	   resentment	  may	  help	  (as	  we	  saw	  in	  §	  1.2)	  to	  restore	  the	  mutual	  respect	  between	  victims	  and	   the	   rest	   of	   the	   community.	   Therefore,	   such	   an	   emotion,	   as	   opposed	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  See	  Ben-­‐Ze’ev	  2002	  for	  a	  defence	  of	  this	  claim;	  see	  La	  Caze	  2001	  and	  Tomlin	  2008	  for	  an	  alternative	  view.	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envy,	  is	  not	  a	  ‘special	  psychology’.	  Rather,	  the	  stated	  emotion	  is	  one	  form	  of	  
moral	  resentment	  that	  Rawls	  (TJ:	  467)	  takes	  as	  a	  moral	  feeling.	  Second,	  and	  more	   importantly,	   this	  objection	  rests	  on	  a	  conflation	  of	  what	  Rawls	  (PL:	  27-­‐28)	  calls	  the	  three	  points	  of	  view.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  that	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position.	  The	  second	  one	  is	  that	  of	  the	  citizens	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	   society.	   And	   the	   third	   one	   is	   ours	   as	   theorists.	   Because	  we	  as	  
theorists	  think	  that	  the	  need	  to	  come	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  past	  is	  a	  psychological	  and	   social	   regularity	   with	   normative	   significance,	   we	   stipulate	   that	   the	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position	  would	  know	  this.	  This	  is	  to	  ensure	  that,	  if	  it	  is	  the	   case	   that	   the	   society	   ordered	   by	   the	   principles	   selected	   by	   them	   does	  count	  severe	   injustices	  within	   its	  past,	   citizens	  would	  have	   the	   institutional	  means	  to	  rectify	  them.13	  This	   takes	  us	   to	   the	  second	   type	  of	   reasons	   in	   favour	  of	   taking	   issue	  with	   historical	   injustice	   in	   an	   ideal	   theory	   of	   liberal	   justice.	   These	   reasons	  have	   to	   do	  with	   the	   social	   level	   of	   historical	   rectification	   (see	  § 1.2	   and	  § 
1.3).	   Another	   comparison	  may	   help	   to	   present	   them.	   The	   evidence	   already	  cited	  suggests	  that	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  an	  unjust	  past	  is	  on	  a	  par	  with	  other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  13	  Tomlin	   2008	   has	   argued	   something	   similar	   regarding	   the	   inclusion	   of	   the	   psychological	  fact	  of	  envy	  as	  part	  of	   the	  knowledge	   (not	  as	  a	  motivation)	   that	   the	  parties	  consider	   in	   the	  original	  position.	  I	  believe	  that	  his	  main	  claim	  is	  correct,	  although	  I	  find	  support	  for	  it	  already	  in	  Rawls’s	   later	  texts.	   	   I	  think	  that	  Tomlin’s	  interpretative	  claims	  rest	  on	  a	  conflation	  of	  the	  cited	  three	  points	  of	  view	  (that	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position,	  that	  of	  the	  citizens	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society,	  and	  ours	  as	  theorist).	  Because	  we	  as	  theorists	  think	  that	  envy	   is	  not	  a	  relevant	   moral	   consideration	   regarding	   the	   correct	   election	   of	   principles	   of	   justice,	   we	  stipulate	  that	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position	  would	  not	  be	  motivated	  by	  envy.	  However,	  
pace	  Tomlin	  2008,	   this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  citizens	   in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  would	  not	  be	  prey	  to	  some	  form	  of	  envy	  sometimes	  and	  that	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position	  would	  not	  be	   aware	   of	   that	   fact	   (see	   JF:	   87).	   In	   the	   end,	   as	   Tomlin	   2008:	   112	   himself	   accepts,	   the	  parties’	   knowledge	   of	   this	   psychological	   fact	   about	   citizens	   (i.e.,	   envy)	  would	  not	   alter	   the	  selection	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  —in	  particular,	  of	  the	  difference	  principle.	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permanent	   features	   of	   liberal	   societies	   such	   as	   reasonable	   pluralism	   and	  
cultural	  pluralism.	  Rawls’s	  Political	  Liberalism,	   as	  part	  of	  his	   ideal	   theory,	   is	  an	  attempt	  to	  accommodate	  the	  former.	  Kymlicka’s	  1989,	  1995,	  2007	  as	  well	  as	  Margalit	   &	   Raz’s	   1995	   (see	   also	   Raz	   1995:	   170-­‐191	   and,	  more	   recently,	  Wall	  2007)	  respective	  theories	  of	  minority	  rights,	  all	  of	  them	  pieces	  of	  ideal	  theory,	   are	   attempts	   to	   accommodate	   the	   latter.	   The	   rationale	   for	   taking	  these	  two	  features	  of	   liberal	  societies	  as	  part	  of	   ideal	  theory	  is	  the	  fact	  that,	  even	  by	   supposing	   strict-­‐compliance	  with	   the	  principles	   that	  must	   regulate	  social	   cooperation	   and	   favourable	   conditions,	   the	   two	   features	   will	   not	  disappear.	  Similarly,	   I	  claim,	  supposing	  strict-­‐compliance	   in	  the	  present	  with	  the	  principles	  that	  must	  regulate	  social	  cooperation	  in	  liberal	  societies	  does	  not	  eliminate	   unjust	   historical	   interactions	   and	   the	   social	   need	   for	   assessing	  them	   morally.	   That	   is,	   just	   as	   religious	   and	   cultural	   interactions	   will	   not	  disappear	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society,	  unjust	  historical	  interactions	  will	  not	  go	  away	   either.	   Any	   theory	   (be	   it	   ideal	   or	   non-­‐ideal)	   of	   liberal	   justice	   that	   is	  sound	   must	   consider	   the	   three	   things	   when	   offering	   its	   principles	   of	  regulation	  for	  liberal	  societies.	  If	  a	  conception	  of	  justice	  does	  not	  offer	  a	  fair	  treatment	   to	   each	   liberally	   compatible	   religious	   or	   cultural	   group,	   the	  members	  of	  these	  groups	  can	  justifiably	  say	  that	  they	  are	  not	  being	  treated	  as	  equals.	  Combined,	  Rawls	  and	  Kymlicka’s	  descriptions	  of	  a	  just	  liberal	  society	  ensure	  that	  this	  result	  is	  avoided.	  Likewise,	  a	  further	  inclusion	  in	  ideal	  liberal	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theory	   might	   be	   needed	   so	   that	   the	   treatment	   as	   equals	   to	   victims	   of	  historical	  injustices	  is	  ensured.	  Notice	   that	   by	   making	   the	   analogy	   between	   cultural	   and	   religious	  pluralism	  —on	   the	   one	   hand—	  and	  historical	   interactions	   shaped	  by	   gross	  injustices	  —on	   the	   other—	  as	   permanent	   features	   of	   liberal	   societies,	   I	   am	  not	   stating	   that	   injustices	   will	   always	   exist	   in	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society.	   For,	  since	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society	   is	   defined	   as	   a	   society	   in	   which	   no	   injustice	  occurs,	  this	  latter	  statement	  would	  suggest	  a	  contradiction	  in	  terms.	  	  Rather,	  what	  I	  claim	  is	  that	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  will	  always	  count	  severe	  injustices	  as	  
part	  of	  its	  pre-­‐ordered	  history.	  In	  fact,	  the	  urgency	  of	  trying	  to	  arrive	  at	  well-­‐ordered	   societies	   is	   precisely	   the	   fact	   that	   right	   now	   severe	   injustices	   are	  taking	  place	  in	  our	  societies	  and	  terrible	  wrongs	  have	  occurred	  in	  their	  past.	  Once	  our	  societies	  are	  well-­‐ordered	  those	  injustices	  and	  wrongs	  will	  be	  part	  of	  their	  history	  and	  that	  will	  always	  be	  the	  case.	  Also,	  notice	  that	  I	  am	  not	  claiming	  that	  new	  injustices	  would	  arise	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society.	  Statements	  of	  that	  sort	  would	  be	  evaluated	  in	  §	  4.2	  and	  
§	  4.3.	  Rather	  as	  I	  have	  said,	  what	  I	  claim	  is	  that	  the	  injustices	  committed	  in	  the	  pre-­‐ordered	  past	  of	  a	  society	  will	  prevail	  as	  part	  of	  that	  society’s	  history	  once	  it	  is	  well-­‐ordered;	  such	  past	  injustices	  (which	  might	  go	  as	  far	  back	  as	  the	  putative	   origin	   of	   the	   society	   in	   question)	   will	   be	   in	   need	   of	   normative	  assessment	  and	  rectification.	  But	   some	  may	  want	   to	   dispute	   the	   stated	   analogy	   between	   cultural	  and	   religious	   pluralism	   —on	   the	   one	   hand—	   and	   historical	   interactions	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shaped	  by	  gross	  injustices	  —on	  the	  other—	  as	  permanent	  features	  of	  liberal	  societies.	  This	  can	  be	  done	  by	  appealing	  to	  each	  of	  the	  two	  clauses	  that	  make	  Rawls’s	  theory	  ideal	  in	  the	  technical	  sense:	  the	  assumptions,	  respectively,	  of	  strict-­‐compliance	  and	  of	  favourable	  conditions.	  Let	  me	  consider	  them	  in	  turn.	  Appealing	   to	   the	   ambiguity	   I	   have	   previously	   mentioned	   regarding	   the	  definition	   of	   ideal	   theory	   (i.e.,	   that	   Rawls	   is	   ambiguous	   on	   whether	   he	   is	  supposing	  strict	  compliance	  only	  in	  the	  present	  or	  also	  in	  the	  past),	  it	  can	  be	  argued	   that	   Rawls	   has	   supposed	   all	   along	   historical	  strict-­‐compliance.	   This	  seems	   to	   be	   the	   spirit	   of	   Thompson’s	   passage	   with	   which	   I	   opened	   this	  section:	  
We	  have	  to	  drop	  the	  assumption	  that	  there	  is	  strict	  compliance	  with	  principles	  of	  justice	   in	  order	   to	   consider	  how	   representatives	  of	   family	   lines	  would	   regard	  claims	   for	   reparation	   for	   historical	   injustice.	   (Thompson	   2001:	   129.	   Italics	  added)	  Thompson	   thinks	   that	   the	   Rawlsian	   clause	   of	   strict-­‐compliance	   eschews	  concern	   for	   historical	   injustice	  within	   the	   proceedings	   of	   ideal	   theory.	   Call	  this	   interpretation	   of	   the	   ideal	   character	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   the	   historical	  
strict-­‐compliance	  reading.	  If	  this	  reading	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  is	  assumed,	  then	  of	  course	   historical	   injustices	   are	   outside	   of	   its	   scope.	   However,	   I	   would	  challenge	  this	  claim	  on	  four	  grounds.	  	  First,	   consider	   the	   oddness	   of	   the	   reading	   itself.	   The	   reading	   states	  that	  Rawls’s	  theory	  wants	  to	  offer	  principles	  to	  regulate	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  a	  society	  that,	  by	  definition	  (according	  to	  the	  assumption	  of	  historical	  strict-­‐
compliance),	  has	  always	  been	  just.	  So	  it	  portrays	  Rawls’s	  theoretical	  exercise	  as	  committed	   to	  something	   like	   the	   following:	   ‘Let	  us	  assume	  that	  a	  society	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has	  been	  well-­‐ordered	   from	  its	  origin	  up	  to	   the	  present.	  Now	  I	  will	   tell	  you	  which	  principles	  will	  make	  it	  well-­‐ordered	  from	  the	  present	  on’.	  This	  sounds	  strange	   enough,	   but	   there	   is	   a	   second	   theoretical	   problem:	   this	   reading	   is	  unable	  to	  explain	  the	  origin	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society.	  It	  simply	  assumes	  that	  before	   the	   society	  was	  well-­‐ordered,	   such	   a	   society	   did	   not	   exist,	   since,	   by	  definition,	  it	  never	  had	  a	  disordered	  (unjust)	  past.	  The	  reading	  thus	  assumes	  that	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  comes	  into	  existence	  out	  of	  nowhere,	  as	  it	  were.	  	  Third,	   if	   the	   historical	   strict-­‐compliance	   reading	   were	   correct,	   then	  Rawls’s	   theory	  would	   be	   ideal	   in	   the	  wrong	  way.	   For	   this	   assumption	   (not	  having	   a	   previous	   disordered	   history)	   is	   a	   condition	   that	   no	   society	   in	   the	  present	   or	   the	   future	   can	   ever	   possibly	   meet,	   making	   Rawls’s	   theory	  completely	   useless	   for	   the	   human	  world.	   This	   also	  makes	   it	   clear	  why	   the	  past	   is	   on	   a	   par	  with	   other	   permanent	   features	   of	   a	   liberal	   society	   such	   as	  cultural	  and	  reasonable	  pluralism:	  if	  Rawls	  were	  to	  assume	  that	  cultural	  and	  reasonable	   pluralism	   did	   not	   exist,	   this	  would	  make	   his	   theory	   completely	  irrelevant	   for	   this	   world,	   since	   no	   liberal	   society	   could	   ever	   meet	   such	  assumption.	  As	   I	  have	  said,	   the	  same	   thing	  will	  happen	   if	  his	   theory	  simply	  eschews	  the	  past.	  	  And	   yet	   there	   is	   a	   fourth	   important	   ground	   for	   the	   rejection	   of	   the	  
historical	  strict-­‐compliance	  reading:	  Rawls’s	  own	  emphasis	  on	  the	  historicity	  of	  his	  conception	  of	  justice.	  This	  is	  clearly	  stated	  in	  (and	  is	  one	  of	  the	  major	  themes	   of)	   Rawls’s	   Political	   Liberalism.	   Rawls	   (PL:	   xxiv)	   holds	   that	   just	   as	  liberalism	   itself,	   his	   political	   conception	   of	   justice	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   solve	   a	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particular	   problem	   that	   has	   a	   historical	   origin	   in	   the	   ‘Reformation	   and	   its	  aftermath,	   with	   the	   long	   controversies	   over	   religious	   toleration	   in	   the	  sixteenth	   and	   seventeenth	   centuries’.	   This	   makes	   his	   conception	   of	   justice	  only	   proper	   to	   the	   societies	   that	   have	   gone	   forward	   from	   such	   past.	   Thus	  Rawls	  states	  he	  wants	  to	  offer	  a	  conception	  of	  justice	  for	  our	  liberal	  societies,	  for	   societies	   having	   our	   shared	   political	   culture.	   But	   consider	   what	   makes	  these	  societies	  ours.	  Rawls	  himself	  appeals	  to	  their	  past.	   It	   is	  because	  of	  the	  historical	  interactions	  that	  allowed	  the	  free	  exercise	  of	  practical	  reason	  that	  now	  our	  societies	  have	  the	  political	  culture	  they	  do.	  However,	  such	  historical	  interactions	  are	  replete	  with	  violations	  to	  the	  principles	  that	  are	  to	  regulate	  social	  cooperation	  as	  well	   (that	   is,	   replete	  with	   injustices).	   In	   fact,	   it	   is	  only	  because	   of	   this	   that	   the	   main	   attempt	   to	   solve	   the	   problem	   of	   political	  liberalism	   (‘what	   are	   the	   fair	   terms	   of	   cooperation	   between	   citizens	  characterised	  as	  free	  and	  equal	  yet	  divide	  by	  profound	  doctrinal	  conflict?’	  —
PL:	  xxv—)	  is	  so	  pressing.	  Summing	   up,	   the	   historical	   strict-­‐compliance	   reading	   of	   the	   ideal	  character	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   is	   completely	   inadequate	   since:	   first,	   it	   makes	  Rawls’s	   theoretical	   exercise	   odd	   (i.e.,	   offering	   a	   conception	   of	   justice	   for	   a	  society	  that	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  just	  ever	  since	  its	  origin);	  second,	  it	  is	  unable	  to	  explain	  the	  origin	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  (for	  such	  society	  is	  assumed	  not	  to	  have	  a	  previous	  disordered	  past);	   third,	   it	  makes	  Rawls’s	   theory	   ideal	   in	  the	  wrong	  way	  (for	  no	  liberal	  society	  in	  the	  present	  or	  the	  future	  could	  meet	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such	   an	   assumption);	   and,	   fourth,	   it	   flies	   in	   the	   face	   of	   some	   of	   the	   most	  salient	  theses	  of	  Rawls’s	  political	  liberalism.	  	   So	   let	   me	   turn	   to	   the	   second	   way	   in	   which	   the	   analogy	   between	  cultural	  and	  reasonable	  pluralism	  —on	  the	  one	  hand—	  and	  an	  unjust	  past	  —on	  the	  other—	  as	  permanent	  features	  of	  liberal	  societies	  may	  be	  disputed.	  It	  may	   be	   argued	   that	   Rawls’s	   clause	   stipulating	   favourable	   conditions	  grants	  the	   supposition	   that	   no	  major	   historical	   injustice	   has	   occurred	   in	   a	   society	  that	   is	   to	   be	   well-­‐ordered	   at	   a	   given	   time	   by	   the	   principles	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	  Korsgaard	  best	  expresses	  this	  putative	  interpretative	  claim:	  Ideal	  theory	  is	  worked	  out	  under	  certain	  assumptions.	  One	  is	  strict	  compliance:	  it	   is	  assumed	  that	  everyone	  will	   [i.e.,	   in	   the	  present	  and	  future]	  act	   justly.	  The	  other,	   a	   little	   harder	   to	   specify,	   is	   that	   historical,	   economic,	   and	   natural	  conditions	  are	  such	  that	  realization	  of	  the	  ideal	  is	  feasible	  […]	  We	  also	  assume	  in	   ideal	   theory	   that	   there	   are	   no	   massive	   historic	   injustices,	   such	   as	   the	  
oppression	  of	  blacks	  and	  women,	   to	  be	  corrected.	  The	  point	   is	   to	  work	   out	   our	  ideal	   view	   of	   justice	   on	   the	   assumption	   that	   people,	   nature,	   and	   history	   will	  behave	  themselves	  so	  that	  the	  ideal	  can	  be	  realized,	  and	  then	  to	  determined	  —in	  light	  of	  that	  ideal—	  what	  is	  to	  be	  done	  in	  actual	  circumstances	  when	  they	  do	  not.	  (Korsgaard	  1996a:	  147-­‐148.	  Italics	  added)	  Korsgaard	  thinks	  that	  the	  Rawlsian	  clause	  of	  favourable	  conditions	  eschews	  concern	   for	   historical	   injustice	  within	   the	   proceedings	   of	   ideal	   theory.	   Call	  this	   interpretation	   of	   the	   ideal	   character	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   the	   favourable	  
historical	   conditions	   reading.	   If	   this	   reading	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   is	   assumed,	  then	  of	  course	  historical	  injustices	  are	  outside	  of	  its	  scope.	  However,	  I	  would	  challenge	  this	  claim	  on	  two	  grounds.	  	  First,	   notice	   that	   it	   is	   a	   matter	   of	   interpretative	   dispute	   whether	   the	  clause	   of	   favourable	   conditions	   is	   in	   place	   to	   grant	   the	   assumption	   that	   no	  major	  historical	  injustice	  has	  occurred	  in	  a	  society	  that	  is	  to	  be	  governed	  by	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justice-­‐as-­‐fairness’s	   principles.	   Certainly,	   some	   passages	   of	   Rawls’s	  theoretical	   corpus	  may	   seem	   to	   suggest	   that	   (see,	   in	   particular,	   JF:	   64-­‐65).	  However,	  I	  believe	  that	  for	  the	  most	  part	  the	  favourable	  conditions	  clause	  is	  concerned	   with	   ensuring	   that,	   once	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society	   is	   established,	  contingent	   historical,	   natural,	   and	   social	   conditions	   from	   then	   on	   would	  favour	   the	   stable	   continuation	   of	   such	   society	   from	   one	   generation	   to	   the	  next	   (see,	   in	   particular,	   JF:	   4,	   13,	  PL:	  336).14	  It	   should	   also	   be	   noticed	   that	  when	  Rawls	  mentions	  historical	  contingencies	  he	  usually	  refers	  to	  the	  specific	  contingent	   social	   positions	   that	   would	   bias	   the	   selection	   of	   principles	   of	  justice	  in	  the	  original	  position	  (social	  class,	  gender,	  race,	  sexual	  orientation)	  and	  not	  to	  past	  historical	  interactions	  as	  such	  (see	  PL:	  271-­‐274	  and	  Simmons	  2010:	   13-­‐15).	   So,	   at	   the	   very	   least	   it	   should	   be	   accepted	   that	   the	  Rawlsian	  theoretical	  corpus	  allows	  a	  different	  interpretation	  of	  its	  ideal	  character	  than	  the	  one	  defended	  by	  the	  favourable	  historical	  conditions	  reading.	  	  Moreover,	   other	   Rawlsian	   passages	   suggest	   the	   complete	   rejection	   of	  the	  stated	  reading.	  Consider	  the	  following:	  In	  addition,	  the	  veil	  of	  ignorance	  (§24)	  is	  interpreted	  to	  mean	  not	  only	  that	  the	  parties	   have	   no	   knowledge	   of	   their	   particular	   aims	   and	   ends	   (except	  what	   is	  contain	   in	   the	   thin	   theory	   of	   the	   good),	   but	   also	   that	   the	   historical	   record	   is	  
closed	   to	   them.	   They	   do	   not	   know,	   and	   cannot	   enumerate	   the	   social	  circumstances	  in	  which	  they	  may	  find	  themselves.	  (TJ:	  160.	  Italics	  added)	  Here	   Rawls	   states	   that	   the	   course	   of	   history	   is	   closed	   to	   the	   parties	   in	   the	  original	  position.	  Another	  passage	  states	  the	  same	  claim:	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  James	  2005:	  282	  offers	   independent	  support	   for	   this	  reading	  of	   the	   favourable	  condition	  clause.	   According	   to	   him,	   Rawls’s	   method	   for	   proposing	   principles	   of	   justice	   for	   a	   given	  practice	  requires	  us	  to:	   ‘identify	  an	  existing	  social	  practice,	  including	  its	  point,	  or	  the	  goods	  that	  is	  meant	  to	  realize.	  Assume	  circumstances	  favorable	  to	  its	  continuance’	  (Italics	  added).	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Let	   us	   distinguish	   between	   three	   kinds	   of	   facts:	   the	   first	   principles	   of	   social	  theory	   […]	   general	   facts	   about	   society	   […]	   and	   finally,	   particular	   facts	   about	  individuals	   […]	   In	   the	  original	  position	   the	  only	  particular	   facts	  known	   to	   the	  parties	   are	   those	   that	   can	   be	   inferred	   by	   the	   circumstances	   of	   justice.	  While	  they	  know	  the	   first	  principles	  of	  social	   theory,	  the	  course	  of	  history	  is	  closed	  to	  
them;	  they	  have	  no	  information	  about	  how	  often	  society	  has	  taken	  this	  or	  that	  form,	  or	  which	  kinds	  of	  society	  presently	  exist.	  (TJ:	  175.	  Italics	  added)	  Rawls	  reiterates	  that	  knowledge	  about	  the	  history	  of	  their	  society	  is	  closed	  to	  the	  parties.	  By	  doing	  this,	  Rawls	  has	  stipulated	  that	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position	  cannot	  make	  assumptions	  regarding	  the	  course	  of	   the	  past	  of	   their	  society.	   Thus,	   just	   as	   the	   parties	   do	   not	   know	  whether	   they	   or	   the	   citizens	  they	  represent	  would	  adopt	  this	  or	  that	  religion	  once	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  is	   established,	   they	   do	   not	   know	   whether	   their	   well-­‐ordered	   society	   would	  
count	  severe	  historical	  injustices	  as	  part	  of	  its	  pre-­‐ordered	  history.	   In	  fact,	  this	  is	  a	  very	  good	  reason	  for	  the	  parties	  to	  ensure	  provisions	  for	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	   the	   past:	   for	   all	   they	   know,	   it	  may	  be	   the	  case	   that	   their	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  counts	  historical	  injustices	  as	  part	  of	  its	  past.	  Second,	  I	  do	  not	  think	  that,	  as	  Korsgaard	  claims,	  the	  ideal	  (in	  the	  non-­‐technical	   sense)	   of	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society	   cannot	   be	   realised	   unless	   we	  suppose	  that	  history	  has	  ‘behaved’	  itself.	  Rather,	  just	  as	  we	  as	  theorists	  need	  to	  show	  that	  it	  is	  still	  a	  practical	  possibility	  that	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  would	  be	  stable	  over	   time	  given	   the	   fact	  of	  persons’	  normal	  sources	  of	  motivation	  and	  the	  facts	  of	  reasonable	  and	  cultural	  pluralism,	  so	  we	  also	  need	  to	  show	  that	  it	  is	  still	  a	  practical	  possibility	  that	  such	  a	  society	  would	  be	  stable	  even	  if	  it	   counts	   severe	   injustices	  as	  part	  of	   its	  past.	  For	  all	  of	  what	  Korsgaard	  has	  stated,	  we	  could	  also	  have	  supposed	  that	  nature	  has	  ‘behaved’	  in	  a	  way	  that	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citizens	  do	  not	  feel	  a	  normal	  tendency	  to	  take	  advantage	  of	  social	  cooperation	  sometimes.	   The	   putative	   realisation	   of	   the	   ideal	   of	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society	  would	  be	  easier	  under	  this	  supposition.	  However,	  it	  is	  a	  remarkable	  virtue	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  that	  it	  does	  not	  eschew	  normal	  psychology	  and	  thus	  confronts	  the	  challenge	  of	  showing	  that	   the	   ideal	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	   is	  possible	  for	  normal	  human	  beings.	  Similarly,	  we	  need	  to	  show	  that	  a	  past	  marked	  by	  injustice	  does	  not	  hinder	  the	  possibility	  of	  arriving	  at	  that	  ideal.	  To	  state	  my	  point	  more	  clearly,	  recall	  what	  Rawls	  (PL:	  27-­‐28)	  calls	  the	  three	  points	  of	  view:	  the	  one	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position,	  the	  one	  of	  the	   citizens	   in	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society,	   and	   the	   one	   of	   us	   as	   theorists.	   The	  question	  then	  is	  this:	  from	  which	  point	  of	  view	  are	  we	  to	  suppose	  that	  history	  has	   ‘behaved’	   itself	   so	   that	   no	   historical	   injustice	   has	   occurred?	  As	  we	   just	  saw,	  it	  cannot	  be	  that	  of	  the	  parties	  of	  the	  original	  position,	  for	  the	  passages	  just	   quoted	   exclude	   this	   possibility.	   It	   cannot	   be	   that	   of	   citizens	   of	   liberal	  societies	   because	   the	  previous	  history	   of	   their	  well-­‐ordered	   society,	   just	   as	  other	   psychological	   and	   social	   facts,	   is	   something	   that	   simply	   happens	   to	  them.	  And	  it	  cannot	  be	  ours	  as	  theorists,	  for	  we	  actually	  know	  that	  the	  history	  of	  liberal	  societies	  is	  full	  of	  injustices	  and	  that,	  I	  tend	  to	  believe,	  is	  one	  of	  our	  main	  motivations	  to	  discuss	  how	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  would	  look	  like.15	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15	  Consider	  what	  Rawls	  (JF:	  13)	  holds:	  ‘We	  ask	  in	  effect	  what	  a	  perfectly	  just,	  or	  nearly	  just,	  constitutional	  regime	  may	  be,	  and	  whether	  it	  may	  come	  about	  and	  be	  made	  stable	  under	  the	  circumstances	  of	  justice,	  and	  so	  under	  realistic	  though	  reasonably	  favorable	  conditions.	  In	  this	  way	   justice	   as	   fairness	   is	   realistically	   utopian:	   it	   probes	   the	   limits	   of	   the	   realistically	  practicable,	  that	  is,	  how	  far	  in	  our	  world	  (given	  its	  laws	  and	  tendencies)	  a	  democratic	  regime	  can	  attain	  complete	  realization	  of	  its	  appropriate	  political	  values’	  (Italics	  added).	  Considering	  what	  Rawls	  states	  here,	  another	  way	  to	  put	  my	  second	  objection	  to	  the	  favourable	  historical	  
conditions	  reading	   is	   that	   it	  holds	  an	  unreasonable	  assumption,	   for	   it	   is	  unrealistic	  and	  also	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Summing	  up,	   the	   favourable	  historical	  conditions	  reading	  of	   the	   ideal	  character	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   is	   both	   interpretatively	   and	   theoretically	  incorrect.	   First,	   since	   the	   course	   of	   history	   is	   closed	   to	   the	   parties	   in	   the	  original	  position,	  the	  need	  for	  ensuring	  provisions	  for	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  an	  unjust	  past	  is	  one	  consideration	  that	  they	  must	  ponder	  (just	  as	  they	  must	  ponder	  the	  psychological	  fact	  of	  citizens’	  sources	  of	  motivation,	  and	  the	  social	  facts	   of	   reasonable	   and	   cultural	   pluralism).	   Second,	  we	   as	   theorist	   need	   to	  show	   that	   even	  under	   historical	   conditions	  marked	  by	   injustice	  —as	   is	   the	  case	   of	   all	   current	   liberal	   societies—	   the	   Rawlsian	   utopia	   (a	   stable	   well-­‐ordered	  society)	  is	  still	  realistic.	  For	   all	   of	   the	   aforementioned	   reasons,	   the	   phenomenon	   of	   the	  importance	  of	   coming	   to	   terms	  with	  an	  unjust	  past	  must	  be	  conceptualised	  also	  as	  part	  of	  ideal	  theory.	  Both	  the	  personal	  and	  social	  levels	  of	  it	  grant	  such	  conceptualisation.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  phenomenon	  is	  on	  a	  par	  with	  other	  psychological	  regularities	  which	  are	  already	  central	   to	  Rawls’s	   ideal	   theory.	  Likewise,	   an	  unjust	  past	   and	   the	  need	   to	   assess	   it	  morally	   is	   on	   a	  par	  with	  other	  permanent	  features	  of	  liberal	  societies	  such	  as	  cultural	  and	  reasonable	  pluralism,	  features	  that	  Rawls’s	  ideal	  theory	  considers	  quite	  carefully.	  	  Remember	  that	  I	  am	  not	  asking	  ideal	  theory	  to	  flesh	  out	  how	  we	  can	  arrive	   from	   our	   contemporary	   liberal	   societies	   (in	   which	   most	   relevant	  historical	   injustices	  remain	  un-­‐rectified)	  to	  well-­‐ordered	  societies	  (in	  which	  no	   relevant	   historical	   injustice	   remains	   un-­‐rectified).	   Theories	   of	   transition	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  unnecessary	   to	   claim	   that	   history	   has	   ‘behaved’	   itself	   (as	   Korsgaard	   says	   in	   the	   passage	  quoted)	  in	  order	  to	  show	  that	  the	  ideal	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  can	  be	  realised.	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may	  thus	  remain	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  non-­‐ideal	  theory.	  Also,	  I	  have	  accepted	  that	   compensatory	   justice	   (stating	   specific	   acts	   of	   reparation	   for	   injustices	  committed	   in	   the	   past)	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   what	   an	   ideal	   theory	   is	   to	  provide.	   What	   I	   am	   asking	   is	   for	   ideal	   theory	   to	   be	   a	   guide	   for	   non-­‐ideal	  theory	   (as	   defenders	   of	   the	  divide	   claim	   it	  must	   be	  —see	   JF:	   66,	   Buchanan	  2004:	   60,	   Valentini	   2009,	   Swift	   2008,	   Simmons	   2010)	   in	   cases	   of	   past	  injustice.	  In	  this	  sense,	  Rawls	  states:	  So	   conceived,	   nonideal	   theory	   presupposes	   that	   ideal	   theory	   is	   on	   hand.	   For	  until	   the	   ideal	   is	   identified,	   at	   least	   in	   outline	   —and	   that	   is	   all	   we	   should	  expect—	  non-­‐ideal	  theory	  lacks	  an	  objective,	  an	  aim,	  by	  reference	  to	  which	  its	  queries	  can	  be	  answered.	  (LP:	  89-­‐91)	  In	  line	  with	  this	  characterisation,	  my	  claim	  is	  Rawls’s	  theory	  should	  also	  offer	  ‘an	   aim	   by	   reference	   to	   which’	   non-­‐ideal	   theory’s	   queries	   regarding	  rectification	  of	  historical	  injustice	  can	  be	  answered.	  Finally,	   let	  me	   finish	   this	   section	   by	  making	   the	   following	   remark.	   I	  have	   analogised	   reasonable	   pluralism,	   cultural	   pluralism,	   and	   unjust	   pre-­‐ordered	   interactions	   as	   permanent	   features	   of	   well-­‐ordered	   societies.	   In	  passing,	   I	   have	  mentioned	   that	  Kymlicka’s	   and	   similar	   theories	   of	  minority	  rights	  might	  ensure	  equal	  treatment	  to	  members	  of	  minority	  cultures	  (just	  as	  Rawls’s	   political	   liberalism	   might	   ensure	   equal	   treatment	   to	   reasonable	  comprehensive	  doctrines).	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  this	  claim	  is	  correct	  (which	  is	   indeed	   irrelevant	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	   thesis),	   let	   me	   underline	   a	  structural	  similarity	  between	  Kymlicka’s	  critique	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  and	  mine.	  	  Kymlicka	   has	   consistently	   defended	   two	   claims,	   one	   empirical	   in	  character	  and	  another	  normative.	  First,	  that	  no	  liberal	  society	  is	  a	  culturally	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homogeneous	  political	   community	   (see	  Kymlicka	  1989:	  206-­‐220,	  1995:	  10-­‐26).	   As	   I	   mentioned	   in	   §	   1.3,	   all	   liberal	   societies,	   aside	   from	   observing	  pluralism	   of	   comprehensive	   doctrines,	   observe	   strong	   forms	   of	   cultural	  pluralism:	   they	   contain	   national	   minorities	   (such	   as	   Scotland	   within	   the	  United	  Kingdom),	  indigenous	  communities	  (such	  as	  the	  Inuit	  in	  Canada),	  and	  immigrant	   populations	   (such	   as	   the	   vast	  Mexican	   community	   in	   the	  United	  States).	  Second,	  Kymlicka	  holds	  that	  Rawls’s	  theory	  of	  distributive	  justice	  as	  it	  is	  written	  does	  not	  have	  the	  normative	  resources	  to	  ensure	  a	  just	  treatment	  to	   such	  cultural	  minorities.	  Therefore,	  Kymlicka	  argues,	   including	  a	   scheme	  of	   minority	   rights	   (commanding	   a	   just	   treatment	   to	   cultural	   minorities)	  within	   such	  a	   theory	   should	   fill	   this	   theoretical	   deficit	   (see	  Kymlicka	  1989:	  162-­‐205,	  1995:	  75-­‐130).	  Similarly,	  throughout	  this	  work	  I	  defend	  two	  claims,	  one	  empirical	  in	  character	   and	   another	   normative.	   First,	   that	   every	   single	   liberal	   society	  counts	  gross	   injustices	  within	   its	  past,	  and	  this	  would	  remain	  the	  case	  once	  they	   became	   well-­‐ordered	   (§	   1.2-­‐2.1).	   Second,	   that	   Rawls’s	   theory	   as	   it	  stands	   right	   now	  might	   not	   have	   the	   normative	   resources	   to	   ensure	   a	   just	  treatment	  to	  victims	  of	  such	  historical	  wrongs	  (§	  3.1).	  	  Now	  consider	  most	  critiques	  of	  Kymlicka’s	  second	  claim:	  they	  focus	  on	  whether	  such	  a	  putative	  scheme	  of	  minority	  rights	  conflicts	  with	  the	  original	  precepts	  of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  such	  as	   the	   importance	  of	  equal	   liberties	  and	  fair-­‐equality	   of	   opportunity	   (see,	   paradigmatically,	   Barry	   2001).	   No	   one,	   to	  my	   knowledge,	   has	   criticised	   Kymlicka’s	   second	   claim	   on	   the	   basis	   that	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Rawls’s	   theory	   is	   ideal	   and,	   therefore,	   justified	   in	   supposing	   —against	   all	  empirical	  evidence	  regarding	  the	  contemporary	  world—	  that	  to	  every	  liberal	  society	   corresponds	   a	   culturally	   homogeneous	   community.	   No	   one	   has	  criticised	  Kymlicka’s	  second	  claim	  on	  that	  basis	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  Rawls	  is	  explicit	  about	  the	  stated	  supposition:	  	  Historical	  conquests	  and	  immigration	  have	  caused	  the	  intermingling	  of	  groups	  with	   different	   cultures	   and	   historical	   memories	   who	   now	   reside	   within	   the	  territory	  of	  most	  contemporary	  democratic	  governments.	  Notwithstanding,	  the	  Law	  of	  Peoples	   starts	  with	   the	  need	   for	   common	  sympathies,	  no	  matter	  what	  their	  source	  may	  be.	  My	  hope	  is	  that	  if	  we	  begin	  in	  this	  simplified	  way,	  we	  can	  work	  out	  political	  principles	  that	  will,	   in	  due	  course,	  enable	  to	  deal	  with	  more	  difficult	  cases	  where	  all	  the	  citizens	  are	  not	  united	  by	  a	  common	  language	  and	  share	  historical	  memories.	  (LP:	  24-­‐25)	  Contrary	  to	  the	  case	  of	  unjust	  historical	   interactions,	  Rawls	  is	  explicit	  about	  the	   fact	   that	   his	   theory	  would	   simply	   assume	   cultural	   homogeneity	  within	  each	  political	  society.	  If	  we	  frame	  this	  as	  one	  of	  the	  suppositions	  granted	  by	  the	   two	   stipulations	   that	   make	   Rawls	   theory	   ideal,	   we	   could	   say	   that	   the	  
favourable	  conditions	  clause	  grants	  the	  supposition.	  But	  if	  this	  is	  so,	  why	  is	  it	  that	  no	  one	  has	  criticised	  Kymlicka’s	  second	  claim	  on	  this	  basis?	  The	  answer,	  it	   seems	   to	   me,	   is	   that	   simply	   appealing	   to	   the	   ideal	   character	   of	   Rawls’s	  theory	   would	   be	   an	   inadequate	   response	   to	   Kymlicka’s	   second	   claim.	   In	  similar	   fashion,	   appealing	   to	   the	   ideal	   character	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   is	   an	  inadequate	  response	  to	  my	  second	  claim	  (i.e.,	  that	  Rawls’s	  theory	  as	  it	  stands	  right	  now	  might	  not	  have	  the	  normative	  resources	  to	  ensure	  a	  just	  treatment	  to	  victims	  of	  historical	  wrongs).	  Rather,	  a	  proper	  response	  should	  argue	  that	  the	  principle	  I	  will	  explore	  in	  §	  3.2	  to	  fill	  this	  gap	  in	  Rawls’s	  theory	  is	  either	  unnecessary	  to	  ensure	  historical	  rectification	  or,	  as	  opponents	  of	  Kymlicka’s	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second	  claim	  vigorously	  defend,	  in	  conflict	  with	  the	  fundamental	  precepts	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	   In	   any	   event,	   pointing	   to	   the	   ideal	   character	   of	   Rawls’s	  theory	  is	  simply	  not	  the	  correct	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	  normative	  significance	  of	  historical	  injustice	  rectification.16	  
2.2	  The	  Forward-­‐Looking	  Character	  of	  Rawls’s	  Theory	  Once	  we	   have	   seen	   that	   appealing	   to	   the	   ideal	  character	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	  does	  not	   justify	   excluding	   concern	   for	  historical	   injustice	   from	  his	   theory,	   I	  now	   turn	   to	   a	   second	   putatively	   Rawlsian	   consideration	   stating	   that	   the	  description	   of	   a	   just	   society	   is	  warranted	   in	   being	   strictly	   forward-­‐looking.	  Something	  similar	  to	  this	  consideration	  is	  expressed	  by	  John	  Simmons:	  Rawls’s	   ideal	   theory,	   it	   is	   said,	   pays	   no	   attention	   to	   the	   long	   histories	   of	  injustice	   […]	   But	   the	   kind	   of	   “oversights”	   with	   which	   such	   criticism	   charge	  Rawls	  are	  not	  in	  any	  way	  essential	  to	  Rawls’s	  characterisation	  of	  ideal	  theory	  or	  its	   relationship	   to	   non-­‐ideal	   theory;	   they	   are	   rather	   simply	   a	   function	   of	   the	  specific	  approach	  that	  Rawls	  employs	  to	  derive	  the	  content	  of	   ideal	   theory,	   to	  argue	   for	   his	   particular,	   favored	   conception	   of	   “justice	   as	   fairness”.	  Historical	  injustice	  goes	  unaddressed	  in	  Rawls’s	  theory	  because	  the	  derived	  principles	  of	  justice	   are	   purely	   “forward-­‐looking”,	   because	   the	   choice	   problem	   given	   to	  
Rawls’s	   original	   position	   contractors	   requires	   their	   choice	   of	   forward-­‐looking	  
principles.	  (Simmons	  2010:	  32-­‐33.	  Italics	  added)	  Unlike	   Korsgaard	   1996a:	   147-­‐148,	   Sher	   1997,	   Thompson	   2001:	   129,	   Butt	  2009:	   6-­‐7,	   and	   many	   others,	   Simmons	   does	   not	   believe	   that	   the	   ideal	  
character	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  excludes	  concern	  for	  historical	   injustice.	  Rather,	  Simmons	   thinks	   that	   the	   choice	   problem	   presented	   to	   the	   parties	   in	   the	  original	  position	  imposes	  the	  selection	  of	  purely	  forward-­‐looking	  principles.	  I	  believe	   Simmons	   is	  mistaken.	   For,	   as	  we	   have	   seen,	   Rawls	   is	   quite	   clear	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  In	   fact,	   in	  §	   4.2	   I	  will	  defend	   that	   the	   ideal	   theory	  reply	   is	  equally	   inadequate	   to	  answer	  similar	   critiques	   to	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   regarding	   its	   lack	   of	   concern	   for	   race	   and	   gender	  oppression.	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stating	   that	   the	   parties	   in	   the	   original	   position	   must	   know	   all	   relevant	  psychological	   and	   social	   facts	   regarding	   human	   nature	   and	   social	  regularities:	  	  It	  is	  taken	  for	  granted,	  however,	  that	  they	  [the	  parties]	  know	  the	  general	  facts	  about	   human	   society.	   They	   understand	   political	   affairs	   and	   the	   principles	   of	  economic	   theory;	   they	   know	   the	   basis	   of	   social	   organization	   and	   the	   laws	   of	  human	  psychology.	  Indeed,	  the	  parties	  are	  presumed	  to	  know	  whatever	  general	  facts	  affect	  the	  choice	  of	  principles	  of	  justice.	  (TJ:	  119)	  The	  psychological	  and	  social	  evidence	  cited	  in	  §	  1.1-­‐1.3	  seems	  sufficient	  for	  stating	   that	   coming	   to	   terms	  with	   the	   past	   is	   of	   the	   greatest	   relevance	   for	  human	  beings	  and	  liberal	  societies.	  As	  such,	  this	  phenomenon	  must	  be	  one	  of	  the	   facts	   available	   to	   the	   parties	   in	   the	   original	   position,	   since	   they	   do	   not	  know	   whether	   their	   resultant	   well-­‐ordered	   society	   would	   count	   severe	  historical	   injustices	   as	   part	   of	   its	   past.	   Because	   of	   this	   simple	   reason,	   the	  choice	  problem	  presented	  to	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position	  (i.e.,	  selecting	  principles	   to	   regulate	   social	   cooperation	   under	   the	   veil	   of	   ignorance	   in	   full	  knowledge	  of	   all	   relevant	   information	   regarding	   the	   regularities	   of	   human	  psychology	   and	   society	   —see	   TJ:	   102-­‐160)	   cannot	   be	   correctly	   solved	   by	  adopting	  strictly	  forward-­‐looking	  principles.	  	  It	   may	   be	   that	   behind	   Simmons’s	   verdict	   of	   what	   warrants	   the	  forward-­‐looking	   character	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   lies	   a	   reading	   of	   the	   original	  position	  more	  akin	  to	  rational	  choice	  theory,	  for	  rational	  choice	  theory	  tends	  to	  work	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  persons	  behave	  in	  a	  forward-­‐looking	  way.	  However	  (as	  it	  has	  been	  neatly	  exposed	  by	  Sen	  1977,	  Herzog	  2006:	  35ff,	  and	  many	  others),	  there	  are	  several	  arguments	  showing	  that	  such	  assumption	  in	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rational	   choice	   theory	   is	   unwarranted.	   For	   my	   part,	   I	   find	   it	   sufficient	   to	  reject	   the	   stated	   assumption	   the	   fact	   that	   it	   goes	   against	   human	   normal	  psychology.	  As	  we	  saw	  in	  §	  1.1,	  the	  understanding	  of	  the	  past	  plays	  a	  major	  role	  in	  persons’	  own	  identity	  formation	  and	  choices.	  More	  importantly	  for	  the	  present	   purposes	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   Rawls	   was	   quite	   clear	   in	   his	   later	   work	  regarding	  his	  dissatisfaction	  with	   the	  rational	  choice	  reading	  of	   the	  original	  position	  (see	  JF:	  82n).	  	  Moreover,	   Rawls	   (TJ:	   260)	   already	   offers	   a	   neat	   reason	   against	  Simmons’s	  understanding	  of	   the	   choice	  problem	  given	   to	   the	  parties	   in	   the	  original	  position.	  Rawls’s	  justification	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  just	  savings	  depends,	  precisely,	  on	  denying	  that	  time	  preference	  is	  one	  of	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position:	  The	  original	  position	  is	  so	  defined	  that	  it	  leads	  to	  the	  correct	  principles	  in	  this	  respect.	   In	   the	   case	   of	   the	   individual,	   pure	   time	   preference	   is	   irrational;	   it	  means	  that	  he	  is	  not	  viewing	  all	  moments	  as	  equally	  parts	  of	  one	  life.	  In	  the	  case	  of	   society,	   pure	   time	   preference	   is	   unjust:	   it	   means	   (in	   the	   more	   common	  
instance	   when	   future	   is	   discounted)	   that	   the	   living	   take	   advantage	   of	   their	  position	  in	  time	  to	  favor	  their	  own	  interests.	  (TJ:	  260.	  Italics	  added)	  Here	   Rawls	   states	   that	   time	   preference	   in	   the	   case	   of	   society	   is	   unjust.	   Of	  course,	   he	   adds	   that	   its	   most	   common	   instance	   is	   to	   show	   no	   concern	   for	  future	  generations	  or	  for	  the	  future	  of	  the	  current	  generation.	  However,	  that	  is	   only	   one	   instance	   of	   the	   injustice	  produced	  by	   time	  preference.	   It	   seems	  that	   the	   only	   other	   instance	   would	   be	   not	   to	   show	   concern	   for	   previous	  generations	   or	   for	   the	   past	   of	   the	   current	   generation.	   It	   thus	   must	   be	  accepted	   that	   the	   very	   same	   reason	   that	   is	   behind	   the	   justification	   of	   the	  principle	   of	   just	   savings	   compels	   the	   Rawlsian	   theory	   to	   show	   concern	   for	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historical	  injustices.	  If	  that	  reason	  is	  introduced	  in	  the	  justification	  of	  one	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice,	  then	  the	  forward-­‐looking	  character	  of	  the	  theory	  —just	   as	   Rawls’s	   forward-­‐looking	   conception	   of	   the	   person,	   as	   we	   saw	   in	   §	  
1.1—	  must	  be	  abandoned.	  	   One	   final	   reason	   against	   the	   exclusive	   forward-­‐looking	   character	   of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  springs	  from	  what	  Rawls	  calls	  the	  ‘most	  fundamental	  idea’	  of	  his	  conception	  of	   justice:	   i.e.,	   that	  a	   liberal	   society	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  ‘fair	  system	  of	  social	  cooperation	  over	  time	  from	  one	  generation	  to	  the	  next’	  (JF:	   5).	   Rawls	   repeatedly	   comes	   back	   to	   the	   idea	   of	   a	   temporal	   continuum	  behind	  his	  understanding	  of	  society:	   ‘Recall	  that	  a	  political	  society	  is	  always	  regarded	   as	   a	   schema	   of	   cooperation	   over	   time	   indefinitely’	   (JF:	   162).	  However,	   if	   society	   is	   so	   understood	   by	   a	   theory,	   such	   a	   theory	  must	   offer	  guidance	  with	  regard	   to	  several	  problems	  arising	  between	  generations	   that	  interact	  with	  each	  other.	  Rawls	  takes	  issue	  with	  a	  relevant	  one	  having	  to	  do	  with	  a	  present	  and	  a	  future	  generation	  (the	  problem	  of	  just	  savings).	  But	  just	  as	  such	  a	  problem	  arises	  by	  assuming	  that	  society	  is	  a	  temporal	  continuum,	  the	   social	   dimension	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   coming	   to	   terms	   with	   the	   past	  arises	   too	   by	   the	   very	   same	   assumption.	   This	   last	   consideration	   is	   very	  important,	   for	   even	   if	   the	   rationale	   given	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   just	   savings	  principle	  was	   to	   be	   abandoned	   (as	   English	   1977:	   98,	  Wall	   2003:	   79,	   Nagel	  and	  Parfit	  —see	   JF:	   160n—	  urge	  Rawls	   to	  proceed),	   this	  would	  not	   change	  the	   fact	   that	   Rawls’s	   theory	   is	   required	   to	   give	   equal	   treatment	   to	   the	  problems	  produced	  by	   the	   interaction	  of	  a	  present	  generation	  with	  both	   its	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past	  and	   future	  generations.	   In	   this	  sense,	  Thompson	   is	  mistaken	  when	  she	  suggests:	  John	  Rawls,	  for	  example,	  thinks	  of	  justice	  between	  generations	  as	  consisting	  of	  duties	  that	  citizens	  owe	  to	  their	  descendants.	  This	  conception	  of	  justice	  divides	  justice	   into	   two	   parts:	   synchronic	   and	   diachronic.	  Synchronic	   justice	   is	   justice	  between	   contemporaries,	   or	   between	   those	   contemporaries	   who	   are	   full	  participants	  in	  the	  political	  relationships	  of	  the	  society.	  Diachronic	  justice	  has	  to	  do	   with	   relationships	   between	   these	   contemporaries	   and	   future	   citizens.	  (Thompson	  2009:	  2.	  Italics	  in	  the	  original,	  references	  removed)	  Thompson	   2009:	   2ff	   seems	   to	   suggest	   that	   the	   stated	   dichotomy	   is	  inadequate	   because	   the	   problems	   of	   interacting	   generations	   are	   also	  
synchronic	   problems:	   that	   is,	   problems	  of	   ‘justice	  between	   contemporaries’.	  That	  this	   is	  so	   is	  manifest	  when	  we	  consider	  how	  the	  duties	  of	  society	  with	  further	   generations	   and	   to	   rectify	   historical	   injustice	   have	   effects	   in	   the	  distribution	  of	  primary	  goods	  amongst	  contemporaries.	  Consider	  what	  Butt	  claims	   when	   analysing	   the	   impact	   of	   rectificatory	   justice	   on	   distributive	  justice:	  Questions	   of	   rectificatory	   justice	   in	   response	   to	   historic	   wrongdoing	   are	  questions	  which	  concern	  the	  distribution	  of	  burdens	  and	  benefits	  in	  the	  present	  day.	  Claims	  that	  a	  given	  group	  is	  owed	  compensation	  as	  a	  result	  of	  [a]	  historic	  injustice	   […]	  are	  claims	  about	  who	  should	  have	  what	  here	  and	  now.	  They	  are	  claims	   that	   operate	   in	   the	   real	  world,	   and	   that	   propose	   particular	   courses	   of	  action	  which	  affect	  the	  distribution	  of	  resources	  within,	  and	  between,	  societies.	  (Butt	  2009:	  33)	  Butt	   points	   at	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   decision	   of	   how	   many	   resources	   will	   be	  allocated	  for	  the	  task	  of	  rectifying	  historical	  injustices	  will	  have	  an	  impact	  on	  how	   the	   resources	   amongst	   contemporaries	   are	   to	   be	   distributed.	   We	   can	  find	  a	  similar	  claim	  in	  Rawls’s	  characterisation	  of	  the	  problem	  of	  just	  savings,	  since	   any	   solution	   contemporaries	   give	   to	   this	   problem	   will	   affect	   the	  distribution	  of	  primary	  goods	  amongst	  them:	  if	  they	  decide	  to	  leave	  as	  many	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resources	  to	  the	  next	  generation	  as	  they	  have,	  this	  will	  set	  a	  limit	  to	  their	  use	  of	  resources	  for	  the	  production	  and	  distribution	  of	  primary	  goods.	  	  This	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  for	  Rawls	  the	  problem	  of	  just	  savings	  is	  also	  a	  
synchronic	   problem,	   and	   thus	   Thompson’s	   2009:	   2	   conceptualisation	   of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  as	  dividing	  justice	  into	  synchronic	  and	  diachronic	  is	  incorrect.	  	  Moreover,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  at	  the	  very	  basis	  of	  Rawls’s	  understanding	  of	  how	  a	  liberal	  society	  must	  be	  conceived	  of	  there	  is	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  ‘intergenerational	  relationships	  are	  central	  to	  a	  political	  society’	  (Thompson	  2009:	  12),	  for	  this	  is	  implied	  by	  Rawls’s	  insistence	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  society	  is	  a	  continuum	  in	  time.	  Interactions	  between	  generations	  are	  intrinsic	  to	  this	  understanding	  of	  society.	  What	  Rawls	  missed,	  perhaps	  due	  to	  the	  ambiguity	  I	  have	  pointed	  out	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  regarding	  his	  characterisation	  of	  the	  divide	   between	   ideal	   and	   non-­‐ideal	   theory,	   is	   that	   some	   of	   the	   problems	  arising	   from	   those	   interactions,	   which	   are	   relevant	   for	   his	   own	   theory	   of	  justice,	  have	  to	  do	  with	  the	  relation	  of	  a	  current	  generation	  with	  its	  own	  past	  or	  with	  previous	  generations.	  So	   we	   have	   three	   reasons	   against	   the	   forward-­‐looking	   character	   of	  Rawls’s	   theory.	   First,	   the	   parties	   in	   the	   original	   position	   know	   all	   relevant	  psychological	   and	   social	   facts,	   one	   of	   which	   must	   be	   the	   importance	   of	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  the	  past	  for	  normal	  human	  beings	  and	  liberal	  societies,	  especially	   considering	   that	   they	   do	   not	   know	  whether	   their	   resultant	  well-­‐ordered	   society	   would	   count	   severe	   injustices	   as	   part	   of	   its	   pre-­‐ordered	  history.	  Second,	  since	  time	  preference	  is	  ruled	  out	  by	  the	  construction	  of	  the	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original	   position,	   the	   parties	   are	   to	   show	   concern	   for	   generations	   behind	  them	   (just	   as	   they	   are	   to	   show	  concern	   for	   generations	  next	   to	   them).	  And	  third,	   even	   if	   this	   rationale	   for	   the	   just	   savings	   principle	   were	   to	   be	  completely	   abandoned,	   so	   long	   as	  Rawls	   assumes	   that	   a	   liberal	   society	   is	   a	  continuum	   in	   time,	   his	   theory	   is	   still	   to	   show	   concern	   for	   the	   problems	   of	  interacting	  generations.	  These	  problems	  include	  not	  only	  the	  interaction	  with	  future	   generations	   but	   also	  with	   past	   generations.	   Considering	   these	   three	  reasons,	   pace	   Simmons	   2010,	   the	   choice	   problem	  modelled	   in	   the	   original	  position	  does	  not	  warrant	  the	  absence	  of	  concern	  for	  historical	  injustice.	  However,	   it	   could	   still	   be	   argued	   that	   Rawls’s	   theory,	   as	   any	   other	  theory	   of	   liberal	   justice,	   is	   justified	   in	   being	   exclusively	   forward-­‐looking	  because	   of	   the	   putative	   existence	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   non-­‐identity	   problem.	  Typically,	   such	   a	   problem	   is	   framed	   as	   follows:	   had	   the	   past	   injustice	   to	  victims	  not	  occurred,	  victims’	  descendants	  simply	  would	  not	  have	  come	  into	  existence.	   Because	   existing	   (at	   least	   in	   sufficiently	   bearable	   conditions)	   is	  better	   than	   failing	   to	   exist,	   the	   occurrence	   of	   such	   past	   injustice	   does	   not	  constitute	   a	   harm	   to	   descendants.	   Thus,	   no	   compensation,	   apology,	   or	   any	  other	   rectificatory	   measure	   is	   due	   on	   descendants’	   behalf	   for	   what	   in	   fact	  made	   possible	   their	   very	   existence	   (see	   Sher	   1981:	   7-­‐8,	   2005:	   181-­‐182,	  Morris	  1984:	  177ff,	  Waldron	  1992:	  12,	  Simmons	  1995:178n,	  A.	  Cohen	  2009:	  81-­‐83).	  	  All	   versions	   of	   the	   non-­‐identity	   problem	   in	   the	   literature	   begin	   by	  accepting	   the	   following	   standard	  modal	   thesis	   (call	   it	   the	  necessity	  of	  origin	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thesis):	  it	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  a	  person’s	  existence	  to	  be	  originated	  by	  a	  particular	  pair	   of	   gametes.	   In	  possible-­‐worlds	   talk,	   this	   is	   equivalent	   to	   say	  that	  there	  is	  no	  world	  in	  which	  a	  person	  exists	  and	  a	  different	  pair	  of	  gametes	  originates	  her.17	  	  From	  here,	  we	  can	  distinguish	  two	  different	  forms	  in	  which	  the	   non-­‐identity	   problem	   is	   presented:	   a	  modal	   and	   a	   probabilistic	   version	  (see	  Sher	  2005:	  184-­‐185).	  The	  modal	  version	  states	  a	  strong	  claim	  about	  modal	  identity:	  i.e.,	  that	  the	   past	   injustice	   is	   a	   necessary	   condition	   of	   the	   existence	   of	   victims’	  descendants	   and	   because	   of	   that	   it	   cannot	   constitute	   a	   harm	   to	   them.	   Had	  such	   injustice	   not	   occurred,	   their	   parents	   (or	   grandparents,	   or	   great-­‐grandparents,	   and	   so	   on)	   would	   not	   have	   met	   and	   conceived	   them	   (or	  conceived	   their	   parents,	   or	   grandparents,	   and	   so	   on)	   at	   the	   time	   they	   did,	  which	  is	  biologically	  required	  in	  order	  for	  them	  to	  be	  originated	  by	  the	  same	  pair	  of	  gametes.	  In	  possible-­‐worlds	  talk,	  this	  is	  equivalent	  to	  saying	  that	  there	  is	  no	  world	  in	  which	  the	  original	  harm	  did	  not	  occur	  and	  descendants	  exist.	  Before	  stating	  my	  own	  response,	  it	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  two	  recurrent	  responses	   to	   the	  modal	  version.	   First,	   consider	   the	   further-­‐harm	  response.	  It	  can	   be	   argued	   that	   even	   if	   the	   past	   injustice	   is	   a	   necessary	   condition	   of	  descendants’	  existence,	  rectification	  is	  still	  due	  on	  the	  following	  basis:	  while	  the	  original	  injustice	  (call	  it	  Injustice	  1)	  harms	  the	  members	  of	  the	  generation	  that	  suffered	  such	  an	  injustice	  (call	   it	  Generation	  1),	  the	  lack	  of	  rectification	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  Perhaps	  this	  thesis	  is	  most	  famous	  because	  of	  Saul	  Kripke’s	  formulation	  (see	  Kripke	  1980:	  110ff).	   Formally,	   such	   a	   thesis	   is	   an	   instance	   of	   the	   following:	   for	   all	   x	   and	   for	   all	   y,	   if	   x	  originates	  from	  y,	  then	  x	  originates	  from	  y	  in	  all	  worlds	  in	  which	  x	  exists.	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of	  Injustice	  1	  to	  Generation	  1	  creates	  a	  further	  harm	  (call	  it	  Injustice	  2)	  to	  the	  next	   generation	   of	   descendants	   (call	   it	   Generation	   2).	   Similarly,	   the	   lack	   of	  rectification	   of	   Injustice	   2	   to	   Generation	   2	   creates	   a	   further	   harm	   (call	   it	  Injustice	  3)	  to	  the	  next	  generation	  of	  descendants	  (call	  it	  Generation	  3),	  and	  so	   on.	   Relevantly,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   case	   that	   Injustice	   1	   harms	   Generation	   2.	  Rather,	   the	   fact	   that	   Injustice	  1	  was	  never	   rectified	   for	  Generation	  1	  brings	  about	   Injustice	  2,	  which	  harms	  Generation	  2	   and	   thus	   is	   the	  one	   for	  which	  Generation	   2	   is	   owed	   rectification.	   Likewise,	   the	   fact	   that	   Injustice	   2	   was	  never	   rectified	   for	   Generation	   2	   brings	   about	   Injustice	   3,	   which	   is	   the	   one	  harming	   Generation	   3	   and	   thus	   the	   one	   for	   which	   Generation	   3	   is	   owed	  rectification.	   In	  this	  way,	  a	  non-­‐rectified	  original	   injustice	  creates	  a	  chain	  of	  further	  injustices	  harming	  successive	  generations	  of	  descendants	  (see	  Boxill	  2003:	   89,	   Sher	   2005:	   190-­‐195,	   and	   Butt	   2009:	   188-­‐189	   for	   independent	  defences	  of	  this	  response).	  Second,	  consider	  the	  group-­‐harm	  response	  against	  the	  modal	  version.	  It	  could	   be	   argued	   that	   even	   if	   the	   past	   injustice	   is	   a	   necessary	   condition	   of	  descendants’	  existence,	  and	  because	  of	   that	   it	  does	  not	  harm	  any	  particular	  descendant	   taken	   as	   an	   individual,	   such	   injustice	   nevertheless	   harms	   all	  descendants	   because	   of	   their	   belonging	   to	   the	   harmed	   group	   (see	  Herstein	  2008:	  527-­‐531	  for	  a	  defence	  of	  this	  response).	  While	   I	   find	   both	   of	   these	   responses	   plausible,	   they	   have	  complications.	  For	  instance,	  one	  problem	  of	  the	  further-­‐harm	  response	  is	  that	  it	  does	  not	  fit	  the	  way	  in	  which	  public	  official	  apologies	  regarding	  historical	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injustices	  are	  given.	  For	   these	  apologies	  are	  not,	  or	  not	  only,	  offered	  due	  to	  the	  further	  harms	  that	  a	  non-­‐rectified	  original	  historical	  injustice	  creates,	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  very	  original	  historical	  injustice.	  That	  is,	  a	  public	  apology	  is	  due	  not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  original	  injustice	  has	  not	  been	  rectified	  over	  the	  course	  of	  history	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  fact	  of	  its	  very	  occurrence	  (see	  Herstein	  2008:	  519-­‐523).	  Likewise,	  the	  collective-­‐
harm	  response	   is	  committed	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   there	  might	  be	  some	   injustices	  harming	  a	  collective	  even	  when	  benefiting	  each	  particular	  individual	  forming	  the	  collective	  —so	  long	  as	  the	  harm	  brings	  each	  of	  them	  into	  existence—	  (see	  Butt	  2009:	  105).	  Of	  course,	  I	  am	  not	  stating	  that	  these	  and	  similar	  objections	  cannot	  be	  overcome	  by	  the	  responses	  just	  explored.	  Yet,	  another	  response	  seems	  to	  be	  more	   straightforward.	   Let	   me	   repeat	   the	   main	   claim	   of	   the	  modal	   version	  using	  possible-­‐worlds	  talk:	  there	  is	  no	  world	  in	  which	  the	  original	  harm	  did	  not	   occur	   and	   descendants	   exist.	   This	   claim	   about	   descendants’	   modal	  identity,	   unlike	   the	   standard	   necessity	   of	   origin	   thesis,	   is	   far	   from	   being	  intuitively	   correct.	   For	   it	   is	   easy	   to	   think	   of	   several	   worlds	   in	   which	  descendants	   exist	  without	   the	   original	   harm	  made	   to	   their	   ancestors.	   Take	  the	  case	  of	   the	  enslavement	  of	  Africans	  and	   the	  existence	  of	  actual	  African-­‐Americans.	  History	  could	  have	  been	  incredibly	  different	  from	  the	  way	  it	  was	  
and	  still	  leave	  room	  for	  African-­‐Americans’	  actual	  ancestors	  to	  meet.	  For	  one,	  they	  could	  have	  been	  invited	  to	  go	  to	  North	  America	  as	  workers	  with	  equal	  rights	  and	  moral	   status.	   In	  possible-­‐worlds	   talk,	   this	   is	  equivalent	   to	  saying	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that	   there	   is	   a	  world	   identical	   to	   the	   actual	   one	   (relevantly,	   containing	   the	  same	  individuals)	  except	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  Africans	  were	  invited	  to	  go	  to	  North	  America	  as	  workers	  with	  equal	   rights	  and	  moral	   status.	  This	   seems	   to	  be	  a	  genuine	   possibility	   regarding	   descendants’	   modal	   identity	   (see	   Simmons	  1995:	  174n	  and	  Butt	  2009:	  115	  for	  equivalent	  responses).18	  Derek	   Parfit	   himself,	  who	   is	   typically	   credited	  with	   the	   introduction	  the	   non-­‐identity	   problem	   (see	   Parfit	   1984:	   351-­‐355,	   2011:	   218),	   refrains	  from	  endorsing	  the	  controversial	  necessity	  claim	  of	  the	  modal	  version	  when	  he	  states:	  	  (TD2)	  If	  any	  particular	  person	  had	  not	  been	  conceived	  within	  the	  month	  of	  the	  time	  when	  she	  was	  in	  fact	  conceived,	  he	  would	  in	  fact	  never	  have	  existed.	  I	  claim	  that	  [what	  TD2	  holds]	  is	  in	  fact	  true.	  I	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  it	  is	  necessarily	  
true.	  The	  different	  views	  about	  this	  subject	  make	  competing	  claims	  about	  what	  is	  necessary.	  It	  is	  because	  I	  claim	  less	  that	  my	  claim	  is	  not	  controversial.	  Those	  who	  disagree	  about	  what	  could	  have	  happened	  may	  agree	  about	  what	  would	  in	  
fact	  have	  happened.	  (Parfit	  1984:	  351	  Italics	  in	  the	  original)	  Here	  Parfit	   clarifies	   that	  he	  does	  not	  hold	   that	   the	  actual	   course	  of	  history,	  affecting	   monthly	   patters	   of	   conception,	   is	   a	   necessary	   condition	   of	   actual	  persons’	  existence.	  Rather,	  his	  (TD2)	   is	  compatible	  with	  statements	   like	  the	  following:	   it	   could	   have	   been	   the	   case	   that	   history	  was	   different	   (and	   thus	  monthly	   patters	   of	   conception	   had	   variations)	   and	   actual	   persons	   still	  existed.	   Coming	   back	   to	   the	   example	   I	   just	   introduced,	   Parfit’s	   original	  formulation	   of	   the	   problem	   is	   compatible	  with	   the	   claim	   that	   it	   could	   have	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  Butt	  states:	  ‘to	  assess	  harm	  following	  injustice,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  compare	  the	  current	  day	  injustice	  with	   some	   kind	   of	   counterfactual.	   This	   is	   done	   by	   imagining	   a	   possible	  world	   in	  where	  no	  injustice	  occurred.	  However,	  there	  are	  many	  such	  possible	  worlds,	  as	  there	  are	  many	  
possible	  kinds	  of	   interaction	  between	   the	  victim	  and	   the	  offender.	   One	   possible	  world	   is	   the	  world	  where	  the	  act	  of	  injustice	  simply	  did	  not	  take	  place’	  (Butt	  2009:	  115.	  Italics	  added).	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been	   the	   case	   that	   African	   Americans’	   ancestors	   were	   invited	   to	   North	  America	   as	   workers	   with	   equal	   rights	   and	   moral	   status	   and	   their	   actual	  descendants	   still	   existed.	   In	   contrast,	   as	  we	  have	   seen,	   the	  modal	  version	   is	  committed	   to	   an	   extremely	   polemical	   assumption	   about	   persons’	   modal	  identity.	  Until	  a	  defence	  of	  such	  an	  assumption	  is	  provided,	  this	  version	  can	  be	  set	  aside.19	  So	  let	  me	  turn	  to	  the	  probabilistic	  version	  of	  the	  non-­‐identity	  problem.	  This	   version	   makes	   the	   following	   softer	   claim:	   it	   is	   highly	   unlikely	   that	  victims’	  descendants	  would	  have	  existed	  had	  the	  past	  injustice	  against	  their	  ancestors	   not	   occurred.	   Indeed,	   Parfit’s	   own	   formulation	   is	   closer	   to	   the	  
probabilistic	  version.	  He	  states:	  Which	   particular	   children	   we	   have	   depends	   on	   the	   slightest	   details	   of	   our	  private	  lives.	  Many	  of	  our	  acts	  affect	  such	  details	  in	  our	  own	  and	  other	  people’s	  lives,	  and	  these	  effects	  spread,	  like	  ripples	  in	  a	  pool,	  over	  more	  and	  more	  lives.	  Unlike	  ripples,	  moreover,	  these	  effects	  never	  fade	  away.	  Over	  time,	  there	  will	  be	  more	   and	  more	   people	   of	  whom	   it	   is	   true	   that,	   if	   we	   acted	   differently,	   those	  people	   would	   never	   have	   been	   conceived.	   If	   the	   motor	   car	   had	   not	   been	  
invented,	   for	   example,	   it	   is	   likely	   that	   readers	   of	   this	   book	   would	   never	   have	  
existed.	  (Parfit	  2011:	  218.	  Italics	  added)	  As	  the	  last	  statement	  of	  this	  passage	  suggests,	  Parfit	  seems	  to	  have	  intended	  to	  pose	   the	  probabilistic	  version	   (rather	   than	   the	  modal	  version)	  of	   the	  non-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  This	  also	  shows	  that	  Sher’s	  original	  response	  to	  the	  non-­‐identity	  problem,	  based	  on	  what	  he	  called	  the	  branching	  criterion	  of	  possible	  worlds	  is	  completely	  inadequate	  (see	  Sher	  1979:	  381-­‐382	  and	  more	  recently,	  Sher	  2005:	  187).	  This	  criterion	  is	  committed	  to	  an	  even	  stronger	  claim	   about	   descendants’	   modal	   identity	   than	   the	  modal	   version.	   For	   according	   to	   such	   a	  criterion	   actual	   history	   as	   a	  whole	   prior	   to	  my	   conception	   is	   a	  necessary	   condition	   of	  my	  existence	   (see	   Sher	   1979:	   382,	   2005:	   187).	   In	   possible	   worlds	   talk,	   this	   is	   equivalent	   to	  stating	  that	  there	  is	  no	  world	  in	  which	  history	  prior	  to	  my	  conception	  is	  different	  from	  actual	  history	  and	  I	  exist.	  Yet	  another	  way	  of	  stating	  the	  same:	  I	  could	  not	  have	  existed	  had	  history	  prior	   to	  my	   conception	  been	   slightly	  different	   from	   the	  way	   it	   actually	  was.	  However,	   this	  form	  of	  hyper-­‐essentialism	  states	  an	  extremely	  polemical	  thesis	  about	  modal	  identity.	  For	  it	  follows	  that	  statements	  of	   the	  sort	   ‘I	  could	  have	  been	  born	   in	  the	  UK	  had	  my	  parents	  been	  studying	  there	  in	  1982’	  are	  plainly	  false.	  Even	  worse,	  if	  Sher’s	  branching	  criterion	  of	  possible	  
worlds	  is	  correct,	  then	  statement	  of	  the	  sort	  ‘I	  could	  have	  existed	  even	  if	  Julio	  Cesar	  had	  not	  died	  in	  the	  Roman	  Senate	  but	  in	  his	  house	  in	  the	  year	  44	  BC’	  are	  false.	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identity	   problem.	   Parfit’s	   disclaimer	   regarding	   the	   non-­‐necessary	   character	  of	  his	  (TD2)	  —stated	  in	  the	  passage	  previously	  quoted—	  also	  reinforces	  this	  interpretation.	  	  	   Now,	   the	   probabilistic	   version	   (unlike	   the	   modal	   version)	   seems	   to	  state	   a	   fairly	   uncontroversial	   claim.	   It	   seems	   indeed	   highly	   unlikely	   that	  descendants	   would	   have	   existed	   had	   the	   original	   historical	   harm	   to	   their	  ancestors	  not	  occurred.	  For,	  coming	  back	   to	  our	  example,	  even	  when	   it	   is	  a	  genuine	  modal	  possibility	   that	   actual	  African	  Americans	   could	  have	  existed	  had	   their	   ancestors	   been	   invited	   to	   North	   America	   as	   workers	   with	   equal	  rights	   and	  moral	   status,	   this	   would	   have	   required	   of	   the	   occurrence	   of	   an	  extremely	  unlikely	  chain	  of	  events	  stretching	  on	  for	  centuries	  resembling	  the	  actual	  one.	  Nevertheless,	   I	   think	   that	   the	   relevant	   question	   to	   ask	   is	   what	   the	  moral	   significance	  of	   this	   fairly	  uncontroversial	  probabilistic	  claim	   is.	  For	   if	  we	   ascribe	   to	   it	   the	   significance	   of	   justifying	   the	   avoidance	   of	   historical	  rectification,	   then	  we	  are	  committed	  to	  the	   idea	  that	  any	  meaningful	   theory	  for	   the	  moral	   assessment	   of	   the	   past	   should	   accept	   absurd	   conclusions.	   To	  show	  this,	  let	  me	  introduce	  the	  following	  example.	  Suppose	   that	  my	  parents	   travelled	   from	  very	   far	  distant	  cities	   to	   the	  capital	   in	  order	   to	   join	  an	  activist	   group	  against	   the	  Vietnam	  War	  and	  only	  because	  of	  this	  reason	  they	  met	  each	  other.	  Considering	  this,	  it	  is	  indeed	  very	  
unlikely	   that	   I	   would	   have	   existed	   had	   the	   Vietnam	   War	   not	   occurred	   —assuming,	  as	  we	  are,	  that	  my	  parents	  travelled	  to	  the	  capital	  for	  this	  reason	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and	   otherwise	   would	   have	   pursued	   their	   independent	   lives	   in	   their	  respective	   cities.	   Does	   this	   mean	   that	   I	   cannot	   morally	   object	   to	   the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  Vietnam	  War	  without	  thereby	  stating	  that	  I	  would	  like	  not	  to	  have	  existed?	  Or	  even	  worse,	  should	  I	  be	  grateful	  about	  the	  occurrence	  of	  the	  war,	  so	  long	  as	  I	  am	  grateful	  about	  my	  own	  existence?	  These	  inferences,	  drawn	  by	  the	  probabilistic	  version,	  seem	  absurd.	  	  More	   importantly,	   the	   probabilistic	   version	   simply	   fails	   to	   show	   the	  moral	  significance	  of	  its	  uncontroversial	  probabilistic	  claim.	  For,	  so	  long	  as	  it	  is	   a	   genuine	   modal	   possibility	   that	   I	   could	   have	   existed	   had	   the	   war	   not	  occurred	  —however	  remote	  such	  a	  possibility	  is—,	  this	  fact	  about	  my	  modal	  identity	  allows	  me	  to	  morally	  object	  to	  the	  war	  without	  thereby	  objecting	  to	  my	   very	   existence.	   Similar	   claims	   can	   be	   made	   about	   historical	   wrongs	  without	  the	  occurrence	  of	  which	  it	  would	  have	  been	  very	  unlikely	  that	  actual	  descendants	  had	  existed	   (see	  Simmons	  1995:	  174n	  and	  Butt	  2009:	  106	   for	  similar	  conclusions).	  Because	   of	   these	   reasons,	   neither	   the	   modal	   nor	   the	   probabilistic	  versions	  of	  the	  non-­‐identity	  problem	  succeed	  in	  showing	  that	  rectification	  of	  past	  wrongs	  is	  not	  morally	  required,	  and	  thus	  in	  showing	  that	  a	  liberal	  theory	  of	   justice	  such	  as	  Rawls’s	   is	  warranted	   in	  being	  strictly	   forward-­‐looking.	  As	  we	   have	   seen,	   while	   the	  modal	   version	   rests	   on	   an	   undefended	   and	   highly	  polemical	   necessity	   claim,	   the	   probabilistic	   version	   fails	   to	   show	   the	  moral	  significance	  of	  the	  non-­‐controversial	  probabilistic	  claim	  on	  which	  it	  is	  based.	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2.3	  The	  Non-­‐Comprehensive	  Character	  of	  Rawls’s	  Theory	  So	   far	  we	  have	  seen	   that	   the	   ideal	  and	   forward-­‐looking	  character	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	   does	   not	   justify	   the	   absence	   of	   concern	   for	   historical	   injustice	   in	  Rawls’s	   description	   of	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society.	   In	   this	   final	   section	   I	   will	  explore	  a	  third	  Rawlsian	  consideration	  that	  could	  be	  offered	  in	  favour	  of	  not	  conceptualising	   of	   historical	   rectification	   as	   part	   of	   such	   a	   theory:	   i.e.,	   the	  claim	   that,	   in	   so	   doing,	   Rawls’s	   theory	   would	   acquire	   a	   comprehensive	  
character	  that	  does	  not	  suit	  the	  purposes	  of	  a	  political	  conception	  of	  justice,	  considering	   the	   fact	  of	   reasonable	  pluralism.	   In	   fact,	   I	   do	  believe	   that	   some	  approaches	   to	   the	   moral	   assessment	   of	   the	   past	   are	   comprehensive	   in	  character.	  Three	  concerns	  in	  this	  direction	  occur	  to	  me.	  	  The	   first	   and	   clearest	   way	   in	   which	   an	   account	   pointing	   at	   the	  importance	   of	   historical	   injustice	   becomes	   comprehensive	   is	   if	   such	   an	  account	  offers	  an	  ethics	  of	  memory	  or	  remembrance	  for	  the	  personal	  domain.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of	  Avishai	  Margalit	  2002	  and	  Jeffrey	  Blustein	  2008,	  for	  these	  authors	  provide	  (amongst	  other	  things)	  an	  account	  of	  what	  persons	  ought	  to	  do	  regarding	  the	  understanding	  of	  their	  own	  past.	  Margalit	  states:	  My	   question,	   ‘Is	   there	   an	   ethics	   of	   memory?’,	   is	   both	   about	   microethics	   (the	  ethics	  of	   individuals)	  and	  about	  macroethics	  (the	  ethics	  of	  collectives).	  What	  I	  want	  to	  address	  can	  be	  rendered	  by	  a	  series	  of	  questions:	  Are	  we	  obligated	  to	  remember	   people	   and	   events	   from	   the	   past?	   […]	   I	   reach	   the	   conclusion	   that	  while	   there	   is	   an	   ethics	   of	   memory,	   there	   is	   very	   little	   morality	   of	   memory.	  (Margalit	  2002:	  6-­‐7)	  Margalit	   distinguishes	   ethics	   from	   morality	   in	   the	   following	   sense:	   while	  morality	   is	   concerned	   with	   the	   principles	   and	   values	   that	   must	   guide	   our	  relations	  with	  all	  human	  beings	  as	  human	  beings,	  ethics	  is	  restricted	  only	  to	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the	  principles	  and	  values	   that	  must	  guide	  our	   relations	  with	  our	  proximate	  human	   beings	   (friends,	   family,	   political	   community).	   Considering	   this	  distinction,	   when	   Margalit	   states	   that	   there	   is	   an	   ethics	   of	   memory,	   he	   is	  proposing	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  behave	  in	  certain	  ways	  in	  a	  domain	  that	  includes	  our	  relationships	  with	  friends	  and	  family.20	  Blustein	  also	  offers	  an	  ethics	  of	  memory	  for	  personal	  relationships.	  He	  holds	   that	   by	   the	   very	   fact	   of	   remembering	   an	   event	   a	   person	   takes	  responsibility	   for	   it.	   Accordingly,	   remembrance	   is	   connected	   with	   moral	  responsibility:	   one	   must	   assume	   responsibility	   for	   what	   one	   has	   done	  (Blustein	   2008:	   33).	   However,	   Blustein	   thinks	   that	   a	   person	   must	   also	  remember	  certain	   things	   for	  which	  she	   is	  not	   responsible	   in	  any	  sense.	  For	  instance,	  Blustein	  believes	  that	  persons	  have	  an	  ethical	  (in	  Margalit’s	  sense)	  obligation	  to	  retain	  the	  memory	  of	  their	  dead	  parents	  and	  close	  friends	  —or,	  as	  Blustein	  2008:	  245	  calls	  them,	  ‘the	  dear	  departed’.21	  	  The	   personal	   domain	   of	   these	   respective	   ethics	   of	  memory	   is	   out	   of	  the	  scope	  of	  what	  a	  non-­‐comprehensive	  account	  of	  historical	  rectification	  can	  provide.	  I	  am	  not	  claiming	  that	  it	  is	  the	  function	  of	  a	  liberal	  State	  to	  promote	  any	  moral	  obligation	  in	  this	  regard.	  So	  long	  as	  their	  distinctive	  accounts	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  These	  oughts,	   according	   to	  Margalit,	  are	  of	   the	   following	  conditional	   form:	   if	  you	  want	  to	  
have	  correct	  ethical	  relationships,	  you	  must	  remember	  certain	  things	  about	  the	  persons	  you	  are	  
engaging	  with	  (see	  Margalit	  2002:	  104-­‐106).	  21	  Blustain’s	   rationale	   for	   this	   claim	   is	   threefold:	   first,	   remembering	   the	  dear	  departed	   is	   a	  way	   of	   retaining	   the	   significance	   of	   their	   life	   (see	   Blustein	   2008:	   260-­‐263);	   second,	   by	  remembering	   the	   dear	   departed	   we	   respect	   the	   ‘enduring	   duties’	   of	   love	   and	   honour	   on	  which	  our	  moral	  relationship	  to	  them	  is	  based	  (see	  Blustein	  2008:	  273-­‐276);	  and,	   third,	  so	  long	  as	  we	  want	   to	  be	  remembered	   in	   turn	  by	  other	  persons,	  we	  shall	   remember	   the	  dear	  departed	   following	   an	   impulse	  of	   reciprocity	   (see	  Blustein	  2008:	  276-­‐281).	  While	   the	   first	  two	   create	   unconditional	   duties	   of	   remembrance,	   the	   third	   one	   only	   creates	   a	   conditional	  duty.	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not	  the	  only	  ethical	  frameworks	  available	  in	  this	  regard	  (remember	  Strawson	  2004	  —end	   of	   §	   1.1)	   and,	   more	   importantly,	   are	   not	   part	   of	   the	   political	  culture	  of	   liberal	   societies,	  Margalit	   and	  Blustein’s	  approaches	   to	   the	  moral	  assessment	   of	   the	   past	   are	   comprehensive.	   In	   contrast,	   notice	   that	   my	  argument	   is	   rather	   different:	   considering	   the	   psychological	   evidence	  provided,	   it	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  human	  psychological	  regularity	  that	  most	  normal	  victimized	  citizens	  are	  in	  need	  of	  coming	  to	  terms	  with	  their	  public	  past.	  It	  is	  this	  interest	  that	  must	  be	  accounted	  for	  in	  a	  theory	  of	  liberal	  justice.	  A	   second	   way	   of	   comprehensiveness	   comes	   by	   affirming	   highly	  speculative	  metaphysical	   claims	   about	  persons	   and	   the	   importance	  of	   their	  past.	  An	   instructive	  way	  of	  dealing	  with	   this	  question	   is	  provided	  by	  Bruce	  Ackerman’s	   paper	   ‘Temporal	   Horizons	   of	   Justice’	   (Ackerman	   1997).	  Ackerman	  develops	  a	  series	  of	  ideas	  regarding	  ‘the	  metaphysical	  foundations	  of	   the	   self’s	   encounter	  with	   time’,	   foundations	   in	  which,	   Ackerman	   argues,	  ‘liberals	  may	  find	  it	  necessary	  to	  probe	  more	  deeply’	  (Ackerman	  1997:	  317).	  Ackerman’s	  adventure	  into	  the	  metaphysics	  of	  the	  self	  ends	  up	  suggesting	  his	  ‘own	   strong	   priority	   to	   the	   self’s	   struggle	   for	   a	   meaningful	   autobiography	  over	   the	   claims	   of	   particular	   relationships	   and	   life	   experiences’	   (Ackerman	  1997:	   317).	   In	   contrast,	   notice	   that	   I	   am	   not	  making	   a	  metaphysical	   claim	  regarding	  the	  relationship	  between	  self	  and	  time.	  The	  relevant	  evidence	  that	  warrants	  the	  concern	  with	  historical	  injustice	  and	  the	  past	  is	  either	  empirical	  in	  character	  or	  independent	  of	  polemical	  speculative	  claims.	  In	  fact,	  this	  idea	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guides	   the	   evidence	   I	   provided	   in	   §	   1.1-­‐1.3	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   normative	  significance	  of	  historical	  injustice	  rectification.	  David	   Velleman	   also	   offers	   (although	   indirectly)	   a	   comprehensive	  view	  about	  the	  relevance	  of	  the	  past.	  Velleman	  holds	  that	  the	  self	  narrates	  its	  own	  life,	  bringing	  certain	  past	  facts	  to	  light	  and	  eschewing	  others,	  creating	  a	  single	  coherent	  narrative	  of	  a	   life.	  The	  result,	  according	  to	  Velleman,	   is	   that	  the	   self	   invents	   itself.	   The	   main	   focus	   of	   his	   discussion	   is	   whether	   such	   a	  
narrative	   self	   is	   fictional	   (as	   Daniel	   Dennett	   1989,	   1992	   holds)	   or	   not.	   For	  Dennett,	  it	  is	  my	  brain	  the	  author	  of	  my	  self-­‐narrative	  (not	  me	  or	  myself)	  and	  the	  result	  of	  such	  invention	  is	  plain	  fiction.	  For	  Velleman,	  myself	  is	  the	  author	  of	  my	  self-­‐narrative	  and	  the	  result	  of	  such	  invention	  is	  true:	  I	  shall	  not	  be	  arguing	  against	  [Dennett’s]	  positive	  conception	  of	  the	  self	  as	  the	  fictive	  protagonist	  of	  a	  person’s	  autobiography.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  I’ll	  argue	  that	  Dennett’s	  positive	  conception	  of	  the	  self	  is	  largely	  right.	  My	  only	  disagreement	  with	  Dennett	  will	  be	  that,	  whereas	  he	  regards	  an	  autobiography	  as	  fictive	  and	  consequently	   false	   in	   characterizing	   its	   protagonist,	   I	   regard	   it	   as	   both	   fictive	  and	   true.	  We	   invent	   ourselves,	   I	   shall	   argue,	   but	  we	   really	   are	   the	   characters	  whom	  we	  invent.	  (Velleman	  2006:	  205-­‐206)	  This	  view	  about	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  past	  for	  human	  lives	  is	  comprehensive	  in	   character,	   for	   it	   relates	   to	  a	  metaphysical	  debate	   regarding	   the	   reality	  of	  the	  self	  as	  a	  narrator.	  As	  such,	  this	  view	  is	  foreign	  to	  a	  political	  conception	  of	  justice.	  	  But	   some	  may	   raise	   an	   objection	   to	  my	   critique	   of	   Rawls’s	   forward-­‐looking	   conception	   of	   the	   person,	   in	  §	   1.1,	   by	  making	   an	   analogy	   between	  Velleman	  and	  Dennett’s	  debate	  and	  the	  one	  between	  Parfit	  and	  Korsgaard	  to	  which	   I	   briefly	   alluded	   to	   there.	   For	   this	   latter	   debate	   is	   about	   the	  
2	  	  	  Is	  Historical	  Injustice	  outside	  the	  Scope	  of	  Rawls’s	  Theory?	  
	  
	   102	  
repercussions	   on	   morality	   of	   putative	   metaphysical	   conclusions	   about	   the	  nature	   of	   personal	   identity.	   Thus,	   it	  may	   be	   argued	   that	   just	   as	   Velleman’s	  claims	  are	   improper	   for	  a	  political	   conception	  of	   justice,	   so	  are	  Korsgaard’s	  remarks	  on	   the	  diachronic	  unity	  of	  agency.	  This	  objection	  would	  state,	   then,	  that	   I	   partly	   relied	   on	   a	   comprehensive	   view	   of	   agency	   in	   order	   to	   argue	  against	  Rawls’s	  forward-­‐looking	  conception	  of	  the	  person.	  	  However,	  the	  equivalence	  between	  Velleman’s	  claims	  about	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  self	  as	  a	  narrator	  and	  Korsgaard’s	  remarks	  on	  the	  diachronic	  unity	  of	  agency,	  at	  least	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  how	  metaphysically	  controversial	  they	  are,	  is	   unfounded,	   for	   Korsgaard	   is,	   precisely,	   trying	   to	   neutralise	   the	   effect	   of	  metaphysical	   disputes	   in	  moral	   discussions.	   Parfit	   famously	   proposes	  what	  he	  considers	  to	  be	  the	  correct	  metaphysical	  understanding	  of	  the	  person,	   in	  which	  personal	  identity	  does	  not	  hold	  the	  importance	  that	  is	  usually	  ascribed	  to	  it.	   In	  fact,	  Parfit	  claims	  that	  personal	  identity	  is	  not	  a	  further	  fact	  about	  a	  person,	  distinct	  from	  and	  not	  reducible	  to	  ‘a	  brain	  and	  a	  body,	  and	  a	  series	  of	  physical	  and	  metal	  events’	  (Parfit	  1984:	  223).	  He	  then	  argues	  that	  from	  such	  a	   reductionist	   understanding	   of	   a	   person	   several	   things	   follow	   regarding	  morality	  and	  rationality,	  some	  of	  them	  favouring	  a	  consequentialist	  approach	  to	  moral	  assessment	  (see	  Parfit	  1984:	  300-­‐321).	  To	   this	   argumentative	   strategy,	   Korsgaard	   opposes	   the	   divide	  between	   theoretical	   and	   practical	   standpoints.	   She	   then	   endorses	   the	  independence	  of	  the	  practical	  standpoint	  from	  its	  theoretical	  counterpart:	  [W]e	   must	   view	   ourselves	   in	   these	   ways	   when	   we	   occupy	   the	   standpoint	   of	  practical	  reason	  —that	  is,	  when	  we	  are	  deciding	  what	  to	  do.	  This	  follows	  from	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the	  mere	  fact	  that	  we	  must	  regard	  ourselves	  as	  the	  causes	  —the	  first	  causes—	  of	   the	   things	   that	  we	  will.	  And	   this	   fundamental	  attitude	   is	   forced	  upon	  us	  by	  the	  necessity	  of	  making	   choices,	   regardless	  of	   the	   theoretical	  or	  metaphysical	  facts.	  (Korsgaard	  1996a:	  378)	  This	   way	   of	   proceeding	   is	   quite	   close	   to	   the	   spirit	   of	   Rawls’s	   political	  liberalism	   itself.	   Moreover,	   the	   approach	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   development	   of	  Rawls’s	  (CP:	  286-­‐303)	  explicit	  defence	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  morality	  from	  putative	   metaphysical	   conclusions.	   So,	   against	   the	   objection	   we	   are	  considering	  now,	  we	  must	  notice	   that	   it	   is	   from	   the	  practical	   point	   of	   view	  that	  the	  diachronic	  unity	  of	  agency	  is	  asserted.	  As	  Korsgaard	  holds,	  ‘this	  does	  not	   require	   that	   your	   agency	   be	   located	   in	   a	   separately	   existing	   entity	   or	  involve	  a	  deep	  metaphysical	  fact.	  Instead,	   it	   is	  a	  practical	  necessity	  imposed	  upon	   you	   by	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   deliberative	   standpoint’	   (Korsgaard	   1996a:	  370).	   Considering	  the	  relation	  between	  the	  citizens	  and	  the	  State,	  this	  can	  be	  framed	   in	   the	   following	  way:	   regardless	  of	  whether	   it	   is	  a	   fact	  of	   the	  world	  that	  we	   are	   free	   diachronic	   unified	   agents,	   the	   State	   (just	   as	  we	   ourselves)	  cannot	  but	  assume	  that	  we	  are.	  This	  claim	  does	  not	  deny	  or	  assert	  that	  we	  in	  
fact	  are	  such	  type	  of	  agents.	  Thus,	  here	  we	  find	  a	  substantial	  difference	  with	  Velleman’s	  claims	  on	   the	  self	  as	  a	  narrator.	  For	  him,	  as	  we	   just	  saw,	  such	  a	  self	  exists	  in	  the	  fabric	  of	  the	  world	  and	  is	  just	  as	  real	  as	  any	  other	  object	  in	  such	  a	  world	  —like	  my	  brain.	  The	  self	  as	  a	  narrator	  is	  thus	  not	  (or	  not	  only)	  a	  postulate	   of	   the	   practical	   standpoint	   but,	   rather,	   an	   alleged	   object	   of	   the	  world	  described	  by	  the	  theoretical	  standpoint.	  Considering	  this,	   I	   think	  that	  the	  analogy	  between	  Velleman’s	  self	  as	  a	  narrator	  and	  the	  thesis	  that	  agency	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presupposes	   diachronic	   unity	   is	   unfounded.	  While	   one	   is	   a	   comprehensive	  metaphysical	  claim	  improper	  to	  a	  political	  conception	  of	  justice,	  the	  other	  is	  not.	   Finally,	  there	  is	  a	  third	  concern	  of	  comprehensiveness.	  This	  has	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  the	  State,	  by	  promoting	  what	  I	  have	  called	  a	  critical	  historical	  narrative	  (i.e.,	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	   the	  past	   that	   is	  sensitive	  to	  the	  existence	   of	   relevant	   historical	   injustices),	   is	   already	   promoting	   a	  comprehensive	  view	  over	  others.	  	  The	  least	  that	  can	  be	  said	  against	  this	  concern	  is	  to	  point	  out	  that,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  §	  1.3,	  every	  single	  liberal	  society	  creates	  a	  historical	  narrative	  for	  itself.	  Such	  a	  narrative	  is	  not	  the	  result	  of	  chance.	  Several	  putative	  facts	  about	  the	   origin	   and	   development	   of	   society	   are	   chosen	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	  creating	   a	   strong	   sense	   of	   belonging,	   solidarity,	   and	   unity.	   Acknowledging	  relevant	  historical	  injustices	  is	  not	  different	  from	  this	  non-­‐stopping	  exercise	  of	   creating	  a	  historical	  narrative.	  Therefore,	   this	   third	  worry,	   if	  maintained,	  would	   be	   stating	   something	   stronger:	   creating	   a	   historical	   narrative	   of	  any	  kind	   is	   always	   a	   comprehensive	   exercise	   from	   which	   a	   liberal	   state	   must	  refrain.	  	  I	  called	  this	  position	   in	  §	  1.3	  the	  libertarian	  view	  of	  history	  —since	   it	  advocates	   for	   exclusively	   leaving	   to	   citizens	   the	   creation	   of	   historical	  narratives	   within	   a	   given	   society.	   As	   I	   said	   there,	   I	   find	   such	   a	   view	  implausible	   on	   several	   accounts.	   However,	   the	   third	   worry	   of	  comprehensiveness	   could	   persist	   even	   if	   I	   am	   right	   about	   the	   unlikeliness	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and	  undesirability	  of	  a	  liberal	  State	  guided	  by	  the	  libertarian	  view	  of	  history.	  It	  can	  be	  said	  that	  the	  very	  fact	  that	  a	  liberal	  State	  cannot	  do	  without	  promoting	  a	  specific	  view	  of	  its	  history	  only	  shows	  that	  every	  single	  liberal	  State	  favours	  a	   comprehensive	   view	  of	   history.	   In	   this	  way,	   this	   third	  worry	  becomes	   an	  objection	  to	  the	  possibility	  of	  a	  political	  conception	  of	  justice	  all	  together.	  Yet	  I	   think	   this	   further	   claim	   is	   also	   incorrect.	   This	   claim	   puts	   the	   competing	  views	  about	  the	  past	  on	  a	  par	  with	  the	  competing	  views	  about	  the	  good	  life.	  And,	   indeed,	   some	   theorists	   working	   on	   public	  memorialisation	   sometimes	  talk	   in	   a	   way	   that	   suggests	   this	   analogy.	   For	   instance,	   with	   regards	   to	   the	  dictatorial	  past	  of	  South	  America	  in	  the	  second	  part	  of	  the	  twentieth	  century,	  Elizabeth	  Jelin	  says:	  Despite	   the	  relevance	  and	  centrality	  of	   these	  confrontations	  on	   the	  content	  of	  democracy	  itself,	  the	  dictatorial	  past	  of	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  is	  still	  very	  much	  part	   of	   the	   current	   debate.	   Many	   victims	   and	   their	   advocates	   demand	   a	  complete	  account	  of	  these	  abuses	  that	  took	  place	  under	  dictatorship	  […]	  Others,	  claiming	  that	   they	  are	  concerned	  above	  all	  with	  the	   functioning	  of	  democratic	  institutions,	  emphasize	  the	  need	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  future	  rather	  than	  the	  past	  […]	  Still	   others	   look	   at	   the	   past	   in	   order	   to	   glorify	   the	   ‘order	   and	   progress’	   that	  dictatorships	   presumably	   secured.	   Thus,	   there	   are	   competing	   and	   conflicting	  understandings	  and	  memories	  of	   the	  past	   in	  societies	   that	  are	  emerging	   from	  periods	  of	  political	  violence	  and	  state	  repression.	  […]	  In	  all	  cases,	  as	  time	  passes	  and	   it	  becomes	  possible	  to	  establish	  or	  conceive	  a	  temporal	  distance	  between	  past	  and	  present,	  alternative	  and	  even	  rival	   interpretations	  of	   the	  recent	  past	  and	   its	  memories	   take	   the	   center	   stage	   of	   cultural	   and	   political	   debate.	   (Jelin	  2007:	  139-­‐140)	  This	   way	   of	   framing	   the	   struggles	   taking	   place	   in	   public	   memorialisation	  states	  that	  there	  are	  many	  competing	  views	  about	  the	  past.	  The	  third	  worry	  of	  comprehensiveness	  we	  are	  exploring	  exploits	  this	  and	  holds	  that	  the	  State	  will	   always	   favour	   one	   to	   the	   detriment	   of	   the	   others	   and	   in	   so	   doing	  will	  adopt	  a	  comprehensive	  view	  about	  its	  history.	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Against	   this	  worry,	  we	  need	  to	  remember	  that	  not	  all	   conceptions	  of	  the	   good	   are	   permissible	   in	   a	   liberal	   state.	   Non-­‐liberal	   conceptions	   of	   the	  good	   are	   forbidden	   and	   discouraged	   due	   to	   their	   rejection	   of	   the	   very	  principles	  of	   liberal	   justice.	  Rawls	  is	  unequivocal	  about	  this	  when	  he	  denies	  that	  what	  it	  may	  be	  called	  absolute	  neutrality	  is	  possible:	  	  No	   society	   can	   include	   within	   itself	   all	   forms	   of	   life	   […]	   As	   Berlin	   has	   long	  maintained	   (it	   is	   one	   of	   its	   fundamental	   themes),	   there	   is	   no	   social	   world	  without	  a	  loss	  […]	  But	  these	  social	  necessities	  are	  not	  to	  be	  taken	  for	  arbitrary	  bias	  or	  injustice.	  (PL:	  197)	  	  Thus,	  even	  if	  we	  preserve	  the	  analogy	  between	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  and	  historical	   narratives,	  we	   can	   say	   that	  certain	   historical	   narratives	   are	   to	  be	  discouraged	   in	   a	   liberal	   society	  —just	   in	   the	   very	   same	  way	   in	  which	  non-­‐liberal	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  life	  are	  discouraged	  in	  a	  liberal	  State.	  In	  fact,	  I	  believe	   that	   the	   moral	   grounds	   for	   the	   exclusion	   of	   certain	   historical	  narratives	   and	   certain	   conceptions	   of	   the	   good	   are	   exactly	   the	   same:	   the	  denial	  of	  the	  equal	  status	  of	  all	  citizens.	  A	  historical	  narrative	  that	  denies	  or	  eschews	  the	  existence	  of	  historical	  injustices	  simply	  is	  a	  non-­‐liberal	  historical	  narrative.	  For	  the	  stated	  reasons,	  appealing	  to	  the	  non-­‐comprehensive	  character	  of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   does	   not	   justify	   the	   lack	   of	   engagement	   with	   historical	  injustice.	  None	  of	  the	  three	  worries	  of	  comprehensiveness	  (the	  independence	  of	  the	  personal	  domain,	  the	  avoidance	  of	  controversial	  metaphysical	  claims,	  and	  the	  role	  of	   the	  State	   in	  discouraging	  certain	  historical	  narratives)	  affect	  the	  State’s	  exercise	  of	  acknowledging	  and	  rectifying	  historical	  injustices.	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2.4	  Concluding	  Remarks	  This	   concludes	  my	   assessment	   of	   the	   view	   that,	   despite	   the	   importance	   of	  historical	   rectification	   in	   the	   real	  world,	   historical	   injustice	   is	   nevertheless	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  view	  is	  mistaken.	  The	   ideal,	   forward-­‐looking,	   and	   non-­‐comprehensive	   character	   of	   Rawls’s	  theory	   does	   not	   justify	   its	   lack	   of	   consideration	   of	   historical	   injustice.	  Discussion	   amongst	   Rawlsians	   should	   not	   gravitate	   around	   the	   question	   of	  which	  aspect	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  justifies	  excluding	  concern	  for	  past	  injustice.	  Rather,	  discussion	  should	  centre	  on	  the	  question	  of	  whether	  Rawls’s	  theory	  as	  it	  stands	  right	  now	  contains	  the	  normative	  apparatus	  to	  respond	  to	  them	  or	  not.	  This	  is	  the	  question	  that	  I	  will	  explore	  in	  the	  following	  chapter.	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3	  
Towards	  a	  Principle	  of	  Historical	  Rectification	  for	  Ideal	  
Theory	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapter	  we	  saw	  why	  the	  current	  default	  position	  holding	  that	  historical	   injustice	   is	   beyond	   the	   scope	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   is	   mistaken.	   The	  
ideal,	   forward-­‐looking,	   and	   non-­‐comprehensive	   character	   of	   such	   a	   theory	  does	   not	   warrant	   the	   absence	   of	   concern	   for	   past	   injustice	   in	   Rawls’s	  description	   of	   a	   just	   society.	   Therefore,	   in	   this	   chapter	   I	   will	   advance	   in	   a	  more	  tentative	  fashion	  one	  way	  in	  which	  Rawls’s	  theory	  could	  respond	  to	  the	  challenge	  posed	  by	  historical	  injustice.	  To	  that	  effect,	  in	  §	  3.1	  I	  first	  consider	  how	   the	   original	   principles	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   might	   relate	   to	   the	  rectification	  of	  historical	  injustice.	  In	  §	  3.2	  I	  consider	  how	  the	  inclusion	  of	  a	  specific	  backward-­‐looking	  principle	  to	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  could	  help	  to	  clarify	  the	   commitment	   of	  Rawls’s	   theory	   to	   the	   idea	   that	  no	   liberal	  society	   is	   fully	  
just	   until	   historical	   rectification	   has	   taken	   place.	   Finally,	   in	   §	   3.3	   I	   will	  elaborate	  on	  the	  putative	  conflict	  between	  retribution	  and	  recognition-­‐driven	  measures	  within	  recent	  historical	  rectification.	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3.1	  The	  Two	  Principles	  and	  Historical	  Rectification	  Every	   liberal	  society	  counts	  historical	   injustices	  within	   its	  past.	  Considering	  this,	   every	   time	   a	   new	   government	   comes	   into	   power,	   numerous	   issues	  regarding	   the	   rectification	  of	   the	  past	   arise.	  The	  very	   first	  one	   is,	   precisely,	  whether	  to	  engage	  in	  historical	  rectification	  or	  not	  —Elster	  2006:	  6	  calls	  this	  the	  ‘fundamental	  decision’.	  That	  this	  goal	  can	  be	  postponed	  indefinitely	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   the	   new	   government	   is	   not	   concerned	  with	  meeting	   liberal-­‐democratic	   standards.	  On	   the	   contrary,	   it	   could	  be	  argued	   that	   rectification	  should	   be	   partly	   postponed	   for	   that	   very	   reason.	   Urgent	   tasks	   such	   as	  ensuring	  the	  rule	  of	   law,	  strengthening	  the	  democratic	  political	  system,	  and	  diminishing	  inequalities	  between	  different	  social	  sectors	  are	  all	  liberal	  goals	  of	   the	   first	   order	   that	   might	   be	   prioritised.	   A	   society	   can	   even	   make	  incredible	   improvements	   on	   all	   these	   scores	   without	   engaging	   in	   the	  rectification	  of	  past	   injustices	  at	  all.	   If	   this	  pattern	  continues	   for	  a	  sufficient	  period	  of	  time,	  we	  can	  imagine	  a	  society	  in	  which	  the	  fundamental	  precepts	  of	  
liberal	  justice	  are	  almost	  fully	  met	  in	  the	  present	  even	  when	  no	  rectification	  of	  
past	   injustice	   has	   ever	   taken	   place.	   These	   reflections	   prompt	   the	   following	  hypothetical	  scenario:	  
Scenario	  1:	   Imagine	  two	  countries	  respectively	  called	  Argentina	  and	  Uruguay	   whose	   societies	   become,	   after	   long	   transitional	   processes,	  well-­‐ordered	   in	  most	   respects	   according	   to	   Rawls’s	   description	   (see	  
PL:	  35).	  First,	  all	  citizens	  accept	  —and	  know	  that	  the	  rest	  accept—	  the	  principles	   of	   justices-­‐as-­‐fairness.	   Second,	   citizens	   have	   developed	   a	  sense	  of	  justice	  that	  allows	  them	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  directives	  of	  their	  social	   institutions.	  And,	  third,	  no	  present	   injustice	  occurs	  within	  both	  societies.	  That	   is,	   the	   institutions	  of	   their	  basic	  structures	  are	  almost	  perfectly	   regulated	  by	   the	  principles	  of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness:	   there	   is	   a	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social-­‐minimum	   ensured	   for	   every	   citizen;	   all	   political	   and	   civil	  liberties	   are	   equally	   distributed	   amongst	   all	   citizens;	   there	   is	   fair	  equality	   of	   opportunity	   in	   the	   competition	   for	   social	   positions	   of	  advantage	   in	  most	  respects;	  and,	   finally,	   the	   fact	   that	  certain	  citizens	  obtain	  the	  best	  social	  positions	  benefits	  the	  worse-­‐off	  of	  society.	  Now	  suppose	  that	  some	  victims	  or	  descendants	  of	  victims	  in	  both	  societies	  raise	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  injustices	  committed	  in	  the	  late	  1970s	  and	  early	  1980s.	  Argentina	  establishes	  a	  truth	  commission,	  allocates	  some	  of	  its	  budget	   or	   calls	   for	   donations	   to	   build	   memorials	   and	   museums	   in	  honour	  of	  past	  victims,	  compensates	  the	  relatives	  of	  citizens	  abducted	  and	   assassinated	   during	   the	   so	   called	   dirty	   war,	   and	   even	   rescinds	  self-­‐amnesties	  that	  former	  aggressors	  gave	  to	  themselves	  before	  they	  left	  office.	  By	   contrast,	  Uruguay	   simply	  decides	   to	  draw	  a	   line	  under	  the	  past:	  “let	  bygones	  be	  bygones”	  is	  the	  spirit	  of	  its	  policies	  towards	  the	  past.22	  	  	  Under	   the	   suppositions	   of	   scenario	   1,	   the	   question	   is:	   which	   of	   the	   two	  courses	   of	   action	   is	   just?	   Considering	   the	   arguments	   offered	   in	  §	   1.1-­‐1.3,	   I	  hope	  you	  would	  agree	   that	   the	  only	   just	   course	  of	   action	  would	  be	   the	  one	  adopted	  by	  Argentina.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  Scenario	  1	  is	  inspired	  by	  the	  actual	  and	  divergent	  paths	  that	  the	  current	  Argentinean	  and	  Uruguayan	  societies	  are	  taking	  regarding	  the	  injustices	  committed	  in	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s	  to	  persons	  considered	  political	  dissidents	  or	  ‘subversive’	  elements.	  Argentina	  has	  come	  back	  to	  the	   path	   it	   started	   in	   1983	   when	   it	   established	   the	   second	   truth	   commission	   of	   the	  contemporary	  era.	  It	  has	  taken	  several	  recognition-­‐driven	  measures	  such	  as	  converting	  into	  a	  memorial	  the	  Navy	  Mechanical	  School	  (the	  biggest	  torturing	  centre	  during	  the	  Dictadura	  —5,000	  out	  of	  the	  calculated	  30,000	  abducted	  citizens	  were	  tortured	  and	  killed	  there)	  as	  well	  as	  marking	  the	  day	  of	  the	  military	  coup	  in	  1976	  as	  a	  national	  day	  of	  mourning	  (March	  24).	  Likewise,	   Argentina	   has	   set	   in	   place	   strong	   compensation-­‐driven	   measures,	   passing	  legislation	  that	  allows	  direct	  monetary	  remuneration	  to	  victims’	  relatives	  and	  also	  to	  citizens	  born	   while	   their	   parents	   were	   in	   illegal	   captivity	   (see	   Guembe	   2006:	   25-­‐47).	   Finally,	  Argentina	  has	  also	  undertaken	  strong	  retribution-­‐driven	  measures,	  judging	  and	  imprisoning	  before	   March	   2011	  more	   than	   two	   hundred	   officials	   involved	   in	   human	   rights	   violations,	  including	   the	   two	   presidents	   of	   Military	   Junta,	   Jorge	   Videla	   (1976-­‐1981)	   and	   Reinaldo	  Bignone	   (1982-­‐1983)	   (see	   ‘Argentina	   Marks	   Coup	   Anniversary	   Amid	   Dirty	   War	   Trail’,	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐latin-­‐america-­‐12832677).	   By	   contrast,	   Uruguay	   had	  refrained	  until	  very	  recently	  from	  undoing	  an	  amnesty	  law	  first	  approved	  in	  1986.	  The	  law	  was	  ratified	  by	  referendums	  both	  in	  1989	  and	  2009	  as	  less	  than	  50%	  of	  voters	  voted	  against	  it	   (see	  Gillespie	  1991:	  218-­‐222).	   In	  March	  2011,	   the	  Parliament	  also	   failed	   to	  overturn	   the	  same	  law	  because	  of	  the	  decisive	  votes	  of	  some	  key	  figures	  of	  the	  Frente	  Amplio,	  the	  party	  in	  office	   since	   the	  arrival	  of	   José	  Mujica	   to	   the	  presidency.	   It	  was	  not	  until	  October	  27,	  2011,	  that	  the	  stated	  law	  was	  finally	  overturned	  by	  the	  Parliament,	  a	  decision	  that	  awaits	  	  Mujica’s	  ratification	   (See	   ‘Uruguay	   overturns	   amnesty	   for	   military-­‐era	   crimes’,	  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-­‐latin-­‐america-­‐15473619).	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Now,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	  although	  historical	  injustice	  is	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory,	  the	  effective	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   suffices	   to	   ensure	   its	   rectification.	   Accordingly,	   for	   this	   view	   to	  succeed,	   it	   must	   be	   the	   case	   that	   a	   society	   in	   which	   relevant	   historical	  injustices	   remain	   un-­‐rectified	   does	   not	   fully	   realise	   Rawls’s	   original	  principles.	  An	  obvious	   first	   candidate	   in	   this	   respect	   is	   the	  principle	   of	   fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity.23	  For,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  historical	  injustices	  may	  have	  tremendous	   effects	   on	   the	   capacity	   of	   victims	   to	   pursue	   their	   plan	   of	   life;	  these	  effects	  can	  introduce	  unfairness	  in	  the	  competition	  for	  social	  positions	  of	   advantage,	   affecting	   victims’	   prospects	   but	   not	   those	   of	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  citizenry.	  Coming	  back	   to	  scenario	   1,	   the	  proponents	  of	   this	   view	  must	   argue	  that	   the	  principle	  of	   fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	   is	  not	  met	   in	  our	   imagined	  Uruguayan	   society.	   For	   as	   long	   as	   their	   past	   political	   harms	   have	   not	   been	  rectified,	   victims	   have	   to	   compete	   for	   social	   positions	   at	   a	   psychological	  disadvantage	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  citizenry.	  In	  fact,	  several	  arguments	  regarding	   the	   connection	   of	   historical	   injustice	   and	   fair	   equality	   of	  opportunity	   have	   been	   made	   in	   the	   literature	   on	   positive	   discrimination.	  Paradigmatically,	  Sher	  holds	  that	  the	  very	  moral	  basis	  of	  affirmative	  action	  is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23	  Rawls’s	   final	   formulation	   of	   this	   principle,	   in	   conjunction	   with	   the	   difference	   principle,	  reads:	   ‘Social	   and	   economic	   inequalities	   are	   to	   satisfy	   two	   conditions:	   first,	   they	   are	   to	   be	  attached	  to	  offices	  and	  positions	  open	  to	  all	  under	  conditions	  of	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity;	  and,	   second,	   they	   are	   to	   be	   to	   the	   greatest	   benefit	   of	   the	   least-­‐advantaged	   members	   of	  society’	  (JF:	  42-­‐43).	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the	   fact	   that	   such	   policies	   restore	   equal	   access	   to	   positions	   of	   advantage	  amongst	  victims	  of	  past	  injustice.	  Sher	  states:	  It	  is,	  I	  think,	  the	  key	  to	  an	  adequate	  justification	  of	  reverse	  discrimination	  to	  see	  that	   practice,	   not	   as	   redressing	   of	   past	   privations,	   but,	   rather	   as	   a	   way	   of	  neutralizing	   the	   present	   competitive	   disadvantage	   caused	   by	   those	   past	  privations	  and	  thus	  a	  way	  of	  restoring	  equal	  access	  to	  the	  goods	  which	  society	  distributes	  competitively.	  (Sher	  1975:	  163.	  Italics	  in	  the	  original)	  There	   are	   three	   important	   things	   to	   notice	   about	   this	   claim.	   First,	   that	  affirmative	  action	   is	  understood	   in	  a	   ‘forward-­‐looking’	  way	  (see	  Sher	  1999:	  85-­‐86	   and	   Taylor	   2009:	   478).	   As	   Sher	   holds	   in	   the	   passage	   quoted,	   this	  approach	  is	  not	  seen	  as	  a	  way	  to	  rectify	  historical	  injustice	  as	  such,	  but	  only	  its	   effects	   on	   citizens’	   present	   opportunities.	   Accordingly,	   by	   exclusively	  trying	   to	   ensure	   equality	   of	   opportunity	   in	   the	   present,	   affirmative	   action	  policies	  are	  not	  thought	  to	  accomplish	  full	  rectification	  for	  past	  wrongs	  (see	  Sher	  1977).	  Second,	  this	  account	  of	  affirmative	  action	  is	  not	  based	  on	  the	  idea	  that	   such	  policies	  must	   be	   in	   place	   because	   they	   guarantee	   a	  more	   diverse	  society	  (see	  Sher	  1999).	  Third,	  affirmative	  action	  policies	  are	  understood	  as	  
temporary	   measures	   to	   achieve	   the	   stated	   objective	   (fair	   equality	   of	  opportunity	  amongst	  victims	  and	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  citizenry).	  In	  this	  sense,	  we	  can	   think	   of	   such	   policies	   as	   one	   of	   the	   strategies	   to	   arrive	   from	   our	  disordered	   societies	   —in	   which	   fair	   competition	   for	   positions	   is	   not	  guaranteed	   due	   to	   the	   unfair	   historical	   background	   of	   some	   citizens—	   to	  well-­‐ordered	  societies	  —in	  which	  the	  citizens’	  background	  does	  not	  influence	  competition.	  Thus,	  once	  the	  transition	  to	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  is	  completed,	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there	   is	  no	  need	   for	  maintaining	  affirmative	  action	  policies.	  This	   is	  also	   the	  spirit	  of	  Samuel	  Freeman’s	  following	  remark:	  	  So-­‐called	   “affirmative	   action”,	   or	   giving	   preferential	   treatment	   for	   socially	  disadvantaged	  minorities,	   is	  not	  part	  of	  FEO	   [fair	   equality	  of	   opportunity]	   for	  Rawls,	   and	   is	   perhaps	   incompatible	   with	   it.	   This	   does	   not	   mean	   that	   Rawls	  never	  regarded	  preferential	   treatment	   in	  hiring	  and	  education	  as	  appropriate.	  In	   lectures	  he	   indicated	   that	   it	  may	  be	   a	  proper	   corrective	   for	   remedying	   the	  present	  effects	  of	  past	  discrimination.	  But	  this	  assumes	  it	   is	  temporary.	  Under	  the	   ideal	   conditions	   of	   a	   “well-­‐ordered	   society”,	   Rawls	   did	   not	   regard	  preferential	   treatment	   as	   compatible	   with	   fair	   equality	   of	   opportunity.	  (Freeman	  2007a:	  90-­‐91)	  The	   work	   of	   these	   authors	   supports	   the	   main	   claim	   of	   the	   view	   we	   are	  considering:	  relevant	  past	  wrongs	  have	  present	  effects	  on	  the	  opportunity	  of	  victims,	  and	  because	  of	  that	  a	  society	  that	  has	  not	  rectified	  such	  effects	  is	  not	  well-­‐ordered.	  Thus,	  even	  when	  no	  injustice	  is	  committed	  in	  the	  present,	  the	  effects	   of	   past	   injustices	   on	   the	  opportunities	   of	   victims	   are	   still	   present	   in	  our	  imagined	  Uruguay.	  Indeed,	  the	  preceding	  point	  must	  be	  fully	  granted.	  	  	   However,	   it	   would	   be	   a	   mistake	   to	   think	   that	   the	   normative	  significance	   of	   historical	   rectification	   is	   exclusively	   related	   to	   the	   fact	   that	  society	   should	   guarantee	   equal	   opportunity	   to	   their	   citizens.	   To	   see	   this,	  consider	  scenario	  2:	  
Scenario	  2	  is	  just	  as	  scenario	  1	  but	  with	  one	  difference.	  Most	  victims	  of	  past	  injustice	  are	  highly	  resilient	  psychologically	  speaking.	  In	  fact,	  a	  former	   political	   dissident,	   call	   him	   José	   Mujica,	   even	   becomes	  president	  of	   the	  well-­‐ordered	  Uruguay.	  During	  the	  1970s	  and	  1980s,	  Mujica	   was	   seized	   and	   tortured	   by	   the	   repressive	   forces	   of	   the	  dictatorial	   regime	   for	   up	   to	   fourteen	   years.	   By	   contrast,	   after	   the	  consolidation	   of	   democracy	   in	   the	   Uruguayan	   transition	   and	  establishment	   of	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society,	   he	   was	   obviously	   neither	  imprisoned	  nor	  tortured;	  and	  —as	  the	  kind	  of	  Übermensch	  that	  he	  is—both	   his	   ability	   and	   his	   willingness	   to	   compete	   for	   public	   office	  remained	  intact.	  He	  himself	  states	  this	  very	  clearly.	  Suppose,	  however,	  that	  he	  does	   say	   something	   along	   the	   following	   lines:	   ‘You	   see,	   after	  democracy	   was	   re-­‐established,	   I	   really	   had	   no	   disadvantage	   in	   my	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struggle	   to	   eventually	   become	   President.	   My	   society	   offered	   all	  opportunities	  and	   I	   took	   them	  as	   they	  were	  coming.	   I	  did	  not	   resent	  my	   past	   while	   in	   such	   a	   process.	   However,	   I	   still	   think	   there	   is	  something	  wrong	  with	  what	  was	  done	  to	  me	  during	  the	  dirty	  war,	  and	  I	  believe	  that	  my	  society	  should	  officially	  acknowledge	  that.	  I	  think	  it	  is	   the	   prerogative	   of	   persons	   like	   me	   to	   stake	   this	   claim	   to	  recognition’.24	  	  The	  point	  to	  underscore	  in	  scenario	  2	  is	  that	  Mujica	  can	  raise	  the	  complaint	  that,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  his	  past	  remains	  un-­‐rectified,	  even	  when	  such	  a	  past	  did	   not	   affect	   his	   opportunities	   ever	   since	   the	   Uruguayan	   society	   became	  well-­‐ordered	  (after	  all,	  he	  even	  managed	  to	  become	  president)25,	  an	  injustice	  is	  still	  taking	  place.	  Such	  injustice	  is	  related	  to	  two	  other	  normatively	  salient	  consequences	  of	  a	  non-­‐rectified	  historical	  wrong.	  First,	   as	   I	   argued	   in	  §	   1.2,	  when	   the	  State	   fails	   to	  provide	  means	   for	  rectification	   of	   past	   violence,	   it	   fails	   to	   show	   respect	   for	   victims’	   moral	  equality.	   Scenario	   2	   illustrates	   that	   the	   State	   should	   provide	   these	  means	  simply	  because	  of	  that	  fact.	  The	  priority	  of	  this	  goal	  over	  fair	  opportunity	  is	  shown	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  even	  when	  victims’	  opportunities	  are	  not	  affected	  the	  State	   still	   must	   offer	   means	   for	   rectification.	   In	   this	   sense,	   in	   scenario	   2	  Mujica	  is	  demanding	  what	  Borneman	  2005:	  60	  calls	  a	  ‘retroactive	  recognition	  of	  dignity’	  —beyond	  the	  equal	  opportunities	  he	  must	  enjoy.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Scenario	   2	   is	   inspired	  by	   the	  current	  Uruguayan	  society,	  with	   the	  difference	   that	  such	  a	  society	   is	   not	   well-­‐ordered	   and	   president	   Mujica	   oscillates	   on	   whether	   to	   pursue	  institutional	   rectification	   for	   the	  gross	   injustices	   committed	  against	  him	  and	  other	   citizens	  like	  him	  or	  not.	  25 	  This	   is	   not	   to	   say	   that,	   more	   generally,	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   person	   from	   a	   historically	  disadvantaged	  group	  manages	  to	  attain	  a	  very	  high	  social	  position	  in	  a	  given	  society	  proves	  that	   fair	   equality	   of	   opportunity	   has	   been	   provided	   in	   such	   society.	   For	   a	   person	   from	   a	  historically	   disadvantaged	   group	   can	   indeed	   attain	   such	   a	   position	   despite	   the	   fact	   of	   her	  disadvantage	  with	  regard	  to	  other	  citizens.	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Of	   course,	   this	   seems	  a	   rather	  unusual	   case.	  For	  scenario	   2	   exploits	  the	  psychological	  strength	  of	  Mujica	  and	  the	  imagined	  Uruguayans,	  strength	  that	   is	  by	  no	  means	  common.	  But	  notice	  that	  Mujica	  can	  still	  say	  something	  similar	   even	   if	   his	   non-­‐rectified	   past	   affected	  his	   opportunities.	   He	   could	   say	  that	  rectification	  is	  not	  only	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  his	  opportunities	  in	  becoming	  president	  were	  affected.	  These	  opportunities	  represent	  just	  one	  aspect	  of	  his	  moral	   standing	   as	   a	   person	   that	   is	   supposed	   to	   be	   protected	   by	   the	  prerogatives	  of	  justice.	  Another	  aspect	  of	  his	  moral	  standing	  as	  a	  fully	  equal	  person,	  having	  to	  with	  the	  dignity	  of	  his	  life	  as	  a	  whole,	  is	  also	  to	  be	  protected	  by	   such	   prerogatives.	   The	   official	   recognition	   of	   his	   terrible	   past	  mistreatment	   is	   thus	   thought	   to	   restore	   this	   other	   aspect	   of	   his	   moral	  standing.	  Second,	  Mujica’s	   compliant	   in	   scenario	   2	   is	   also	   related	   to	   the	   fact	  that	  —beyond	  the	  importance	  of	  providing	  equal	  opportunity—	  rectifying	  a	  historical	  injustice	  is	  central	  for	  ensuring	  the	  liberal	  integrity	  of	  society	  as	  a	  whole.	   Since	   Mujica’s	   past	   mistreatment	   has	   not	   been	   acknowledged	   as	  something	   wrong	   that	   should	   not	   have	   occurred,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   that	   the	  Uruguayan	   society	   shows	   regret	   for	   the	   abuses	   committed	   during	   its	   non-­‐liberal	   period.	   Some	  might	   even	  hold	   that	   such	   a	   period	  was	   necessary	   for	  Uruguay	  to	  be	  where	  it	  is	  in	  its	  present.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  in	  §	  3.3,	  this	  is	  precisely	  what	  many	  militia	  members	  who	   took	  part	   in	  gross	  human	  rights	  violations	   during	   Uruguay’s	   dirty	   war	   actually	   believe.	   By	   failing	   to	  acknowledge	   that	   Mujica’s	   mistreatment	   was	   wrong	   and	   should	   not	   have	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occurred,	  it	  is	  not	  clear	  then	  that	  citizens	  have	  distanced	  themselves	  from	  the	  unfortunate	  belief	  that	  illegal	  detentions,	  torture,	  and	  forced	  disappearances	  
might	  be	  a	  necessary	  means	  of	  accelerating	  the	  process	  of	  achieving	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society.	  These	   reasons	   show	   that	   the	   aim	   of	   providing	   means	   for	   historical	  rectification	  is	  more	  fundamental	  than	  the	  need	  to	  secure	  a	  fair	  competition	  for	  positions	  of	  advantage.	  Considering	  this,	   it	  could	  be	  argued	  that	   it	   is	  not	  the	   perfect	   regulation	   of	   the	   fair	   equality	   of	   opportunity	   principle	   that	   is	  missing	   in	   scenario	   2	   but,	   rather,	   the	   perfect	   regulation	   of	   Rawls’s	   first	  principle	   of	   justice.26	  In	   particular,	   it	   could	   be	   defended	   that	   the	   lack	   of	  official	   acknowledgement	   of	  Mujica’s	   past	  mistreatment	   deprives	   him	   from	  what	  Rawls	  (TJ:	  53)	  calls	  the,	  ‘freedom	  of	  the	  person,	  which	  includes	  freedom	  from	  psychological	  oppression’	  (see	  also	  PL,	  291,	  JF:	  44),	  and	  because	  of	  that,	  such	  a	  liberty	  has	  been	  distributed	  unequally	  in	  our	  imagined	  Uruguay.	  This	   last	   claim	   is	  more	  plausible.	  Yet	   I	   am	   inclined	   to	   think	   that	   this	  theoretical	   way	   of	   stating	   that	   means	   for	   historical	   rectification	   will	   be	  provided	   in	   scenario	   2	   places	   too	   much	   explanatory	   weight	   on	   the	  importance	   of	   guaranteeing	   the	   equal	   distribution	   of	   the	   freedom	   from	  psychological	   oppression.	   Furthermore,	   the	   importance	   of	   historical	  rectification	   in	   scenario	   2	   goes	   beyond	   the	   fact	   that	   Mujica	   has	   been	  
individually	  psychologically	  oppressed	  —conceding	  that	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  for	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	  Rawls’s	   final	   formulation	  of	   this	  principle	   reads:	   ‘Each	  person	  has	   the	   same	   indefeasible	  claim	  to	  a	   fully	  adequate	  scheme	  of	  equal	  basic	   liberties,	  which	  scheme	   is	  compatible	  with	  the	  same	  scheme	  of	  liberties	  for	  all’	  (JF:	  42).	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scenario	   2	  Mujica	   is	  presumed	  to	  have	  tremendous	  psychological	  strength.	  As	  we	  saw,	   the	   importance	  of	  rectification	   in	   this	  case	   is	  also	  related	  to	   the	  fact	  that	  the	  Uruguayan	  society	  must	  show	  institutional	  regret	  for	  its	  terrible	  non-­‐liberal	  period	  of	  abuses.	  	  That	  this	  route	  for	  ensuring	  full	  historical	  rectification	  is	  not	  entirely	  satisfactory	  might	  be	  clearer	  by	  considering	  the	  following	  scenario:	  
Scenario	   3:	   Suppose	   that	   Mexico,	   after	   a	   long	   transitional	   process,	  becomes	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society.	  Basic	  institutions	  are	  fully	  regulated	  by	   Rawls’s	   principles	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   and	   all	   citizens	   know,	  accept,	  and	  are	  motivated	  by	  this	  fact.	  Now	  suppose	  that	  some	  citizen	  activists	   raise	   the	   complaint	   that	   the	   State	   must	   acknowledge	   that	  during	   the	   19th	   century	   the	   Mexican	   liberal	   State	   tolerated	   the	  extreme	   exploitation	   of	   thousands	   of	   indigenous	   persons	   at	   the	  beginning	   of	   its	   long	   transition	   to	   becoming	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society.	  There	  is	  no	  direct	  relation	  between	  the	  activist	  and	  those	  indigenous	  persons	   (the	   complainants	   may	   not	   even	   be	   indigenous	   persons	  themselves)	  and	  yet	  the	  former	  think	  there	  is	  something	  wrong	  in	  not	  recognising	   such	   a	   past.	   Notice	   that,	   since	   we	   are	   supposing	   that	  Mexico	   is	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society	   in	   this	   scenario,	   all	   indigenous	  persons	   in	   the	   present,	   as	   citizens	   of	   the	   Mexican	   State,	   are	   now	  effectively	   protected	   by	   the	   prerogatives	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness,	  including	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  can	  compete	  in	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  for	  social	  positions	  of	  advantage.	  Yet,	   the	  complainants	  ask	   the	  State	  to	   advocate	   for	  what	   in	   §	   1.3	   I	   called	   a	   critical	   historical	   narrative.	  That	   is,	   a	  narrative	   that	  not	  only	   celebrates	   the	  putative	   remarkable	  facts	   about	   the	   origins	   of	   the	   Mexican	   State	   in	   its	   transition	   to	  becoming	   a	   just	   society	   but,	   also,	   one	   that	   is	   sensitive	   to	   the	   past	  wrongdoing	  of	  Mexican	  society	  as	  a	   cultural	  and	  political	   continuum	  over	  time.27	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Scenario	  3	  is	  inspired	  by	  the	  current	  Mexican	  state	  of	  affairs.	  The	  gross	  exploitation	  of	  the	  indigenous	   population	   throughout	   Mexico’s	   history	   includes	   specific	   acts	   of	   genocide,	  systematic	   confiscation	   of	   land	   and	   property,	   systematic	   exclusion	   from	   political	  participation	  and	  discrimination	  (see	  Robins	  2005:	  23-­‐68,	  Vandervort	  2006:	  138-­‐161,	  Gueda	  2010:	  265-­‐285).	  Against	   this	  well-­‐documented	   reality,	   time	  and	  again	  organised	   groups	  of	  citizens	   ask	   not	   only	   for	   providing	   equal	   participation	   to	   indigenous	   persons	   in	   current	  political	  proceedings,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  official	  promotion	  of	  a	  multicultural	  understanding	  of	  the	  nation,	   including	  the	  claim	  that	  history	   lessons	   in	  primary	  schools	  should	  acknowledge	  the	   systematic	   exploitation	   of	   indigenous	   communities	   throughout	   Mexican	   history.	   This	  demand,	   amongst	   many	   others,	   has	   been	   set	   forward	  more	   directly	   by	   militants	   of	   EZLN	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  As	  we	   saw	   in	  §	   1.3,	   historical	   rectification	   of	   distant	   past	  wrongs	  within	   a	  liberal	  society	  requires	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  critical	  historical	  narrative.	  This	   is	  precisely	  what	  citizens	  in	  scenario	  3	  are	  demanding.	  However,	  it	  seems	  hard	  to	   defend	   in	   this	   case	   that	   the	   very	   citizens	   complaining	   about	   the	   lack	   of	  rectification	  are	  been	  psychologically	  oppressed.	  These	  citizens	  are	  supposed	  to	   have	   successfully	   achieved	   their	   plan	   of	   life	   in	   a	   context	   in	   which	   most	  prerogatives	  of	  justice	  are	  fulfilled	  except	  for	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  stated	  act	  of	  historical	   rectification;	  we	  have	  even	  assumed	   that	   they	  are	  not	   indigenous	  persons	   themselves.	  Arguing	   that	   the	  absence	  of	   rectification	   in	   this	   case	   is	  an	  infringement	  on	  citizens’	  freedom	  from	  psychological	  oppression	  seems	  to	  stretch	  too	  much	  the	  way	  in	  which	  such	  a	  freedom	  can	  be	  violated.	  	  	   Even	   when	   a	   non-­‐critical	   historical	   narrative	   might	   not	   directly	  oppress	   citizens	   taken	   individually,	   there	   are	   still	   important	   reasons	   for	  rejecting	   it.	   As	  we	   saw	   in	  §	   1.3,	   a	   liberal	   society	   is	   a	   cultural	   and	   political	  continuum	   that	   uses	   institutional	   means	   to	   promote	   a	   particular	  understanding	   of	   its	   history.	   Institutions	   must	   then	   express	   their	   liberal	  commitment	   by	   stating	   their	   condemnation	  of	   the	   non-­‐liberal	   institutional	  context	   that	  allowed	  the	  perpetration	  of	  political	  violence	   in	   the	  past.	  For	  a	  society	   that	   systematically	   fails	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   past	   wrongdoing	   that	  occurred	   within	   its	   long	   transition	   to	   become	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society	  undermines	   its	  own	   liberal	   integrity.	  There	   is	   room	   for	   some	  disagreement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (Zapatista	  National	  Liberation	  Army),	  a	  political	  movement	  originating	  in	  the	  Mexican	  State	  of	  Chiapas	  in	  1994	  and	  now	  with	  followers	  all	  over	  the	  country.	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regarding	  some	  particular	  events	  and	  their	  significance,	  especially	  when	  such	  events	   become	   more	   distant	   in	   time.	   However,	   we	   should	   note	   that	   the	  systematic	   omission	   of	   past	   injustice	   promoted	   by	   a	   non-­‐critical	   historical	  narrative	  goes	  far	  beyond	  disputes	  about	  what	  happened	  at	  a	  given	  time.	  	  Appealing	  to	  the	  first	  principle	  cannot	  directly	  support	  the	  adoption	  of	  a	  critical	  historical	  narrative	  in	  scenario	  3.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  as	  we	  saw	  in	  
scenario	  2,	  the	  entire	  burden	  of	  justification	  for	  securing	  means	  for	  recent-­‐past	   rectification	   might	   fall	   under	   Rawls’s	   freedom	   from	   psychological	  oppression	   —as	   scenario	   2	   is	   meant	   to	   show	   that	   a	   society	   can	   make	  incredible	   achievements	   in	   ensuring	   the	   rest	   of	   Rawls’s	   basic	   liberties,	   fair	  equality	   of	   opportunity	   and	   beneficial	   inequalities	  without	   engaging	   in	   the	  rectification	  of	   the	   recent-­‐past	  at	   all.	  Of	   course,	   this	   is	  nothing	  more	   than	  a	  preliminary	   assessment	   of	   how	   the	  original	   principles	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  might	  directly	  command	  the	  rectification	  of	  past	  wrongs.	  However,	  I	  hope	  it	  serves	   at	   least	   to	   motivate	   the	   need	   to	   consider	   a	   specific	   principle	   of	  historical	   rectification	   as	   a	   way	   of	   tackling	   the	   normative	   significance	   of	  historical	  injustice	  within	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.28	  
3.2	  Towards	  a	  Principle	  of	  Historical	  Rectification	  for	  Ideal	  Theory	  As	   scenarios	   2	   and	   3	   try	   to	   exemplify,	   a	   society	   can	   make	   incredible	  improvements	   in	   important	   liberal-­‐democratic	   scores	   without	   engaging	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  28	  In	   §	   4.2	   I	   will	   come	   back	   to	   the	   relation	   between	   the	   original	   principles	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  and	  historical	  rectification	  in	  the	  context	  of	  a	  comparison	  with	  Seana	  Shiffrin’s	  claim	  that	  such	  a	  conception	  of	   justice	  should	  be	  complemented	  by	  a	  specific	  anti-­‐discrimination	  principle.	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directly	  with	  the	  rectification	  of	  past	   injustices.	  This	  possibility	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  following	  theoretical	  positions:	  (i) Ideal	   liberal	   justice	   requires	   ensuring	   the	   prerogatives	   of	  justice	  from	  the	  present	  on.	  	  	  (ii) Ideal	   liberal	   justice	   requires	   ensuring	   the	   prerogatives	   of	  justice	  from	  the	  present	  on	  and	  providing	  means	  for	  historical	  rectification	   —such	   as	   retribution,	   compensation,	   and	  
recognition-­‐driven	   measures	   on	   behalf	   of	   victims	   of	   past	  political	   violence,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   institutional	   promotion	   of	   a	  critical	  historical	  narrative.	  	  (iii) Ideal	   liberal	   justice	   requires	   ensuring	   the	   prerogatives	   of	  justice	   from	   the	   present	   on.	   It	   does	   not	   require	   providing	  means	  for	  historical	  rectification.	  	  	  I	   have	  defended	   (ii)	   by	  pointing	   to	   the	  normative	   significance	  of	   coming	   to	  terms	   with	   a	   past	   shaped	   by	   political	   violence	   regarding	   (1)	   citizens’	  psychology	  and	  self-­‐respect,	  (2)	  their	  mutual	  respect,	  and	  (3)	  society’s	  liberal	  integrity.	   One	  way	   of	   expressing	   commitment	   to	   (ii)	   is	   by	   holding	   that	   the	  basic	   institutions	   of	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   liberal	   society	   are	   also	   regulated	   by	   a	  specific	   backward-­‐looking	   principle	   ensuring	   that	   processes	   of	   historical	  rectification	   take	   place.	   This	  makes	   it	   clear	   that,	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	  justice,	   historical	   rectification	   is	   not	   optional	   even	   when	   most	   liberal-­‐egalitarian	  goals	  are	  fulfilled.	  As	   I	   also	   tried	   to	   show	   in	   the	   previous	   section,	  while	   it	   is	   clear	   that	  Rawls’s	  description	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  (i),	  it	  is	  not	  so	  clear	  at	  the	  present	  moment	  how	  such	  a	  description	  is	  a	  robust	  expression	  of	   (ii).	   Let	   me	   then	   resume	   in	   four	   related	   points	   the	   case	   in	   favour	   of	  including	  a	  specific	  principle	  of	  historical	   rectification	   to	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	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First,	  the	  three	  considerations	  on	  which	  I	  based	  the	  normative	  significance	  of	  historical	   rectification	   —(1)	   citizens’	   psychology	   and	   self-­‐respect,	   (2)	  citizens’	  mutual	  respect,	  and	  (3)	  society’s	  liberal	  integrity—	  are	  of	  incredible	  importance	   for	   Rawls’s	   theory.	   Second,	   as	   I	   argued	   through	   §	   2.1-­‐2.3,	   the	  theoretical	  constraints	  on	  which	  such	  a	  theory	  is	  built	  do	  not	  exclude	  concern	  for	   historical	   injustice.	   Third,	   the	   inclusion	   of	   this	   principle	   could	   help	   to	  create	   theoretical	   balance	   within	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness,	   for	   the	   importance	   of	  fulfilling	  the	  prerogatives	  of	  justice	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  past,	  present,	  and	  future	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  would	  be	   fully	  addressed	  (considering	  that	  such	  a	  society	   is	   a	   cultural	   and	   social	   continuum	  with	   an	   intergenerational	   span).	  And,	   fourth,	   including	   such	   a	   principle	   within	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   is	   not	   a	  violation	   of	   the	   Rawlsian	   divide	   between	   ideal	   and	   non-­‐ideal	   theory.	   This	  principle	  would	   simply	   clarify	   the	   commitment	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory	   to	   (ii)	  —that	   is,	   commitment	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   no	   liberal	   society	   is	   fully	   just	   until	  
historical	  rectification	  has	  taken	  place.	   In	   fact,	   Simmons’s	   remarks	   reviewed	  in	  §	  2.2	  offer	  strong	  support	  for	  this	  fourth	  point:	  	  Rawls’s	   ideal	   theory,	   it	   is	   said,	   pays	   no	   attention	   to	   the	   long	   histories	   of	  injustice	   […]	   But	   the	   kind	   of	   “oversights”	   with	   which	   such	   criticism	   charge	  Rawls	  are	  not	  in	  any	  way	  essential	  to	  Rawls’s	  characterisation	  of	  ideal	  theory	  or	  its	   relationship	   to	   non-­‐ideal	   theory;	   they	   are	   rather	   simply	   a	   function	   of	   the	  specific	  approach	  that	  Rawls	  employs	  to	  derive	  the	  content	  of	   ideal	   theory,	   to	  argue	   for	   his	   particular,	   favored	   conception	   of	   “justice	   as	   fairness”.	  Historical	  injustice	  goes	  unaddressed	  in	  Rawls’s	  theory	  because	  the	  derived	  principles	  of	  justice	   are	   purely	   “forward-­‐looking”,	   because	   the	   choice	   problem	   given	   to	  Rawls’s	   original	   position	   contractors	   requires	   their	   choice	   of	   forward-­‐looking	  principles.	  (Simmons	  2010:	  32-­‐33)	  I	   have	   tried	   to	   show	   that	   Simmons	   is	   mistaken	   in	   arguing	   that	   the	   choice	  problem	  given	  to	  the	  parties	  in	  the	  original	  position	  justifies	  the	  selection	  of	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exclusive	  forward-­‐looking	  principles.	  However,	  a	  few	  lines	  below	  the	  passage	  previously	  quoted,	  Simmons	  states	  the	  following	  idea:	  A	   quite	   different	   content	   to	   ideal	   theory	   (for	   instance,	   one	   that	   was	   more	  sensitive	   to	   the	   need	   to	   redress	   historical	   injustice)	   could	   be	   defended	  while	  still	   subscribing	  wholeheartedly	   to	   the	  Rawlsian	  version	  of	   the	   ideal-­‐nonideal	  distinction.	  (Simmons	  2010:	  32-­‐33)	  Simmons	  is	  right	  in	  arguing	  that	  a	  liberal	  theory	  of	  justice	  can	  show	  concern	  for	  historical	  injustice	  without	  thereby	  violating	  Rawls’s	  distinction	  between	  ideal	   and	   non-­‐ideal	   theory.	   Such	   a	   theory	   would	   subscribe	   to	   (ii)	   as	   the	  correct	   ideal	   of	   liberal	   justice	   at	   which	  we	   should	   aim	   in	   our	   actual	   social	  proceedings.	   Once	   such	   a	   commitment	   is	   established,	   different	   specific	  approaches	  to	  the	  transition	  to	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  that	  ideal	  can	  be	  provided.	  Of	  course,	   we	   should	   expect	   countless	   variations	   of	   appropriate	   rectificatory	  measures	   depending	   on	   the	   context	   of	   the	   society	   in	   question.	   How	  many	  persons	  were	  the	  target	  of	  wrongdoing,	  for	  what	  arbitrary	  reason,	  how	  grave	  the	  wrong	  inflicted	  on	  them	  was,	  and	  how	  distant	  in	  time	  the	  stated	  injustice	  is,	  are	  all	  contextual	  elements	  that	  propel	  different	  institutional	  responses	  for	  each	  case.	  A	  theory	  of	  justice	  on	  a	  philosophical	  level	  of	  generality	  cannot	  but	  come	  short	  of	  offering	  more	  concrete	   stipulations	   in	   this	   regard	   (see	  Elster	  2004:	  78	  and	  de	  Grieff	  2006b:	  466).29	  It	   is	   nevertheless	   worth	   mentioning	   that	   specific	   rectificatory	  frameworks	  of	  recent-­‐past	  political	  violence	  usually	  require	  of	  a	  coherent	  set	  of	  policies	  including	  instances	  of	  each	  of	  the	  three	  measures	  outlined	  in	  (ii).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  29	  Elster	  states:	  ‘I	  do	  not	  aim	  at	  presenting	  a	  “theory	  of	  transitional	  justice”.	  As	  in	  my	  earlier	  work	  on	  local	  justice,	  I	  have	  found	  that	  context-­‐dependence	  to	  be	  an	  insuperable	  obstacle	  to	  generalizations’	  (Elster	  2004:	  78).	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For	  instance,	  when	  only	  retribution-­‐driven	  measures	  are	  undertaken,	  victims	  might	  think	  that	  the	  State	  is	  merely	  focusing	  on	  a	  struggle	  against	  aggressors	  and	   is	  making	   no	   effort	   on	  victims’	  behalf	   directly	   (see	   de	  Grieff	   2006a:	   2).	  Likewise,	  if	  the	  State	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  economic	  compensation,	  victims	  might	  perceive	  this	  as	  a	  form	  of	   ‘blood	  money’,	  that	  is,	  as	  a	  way	  of	  silencing	  their	  claims	  for	  justice	  in	  exchange	  of	  economic	  advantage	  (see	  Elster	  2004:	  166n).	   If	   the	   State	   implements	   only	   recognition-­‐driven	   measures,	   victims	  might	   perceive	   this	   as	   a	   facade	   for	   covering	   aggressors’	   lack	   of	   real	  accountability	   for	   their	   past	   wrongdoing	   (see	   Verdeja	   2006:	   130-­‐31).	  Accordingly,	   regardless	   of	   the	   contextual	   variations	   expected	   in	   different	  liberal	  societies,	  effective	  programs	  of	  recent-­‐past	  rectification	  must	  include	  a	  coherent	  set	  of	  retribution,	  compensation,	  and	  recognition-­‐driven	  measures.	  When	  one	  of	  these	  measures	  is	  absent,	  this	  is	  in	  need	  of	  justification.	  	  Also,	   it	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that,	   in	   general,	   the	   more	   recent	   the	  historical	   injustice	   is,	   the	  more	   relevant	   it	   becomes	   and	   the	  more	   negative	  effects	   it	  has	  on	   the	   society	   in	  question	   (see	  Sher	  1981:	  6	  and	  Elster	  2004:	  222-­‐229).	  Considering	  this,	  a	  principle	  of	  historical	  rectification	  within	  ideal	  theory	  could	  state	  that	  while	  recent	  cases	  of	  historical	  injustice	  call	  for	  strong	  
retribution,	   compensation	   and	   recognition-­‐driven	   measures	   as	   appropriate,	  other	   cases	   involving	   distant	   past	   wrongs	   call	   for	   recognition	   within	   the	  critical	  historical	  narrative	  promoted	  by	  the	  institutional	  means	  of	  the	  State	  (see	   Thompson	   2001:	   132-­‐135).	   For	   retribution-­‐driven	  measures	   rectifying	  the	   course	   of	   history	   are	   simply	   impossible.	   Likewise,	   compensation-­‐driven	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measures	   going	   all	   the	   way	   to	   the	   accepted	   historical	   origins	   of	   a	   liberal	  society	  make	  little	  sense	  —if	  any	  sense	  at	  all.	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  seen,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  history	  as	  such	  is	  out	  of	  the	  scope	  of	  liberal	  institutions’	  moral	  assessment.	  In	   sum,	   the	   main	   reason	   for	   including	   a	   specific	   backward-­‐looking	  principle	  within	  a	   liberal	   ideal	   theory	  of	   justice	   is	   the	  capital	   importance	  of	  stating	   that	   (ii)	   represents	   the	   ideal	  we	   should	   aim	   for	   in	   our	   actual	   social	  proceedings.	  In	  Rawlsian	  fashion,	  this	  idea	  can	  be	  formulated	  by	  saying	  that	  a	  liberal	   well-­‐ordered	   society	   is	   also	   regulated	   by	   a	   principle	   of	   historical	  rectification.	  Accordingly,	  what	  Elster	   calls	   the	   ‘most	   fundamental	   decision’	  should	  be	  always	  resolved	  in	  the	  same	  way:	  The	  dependent	  variables	  [of	  historical	  rectification]	  may	  be	  conceptualized	  as	  a	  series	   of	  decisions.	   The	  most	   fundamental	   is	   the	   decision	  whether	   to	   address	  the	  wrongdoings	   of	   the	   past	   at	   all,	   or	   rather	   draw	   “a	   thick	   line”	   through	   the	  past.	  If	  the	  former	  option	  is	  chosen,	  the	  new	  regime	  may	  weight	  the	  options	  of	  
truth	  or	  justice.	  (Elster	  2006:	  6.	  Italics	  added)	  Elster	  makes	   this	   remark	   in	   the	   context	   of	   rectification	  within	  post-­‐conflict	  societies.	  However,	  as	  I	  said	  at	  the	  beginning	  of	  §	  3.1,	  every	  new	  government	  that	   comes	   into	  power	   in	   all	   liberal	   societies	   confronts	   such	  a	   fundamental	  decision	  —since	   every	   society	   counts	   historical	   injustices	  within	   its	   recent	  and	   distant	   past.	   From	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   justice,	   drawing	   ‘a	   thick	   line’	  through	  the	  past	  or	  ‘closing	  the	  books’	  is	  not	  an	  option	  for	  any	  liberal	  society.	  In	  the	  following	  section	  I	  would	  like	  to	  address	  the	  second	  putative	  decision	  confronted	   by	   a	   society	   that	   decides	   to	   set	   forth	   mechanisms	   of	   historical	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rectification.	   This	   decision	   is,	   nevertheless,	   more	   pressing	   for	   societies	   in	  need	  of	  rectifying	  cases	  of	  severe	  recent	  political	  violence.	  	  
3.3	  On	  a	  Recurrent	  Transitional	  (non-­‐Ideal)	  Problem:	  Retribution	  VS	  
Recognition	  	  Admittedly,	   as	   Elster	   holds,	   some	   rectificatory	   measures	   might	   come	   into	  conflict	  when	  dealing	  with	   cases	  of	   recent	  political	   violence.	  Consider	  what	  scholar	  Marie	  Breen	  Smyth,	  quoted	  in	  §	  1.2,	  states:	  Whilst	  the	  provisions	  of	  amnesty	  may	  be	  a	  valuable	  incentive	  to	  perpetrators	  to	  participate	  in	  a	  truth	  recovery	  process,	  the	  provision	  of	  amnesty	  precludes	  the	  achievement	   of	   justice	   for	   victims	   […]	  Victims	   in	   general	   are	   seemingly	   faced	  with	  a	  choice	  between	  more	  information	  or	  ‘truth’	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and	  justice	  on	  the	  other.	  (Smyth	  2007:	  13)	  In	   this	   section	   I	   would	   like	   to	   address	   this	   conflict	   in	   some	  more	   depth.	   I	  focus	   on	   this	   conflict,	   rather	   than	   on	   other	   problems	   that	   theories	   of	  rectification	  confront,	   for	  two	  reasons.	  First,	   this	  conflict	   is	  quite	  prominent	  in	  the	  literature	  (see,	  for	  instance,	  Van	  Zyl	  1999,	  Elster	  2004:	  118,	  Lutz	  2007:	  326,	  Smyth	  2007:	  6-­‐21,	  Roper	  and	  Barria	  2009).	  Second,	  I	  think	  this	  conflict	  is	   indeed	   about	   what	   is	   required	   for	   doing	   justice	   to	   victims.	   This	   latter	  feature	  distinguishes	  the	  clash	  between	  different	  rectificatory	  measures	  from	  the	  other	  frequent	  and	  overwhelming	  problems	  of	  rectification	  theories.	  For	  most	  of	  such	  problems	  have	  to	  do	  with	  how	  to	  reconcile	  the	  requirements	  of	  justice	   with	   the	   current	   practical	   possibilities	   of	   rectification	   in	   particular	  societies.	  The	   clash	   of	   retribution	   and	   recognition-­‐driven	   measures	   was	   fully	  assumed	   by	   the	   paradigmatic	   truth	   commission:	   South	   Africa’s	   Truth	   and	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Reconciliation	   Commission	   (TRC).	   For	   the	   TRC	   offered	   ‘amnesty’	   to	  aggressors	  who	  were	  willing	  to	  fully	  and	  publicly	  disclose	  the	  nature	  of	  their	  wrongdoing.	  The	  motivation	  behind	   these	  amnesties,	  which	  rub	  against	   the	  very	   idea	  of	  retributive	   justice,	  was	  to	  evince	  the	  confessions	  of	  aggressors.	  Along	  with	  the	  testimonies	  of	  the	  victims,	  these	  confessions	  would	  be	  part	  of	  the	  material	   used	   to	   construct	   a	   critical	   historical	   narrative	   about	   the	   past	  (see	   Holtermann	   2010).	   In	   similar	   fashion,	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   Guatemalan	  Truth	  Commission,	  tellingly	  called	  the	  Commission	  for	  Historical	  Clarification	  (CEH),	   was	   not	   to	   impose	   sanctions	   against	   the	   culprits	   involved,	   and	  therefore	   it	   refrained	   from	   ‘individualizing’	   responsibilities	   (see	   Quinn	   &	  Freeman	   2003,	   Chapman	   &	   Ball	   2001).	   Instead,	   the	   CEH	   was	   expected	   to	  write	  a	  report	  about	  the	  legacy	  of	  past	  violence,	  which	  among	  others	  things	  characterised	  the	  State-­‐commanded	  decimation	  of	  Mayan	  people	  during	  the	  civil	  war	   as	  genocide;	   in	   the	  words	   of	   one	   of	   its	   commissioners,	   the	   report	  contained	  pages	  covering	  the	  darkest	  period	  in	  the	  history	  of	  the	  country,	  as	  well	   as	   their	   causes,	   which	   could	   be	   traced	   back	   as	   far	   as	   the	   ‘Spanish	  conquest’	   and	   ‘the	   poisoning	   effect	   of	   racism	   on	   Guatemalan	   society’	  stemming	  from	  it	  (see	  Tomuschat	  2001).	  But	  the	  importance	  of	  building	  a	  critical	  historical	  narrative	  is	  not	  the	  only	   normative	   reason	   for	   focusing	   on	   recognition	   rather	   than	   retribution	  when	   rectifying	   a	   recent	   past	   injustice.	   In	   some	   cases	   the	   individuation	   of	  moral	   responsibility	   required	   for	   applying	   correct	   retribution-­‐driven	  measures	   might	   be	   extremely	   difficult.	   An	   important	   distinction	   in	   this	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regard	  is	  frequently	  missed	  in	  the	  literature	  of	  transitional	  justice:	  that	  of	  the	  different	  levels	  of	  responsibility	  of	  high	  and	  low-­‐rank	  aggressors.	  There	   is	   one	   striking	   feature	   of	   numerous	   cases	   of	  massive	   political	  violence:	  aggressors’	  belief	  that	  they	  are	  doing	  the	  right	  thing	  by	  persecuting	  and	   depriving	   victims.	   Most	   militia	   members	   of	   all	   dictatorships	   in	   Latin	  America	   during	   the	   period	   of	   1960-­‐1990	   who	   have	   been	   forced	   to	   accept	  their	   leading	   participation	   in	   gross	   human	   rights	   violations,	   reiterate	   this	  belief	   (see	   Payne	   2008:	   141-­‐172).	   Consider,	   for	   instance,	   what	   colonel	  Gilberto	   Vázquez	   (prominent	   member	   of	   the	   Uruguayan	   militia	   who	  abducted,	   tortured,	   and	   disappeared	   political	   dissidents	   —now	   in	   jail	   in	  Argentina)	   stated	   in	   a	   recent	   interview	   to	   the	   local	   newspaper	   Ultimas	  
Noticias:	  	  ‘Torturing	  is	  horrible	  and	  stays	  in	  your	  consciousness	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  your	   life.	  However,	  it	  was	  necessary	  […]	  It	  was	  as	  when	  a	  surgeon	  has	  to	  amputate	  a	  leg	  because	  with	  gangrene	   the	  person	  dies.	  He	  does	  not	  do	  so	  because	  he	   likes	   it	  […]	  So	  I	  do	  not	  regret	  doing	  it.	  I	  am	  proud	  of	  my	  participation	  in	  the	  salvation	  of	  my	  country’.	  (Reproduced	  in	  La	  Jornada	  1/02/2011.	  Translation	  mine.)	  The	  immediate	  task	  then	  becomes	  to	  explain	  how	  aggressors	  can	  form	  such	  an	  attitude.	  We	  need	  to	  avoid	  ingenuous	  and	  meaningless	  explanations	  such	  as	  their	  putative	  inner-­‐immorality	  or	  evilness.	  This	  is,	  I	  believe,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  valuable	   lesson	   from	  Hanna	  Arendt’s	  analysis	  of	  Eichmann’s	   trial	   (see	  Arendt	  2006).	  Rather,	  a	  more	  accurate	  explanation	  of	  the	  stated	  belief	  has	  to	  do	   with	   noting	   a	   previous	   process	   of	   normative	   distortion	   affecting	  aggressors’	  moral	  judgement	  and	  subsequent	  actions.	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There	  are	   two	   important	  elements	   that	   inform	  moral	   judgement:	   the	  processing	  and	  pondering	  of	  information	  that	  calls	  for	  moral	  evaluation	  and	  moral	  concepts	  themselves.	  Barbara	  Herman	  (see	  Herman	  1993,	  2007)	  calls	  the	   conjunction	   of	   these	   two	   elements	   the	   ‘rules	   of	   moral	   salience’.	   These	  rules	  determine	  which	  situations	  are	   in	  need	  of	  normative	  assessment	  (and	  which	  factual	  information	  is	  to	  be	  considered)	  as	  well	  as	  how	  we	  understand	  moral	   concepts	   such	  as	   justice,	   equality,	   reciprocity,	   etc.,	  before	  we	  actually	  exercise	  our	  moral	  judgement.	  For	  Herman,	  the	  correct	  realisation	  of	  such	  a	  capacity	   requires	   the	   implementation	   of	   the	   categorical	   imperative	   in	   the	  form	  of	   the	   ‘CI	  procedure’,	   that	   is,	   a	  procedure	   testing	   the	  permissibility	   of	  our	   actions	   by	   envisioning	   the	   universalization	   of	   the	  maxims	   that	   prompt	  them	  (see	  Herman	  1993:	  75).	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  this	  characterisation	  of	  the	  exercise	  of	  moral	  judgement	  is	  correct	  or	  not,	  what	  I	  want	  to	  underscore	  is	   that	  Herman’s	  analysis	  makes	   it	   explicit	   that	   such	  a	   capacity	   is	   exercised	  
within	  a	  social	  context.	  The	  rules	  of	  moral	  salience	  within	  which	  agents	  make	  moral	  judgements	  are	  passed	  on	  ‘as	  elements	  in	  a	  moral	  education’	  and,	  more	  generally,	   ‘as	   part	   of	   socialization’	   (Herman	   1993,	   77-­‐78).	   It	   is	   a	   further	  advantage	  of	  Herman’s	  analysis	  that	  it	  identifies	  this	  context	  as	  fashioned	  by	  
rules,	  for	  this	  makes	  it	  clear	  that	  there	  is	  some	  normative	  force	  that	  induces	  agents	  to	  comply	  with	  it.	  With	   this	  analysis	   in	  hand,	  we	  now	  can	  see	  how	  aggressors	   typically	  form	   the	   belief	   that	   they	   are	   doing	   the	   right	   thing	   by	   partaking	   in	   cases	   of	  mass	  political	  violence:	  the	  social	  context	  within	  their	  moral	  community	  has	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distorted	   the	   rules	   of	   moral	   salience	   up	   to	   the	   needed	   point.	   Exposure	   to	  intense	   ideology	  plays	   a	  mayor	   role	   in	   the	  achievement	  of	   this	   goal.	   In	   line	  with	   the	   first	   element	   shaping	   the	   rules	   of	   moral	   salience,	   empirical	  information	   is	   usually	   distorted	  up	   to	   the	  point	   in	  which	  partaking	   in	   such	  atrocities	   is	   perceived	   as	   necessary	   to	   ensure	   the	   very	   survival	   of	   the	  community,	   institutional	  order,	  or	   country.	   In	   line	  with	   the	   second	  element	  shaping	  the	  rules	  of	  moral	  salience,	  key	  moral	  concepts	  such	  as	  equality	  and	  reciprocity	   can	   be	   twisted	   up	   to	   the	   point	   in	   which	   victims	   are	   no	   longer	  subjects	   to	   equal	   moral	   consideration.	   The	   result	   of	   these	   antecedent	  processes	   of	   normative	   distortion	   is	   such	   that	   aggressors	   evaluate	   their	  actions	  in	  line	  with	  the	  precepts	  of	  morality	  (see	  Pauder-­‐Studer	  &	  Velleman	  2011).	  Accordingly,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  aggressors’	  actions	  may	  become	  a	  result	  of	  what	  Gideon	  Rosen	  2003:	  64	   calls	   ‘blameless	  moral	   ignorance’,	   that	   is,	   a	  case	  in	  which	  the	  agent,	  due	  to	  social	  factors	  delivering	  incorrect	  factual	  and	  normative	   information,	   acts	   wrongly	   without	   bearing	   full	   moral	  responsibility	  for	  her	  action	  or	  the	  ignorance	  that	  motivated	  it.	  To	   these	   social	   processes	   affecting	   agents’	   moral	   judgement	   and	  actions	   we	   should	   add	   some	   psychological	   ones	   too.	   In	   particular,	   the	  empirical	   evidence	   provided	   by	   the	   famous	   Milgram	   experiments	   (see	  Milgram	  1974)	  and	  their	  multiple	  replicas	  support	  the	  claim	  that	  agents	  have	  a	  tendency	  to	  obey	  authority	  when	  they	  think	  such	  an	  authority	  is	  backed	  up	  by	   a	   solid	   institutional	   framework,	   even	   in	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   directives	  received	  conflict	  with	  their	  previously	  accepted	  moral	  standards.	  Yet	  further	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‘situational	  forces’	  hold	  a	  direct	  effect	  on	  agents’	  behaviour.	  John	  Sabini	  and	  Maury	   Silver	   have	   recently	   presented	   an	   excellent	   review	   of	   social	  psychology	   studies	   detailing	   such	   forces	   (see	   Sabini	   &	   Silver	   2005).	   These	  studies	   provide	   evidence	   of	   a	   tendency	   to	   lose	   one’s	   moral	   compass	   in	   a	  slippery	   slope	   manner	   when	   confronted	   with	   directives	   of	   institutional	  authority	   (Sabini	  &	  Silver	  2005:	  549),	   a	   tendency	  to	  conform	  with	  the	  social	  
context	  even	  when	  one’s	  cognitive	  worldview	  is	  drastically	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  social	   consensus	   (Sabini	  &	   Silver	   2005:	   554-­‐555),	   and	   a	   tendency	   to	  diffuse	  
responsibility	  in	  a	  context	  in	  which	  others	  agents	  might	  offer	  altruistic	  help	  or	  even	  help	  for	  ensuring	  one’s	  own	  safety	  within	  a	  group	  (Sabini	  &	  Silver	  2005:	  555-­‐557).	  They	  summarise	  these	  findings	  as	  follows:	  Social	   psychology	   since	   the	   Second	   World	   War	   has	   indeed	   discovered	   […]	  something	   important	   about	   character	   and	   morally	   significant	   action.	   The	  tradition	  that	  begun	  by	  Ash	  [whose	  work	  evinces	  agents’	  tendency	  to	  conform	  
with	   the	   social	   context]	   and	   continued	   through	  Milgram	   [whose	  work	   evinces	  agents’	  tendency	  to	  obey	  institutional	  authority]	  and	  Lactané	  and	  Darley	  [whose	  work	   evinces	   agents’	   tendency	   to	  diffuse	  responsibility]	   has	   revealed	   just	   how	  weak,	   morally	   weak,	   we	   are	   when	   confronted	  with	   a	   resolute	   authority	   or	   a	  unanimous	  group	  of	  other	  seemingly	  normal	  people	  who	  seem	  to	  see	  the	  social,	  moral,	  and	  even	  physical	  world	  differently	  from	  the	  way	  we	  do.	  This	  weakness	  is	   partly	   cognitive	  —people	   tend	   to	   loose	   their	   moral	   compass—	   but	   is	   also	  partly	  a	  matter	  of	  people’s	  being	  unable	  or	  unwilling	  to	  expose	  themselves,	  to	  disrupt	   social	   situations,	  by	  exposing	   their	  different	  perceptions	  of	   the	  world.	  (Sabini	  &	  Silver	  2005:	  560)	  Despite	   their	   acknowledgement	   of	   the	   incredible	   force	   of	   these	   tendencies,	  Sabini	  and	  Silver	  are	  careful	  enough	  not	  to	  accept	  the	  claim	  that	  such	  findings	  show	   that	   moral	   character	   is	   simply	   and	   globally	   defeated	   by	   the	   social	  context.	  Rather,	  they	  argue	  that	  certain	  contexts	  enhance	  the	  strength	  of	  such	  tendencies	  and	  that,	  by	  being	  aware	  of	  them,	  agents	  can	  mitigate	  their	  effect	  on	  their	  own	  actions	  (Sabini	  &	  Silver	  2005:	  562).	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The	   pervasive	   effect	   of	   these	   social	   and	   psychological	   factors	   in	  contexts	  allowing	  the	  irruption	  of	  political	  violence	  (i.e.,	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  rules	  of	   moral	   salience	   normatively	   command	   such	   an	   irruption	   and	   agents’	  psychological	   tendencies	   to	   obey	   institutional	   authority,	   conform	   with	   the	  social	  context,	  and	  diffuse	  responsibility),	  make	  the	  correct	   individuation	  of	  responsibility	   for	   adequate	   retributive	   action	   against	   some	   aggressors	  difficult.	   However,	   in	   line	   with	   Sabini	   and	   Silver’s	   precautions	   stating	   that	  such	  findings	  do	  not	  defeat	  moral	  character	  all	   together,	   I	  do	  not	  claim	  that	  individual	   ascription	   of	   moral	   responsibility	   is	   all	   together	   impossible.	  Because	  of	  this,	  I	  disagree	  with	  Rosen	  when	  he	  states:	  [I]t	   makes	   little	   sense	   to	   hold	   this	   injustice	   against	   the	   perpetrator	   when	   it	  would	  have	  taken	  a	  miracle	  of	  moral	  vision	  for	  him	  to	  have	  seen	  the	  moral	  case	  for	  acting	  differently.	  It	  may	  be	  hard	  to	  believe	  that	  moral	  evil	  might	  turn	  out	  to	  
be,	  in	  the	  relevant	  sense,	  no	  one’s	  fault.	  But	  so	  long	  as	  the	  underlying	  ignorance	  is	  no	  one’s	  fault,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  is	  just	  what	  we	  should	  think.	  	  (Rosen	  2003:	  66)	  Rosen	   thinks	   that	   the	   inescapable	   effect	   of	   the	   social	   context	   in	   informing	  agents’	   moral	   judgement	   and	   subsequent	   actions	   poses	   an	   incredible	  challenge	  to	  the	  ascription	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  in	  a	  great	  majority	  of	  cases	  (see	  Rosen	  2003,	  2004).	  However,	  at	  least	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  cases	  of	  political	  violence,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   believe	   that	   wrongdoing	   is	   ‘no-­‐one’s	   fault’.	   For	   it	   is	  extremely	  important	  to	  note	  that	  most	  of	  the	  time	  the	  distortion	  of	  the	  rules	  of	   moral	   salience	   is	   commanded	   by	   the	   high	   or	   influential	   hierarchy	   of	  society.	  These	  hierarchies	  usually	  have	  all	  the	  necessary	  means	  to	  avoid	  the	  stated	  distortion.	  They	  have	  access	  to	  the	  relevant	  empirical	  and	  normative	  information	   showing	   that	   massive	   political	   violence	   against	   a	   particular	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group	   is	  wrong.	   In	   fact,	   such	  groups	  might	  even	  have	  access	   to	  confidential	  information	  evincing	  the	  opposite	  of	  what	  they	  command.	  The	  fact	  that	  high-­‐rank	  aggressors	  have	  access	  to	  such	  information	  shows	  that	  their	  actions	  are	  not	  a	  result	  of	   ‘blameless	  moral	   ignorance’.	  Likewise,	  we	  should	  also	  notice	  that	  high-­‐rank	  aggressors	  are	  not	  under	   the	  pressure	  of	  authority,	  as	   is	   the	  case	   with	   low-­‐rank	   aggressors,	   and	   thus	   they	   cannot	   invoke	   the	   normal	  psychological	   tendencies	   to	   follow	  institutional	  authority	  against	  previously	  accepted	  moral	  standards	  described	  by	  the	  Milgram	  experiments.	  Therefore,	  while	   ascription	   of	   moral	   responsibility	   to	   low-­‐rank	   aggressors	   might	   be	  difficult,	  ascription	  of	  moral	  responsibility	  to	  high-­‐rank	  aggressors	  is	  indeed	  quite	  possible.	  Thus	   retributive	  action	  against	   the	   latter	   is	  usually	   justified.	  Moreover,	  the	  fact	  that	  high-­‐rank	  aggressors	  shift	  the	  rules	  of	  moral	  salience	  and	  command	  authority	   in	  order	   to	  allow	  the	   irruption	  of	  political	  violence	  exacerbates	   their	  moral	  responsibility	   for	   it,	   justifying	  an	  even	  more	  severe	  retributive	  action	  against	  them.	  These	   remarks	   are	   only	   aimed	   at	   showing	   that	   it	   is	   not	   always	   true	  that	  doing	  justice	  to	  victims	  of	  recent	  political	  violence	  requires	  retribution-­‐driven	  measures	  against	  all	  aggressors.	  Some	  cases	  may	  require	  instead	  the	  implementation	  of	  both	  compensation	  and	  recognition-­‐driven	  measures.	  This	  conclusion	   goes	   against	   two	   extended	   and	   related	   views	   regarding	   post-­‐conflict	   violence	   rectification:	   that	   policies	   granting	   retributive	   amnesty	   to	  aggressors	  are	  always	   in	  detriment	  of	  doing	  justice	  to	  victims,	  and	  that	  only	  prudential	   or	   pragmatic	   reasons	   can	   justify	   such	   policies	   (such	   as	   the	   fact	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that	  retributive	  action	  against	  aggressors	  at	  a	  given	  time	  might	  conflict	  with	  stability	   and	   reconciliation).	   Such	   views	   are	   mistaken	   at	   that	   level	   of	  generality.	   For,	   as	  we	  have	   seen,	   doing	   justice	   to	   victims	  might	  not	   require	  
retribution-­‐driven	   measures	   against	   low-­‐rank	   aggressors	   at	   least	   in	   some	  cases.	   The	   reason	   for	   this,	   as	   we	   have	   also	   seen,	   is	   moral	   rather	   than	  prudential	   in	   character:	   the	   fact	   that	   low-­‐rank	   aggressors’	   individual	  moral	  responsibility	  for	  their	  deeds	  may	  be	  extremely	  hard	  to	  pin	  down.	  	  This	  does	  not	  mean	   that	   low-­‐rank	  aggressors	   can	   fail	   to	  accept	   their	  deeds	  as	  properly	  theirs.	  For,	  once	  the	  social	  context	  is	  restored	  for	  ensuring	  the	  equal	  integrity	  of	  all	  citizens,	  low-­‐rank	  aggressors	  can	  see	  that	  their	  past	  deeds,	   although	   perhaps	   predictable	   within	   the	   previous	   normatively	  distorted	   social	   context,	   were	   fully	   and	   plainly	   wrong.	   Public	   apologies,	  another	   important	   recognition-­‐driven	  measure,	   have	   the	  purpose	   of	   stating	  this	  belief.	  Amongst	  other	  things,	  a	  sincere	  public	  apology	  restores	  the	  equal	  status	  of	  a	  victim	  by	  acknowledging	  her	  past	  deprivation	  as	  a	  wrong;	  it	  is	  also	  a	   statement	   of	   the	   commitment	   not	   to	   repeat	   the	   stated	  wrong	   and,	  more	  generally,	  a	  strong	  way	  of	  showing	  repudiation	  for	  the	  illiberal	  social	  context	  that	  allowed	  it	  (see	  Verdeja	  2010:	  570-­‐571).	  When	  a	  public	  apology	  for	  past	  wrongdoing	   is	  not	  offered,	   it	   is	  simply	  not	  clear	  that	   the	  aggressor	  sees	  her	  past	   deeds	   as	   wrong.	   This	   is	   the	   case	   of	   most	   militia	   members	   of	   all	  dictatorships	   in	  Latin	  America	  during	   the	  period	  of	  1960-­‐1990,	   such	  as	   the	  Uruguayan	   colonel	   Gilberto	   Vázquez	   quoted	   above,	   for	   they	   refuse	   to	  apologise	  for	  their	  terrible	  deeds.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  quite	  common	  to	  see	  high-­‐rank	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aggressors	   defending	   their	   past	   actions	   and	   showing	   no	   regret	  whatsoever	  for	   committing	   them	   (see	   Payne	   2008:	   141-­‐172).	   This	   means	   that	   there	  persists	   the	   belief	   that	   victims	   are	   indeed	   not	   worthy	   of	   equal	   moral	  consideration.	  It	  means,	  then,	  that	  the	  rejection	  of	  a	  liberal	  context	  of	  moral	  interaction	  persists.	  
3.4	  Concluding	  Remarks	  This	   concludes	   my	   assessment	   of	   the	   clash	   between	   retribution	   and	  
recognition-­‐driven	   measures,	   as	   well	   as	   of	   the	   theoretical	   advantages	   of	  including	   a	   backward-­‐looking	   principle	  within	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	   As	   I	   said,	  doing	  so	  would	  be	  a	  straightforward	  way	  of	  establishing	  the	  commitment	  of	  Rawls’s	   theory	   to	   the	   ideal	   that	   no	   liberal	   society	   will	   be	   fully	   just	   until	  historical	   rectification	   has	   taken	   place.	   Note,	   nevertheless,	   that	   I	   am	   not	  suggesting	  that	  there	  is	  no	  plausible	  way	  of	  arguing	  in	  favour	  of	  full	  historical	  rectification	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  original	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	  Yet	  it	   seems	   at	   least	   theoretically	   convenient	   to	   include	   a	   specific	   backward-­‐looking	  principle	   in	  order	   to	  express	  direct	  commitment	   to	   that	  goal.	  Other	  authors,	  however,	  have	  made	  similar	  claims	  regarding	   the	  silence	  of	  Rawls’	  theory	  of	  justice	  with	  respect	  to	  racial	  and	  gender	  relations.	  In	  the	  following	  chapter,	  I	  will	  revise	  some	  of	  these	  claims	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  current	  debate	  on	  the	  correct	  understanding	  of	  equality	  and	  egalitarian	  justice.	  The	  purpose	  of	   this	   assessment	   is	   to	   see	   the	   different	   strategies	   needed	   to	   ensure	   the	  respect	  of	  citizens’	  moral	  equality	   in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society.	  Also,	  reviewing	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these	   claims	   help	   to	   clarify	   when	   it	   is	   justified	   to	   argue	   that	   a	   further	  principle	  should	  be	  included	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  liberal	  ideal	  theory	  and	  when	  is	  not.	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4	  
The	  Protection	  of	  Citizens’	  Moral	  Equality	  
In	  the	  previous	  chapters	  I	  have	  criticised	  Rawls’s	  theory	  of	  justice	  for	  its	  lack	  of	   concern	   for	   historical	   injustice.	   In	   this	   chapter,	   I	   will	   focus	   on	   a	   similar	  critique	   that	   it	   is	   often	  made	   against	   such	   a	   theory:	   its	   lack	   of	   concern	   for	  racial	  and	  gender	  relations.	  In	  §	  4.1	  I	  argue	  that	  one	  way	  this	  critique	  can	  be	  framed	  (which	  I	  call	  the	  no-­‐use	  critique)	  fails	  once	  we	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  clarifying	  what	  I	  call	  the	  fundamental	  egalitarian	  aim.	  In	  §	  4.2	  I	  argue	  that	  another	  way	   the	   race	   and	   gender	   critique	   can	   be	   framed	   (which	   I	   call	   the	  
institutional	  injustice	  critique)	  also	  fails.	  I	  focus	  on	  Seanna	  Shiffrin’s	  version	  of	  this	   critique	   in	   order	   to	   assess	   her	   claim	   that	   a	   specific	   anti-­‐discrimination	  principle	  with	   forward-­‐looking	  character	   should	  be	   included	  within	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	  Finally,	   in	  §	   4.3	   I	  argue	   that	  a	   response	   to	  a	   third	  way	   the	  race	  and	  gender	  critique	  can	  be	  framed	  (which	  I	  call	  the	  non-­‐institutional	  injustice	  
critique),	   requires	   the	   inclusion	   of	   an	   egalitarian	   ethos,	   informing	   citizens’	  personal	   interactions,	   within	   the	   description	   of	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society.	  Importantly,	  I	  defend	  that	  Rawls’s	  theory	  already	  contains	  all	  the	  normative	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elements	  required	  for	  establishing	  that	  such	  an	  ethos	  is	  informed	  by	  a	  norm	  commanding	  respect	  for	  citizens’	  moral	  equality.	  
4.1	  The	  No-­‐Use	  Critique	  and	  the	  Fundamental	  Egalitarian	  Aim	  Rawls’s	   theory	   of	   justice	   has	   been	   attacked	   for	   its	   blindness	   to	   several	  important	   problems	   concerning,	   amongst	   other	   things,	   racial	   relations	   (see	  Shiffrin	  2004)	  and	  gender	  relations	  (see	  Schwartzman	  2006).	  	  These	  critiques	  can	  take	  numerous	  forms.	  The	  most	  basic	   form	  gives	  rise	  to	  what	  I	  will	  call	  the	  no-­‐use	  critique:	  to	  wit,	  the	  idea	  that	  Rawls’s	  theory,	  by	  merely	  offering	  an	  ideal	  (in	  the	  non-­‐technical	  sense	  —see	  §	  2.1)	  of	  how	  a	  just	  society	  should	  be	  (i.e.	   the	  realist	  utopia	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society),	   is	  of	  no	  use	   for	   tackling	   the	  elimination	  of	  oppressive	  social	   structures	  of	  power	  pending	  upon	  women	  and	  racially	  discriminated	  groups	  and,	  what	  is	  worse,	  might	  even	  obscure	  the	  urgent	  need	  in	  all	  liberal	  societies	  of	  doing	  so.	  Notice	  that	  the	  no-­‐use	  critique	  is	  not,	  or	  at	  least	  not	  only,	  directed	  towards	  the	  use	  of	  the	   stipulations	   of	   strict-­‐compliance	   and	   favourable	   conditions	   when	   doing	  political	  philosophy.	  Rather,	  the	  primary	  focus	  of	  this	  critique	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  Rawls’s	  theory	  is	  concerned	  with	  offering	  a	  description	  of	  how	  an	  ideally	  just	  society	   should	   look	   (see	   Mills	   2005	   and	   Sen	   2009	   for	   variations	   of	   this	  critique).	  As	  I	  have	  suggested	  throughout	  this	  thesis,	   I	  do	  not	   find	  this	  critique	  compelling.	   One	   of	   the	   main	   tasks	   of	   political	   philosophy	   (as	   a	   branch	   of	  practical	   philosophy	  more	   generally)	   is	   to	   offer	   descriptions	   of	   how	   things	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should	   be	   from	   a	   normative	   point	   of	   view.	   This	   exercise	   is	   not	   futile,	  considering	   that	   in	   many	   cases	   there	   is	   strong	   disagreement	   about	   how	  
things	   should	   be.	   For	   instance,	   persons	   (including	   philosophers,	   politicians,	  and	   citizens)	  disagree	  on	  how	  much	   income-­‐inequality	   is	   allowed	  by	   a	   just	  distribution	   of	   the	   burdens	   and	   benefits	   of	   social	   cooperation.	   This	  disagreement	  is	  about	  how	  a	  just	  distribution	  should	  be.	  It	  is	  about	  the	  ideal	  we	   should	   try	   to	   realise	   in	   our	   real	   distributions.	   Only	  when	  we	   know	   the	  
ideal	   we	   want	   to	   achieve	   in	   this	   regard	   (say,	   for	   instance,	   that	   our	  distribution	   should	   only	   allow	   income-­‐inequality	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  difference	   principle),	   can	   we	   then	   inquire	   both	   how	   far	   our	   current	  distributions	   are	   from	   that	   ideal	   and	   how	   we	   can	   adjust	   them	   to	   better	  approximate	  the	  ideal.	  Taking	  these	  two	  further	  steps	  is	  not	  possible	  without	  knowing	  what	  the	  ideal	  is	  that	  we	  wish	  our	  distributions	  to	  fulfil.	  There	   are	   infinite	   examples	   like	   the	   previous	   one	   in	   many	   other	  domains.	  To	  mention	  another	  one,	   consider	   the	  current	  dispute	   in	  Uruguay	  on	   whether	   to	   rectify	   the	   historical	   injustices	   of	   the	   late	   1970s	   and	   early	  1980s.	   The	   Uruguayan	   society	   is	   sharply	   divided	   in	   this	   regard.30	  By	   2009,	  nearly	  half	  of	  the	  politically	  active	  citizens	  expressed	  that	  the	  current	  state	  of	  affairs,	  in	  which	  full	  rectification	  of	  such	  injustices	  is	  forbidden	  by	  law,	  is	  not	  
the	  way	   things	   should	  be.	   Conversely,	   the	   other	   half	   of	   the	   politically	   active	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  As	  I	  reported	  in	  §	  3.1,	  in	  2009	  Uruguay	  held	  a	  referendum	  on	  whether	  to	  nullify	  the	  Ley	  de	  
Caducidad	   de	   Pretensión	   Punitiva	   del	   Estado	   (first	   approved	   in	   December	   22,	   1986),	  establishing	  a	  statue	  of	  limitation	  for	  crimes	  committed	  by	  military	  forces	  and	  police	  prior	  to	  March	  1,	  1985.	  	  In	  the	  stated	  referendum,	  47.98%	  of	  participants	  voted	  for	  nullifying	  the	  Law	  and	  52.02%	  voted	  in	  favour	  of	  preserving	  it.	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citizens	  expressed	  that	  such	  state	  of	  affairs	  is	  the	  way	  things	  should	  be.	  This	  is	  a	   normative	   dispute	   at	   the	   core	   of	   current	   politics	   in	   Uruguay	   concerning	  how	  to	  deal	  with	  its	  recent	  past,	  and	  one	  of	  the	  fundamental	  aims	  of	  political	  philosophy	  must	  be	  to	  clarify	  what	  justice	  requires	  in	  this	  and	  similar	  cases.	  The	  relevance	  of	  defending	  a	  principle	  of	  historical	  rectification,	  as	  one	  of	  the	  principles	   regulating	   the	   basic	   structure	   of	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society,	   is	  precisely	   that:	   i.e.,	   stating	  that	  no	  society	  would	  be	   fully	   just	  until	  historical	  rectification	  takes	  place.	  Of	  course,	  once	  we	  agree	  on	  the	  ideal	  to	  pursue	  in	  each	  particular	  case,	  the	   pressing	   issue	   of	   how	   to	   realise	   that	   ideal	   considering	   the	   current	  conditions	   of	   the	   society	   in	   question	   arises.	   However,	   as	   I	   have	   said,	   this	  further	   issue	   only	   arises	   once	   we	   know	   what	   we	   want	   to	   achieve.	   In	   this	  sense,	   the	   no-­‐use	   critique	   subsumes	   all	   possible	   normative	   work	   to	  transitional	   theory,	  without	  realising	   that	  any	   transitional	  exercise	  requires	  an	  ideal	  at	  which	  we	  wish	  to	  arrive.	  The	   importance	   of	   clarifying	   the	   ideal	   we	   want	   to	   arrive	   at	   also	  illuminates	   the	   main	   problem	   of	   the	   so-­‐called	   luck-­‐egalitarianism,	   when	  taken	   as	   a	   fundamental	   conception	   of	   egalitarian	   justice.	   Consider	   what	  Kymlicka	  (wrongly	  attributing	  to	  Rawls,	  as	  we	  will	  see)	  states	  in	  this	  regard:	  …what	  it	  would	  be	  for	  a	  distributive	  scheme	  to	  fulfil	  the	  basic	  aims	  of	  Rawlsian	  theory:	   a	   distributive	   scheme	   that	   respects	   the	  moral	   equality	  of	   persons	   by	  compensating	  for	  unequal	  circumstances	  while	  holding	  individuals	  responsible	  for	  their	  choices.	  (Kymlicka	  2002:	  86.	  Italics	  added)	  	  Also	   consider	   what,	   in	   similar	   fashion,	   Kok-­‐Chor	   Tan	   has	   stated	   more	  recently:	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For	   luck-­‐egalitarians,	   the	   idea	   of	   the	  moral	   equality	  of	   persons	   requires	   that	  each	  person	  take	  the	  responsibility	  for	  her	  choices	  and	  assume	  the	  cost	  of	  these	  choices.	  Conversely,	  it	  holds	  that	  no	  one	  should	  be	  worse	  off	  just	  because	  of	  bad	  luck.	  (Tan	  2008:	  665.	  Italics	  added)	  Notice	   two	   important	   things	   regarding	   these	   passages.	   First,	   that	   at	   least	  some	   luck-­‐egalitarians	   think	   that	   the	   fundamental	   normative	   aim	   of	  egalitarian	   justice	   is	  to	  safeguard	  citizens’	  moral	  equality	  (see	  also	  Dworkin	  2000:	  3ff	   for	  a	  variation	  of	   this	  statement).	   In	  this,	   I	   think	  they	  concur	  with	  so-­‐called	   political	   or	   social-­‐egalitarians	   (such	   as	   Anderson	   1999,	   Hinton	  2001:	  73,	  Scheffler	  2003:	  22,	  Daniels	  2003,	  and	  Munoz-­‐Dardé	  2005).	  Where	  the	   two	  positions	  differ	   is	  with	   respect	   to	   the	   second	  claim	  stated	  by	   these	  passages:	   i.e.,	   that	  realising	   that	  a	   fundamental	  egalitarian	  aim	  requires	  our	  distributions	  to	  comply	  with	  the	  luck/choice	  principle.	  	   In	   fact,	   scholars	  have	  developed	  a	  battery	  of	  objections	  against	   luck-­‐egalitarians’	   second	   claim.	   Let	   me	   just	   briefly	   mention	   three	   of	   the	   most	  salient	  ones.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Elizabeth	  Anderson	  (see	  Anderson	  1999:	  303-­‐307)	   has	   famously	   shown	   how	   the	   strict	   realisation	   of	   the	   luck/choice	  principle	   in	   our	   distributions	   would	   command	   eschewing	   urgent	   help	   to	  citizens	   whose	   imprudent	   voluntary	   choices	   have	   resulted	   in	   precarious	  results	   for	   them	  (see	  also	  Scheffler	  2005a:	  15).	  Call	   this	   critique	  Anderson’s	  
objection.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   Jonathan	  Wolff	  (see	  Wolff	  1998:	  109-­‐112)	  has	  shown	   how	   the	   strict	   realisation	   of	   the	   luck/choice	   principle	   in	   our	  distributions	  would	   require	   from	   citizens	   to	   unveil	   shameful	   aspects	   about	  themselves	  regarding	  their	  lack	  of	  talent.	  Call	  this	  critique	  Wolff’s	  objection.	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Add	   to	   these	   influential	   objections	   against	   luck-­‐egalitarians’	   second	  claim	  what	  I	  call	  the	  dysfunctional	  market	  objection.	  G.A.	  Cohen	  himself	  poses	  this	  objection.	  He	  states:	  [O]ne	  man’s	  choice	   is	  another	  man’s	   luck	   […]	  Choices	  both	   to	  give	  and	   to	  buy	  have	  the	  property	  that	  it	  is	  accidental	  who	  is	  favored	  by	  them:	  You	  and	  I	  offer	  a	  commodity	  at	  £10,	  and	  it	  is	  an	  accident	  from	  whom	  a	  purchaser	  decides	  to	  buy,	  even	  in	  the	  most	  “perfect”	  of	  markets.	  And	  the	  underlying	  point	  might	  be	  that	  a	  luck	   egalitarian	   can’t	   allow	   for	   any	   transactions.	   Sure,	   she	   can	   allow	  transactions	   that	   preserve	   absence	   of	   luck	   in	   the	   distribution,	   but	   that	  won’t	  confer	  much	  choice.	  (Cohen	  2011a:	  143)	  Let	   us	   suppose	   that	   the	   purchaser	   randomly	   decides	   to	   get	   the	   commodity	  from	   Cohen’s	   store	   and	   not	   from	  mine.	   The	   dysfunctional	  market	   objection	  states	  that	  if	  the	  distribution	  of	  inequalities	  between	  Cohen	  and	  I	  is	  to	  follow	  the	   luck/choice	   principle,	   then	   either	   I	   should	   be	   compensated	   by	   the	  inequality	   that	   the	   purchaser’s	   choice	   has	   generated	   or	   her	   purchase	   from	  Cohen’s	  store	  should	  be	  impermissible.	  This	  is	  so	  because	  it	  would	  only	  have	  been	  bad	  brute-­‐luck	  for	  me	  that	  the	  purchaser	  decided	  to	  buy	  at	  Cohen’s	  and	  not	   at	   my	   store.	   Accordingly,	   to	   preserve	   an	   egalitarian	   distribution	  according	  to	  the	  luck/choice	  principle,	  one	  of	  the	  two	  mentioned	  paths	  must	  be	  taken	  (i.e.,	  compensating	  me	  for	  the	  inequality	  or	  making	  arbitrary	  market	  choice	   impermissible).	   Now	   replicate	   this	   simple	   example	   to	   all	   market	  transactions	  for,	  as	  Anderson	  2007	  argues	  and	  Cohen	  himself	  acknowledges	  in	  the	  passage	  quoted,	   in	  every	  market,	  no	  matter	  how	  perfect	   it	   is,	  citizens	  make	   arbitrary	   choices	   regarding	   where	   to	   buy	   their	   commodities.	   In	   this	  sense,	   there	   will	   always	   be	   an	   unavoidable	   element	   of	   luck	   affecting	   third	  parties	   in	  every	  single	  market	  transaction.	   In	  similar	   fashion,	  Lazenby	  2010	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defends	  the	  view	  that	  citizens	  always	  make	  arbitrary	  choices	  in	  their	  acts	  of	  offering	   ‘material’	   and	   ‘immaterial’	   gifts	   to	   one	   another.	   Variations	   on	  persons’	   circumstances	   because	   of	   such	   gifts	   are	   unavoidable.	   While	   the	  circumstances	  of	  some	  are	  improved	  the	  circumstances	  of	  others	  deteriorate.	  There	   is,	  again,	  an	  unavoidable	  element	  of	   luck	   in	  every	  act	  of	  giving.	   If	   the	  luck/choice	  principle	  were	   to	   inform	  our	  distributions,	   then	   either	   random	  giving	  acts	  to	  second	  parties	  should	  be	  followed	  by	  compensation	  to	  affected	  third	   parties,	   or	   they	   should	   be	   impermissible.	   For,	   in	   accordance	   with	  Cohen’s	  2011a:	  143	  dictum,	  we	  can	  say:	  one	  person’s	  choice	  to	  buy	  or	  to	  give	  is	   at	   once	   always	   another	   person’s	   good	   brute-­‐luck	   (the	   one	   selling	   the	  commodity	   or	   receiving	   the	   gift)	   and	   another	   person’s	   bad	   brute-­‐luck	   (the	  one	  not	  selling	  the	  commodity	  or	  not	  receiving	  the	  gift).	  	  Now,	   to	   these	   and	   similar	   objections	   (such	   as	   the	   levelling-­‐down	  
objection	  —see	   Raz	   1986:	   227-­‐231	   and	   Parfit	   1997:	   211)	   luck-­‐egalitarians	  typically	   reply	  by	   stating	   that	   egalitarian	   justice,	   as	  understood	  by	   them,	   is	  but	   one	   aspect	   that	   is	   to	   be	   considered	   when	   offering	   principles	   for	   the	  regulation	   of	   social	   affairs	   in	   the	   real	   world.	   So	   it	   may	   be	   that	   the	  achievement	  of	  perfect	  egalitarian	  justice,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  luck/choice	  principle,	   in	   effect	   implies	   the	   outcomes	   foreseen	   by	   the	   levelling-­‐down	  
objection,	  Anderson’s	  objection,	  Wolff’s	  objection	  and	  the	  dysfunctional	  market	  
objection;	   however,	   since	   equality	   is	   but	   one	   principle	   that	   is	   to	   inform	  material	  distributions	  in	  a	  given	  society,	  it	  may	  be	  limited	  and	  complemented	  by	  other	  principles,	  thereby	  ensuring	  that	  such	  outcomes	  are	  avoided.	  Cohen,	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for	   instance,	   explicitly	   endorses	   this	   reply.	   For	   he	   defends	   what	   he	   calls	   a	  ‘weak-­‐equalisandum	  claim’;	   that	   is,	  a	  claim	  stating	   that	  people	   ‘should	  be	  as	  equal	   as	   possible	   in	   some	   dimension	   [welfare,	   resources,	   capabilities,	  flourishing]	   but	   subject	   to	   whatever	   limitations	   need	   to	   be	   imposed	   in	  deference	  to	  other	  values’	  (Cohen	  2011b:	  5)	  —see	  Parfit	  1997:	  211ff.31	  Cohen	   has	   made	   of	   this	   reply	   a	   debate	   on	   the	   very	   nature	   of	   first	  principles	   of	   justice.	   In	  §	   5.1	   I	  will	   consider	   his	   ideas	   in	   this	   regard	   in	   the	  context	  of	  his	  criticism	  of	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘the	  constructivist	  approach	  to	  social	  justice’	   (Cohen	   2008:	   274).	   For	   now,	   I	   only	   want	   to	   point	   out	   that	   this	  successful	  reply	   in	   the	  context	  at	  stake	  comes	  with	  an	   incredibly	  high	  price	  for	  luck-­‐egalitarians.	  For	  the	  reply	  implies	  that	  luck-­‐egalitarians	  do	  not	  aspire	  to	  a	   fully	  egalitarian	   society	   in	   their	  own	  terms,	   since	  such	  a	  society	  would	  observe	   the	   consequences	   foreseen	   by	   the	   levelling	   down	   objection,	  
Anderson’s	  objection,	  Wolff’s	  objection	  and	  the	  no	  functional	  market	  objection.	  Accordingly,	   pace	   Kymlicka	   2002:	   86	   and	   Tan	   2008:	   665,	   luck-­‐egalitarianism	   cannot	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   position	   describing	  what	   is	   needed	   of	   a	  distribution	   that	   realises	   the	   fundamental	   egalitarian	   aim	   (i.e.,	   showing	  respect	  for	  citizens’	  moral	  equality).	  In	  fact,	  as	  the	  objections	  show,	  realising	  such	   an	   aim	   requires	   limiting	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   luck/choice	   principle	   in	  determining	   the	   outcome	   of	   our	   distributions.	   If	   luck-­‐egalitarians	   were	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  Perhaps	  the	  best	  example	  of	  this	  reply	  is	  Larry	  Temkin’s	  famous	  passage:	  ‘I,	  for	  one,	  think	  that	  inequality	  is	  bad.	  But	  do	  I	  really	  think	  that	  there	  is	  some	  respect	  on	  which	  a	  world	  where	  only	   some	   are	   blind	   is	  worse	   than	   one	  where	   all	   are?	   Yes.	   Does	   this	  means	   that	   I	   think	   it	  would	  be	  better	  if	  we	  blinded	  everybody?	  No.	  Equality	  is	  not	  all	  that	  matters.	  (Temkin	  1993:	  282.	  Italics	  in	  the	  original)	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insist	   that	   their	   position	   is	   one	   about	   what	   is	   needed	   to	   realise	   the	  fundamental	  egalitarian	  aim,	  this	  would	  come	  at	  the	  cost	  of	  holding	  that	  we	  should	   aim	  at	   respecting	   citizens’	  moral	   equality	   imperfectly.	  However,	   this	  looks	  like	  a	  rather	  wrong	  ideal	  to	  pursue.	  I	  call	  this	  the	  wrong	  ideal	  objection,	  and	   it	   is	   prompted	   by	   the	   typical	   luck-­‐egalitarian	   response	   to	   avoid	   other	  objections.32	  	   Finally,	  notice	  how	  Rawls’s	  position	  cannot	  be	  charged	  with	  the	  wrong	  
ideal	  objection.	  Kymlicka	  is	  mistaken	  in	  holding	  	  …what	  it	  would	  be	  for	  a	  distributive	  scheme	  to	  fulfil	  the	  basic	  aims	  of	  Rawlsian	  theory:	   a	   distributive	   scheme	   that	   respects	   the	  moral	   equality	   of	   persons	   by	  compensating	  for	  unequal	  circumstances	  while	  holding	  individuals	  responsible	  for	  their	  choices.	  (Kymlicka	  2002:	  86)	  These	   interpretative	   remarks	   fly	   on	   the	   face	   of	   Rawls’s	   own	   discussion	   on	  what	   is	   needed	   to	   protect	   the	   moral	   equality	   of	   persons.	   Rawls’s	   explicit	  discussion	   on	   this	  matter	   is	   prompted	   by	   an	   objection	   to	   a	   distribution	   of	  material	  wealth	  guided	  by	  the	  difference	  principle:	  namely,	  that	  the	  worse-­‐off	  of	   society	   may	   see	   their	   equal	   status	   affected	   by	   the	   inequalities	   that	   the	  difference	  principle	  allows.	  To	  this	  objection,	  Rawls	  responds:	  Of	  course,	  it	  does	  not	  follow	  that	  in	  a	  just	  society	  everyone	  is	  unconcerned	  with	  matters	   of	   status.	   The	   account	   of	   self-­‐respect	   as	   perhaps	   the	  most	   important	  primary	  good	  has	  stressed	  the	  great	  significance	  of	  how	  we	  think	  others	  value	  us.	   But	   in	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society	   the	   need	   for	   status	   is	   met	   by	   the	   public	  recognition	  of	  just	  institutions,	  together	  with	  the	  full	  and	  diverse	  internal	  life	  of	  the	  many	  free	  communities	  of	   interest	  that	  equal	   liberties	  allow.	  The	  basis	  for	  self-­‐respect	   in	   a	   just	   society	   is	   not	   then	   one’s	   income	   share	   but	   the	   publicly	  
affirmed	   distribution	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   and	   liberties.	   And	   this	   distribution	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  A	  similar	  claim	  is	  made	  by	  Wolff	  in	  a	  paper	  revisiting	  his	  seminal	  critique:	  ‘[E]ven	  for	  those	  who	  believe	  luck	  egalitarianism	  to	  be	  ideal	  theory,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  thinking	  to	  do	  about	  whether	  we	  should	  aim	  to	  implement	  it	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  path	  from	  there;	  what	  the	  steps	  are	  in	  the	  path	  […]	  The	  case	  of	  shameful	  revelation	  can	  be	  taken	  as	  an	  illustration	   of	   how	   the	   process	   could	   go	   wrong,	   and	   to	   point	   out	   the	   need	   of	   broader	  reflection’.	  (Wolff	  2010:	  347)	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being	  equal,	  everyone	  has	  a	  similar	  and	  secure	  status	  when	  they	  meet	  to	  conduct	  
the	  common	  affairs	  of	  the	  wider	  society.	  (TJ:	  477.	  Italics	  added)	  In	   this	   passage	   Rawls	   holds	   that	   citizens	   in	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society	   do	   not	  ground	   their	   equal	   status	   to	   one	   another	   on	   the	   putative	   parity	   of	   their	  material	   incomes.	   Rather,	   they	   ground	   it	   in	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   enjoy	   equal	  access	  to	  rights	  and	  liberties,	  and	  thus	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  enjoy	  what	  Rawls	  (TJ:	  476)	  calls	  equal	  citizenship.	  	   The	  contrast	  identified	  in	  Rawls’s	  passage	  is	  reproduced	  in	  the	  debate	  we	   have	   just	   evaluated	   between	   luck-­‐egalitarians	   and	   social-­‐egalitarians	  regarding	   what	   is	   required	   to	   realise	   the	   fundamental	   aim	   of	   egalitarian	  justice.	   Against	   luck-­‐egalitarians’	   second	   claim	   (i.e.,	   that	   realising	   the	  fundamental	   egalitarian	   aim	   requires	   our	   distributions	   to	   comply	  with	   the	  luck/choice	   principle),	   social-­‐egalitarians	  defend	   variations	   of	   the	   idea	   that	  our	   distributions	   should	   be	   free	   of	   oppression-­‐determinants,	   so	   that	  regardless	  of	  the	  material	  inequalities	  arising	  by	  luck	  and	  choices	  within	  such	  distributions,	  we	  nevertheless	  relate	  to	  each	  other	  as	  equal	  persons	  on	  equal	  footing	   within	   social	   and	   political	   structures	   (see	   Anderson	   1999,	   2007,	  2008,	  Scheffler	  2003:	  22,	  Hinton	  2001:	  73,	  Munoz-­‐Dardé	  2005).	  According	  to	  Rawls,	  the	  equal	  distribution	  of	  liberties	  and	  rights	  ensures	  that.33	  	   I	   have	   defended	   the	   claim	   that	   it	   is	   a	   fundamental	   task	   of	   political	  philosophy	   to	   offer	   descriptions	   of	   how	   things	   should	   be;	   that	   is,	   ideals	   to	  arrive	   at	   in	   our	   actual	   social	   proceedings.	   The	   importance	   of	   this	   task	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  Daniels	  2003:	  247-­‐248	  and	  Scheffler	  2003:	  8-­‐13	  offer	  similar	  interpretations	  of	  Rawls	  by	  highlighting	  other	  aspects	  of	  his	  theory.	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discredits	   the	  non-­‐use	  critique.	   Also,	  we	   saw	   that	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	  egalitarian	   justice,	   the	   ideal	   of	   a	   society	   in	  which	   citizens’	  moral	   equality	   is	  fully	   respected	   is	   particularly	   important.	   Rawls’s	   realistic	   utopia	   of	   a	  well-­‐ordered	   society	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   better	   description	   of	   such	   an	   ideal	   than	   a	  society	   in	   which	   distributive	   justice	   is	   fully	   informed	   by	   the	   luck/choice	  principle.	   However,	   as	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   the	   previous	   chapter,	   such	   a	  description	   might	   need	   to	   undergo	   some	   modifications	   to	   allow	   for	   full	  rectification	  of	  historical	  wrongs.	  
4.2	  The	  Institutional	  Injustice	  Critique	  and	  the	  Two	  Principles	  There	   is	   another	  way	   in	  which	   one	   can	   complain	   about	  Rawls’s	   theoretical	  silence	   regarding	   gender	   and	   racial	   relations:	   to	   wit,	   the	   idea	   that	   Rawls’s	  lack	  of	  concern	  for	  race	  and	  gender	  discrimination	  obscures	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	   society	   —that	   is,	   a	   society	   perfectly	   regulated	   by	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness—	   injustices	   regarding	   racial	   or	   gender	   discrimination	   will	   arise	  within	   society’s	   institutional	   structures.	   Call	   this	   the	   institutional	   injustice	  
critique.	  First	   of	   all,	   notice	   the	   similarity	   between	   the	   institutional	   injustice	  
critique	   and	   mine.	   Both	   hold	   that	   the	   existence	   of	   certain	   injustices	   is	  compatible	  with	  Rawls’s	  original	  description	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society.	  Notice	  also	   that	   the	   institutional	  injustice	  critique	   is	  usually	  dismissed	  by	   the	   same	  consideration	   with	   which	   I	   started	   my	   inquiry	   in	   §	   2.1:	   i.e.,	   the	   ideal	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character	   (in	   the	   technical	   sense)	   of	   Rawls’s	   theory.	   Consider,	   for	   instance,	  what	  Seana	  Shiffrin	  reports	  regarding	  Rawls’s	  treatment	  of	  racial	  relations:	  The	   problem	   of	   race,	   for	   Rawls,	   may	   be	   a	   problem	   that	   arises	   in	   non-­‐ideal	  theory,	   not	   ideal	   theory	   […]	   This	   is	   an	   appealing	   thought	   and	   has	   some	  plausibility.	   Certainly,	   many	   of	   the	   pressing	   issues	   regarding	   race,	   such	   as	  reparations	  and	  affirmative	  action,	  are	  intimately	  connected	  to	  redress	  for	  and	  reconstruction	  in	  the	  face	  of	  public	  failures	  and	  wrongs	  toward	  people	  of	  color	  […]	   If	   the	   two	   principles	   were	   implemented,	   the	   significance	   of	   class	  distinctions	   as	   we	   know	   them	   would	   alter	   dramatically.	   Even	   if	   class	  distinctions	   remained,	   the	   absolute	   level	   of	   social	   stratification	  would	   reduce	  […]	   While	   these	   motivations	   may	   explain	   the	   omission	   of	   an	   in-­‐depth	  discussion	   of	   race	   by	   Rawls,	   I	   do	   not	   think	   they	   fully	   justify	   the	   omission	   of	  explicit	  anti-­‐discrimination	  principles.	  (Shiffrin	  2004:	  1654)	  Now	   consider	   what	   Lisa	   Schwartzman	   comments	   regarding	   Rawls’s	  treatment	  of	  gender	  relations:	  On	  a	  similar	  note,	  a	  Rawlsian	  might	  argue	  that	  because	  a	  Theory	  of	  Justice	  deals	  mainly	  with	  ideal	  theory,	  that	  is,	  with	  a	  world	  in	  which	  there	  is	  ‘full	  compliance’	  (as	   opposed	   to	   ‘partial	   compliance’)	  with	   a	   theory	   of	   justice,	   Rawls	   need	   not	  address	  the	  specific	  forms	  of	  injustice	  based	  on	  factors	  such	  as	  gender	  and	  race.	  There	  are	  several	  problems	  with	  this	  line	  of	  argument,	  however.	  (Schwartzman	  2006:	  68)	  At	  this	  stage	  of	  contemporary	  political	  philosophy,	  it	  is	  curious	  how	  often	  the	  ideal	   character	  of	  Rawls’s	   theory	   is	  pointed	  out	  as	  an	   instantaneous	  way	  of	  dismissing	   the	   institutional	  injustice	  critique;	   especially	   considering	   that	   the	  social	  understanding	  of	  egalitarian	   justice	   is	  now	  more	  prominent	   (with	   its	  strong	   emphasis	   on	   the	   importance	   of	   avoiding	  oppression-­‐determinants	   in	  our	  distributions),	  and	  also	  how	  frequently	  it	  is	  defended	  that	  Rawls’s	  theory	  offers	  a	  defence	  of	  such	  an	  understanding	  (see	  Anderson	  1999,	  Daniels	  2003,	  Scheffler	  2003,	  Freeman	  2007b).	   I	   therefore	  share	   the	  dissatisfaction	  of	   the	  quoted	  scholars.	  Also	  curious	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  Kymlicka’s	  critique	  highlighting	  Rawls’s	  absence	  of	  concern	  for	  the	  relations	  between	  majority	  and	  minority	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cultures	  has	  not	  been	  dismissed	  in	  such	  a	  way	  (as	  I	  reported	  at	  the	  end	  of	  §	  
2.1).	  	  	  	   All	   the	   same,	   I	   think	   that	   the	   institutional	   injustice	   critique	   only	   has	  real	   force	   when	   framed	   as	   criticism	   of	   the	   lack	   of	   concern	   for	   historical	  injustice	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory,	  and	  not	  as	  a	  way	  of	  defending	  that	  new	  injustices	  would	  arise	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society.	  For,	  aside	  from	  the	  possible	  absence	  of	  historical	   rectification	   in	  cases	   such	  as	  scenarios	   1,	   2	   and	  3	   (see	  §	   3.1),	   it	  seems	  hard	  to	  envision	  that	  the	  correct	  regulation	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   would	   allow	   the	   irruption	   of	   new	   forms	   of	   injustice	   or	  discrimination	  in	  given	  society.	  Contrarily,	  Shiffrin	  holds:	  To	  put	   it	  concretely,	   it	   is	  unclear	  what	  specific	  provision	  of	  the	  two	  principles	  would	  directly	   condemn	  as	  unjust	   the	   treatment	   of	  Rosa	  Parks	   and	   countless	  other	  African-­‐Americans	  who	  were	  told	  they	  had	  to	  sit	  at	   the	  back	  of	   the	  bus.	  (Shiffrin	  2004:	  1647)	  Note	   that	   Shiffrin	   is	   not	   referring	   to	   the	   injustices	   related	   to	   the	   Jim	   Crow	  laws	  as	  past	   injustices	   in	  need	  of	   rectification.	  Rather,	   her	   claim	   is	   that	   the	  
possibility	  of	  this	  type	  of	  discriminatory	  policies	  is	  not	  directly	  condemned	  as	  unjust	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	  Thus,	  her	  concern	  is	  about	  how	  the	  forward-­‐looking	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  ensure	  that	  such	  policies	  would	  not	  be	  enacted	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society.	  	  Shiffrin	   considers	   which	   basic	   liberty	   according	   to	   Rawls	   would	   be	  violated	   by	   the	   mentioned	   discriminatory	   policies.	   She	   concludes	   that	   in	  Rawls’s	  framework	  these	  policies	  command	  something	  close	  to	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  ‘freedom	  from	  arbitrary	  arrest	  and	  seizure	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  rule	  of	  law’	  (TJ:	  53).	  While	  Shiffrin	  concedes	  that	   ‘arbitrary	  treatment	  arguably	  conflicts	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with	  the	  principles	  underlying	  the	  rule	  of	  law’	  […]	  ‘it	  is	  certainly	  regrettable	  that	  the	  antidiscrimination	  character	  of	  these	  principles	  [Rawls’s	  principles]	  is	  so	  submerged’	  (Shiffrin	  2004:	  1647).	  	  But	   it	   could	   be	   argued	   that	   the	   anti-­‐discrimination	   character	   of	  Rawls’s	   first	   principle	   (for	   short,	   EL)	   is	   not	   submerged.	   Aside	   from	   the	  liberties	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   on	   which	   Shiffrin	   focuses,	   the	   discrimination	  character	   of	   the	   Jim	   Crow	   laws	   is	   rejected	   by	   EL	   because	   of	   the	   fact	   that	  liberties	  must	  be	  equally	  distributed	  amongst	  citizens.	  In	  the	  particular	  case	  at	   stake,	  while	   it	   could	   be	   defended	   (perhaps	  with	   some	   controversy)	   that	  freedom	   of	   movement	   is	   not	   equally	   distributed,	   it	   is	   nevertheless	  uncontroversial	  that,	  by	  requiring	  some	  citizens	  to	  sit	  at	  the	  back	  of	  the	  bus	  in	  function	  of	  their	  race,	  what	  Rawls	  (TJ:	  53)	  calls	  the	  ‘freedom	  of	  the	  person,	  which	  includes	  freedom	  from	  psychological	  oppression’	  (see	  also	  PL,	  291,	  JF:	  44),	  is	  been	  distributed	  unequally.	  It	  is	  certainly	  the	  case	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  this	  crucial	  liberty	  is	  not	  fully	   explored	   by	   Rawls.	   However,	   consider	   Freeman’s	   characterisation	   of	  such	  a	  liberty	  in	  the	  context	  of	  introducing	  all	  basic	  liberties:	  He	   [Rawls]	   mentions	   five	   sets	   of	   basic	   liberties:	   freedom	   of	   conscience	   and	  freedom	  of	  thought;	  freedom	  of	  association;	  equal	  political	  liberties;	  the	  rights	  and	   liberties	   that	   protect	   the	   integrity	   and	   freedom	   of	   the	   person	   (including	  freedom	  of	  occupation	  and	  choice	  of	  careers	  and	  a	  right	  to	  personal	  property);	  and	  finally	  the	  rights	  and	  liberties	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  Protections	  for	  the	  physical	  
and	  psychological	  integrity	  and	  freedom	  of	  the	  person	  are	  the	  most	  obvious	  basic	  
rights	  and	  liberties,	  for	  they	  forbid	  unjustified	  violence,	  coercion,	  and	  enslavement	  
of	  persons	  (amongst	  other	  things).	  Any	  reasonable	  conception	  of	   justice,	   liberal	  or	  non-­‐liberal,	   recognizes	   these	  as	  morally	  protected	   rights.	   (Freeman	  2007a:	  46.	  References	  omitted)	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As	   Freeman	   suggests	   in	   this	   passage,	   the	   rights	   and	   liberties	   protecting	  persons’	  physical	   and	  psychological	   integrity	  are	  extremely	   important	   from	  the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   liberal	   justice.	   In	   this	   sense,	   the	   connection	   of	   the	  freedom	  from	  psychological	  oppression	  with	  the	  social	  bases	  of	  self-­‐respect	  and	   the	   fulfilment	   of	   the	   fundamental	   egalitarian	   aim	   (respect	   for	   citizens’	  moral	   equality)	   should	  be	   explored	  more	  deeply.	   I	   think,	  nevertheless,	   that	  appealing	   to	   such	   a	   liberty	   within	   the	   Rawlsian	   framework	   suffices	   to	  condemn	   straightforwardly	   as	   unjust	   the	   arbitrary	   treatment	   enacted	   by	   a	  discriminatory	  system	  of	  law.	  Appealing	  to	  this	  basic	  liberty	  also	  clarifies	  how	  to	  answer	  another	  of	  Shiffrin’s	   claims.	   She	   argues	   that	   bus	   transportation	   and	  other	   institutional	  settings	   in	   which	   discrimination	   might	   occur,	   as	   the	   paradigmatic	   case	   of	  Rosa	   Parks	   illustrates,	   are	   not	   even	   regulated	   by	   the	   liberties	   ensuring	   the	  rule	  of	  law:	  However	  broadly	  understood,	   the	  guarantee	  of	   the	  rule	  of	   law	  only	  applies	   to	  the	  state	  and	   its	   legal	  system.	   Importantly,	   it	  does	  not	  represent	   the	   idea	   that	  other	   forms	   of	   discrimination	   in	   the	   provision	   of	   public	   amenities	   by	   non-­‐governmental	   actors	   are	  unjust	   in	   addition	   to	   immoral.	  Many	  bus	   companies,	  lunch	   counters,	   and	   hotels,	   are,	   after	   all,	   privately	   operated.	   (Shiffrin	   2004:	  1648.	  References	  omitted)	  It	  may	  be	  a	  matter	  of	  debate	  whether	  the	  institutions	  of	  public	  transportation	  are	  directly	  regulated	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  as	  part	  of	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society.	  It	  is	  nevertheless	  clear	  that	  such	  institutions	  are	  at	  least	  indirectly	  regulated	  by	   them,	   just	   as	  other	  private	  associations	  are.	  To	   see	   this,	   recall	  the	  divide	  between	  local	  and	  domestic	  justice	  adopted	  by	  Rawls	  (JF:	  10ff).	  On	  the	   one	   hand,	   associations	   such	   as	   churches	   and	   universities	   are	   directly	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regulated	  by	  diverse	  principles	  of	   local	   justice.	  These,	   for	   instance,	  may	  not	  command	   strict	   democratic	   policies	   in	   the	   structural	   organisation	   of	   such	  associations.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  domestic	  principles	  (such	  as	  those	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness)	   have	   a	   twofold	   role:	   first,	   they	   are	   to	   regulate	   directly	   the	  institutions	  of	  the	  basic	  structure	  and,	  second,	  they	  are	  to	  regulate	  indirectly	  local	  associations	  and	  their	  principles:	  	  In	   general,	   principles	   for	   the	   basic	   structure	   constrain	   (or	   limit),	   but	   not	  determine	  uniquely,	  the	  suitable	  principles	  of	  local	  justice.	  (JF:	  11-­‐12)	  As	  citizens	  we	  have	  reasons	  to	  impose	  the	  constraints	  specified	  by	  the	  political	  principles	  of	  justice	  on	  associations;	  while	  as	  members	  of	  associations	  we	  have	  reasons	   for	   limiting	   those	   constraints	   so	   that	   they	   leave	   room	   for	   a	   free	   and	  flourishing	  internal	  life	  appropriate	  to	  the	  association	  in	  question.	  (JF:	  165)	  Rawls	  holds	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  regulate	  indirectly	  those	  of	   local	   justice	   by	   putting	   constraints	   on	   them.	   This	   restriction	   suffices	   to	  ensure	   that	   even	   if	   the	   institutions	   providing	   public	   transportation	   are	   not	  part	   of	   the	   basic	   structure	   (and	   thus	   reassemble	  more	   the	   status	   of	   hotels,	  clubs,	   universities,	   and	   churches),	   they	   nevertheless	   cannot	   adopt	   a	   policy	  principle	   commanding	   preferential	   treatment	   to	   some	   citizens	   considering	  factors	  such	  as	  race,	  since	  the	  liberties	  protecting	  persons’	  integrity	  would	  be	  impaired.	  It	   seems,	   then,	   that	   EL	   as	   it	   stands	   can	   be	   straightforwardly	  understood	   as	   a	   principle	   against	   discrimination.	   Now,	   even	   if	   it	   is	   shown	  that	  EL	  is	  a	  straightforward	  principle	  against	  discrimination,	  it	  is	  not	  so	  clear	  that	   it	  directly	   commands	  historical	   rectification	  —that	   is,	   it	   is	  not	   so	   clear	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that	   it	   can	  be	   interpreted	  as	   a	  principle	  of	  historical	   rectification.	  Consider,	  again,	  what	  Shiffrin	  says	  in	  the	  passage	  with	  which	  I	  opened	  this	  section:	  The	   problem	   of	   race,	   for	   Rawls,	   may	   be	   a	   problem	   that	   arises	   in	   non-­‐ideal	  theory,	   not	   ideal	   theory	   […]	   This	   is	   an	   appealing	   thought	   and	   has	   some	  plausibility.	   Certainly,	   many	   of	   the	   pressing	   issues	   regarding	   race,	   such	   as	  reparations	  and	  affirmative	  action,	  are	  intimately	  connected	  to	  redress	  for	  and	  reconstruction	  in	  the	  face	  of	  public	  failures	  and	  wrongs	  toward	  people	  of	  color	  […]	   While	   these	   motivations	   may	   explain	   the	   omission	   of	   an	   in-­‐depth	  discussion	   of	   race	   by	   Rawls,	   I	   do	   not	   think	   they	   fully	   justify	   the	   omission	   of	  explicit	  anti-­‐discrimination	  principles.	  (Shiffrin	  2004:	  1654)	  I	   have	   tried	   to	   show	   that	   Shiffrin	   is	  mistaken	   in	   arguing	   that	   EL	   is	   not	   an	  explicit	   anti-­‐discrimination	   principle.	   However,	   I	   agree	   with	   her	   on	   the	  following	  idea:	  It	  does	  seem	  strange	  to	  classify,	  implicitly,	  anti-­‐discrimination	  principles	  along	  with	  principles	  of	  redress.	  Anti-­‐discrimination	  principles	  seem	  more	  analogous	  to	  the	  other,	  already-­‐acknowledge	  basic	  liberties:	  they	  demarcate	  a	  standard	  of	  treatment	  that	   is	   forward-­‐looking	  and	  that	  aims	  at	  regulate	  a	   latent	  or	  explicit	  hazard.	  (Shiffrin	  2004:	  1655.	  Italics	  added)	  Shiffrin	  is	  right	  in	  arguing	  that	  EL	  has	  an	  obvious	  forward-­‐looking	  character.	  In	   fact,	   this	   is	   one	   of	   the	  main	   reasons	  why	   I	   think	   that	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  could	   be	   complemented	   by	   a	   backward-­‐looking	   principle.	   For,	   while	   it	   is	  certainly	   true	   that	  we	  could	  appeal	   to	   the	  very	   freedom	   from	  psychological	  oppression	  as	  a	  way	  of	  defending	  the	  need	  of	  historical	  rectification	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	   society,	   appealing	   exclusively	   to	   such	   a	   liberty	   for	   that	   purpose	  might	   place	   too	   much	   explanatory	   weight	   on	   it.	   For	   instance,	   the	   need	   to	  adopt	  a	  critical	  historical	  narrative	  (one	  of	  the	  chief	  rectificatory	  measures	  in	  my	  view)	  might	  not	  follow	  directly	  from	  the	  need	  to	  ensure	  citizens’	  freedom	  from	  psychological	  oppression.	  Note,	  nevertheless,	   that	   I	  am	  not	  suggesting	  that	   there	   is	   no	   plausible	   way	   of	   arguing	   in	   favour	   of	   full	   historical	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rectification	  by	  appealing	  to	  EL.	  However,	  as	  I	  said	  in	  §	  3.4,	  it	  seems	  at	  least	  theoretically	   convenient	   to	   include	  a	   specific	  backward-­‐looking	  principle	   in	  order	   to	   express	   direct	   commitment	   to	   that	   goal.	   This	   principle,	   unlike	   EL,	  would	   be	   a	   straightforward	   backward-­‐looking	   principle	   —or,	   as	   Shiffrin	  holds,	  a	  ‘principle	  of	  redress’.34	  As	  I	  said	  in	  §	  3.2,	  such	  a	  principle	  could	  bring	  theoretical	  balance	   to	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness,	   for	   the	   importance	  of	   fulfilling	   the	  prerogatives	  of	   justice	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  past,	  present,	   and	   future	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	   society	   would	   be	   explicitly	   addressed.	   Also,	   adding	   a	   specific	  backward-­‐looking	   principle	   could	   help	   to	  make	   explicit	   the	   commitment	   of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  liberal	  society	  is	  not	  fully	  just	  until	  historical	  rectification	  has	  taken	  place	  —so	  that	  ‘closing	  the	  books’	  or	  drawing	  a	  ‘thick	  line’	   through	   the	   past	   is	   never	   an	   option	   from	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	   justice.	  These	   reasons	   ground	   the	   pertinence	   of	   including	   a	   backward-­‐looking	  principle	  as	  part	  of	  an	  ideal	  liberal	  theory	  of	  justice.35	  	   In	   sum,	  while	  EL	  explicitly	  establishes	   the	  commitment	  of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  to	  anti-­‐discrimination,	  it	  does	  not	  explicitly	  establish	  a	  commitment	  to	  the	  need	  for	  historical	  rectification.	  Therefore,	  while	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  add	  a	   specific	   backward-­‐looking	   principle	   to	   such	   a	   conception	   of	   justice,	   there	  seems	   to	   be	   no	   reason	   to	   include	   a	   further	   anti-­‐discrimination	   principle	  within	  it.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  34	  This	  use	  differs	  from	  what	  Rawls	  (TJ:	  86)	  calls	  the	  ‘principle	  of	  redress’.	  35	  Remember	  Simmons’s	  revealing	  remark	  quoted	  in	  §	  3.2:	  ‘A	  quite	  different	  content	  to	  ideal	  theory	  (for	  instance,	  one	  that	  was	  more	  sensitive	  to	  the	  need	  to	  redress	  historical	  injustice)	  could	   be	   defended	   while	   still	   subscribing	   wholeheartedly	   to	   the	   Rawlsian	   version	   of	   the	  ideal-­‐nonideal	  distinction’	  (Simmons	  2010:	  32-­‐33).	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Let	  me	   now	   turn	   to	   the	   relation	   between	   discrimination	   and	   the	   fair	  equality	   of	   opportunity	   principle	   (for	   short,	   FEO).	   Of	   course,	   many	  discriminatory	  acts	  would	  not	  occur	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  because	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  FEO.	  Shiffrin	  2004:	  1650	  is	  very	  aware	  of	  this	  fact:	  ‘employment	  discrimination	  is	  obviously	  incompatible	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity’.	   In	   fact,	   partly	   because	   of	   this	   she	   offers	   powerful	   arguments	  against	  the	  priority	  of	  EL	  over	  FEO	  (see	  Shiffrin	  2004:	  1672).	  She	  notes	  that	  Rawls’s	   main	   argument	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   priority	   of	   EL	   over	   the	   second	  principle	   only	   applies	   to	   the	   difference	   principle,	   for	   Rawls	   holds	   that	   the	  second	  principle	  as	  a	  whole	  should	  not	  be	  part	  of	  the	  constitutional	  essentials	  because	   ‘the	   history	   of	   successful	   constitutions	   suggests	   that	   principles	   to	  regulate	   economic	   and	   social	   inequalities	   […]	   are	   generally	   not	   suitable	   as	  constitutional	  restrictions’	  (PL:	  337).	  As	   is	  clear,	   this	  defence	  of	   the	  priority	  of	  EL	  assumes	  that	  FEO’s	  main	  function	  is	  helping	  in	  the	  correct	  regulation	  of	  the	  economy	  —in	  the	  very	  same	  way	  as	  that	  of	  the	  difference	  principle.	  	  However,	   this	   interpretation	  of	  FEO	  clashes	  with	  Rawls’s	  own	  defence	  of	  the	  priority	  of	  FEO	  over	  the	  difference	  principle:	  	  I	  have	  not	  maintained	  that	  offices	  must	  be	  open	  if	  in	  fact	  everyone	  is	  to	  benefit	  from	  an	  arrangement.	  For	  it	  may	  be	  possible	  to	  improve	  everyone’s	  situation	  by	  assigning	  certain	  powers	  and	  benefits	  to	  positions	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  certain	  groups	  are	  excluded	   from	  them	  […]	  But	   the	  principle	  of	  open	  positions	   [FEO]	  forbids	  this.	  It	  expresses	  the	  conviction	  that	  if	  some	  places	  were	  not	  open	  on	  a	  fair	  basis	   to	  all,	   those	  kept	  out	  would	  be	  right	   in	   feeling	  unjustly	   treated	  even	  though	   they	  benefit	   from	   the	   greater	   efforts	  who	  were	   allowed	   to	  hold	   them.	  (TJ:	  84)	  This	   passage	   —which	   establishes	   the	   priority	   of	   FEO	   over	   the	   difference	  principle—	   explicitly	   states	   that	   FEO	   is	  not	   a	   principle	   concerned	  with	   the	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efficient	   performance	   of	   the	   economy.	   For	   even	   if	   unfair	   and	   unequal	  opportunities	  to	  members	  of	  different	  groups	  were	  to	  benefit	  the	  worse-­‐off,	  such	  a	  differential	  treatment	  would	  simply	  be	  unjust.	  Therefore,	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  priority	  of	  FEO	  over	  the	  difference	  principle	  shows	  that	  the	  basis	  for	  the	  priority	  of	  EL	  only	  applies	  to	  the	  difference	  principle.	  	  Because	  of	  this	  reason,	  it	  could	  be	  argued	  (along	  Shiffrin’s	  lines)	  that,	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society,	   citizens	  ground	   their	  equal	   status	  not	  only	   in	   the	  fact	   that	   they	   possess	   equal	   rights	   and	   liberties	  —as	   the	   Rawlsian	   passage	  reviewed	  at	  the	  end	  of	  §	  4.1	  establishes	  (see	  TJ:	  478)—,	  but	  also	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  they	  possess	  fair	  opportunity.	  In	  other	  words,	  Rawlsian	  equal	  citizenship	  encompasses	   fair	   opportunity.	   Rawls’s	   own	   defence	   of	   the	   priority	   of	   FEO	  over	  the	  difference	  principle	  seems	  to	  support	  this	  idea.	  	   Having	   said	   that,	   we	   should	   consider	   the	   main	   reason	   why	   Shiffrin	  rejects	   the	   claim	   that	   FEO	   can	   be	   understood	   primarily	   as	   an	  antidiscrimination	  principle:	  Deriving	  principles	  of	  anti-­‐discrimination	  form	  the	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity	  principle	  is	  an	  unsatisfying	  route	  of	  ensuring	  racial	  equality	  and	  of	  marking	  the	  wrong	   of	   racial	   discrimination	   […]	   Although	   a	   crucial	   reason	   that	  discrimination	   is	   so	   offensive	   to	   our	   sense	   of	   justice	   has	   to	   do	   with	   the	  distorting	  effect	  on	  individuals’	  career	  prospects,	  other	  opportunities	  and	  equal	  access	   to	   power,	   it	   is	   not	   the	   exhaustive,	   or	   perhaps	   the	   central,	   objection	   to	  racial	  discrimination.	  (Shiffrin	  2004:	  1650)	  	  Shiffrin’s	  point	  here	  is	  that,	  even	  when	  many	  discriminatory	  acts	  would	  not	  occur	   because	   of	   the	   regulation	   of	   FEO,	   the	   commitment	   to	   avoid	  discrimination	   is	  more	   fundamental	   than	   the	  need	   to	   secure	   fair	   and	   equal	  opportunities	   across	   the	   citizenry.	   So	  we	  are	  back	   to	   the	   idea	   that	   the	  only	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direct	  anti-­‐discrimination	  principle	  within	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  is	   found	  in	  EL:	  what	  it	  is	  wrong	  with	  discrimination	  is	  that	  it	  shatters	  the	  personal	  integrity	  of	   the	   discriminated	   person.	   The	   fact	   that	   her	   competitive	   chances	   can	   be	  affected	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  by-­‐product	  of	  that	  wrong.	  In	   fact,	   I	   made	   a	   parallel	   remark	   in	   §	   3.1	   regarding	   the	   mitigating	  effect	   of	   FEO	   on	   the	   effects	   of	   historical	   injustice:	   i.e.,	   that	   the	   normative	  significance	  of	  rectifying	  past	  political	  violence	  is	  more	  fundamental	  than	  the	  need	  to	  provide	  fair	  competition	  for	  social	  positions	  of	  advantage	  across	  the	  citizenry	  —even	  if	   in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  most	  of	  the	  effects	  of	  historical	  wrongs	  would	  have	  been	  mitigated	  because	  of	  the	  regulation	  of	  FEO.	  Rather,	  the	   normative	   significance	   of	   setting	   forth	   rectificatory	   measures	   is	  fundamentally	   connected	   to	   the	   need	   of	   acknowledging	   institutional	   past	  wrongdoing	   as	   such,	   as	   something	   that	   should	   not	   have	   occurred,	   and	   as	  something	  that	  now	  society	  officially	  regrets.	  Furthermore	  (as	  we	  also	  saw	  in	  
§	   3.1),	   just	   as	  with	   EL,	   some	  mechanisms	   of	   historical	   rectification	   do	   not	  seem	  to	  follow	  directly	  from	  the	  correct	  regulation	  of	  FEO.	  	  In	   any	   event,	   note	   that	   Shiffrin’s	   version	   of	   the	   institutional	   injustice	  
critique	   does	   not	   warrant	   the	   inclusion	   of	   an	   explicit	   anti-­‐discrimination	  principle	  to	  Rawls’s	  original	  theory.	  	  
4.3	  The	  Non-­‐Institutional	  Injustice	  Critique	  and	  the	  Egalitarian	  Ethos	  So	  far	  we	  have	  seen	  that	  both	  the	  no-­‐use	  critique	  and	  the	  institutional	  injustice	  
critique	  fail	  against	  Rawls’s	  theory.	  But	  there	  is	  a	  third	  way	  in	  which	  one	  can	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complain	   about	   Rawls’s	   theoretical	   silence	   regarding	   gender	   and	   racial	  relations:	   to	  wit,	   the	   idea	   that	   Rawls’s	   lack	   of	   concern	   for	   race	   and	   gender	  discrimination	   obscures	   the	   fact	   that	   in	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society	  —that	   is,	   a	  society	  perfectly	  regulated	  by	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness—	  injustices	  regarding	  racial	  or	   gender	   discrimination	  would	   arise	   in	   non-­‐institutional	   settings.	   Call	   this	  the	  non-­‐institutional	  injustice	  critique.	  This	   critique	   has	   some	   initial	   plausibility.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   Rawls’s	  principles	   guarantee	   non-­‐discrimination	   in	   local	   and	   domestic	   institutions.	  However,	   citizens	   also	   interact	   outside	   those	  domains:	   they	   go	   to	   the	  park,	  walk	  on	  the	  street,	  settle	  in	  certain	  neighbourhoods,	  talk	  to	  each	  other,	  make	  decisions	   regarding	  who	   they	  want	   to	   befriend,	   etc.	   Considering	   this,	   even	  when	  domestic	  and	  local	  institutions	  would	  not	  allow	  acts	  of	  discrimination	  when	   the	   principles	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   are	   in	   place,	   subtle	   forms	   of	  discrimination	  might	  still	  occur	  in	  this	  further	  domain.	  Think,	  for	  instance,	  of	  the	   possibility	   that	   even	   if	   public	   transportation	   is	   strictly	   regulated	   by	   a	  general	  policy	  prohibiting	  discrimination,	   some	  particular	   citizens	  may	   still	  deny	  them	  seats,	  or	  change	  places	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  sharing	  a	  seat,	  or	  try	  to	  persuade	  others	  to	  sit	  somewhere	  else	  by	  looking	  at	  them	  disrespectfully	  or	  aggressively	   because	   of	   their	   race,	   gender,	   or	   sexual	   orientation.	   Kymlicka	  neatly	  illustrates	  the	  point:	  [L]egal	   requirements	  of	  non-­‐discrimination	  have	   increasingly	  been	  applied	   to	  ‘private’	   firms	   and	   associations.	   This	   extension	   of	   non-­‐discrimination	   from	  government	  to	  civil	  society	  is	  not	  just	  a	  shift	  in	  the	  scale	  of	  liberal	  norms,	  it	  also	  involves	   a	   radical	   extension	   of	   the	   obligations	   of	   liberal	   citizenship.	   For	   the	  obligation	   to	   treat	   people	   as	   equal	   citizens	   now	   applies	   to	   the	  most	   common	  everyday	  decisions	  of	  individuals	  […]	  Liberal	  citizens	  must	  learn	  to	  interact	  in	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every	   day	   life	   settings	   on	   an	   equal	   basis	   with	   people	   for	   whom	   they	   might	  harbour	  prejudice.	  (Kymlicka	  2002:	  301)	  The	   discussion	   of	   the	   correct	   regulation	   for	   this	   domain	   of	   citizens’	  interaction	  then	  takes	  us	  to	  a	  debate	  regarding	  the	  adequate	  egalitarian	  ethos	  that	  should	  govern	  citizens’	  personal	  lives.	  	  	   Most	  of	   the	  discussion	  on	  such	  an	  ethos	  has	   focused	  on	  whether	   the	  difference	   principle	   should	   inform	   citizens’	   personal	   job-­‐market	   decisions	  and	   how	   that	   might	   contradict	   Rawls’s	   argument	   in	   favour	   of	   economic	  incentives	  (see	  Cohen	  1992,	  Williams	  1998,	  Van	  Parijs	  2003,	  Scheffler	  2006,	  Titelbaum	   2008,	   Shiffrin	   2010).	  We	   can	   distinguish	   three	   positions	   in	   this	  debate.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  Cohen	  extensively	  argues	  that	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	   society	   should	   guide	   their	   personal	   job-­‐market	   decisions	   in	  accordance	   with	   the	   difference	   principle,	   so	   that	   they	   would	   not	   ask	   for	  economic	  incentives	  to	  work	  harder,	  since	  this	  would	  make	  the	  worse-­‐off	  as	  well-­‐off	   as	   possible	   (see	   Cohen	   1992,	   1997).	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   some	  scholars	   deny	   that	   citizens	   should	   directly	   guide	   their	   personal	   job-­‐market	  decisions	  by	  the	  difference	  principle	  (see	  Williams	  2008	  and	  Scheffler	  2005,	  2006).	  Scheffler,	  in	  particular,	  supports	  this	  claim	  by	  appealing	  to	  a	  division	  of	   moral	   labour	   between	   principles	   for	   the	   basic	   structure	   required	   in	  securing	   background	   justice	   and	   principles	   for	   personal	   conduct	   (see	  Scheffler	  2005,	  2006).	  Finally,	  scholars	  in	  the	  third	  position	  have	  argued	  that,	  while	   a	   ‘correlate’	   of	   the	   difference	   principle	   must	   indeed	   regulate	   the	  personal	  conduct	  of	  citizens	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society,	  so	  does	  a	  ‘correlate’	  of	  the	  first	  principle	  of	  justice.	  Titelbaum,	  in	  particular,	  argues	  that	  a	  ‘full	  ethos’	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including	  correlates	  of	  both	  principles	  would	  allow	  citizens	  to	  exercise	  what	  he	  calls	  ‘productive	  latitude’	  (i.e.,	  not	  always	  trying	  to	  make	  the	  worse-­‐off	  as	  well-­‐off	   as	   possible	   when	   taking	   into	   account	   job-­‐market	   decisions),	   as	  granted	  by	  the	  priority	  ascribed	  to	  the	  correlate	  of	  the	  first	  principle	  over	  the	  correlate	  of	   the	  second	  one	  within	  the	   full	  ethos	  (see	  Titelbaum	  2008:	  315-­‐322).36	  All	  this	  work	  on	  the	  putative	  egalitarian	  ethos	  appropriate	  for	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  has	  been	  dominated	  by	  Cohen’s	  original	   critique	  of	  Rawls’s	  incentives	  argument.	  However,	  considering	  the	  fundamental	  egalitarian	  aim	  —i.e.,	  respect	  for	  citizens’	  moral	  equality—,	  the	  relevance	  of	  such	  an	  ethos	  is	  much	   more	   patent	   in	   light	   of	   the	   non-­‐institutional	   injustice	   critique.	   By	  focusing	  on	  how	  the	  two	  original	  principles	  of	  justice	  would	  properly	  inform	  the	   stated	   ethos,	   these	   authors	   have	   failed	   to	   see	   that,	   more	   generally,	  citizens	   should	   also	   guide	   their	   interactions	   by	   a	   norm	   ensuring	   that	   they	  would	  respect	  the	  moral	  equality	  of	  all.	  Ascribing	  such	  content	  to	  the	  ethos	  is	  less	   controversial	   and,	   in	   this	   sense,	   independent	   of	   which	   of	   the	   three	  mentioned	   positions	   prompted	   by	   Cohen’s	   critique	   of	   Rawls’s	   incentives	  argument	  is	  correct;	  it	  is,	  also,	  a	  more	  urgent	  task	  in	  light	  of	  the	  fundamental	  egalitarian	  aim.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  36	  Cohen	   also	   defends	   the	   possibility	   of	   exercising	   ‘productive	   latitude’.	   He	   does	   so	   by	  appealing	  to	  what	  he	  calls	  a	  legitimate	   ‘agent-­‐centered	  prerogative’	  (see	  Cohen	  1992:	  302).	  However,	  as	  Titelbaum	  2008:	  322	  points	  out,	  Cohen	  does	  not	  offer	  an	  argument	  as	  how	  such	  a	   prerogative	   would	   be	   justified	   to	   the	   worse-­‐off.	   This,	   Titelbaum	   holds,	   is	   a	   further	  advantage	  of	  defending	  a	  Rawlsian	  full	  ethos	  of	  justice	  as	  his.	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There	  are	  four	  main	  Rawlsian	  theses	  grounding	  the	  existence	  of	  such	  a	  norm	   within	   the	   ethos	   governing	   citizens’	   personal	   interactions	   in	   a	   well-­‐ordered	  society.	  First,	  and	  most	   importantly,	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  parties	   in	   the	  original	  position	  agree	  to	  a	  principle	  of	  mutual	  respect:	  This	   is	   the	  duty	   to	  show	  a	  person	   the	  respect	  which	   is	  due	   to	  him	  as	  a	  moral	  being,	  that	  is,	  as	  a	  being	  with	  a	  sense	  of	  justice	  and	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  […]	  Mutual	  respect	  is	  shown	  in	  several	  ways:	  in	  our	  willingness	  to	  see	  the	  situation	  of	  others	  from	  their	  point	  of	  view,	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	  their	  conception	  of	  their	  good,	  and	  in	  our	  being	  prepared	  to	  give	  reasons	  for	  our	  actions	  whenever	  the	  interest	  of	  others	  are	  materially	  affected.	  (TJ:	  297)	  According	  to	  Rawls,	  a	  duty	  of	  mutual	  respect	  so	  defined	  would	  be	  agreed	  to	  in	   the	  original	  position.	  This	  means	   that	   the	  parties	  consider	   that	   in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	   society	   all	   citizens	   would	   observe	   this	   duty	   in	   their	   personal	  interactions.	   In	  direct	   response	   to	   the	  non-­‐institutional	  injustice	  critique,	  we	  should	  notice	  that	  ‘not	  to	  have	  or	  act	  on	  racist	  attitudes	  […]	  follows	  from	  the	  duty	  of	  mutual	  respect’	  as	  Alex	  Voorhoeve	  2005:	  5	  has	  pointed	  out.	  	   A	  second	  Rawlsian	   thesis	   in	   this	  regard	   is	   that	  citizens	  accept	  all	   the	  main	   ideas	   of	   the	   shared	   political	   culture	   of	   a	   liberal	   society.	   One	   of	   such	  ideas,	   the	  most	   important	  one	  —as	  Rawls	  (JF:	  5)	  states—,	   is	   the	   idea	  that	  a	  liberal	  society	   is	  a	   fair	  system	  of	  social	  cooperation	  between	   free	  and	  equal	  citizens.	   Citizens	   are	   all	   supposed	   to	   accept	   this	   fundamental	   idea	  within	   a	  well-­‐ordered	  society,	  and	  one	  thing	  they	  have	  to	  do	  to	  honour	  it	  is,	  precisely,	  to	  respect	  their	  co-­‐citizens’	  moral	  equality	  in	  both	  formal	  and	  informal	  social	  settings.	  	   A	  third	  Rawlsian	  thesis	  in	  this	  regard	  is	  that	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  what	  Rawls	  calls	   the	  political	  virtues	  would	  shape	  citizens’	  moral	  character.	  
4	  	  	  The	  Protection	  of	  Citizens’	  Moral	  Equality	  
	  
	   162	  
These	  virtues	   include,	   ‘the	  virtues	  of	   social	   cooperation	   such	  as	   civility	  and	  tolerance,	  of	  reasonableness	  and	  the	  sense	  of	  fairness’	  (PL:	  194).	  Were	  these	  virtues	   to	   shape	   citizens’	   moral	   character,	   it	   is	   hard	   to	   envision	   that	   they	  would	  commit	  discriminatory	  acts.	  Finally,	   a	   fourth	  Rawlsian	   thesis	   is	   that	   citizens	  would	  observe	  what	  Rawls	  (PL:	  217)	  calls	  the	  duty	  of	  civility:	  to	  wit,	  only	  offer	  reasons	  in	  political	  matters	  that	  one	  sincerely	  thinks	  are	  acceptable	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  all	  reasonable	   comprehensive	  doctrines.	  Now,	  while	   the	   limits	  of	   this	  duty	  are	  not	  clear	  (see	  PL:	  253-­‐254),	  it	  is	  nevertheless	  clear	  that	  it	  applies	  to	  citizens’	  individual	  political	   actions	  and	  not	  only	   to	   those	  of	  officials,	   legislators	  and	  judges	  (see	  PL:	  217).	  	   These	   four	   theses	   show	   that	   the	   egalitarian	   ethos	   of	   a	  well-­‐ordered	  liberal	   society	   would	   be	   informed	   by	   a	   norm	   commanding	   the	   respect	   for	  citizens’	  moral	  equality.	  However,	  Rawls’s	  original	  rationale	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  first	  thesis	  must	  be	  revised	  in	  the	  context	  of	  the	  ideas	  of	  political	  liberalism.	  For	  Rawls	  seems	  to	  have	  offered	  the	  wrong	  reasons	   in	  support	  of	   the	  claim	  that	   the	   parties	   in	   the	   original	   position	  would	   agree	   to	   the	   duty	   of	  mutual	  respect	  (see	  TJ:	  297).	  Admittedly,	  Rawls’s	  discussion	  of	  this	  matter	  is	  brief:	  	  Now	  our	  self-­‐respect	  normally	  depends	  upon	  the	  respect	  of	  others.	  Unless	  we	  feel	  that	  our	  endeavors	  are	  respected	  by	  them,	  it	  is	  difficult	  if	  not	  impossible	  for	  us	  to	  maintain	  the	  conviction	  that	  our	  ends	  are	  worth	  advancing.	  Hence	  for	  this	  reason	  the	  parties	  would	  accept	  the	  natural	  duty	  of	  mutual	  respect.	  (TJ:	  156)	  	  This	  passage	  is	  a	  statement	  of	  what	  Bird	  2008:	  17	  (as	  we	  saw	  in	  §	  1.2)	  calls	  ‘the	  dependency	  thesis’	  —i.e.,	  the	  claim	  that	  all	  that	  deficits	  in	  mutual	  respect	  bring	   about	  deficits	   in	   self-­‐respect.	   I	   have	   argued	  against	   such	   a	   thesis.	   Yet	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other	  passages	  evince	  that	  Rawls	  thinks	  that	  the	  parties	  would	  agree	  to	  the	  duty	  of	  mutual	  respect	  out	  of	  self-­‐interested	  reasons:	  Now	   the	   reason	   why	   this	   duty	   would	   be	   acknowledged	   is	   that	   although	   the	  parties	   in	   the	  original	  position	   take	  no	   interest	   in	   each	  other’s	   interests,	   they	  know	   that	   in	   society	   they	   need	   to	   be	   assured	   by	   the	   esteem	   of	   others	   their	  associates.	   Their	   self-­‐respect	   and	   their	   confidence	   in	   the	   value	   of	   their	   own	  system	  of	  ends	  cannot	  withstand	  the	  indifference	  much	  less	  the	  contempt	  of	  the	  others.	   Everyone	   benefits	   from	   living	   in	   a	   society	   where	   the	   duty	   of	   mutual	  
respect	   is	   honoured.	   The	   cost	   of	   self-­‐interest	   is	   minor	   in	   comparison	   with	   the	  
support	  for	  the	  sense	  of	  one’s	  own	  worth.	  (TJ:	  297.	  Italics	  added)	  Here	  Rawls	  holds	  that	  the	  parties	  would	  elect	  the	  duty	  of	  mutual	  respect	  out	  of	   preoccupation	   for	   the	  possible	   psychological	   and	  moral	   consequences	   of	  not	   being	   respected	   in	   turn.	   One	   might	   initially	   think	   that	   this	   reasoning	  fashions	   an	   unproblematic	   impulse	   for	   reciprocity	   in	   social	   interactions.	  However,	  let	  us	  suppose	  that	  citizens	  could	  indeed	  develop	  successfully	  their	  own	  system	  of	  ends	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  indifference	  and	  disrespect	  of	  others.	  Does	  this	  mean	  that	   in	  such	  situations,	  considering	   their	   incredible	  psychological	  strength	  and	  self-­‐sufficiency,	  citizens	  are	  no	   longer	  obliged	   to	  show	  respect	  for	   their	   co-­‐citizens?	   The	   answer	   seems	   to	   be,	   plainly,	   no.	   However,	   if	   the	  reason	  why	  citizens	  respect	  others	  is	  merely	  because	  of	  the	  importance	  that	  being	  respected	  in	  turn	  holds	  for	  the	  pursing	  of	  their	  way	  of	  life,	  the	  outcome	  just	   outlined	   seems	   to	   follow.	   The	   problem	   is,	   then,	   that	   Rawls’s	   original	  reason	   in	   support	   of	   the	   duty	   of	   mutual	   respect	   makes	   its	   observance	   by	  citizens	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  a	  modus	  vivendi.37	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37	  This	  original	   rationale	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  duty	  of	  mutual	   respect	   is	  more	  akin	   to	  a	   rational	  choice	  reading	  of	  the	  original	  position	  in	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice.	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  §	  
2.2,	  Rawls	  was	  quite	  clear	  in	  his	  later	  work	  regarding	  his	  dissatisfaction	  with	  this	  reading	  of	  the	  original	  position	  —see	  (JF:	  82n).	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   Setting	   aside	   this	  modification	   to	   Rawls’s	  main	   rationale	   behind	   the	  duty	  of	  mutual	  respect,	  notice	  three	  things.	  First,	  that	  Rawls’s	  theory	  has	  all	  the	  ideas	  needed	  to	  justify	  that	  an	  egalitarian	  ethos	  would	  regulate	  citizens’	  personal	   conduct	   in	   a	  well-­‐ordered	   society	   (as	   opposed	   to	  what	   Titelbaum	  2008	   holds	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Cohen’s	   critique).	   Second,	   that	   such	   an	   ethos	  does	   not	   violate	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness’s	   non-­‐comprehensive	   character	   (as	  opposed	   to	  what	  Van	  Parijs	   2003	  holds	   in	   the	   context	   of	   Cohen’s	   critique).	  Third,	   that	   such	   an	   ethos	   does	   not	   violate	   the	   moral	   division	   of	   labour	   in	  Rawls’s	   theory	   (as	   opposed	   to	  what	   Scheffler	   2005	   holds	   in	   the	   context	   of	  Cohen’s	  critique).	  	   	  If	   a	   norm	   commanding	   respect	   for	   citizens’	  moral	   equality	   properly	  informs	  the	  egalitarian	  ethos	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society,	  both	  the	  institutional	  
injustice	  critique	  and	  the	  non-­‐institutional	  injustice	  critique	  are	  fully	  met.	  For	  it	  would	  have	  been	  shown	  that	  no	  discriminatory	  acts	  would	  take	  place	  in	  the	  domestic,	   local,	   and	   personal	   domains.	   Note	   also	   how	   the	   inclusion	   of	   an	  egalitarian	  ethos	  in	  the	  description	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  helps	  to	  respond	  to	  more	   feminist-­‐oriented	  versions	  of	   such	  critiques.	  The	   final	   statement	  of	  Rawls’s	  theory	  seems	  to	  favour	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  institution	  of	  the	  family	  is	  part	  of	  the	  basic	  structure	  and	  thus	  regulated	  by	  Rawls’s	  original	  principles	  of	   justice	   (see	   JF:	   162-­‐66).	   If	   we	   add	   to	   this	   the	   fact	   that	   citizens	   would	  observe	  the	  egalitarian	  ethos,	  pace	  Arneson’s	  1999	  critique	  of	  FEO,	  the	  social	  and	   cultural	   roles	   assigning	   different	   labour	   burdens	   and	   carrier	  expectations	  to	  women	  and	  men	  within	  the	  family	  would	  disappear.	  So	  long	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as	   such	  roles	  are	   incompatible	  with	   the	  respect	  of	  women’s	  moral	  equality,	  citizens	  would	  not	  support	  them	  once	  they	  embraced	  the	  egalitarian	  ethos.	  Notice,	   then,	   that	   a	   Rawlsian	   response	   to	   the	   institutional	   injustice	  
critique	   and	   the	   non-­‐institutional	   injustice	   critique	   does	   not	   require	   the	  inclusion	   of	   further	   principles	   to	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	   Rather,	   it	   requires	  working	   out	   the	   proper	   ethos	   that	   would	   govern	   the	   private	   relations	   of	  citizens	   within	   a	   well-­‐ordered	   society.	   This	   conclusion	   marks	   a	   sharp	  contrast	  with	   the	   claims	   I	  made	   in	  §	   3.1—§	   3.2.	   I	   argued	   that	  without	   the	  addition	  of	   a	   further	  principle	   for	   the	   regulation	  of	   the	  basic	   structure,	   full	  historical	  rectification	  might	  not	  be	  guaranteed	  in	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society.	  For	  all	   retribution,	   compensation	   and	   recognition-­‐driven	   measures	   needed	   to	  rectify	  historical	  wrongs	  occur	  within	  and	  with	  support	  of	  basic	  institutional	  settings.	  Conversely,	   it	   is	  difficult	   to	  see	  what	  particular	  principle	  regarding	  historical	  rectification	  must	   inform	  the	  egalitarian	  ethos.	  So	   long	  as	  such	  an	  ethos	  is	  guided	  by	  a	  general	  norm	  as	  stated	  above,	  the	  interaction	  of	  victims	  of	  past	  wrongs	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  citizenry	  in	  private	  and	  informal	  settings	  is	  guaranteed	  to	  be	  a	  respectful	  one.	  
4.4	  Concluding	  Remarks	  This	   concludes	   my	   assessment	   of	   some	   of	   the	   critiques	   against	   Rawls’s	  theoretical	   silence	   regarding	   racial	   and	   gender	   relations.	   As	  we	   have	   seen,	  aside	   from	   the	   need	   to	   flesh	   out	   the	   proper	   egalitarian	   ethos	   of	   a	   well-­‐ordered	  society	  (by	  pointing	  at	  the	  fact	  that	  it	  includes	  a	  norm	  commanding	  a	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commitment	   to	   the	   fundamental	   egalitarian	   aim	  —i.e.,	   respect	   for	   citizens’	  moral	  equality),	  no	   further	  addition	  to	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   is	  needed	  to	  meet	  the	  revised	  critiques.	  In	  the	  following	  chapter	  I	  will	  resume	  my	  assessment	  of	  the	   discussion	   about	   the	   nature	   of	   egalitarian	   justice	   by	   exploring	   Cohen’s	  critique	  of	  Rawls’s	  concept	  of	  justice.	  
	  	   167	  
5	  
Practice-­‐Dependence,	  Constructivism,	  and	  Liberalism	  
In	   the	   previous	   chapter	   we	   saw	   that	   in	   contemporary	   political	   philosophy	  there	   is	   a	   wide	   dispute	   about	   the	   correct	   understanding	   of	   the	   nature	   of	  egalitarian	   justice.	   As	   with	   many	   disagreements	   in	   current	   political	  philosophy,	   this	   one	   starts	   as	   a	   criticism	   to	   Rawls’s	   ideas	   in	   A	   Theory	   of	  
Justice.	  Perhaps	   the	  most	  developed	  contemporary	  critique	   in	   this	  regard	   is	  presented	  G.	  A.	   Cohen	   in	   his	   book	   informatively	   called	  Rescuing	   Justice	  and	  
Equality	  (see	  Cohen	  2008).	  In	  this	  chapter,	  I	  will	  review	  his	  critique	  of	  what	  he	   calls	   the	   ‘constructivist	   understanding	   of	   justice’	   and	   also	   how	   the	  constructivist	  methodology	   relates	   to	   political	   liberalism.	   In	  §	   5.1	   I	   defend	  three	  things:	  first,	  that	  Cohen	  is	  mistaken	  in	  presenting	  his	  critique	  of	  Rawls’s	  concept	   of	   justice	   as	   a	   critique	   of	   Rawls’s	   constructivism.	   Second,	   that	  Cohen’s	  first	  condition	  of	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  justice	  (stating	  that	  such	  principles	   must	   be	   fact-­‐insensitive)	   is	   trivial.	   Third,	   that	   Cohen’s	   second	  condition	   of	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   justice	   (stating	   that	   such	   principles	  must	   be	   derived	   from	   considerations	   of	   justice	   alone)	   creates	   what	   I	   call	  
Cohen’s	  dilemma.	   In	  §	   5.2	   I	  argue	   that	  only	  a	  meta-­‐ethical	  understanding	  of	  
5	  	  	  Practice-­‐Dependence,	  Constructivism	  and	  Liberalism	  
	  
	  
	   168	  
constructivism,	  as	  opposed	  to	  one	  offered	  at	  a	  normative	   justificatory	   level,	  must	  be	  considered	  a	  constructivist	  view	  proper.	  Finally,	  in	  §	  5.3	  I	  hold	  that	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness,	   in	   order	   to	   serve	   the	   purposes	   of	   political	   liberalism,	   is	  better	   interpreted	   as	   uncommitted	   to	   a	   constructivist	   view	   so	   understood.	  This	   forces	   the	   elimination	  of	  Rawls’s	  mirroring	   ideas	  of	   full	  autonomy	   and	  
political	  constructivism	  and,	  ultimately,	  prompts	  a	  deflationist	  interpretation	  of	  the	  original	  position.	  
5.1	  A	  Concept	  of	  Pure	  Justice	  VS	  a	  Concept	  of	  Impure	  Justice	  Throughout	  this	  thesis	  I	  have	  endorsed	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  how	  to	  do	   political	   philosophy	   that	   is	   now	   sometimes	   called	  practice-­‐dependent	  or	  
practice-­‐based	  (see	  James	  2005:	  282,	  Mackled-­‐Garcia	  2008:	  246,	  Sangiovanni	  2008:	  2,	  Valentini	  2011:	  399-­‐400).	  What	  distinguishes	  this	  understanding	  is	  the	   claim	   that	   facts	   about	   a	   given	   practice	   (e.g.,	   local,	   domestic	   or	   global	  interactions)	   must	   be	   seriously	   considered	   when	   justifying	   principles	   of	  justice	  for	  such	  a	  practice.	  	  This	  way	  of	  doing	  political	  philosophy	  is,	  of	  course,	  widely	  inspired	  by	  Rawls’s	   theory.	   A	   commitment	   to	   such	   a	   crucial	   claim	   is	   stated	   in	   the	   very	  first	  pages	  of	  A	  Theory	  of	  Justice:	  ‘the	  correct	  regulative	  principle	  for	  anything	  depends	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   that	   thing’	   (TJ:	   25).	   Later	   on,	   Rawls	   affirms:	  ‘conceptions	  of	  justice	  must	  be	  justified	  by	  the	  conditions	  of	  life	  as	  we	  know	  it	  or	   not	   at	   all’	   (TJ:	   398).	  As	   we	   have	   seen	   in	   §	   2.1,	   Rawls	   holds	   that,	   when	  proposing	   domestic	   principles	   of	   justice,	   we	   must	   consider	   all	   available	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knowledge	   about	   human	   psychological	   regularities	   as	   well	   as	   the	   general	  social	  facts	  about	  liberal	  societies	  (see	  TJ:	  119).	  In	  fact,	  I	  have	  partly	  pressed	  Rawls’s	   theory	  regarding	   the	   importance	  of	  historical	  rectification	  precisely	  on	  these	  terms	  (see	  §1.1-­‐§	  2.1).	  The	   practice-­‐dependent	   approach	   just	   outlined,	   as	   represented	   by	  Rawls’s	  work	   itself,	   has	   been	   recently	   criticised	   by	   G.	   A.	   Cohen	   (see	   Cohen	  2008).	   In	   this	   section	   I	   advance	   three	  objections	   to	   such	  a	   criticism.	  First,	   I	  defend	  that	  while	  Cohen	  claims	  that	  he	  is	  criticising	  Rawls’s	  constructivism,	  his	   critique	   exclusively	   targets	   Rawls’s	   understanding	   of	   the	   concept	   of	  justice.	  In	  order	  to	  show	  this,	  I	  hold,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  engage	  with	  Cohen’s	  critique	  itself.	  Second,	  I	  argue	  that	  the	  first	  part	  of	  Cohen’s	  critique	  (stated	  by	  the	  condition	  that	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  justice	  must	  be	  fact-­‐insensitive)	  is	  trivial.	  Third,	  I	  hold	  that	  the	  second	  part	  of	  Cohen’s	  critique	  (stated	  by	  the	  condition	   that	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   justice	   must	   not	   be	   derived	   from	  non-­‐justice	   considerations)	   speaks	   against	  Cohen’s	  own	  preferred	  principle	  of	  justice,	  creating	  what	  I	  call	  Cohen’s	  dilemma.	  Let	  me	  start	  with	  the	  first	  of	  these	  issues.	  	   Cohen	   criticises	   what	   he	   calls	   ‘the	   constructivist	   approach	   to	   social	  justice’,	  which	  he	  defines	  as	  follows:	  In	  its	  most	  general	  description,	  constructivism	  is	  the	  view	  that	  a	  principle	  gains	  its	  normative	  credentials	  by	  being	  the	  product	  of	  a	  sound	  selection	  procedure.	  But	   I	   am	   not	   concerned	   in	   this	   but	   in	   entirely	   general	   form.	   I	   am	   concerned	  with,	  precisely,	  the	  constructivist	  approach	  to	  social	  justice	  in	  particular,	  which	  is	   constructivism	   understood	   as	   characterized	   above,	   but	   with	   respect	   to	  fundamental	   principles	   of	   justice	   in	   particular,	   and	   that	   proceeds	   by	   putting	  and	   answering	   the	  question	   “What	   rules	   of	   governance	   are	   to	  be	   adopted	   for	  our	  common	  social	   life?”	  Unless	  otherwise	  indicated,	  that	  is	  what	  I	  shall	  mean	  buy	  ‘constructivism’	  here.	  (Cohen	  2008:	  274-­‐275.	  Italics	  in	  the	  original)	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Something	  needs	  to	  be	  immediately	  noticed	  about	  what	  Cohen	  takes	  to	  be	  his	  target.	   As	   the	   passage	   states,	   Cohen	   criticises	   constructivism	   as	   the	   view	  holding	  that:	  (1) The	   normative	   credentials	   of	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   justice	   are	  gained	  through	  their	  being	  the	  result	  of	  a	  specified	  procedure.	  	  (2) Fundamental	  principles	  of	   justice	  are	   the	   ‘rules	  of	  governance	  […]	   to	  be	  adopted	  for	  our	  social	  common	  life’.	  	  A	   view	   committed	   to	   (2),	   Cohen	   explains	   at	   length,	   identifies	   fundamental	  principles	  of	  justice	  (i.e.	  principles	  that	  are	  not	  derived	  from	  other	  principles)	  with	  the	  optimal	  principles	  of	  regulation	  for	  society	  (see	  Cohen	  2008:	  276).	  Cohen	   then	   claims	   that	   a	   theory	   committed	   to	   (2)	   is	   mistaken	   because	  identifying	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  justice	  with	  principles	  of	  regulation	  for	  the	   institutions	   of	   society	   makes	   the	   former	   sensitive	   both	   to	   facts	   about	  human	   psychology	   and	   social	   regularities,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   other	   important	  values	  other	  than	  justice	  alone	  —for	  only	  principles	  of	  regulation	  sensitive	  to	  these	  two	  things	  can	  successfully	  regulate	  a	  society	  like	  ours.	  	   Of	  course,	  Rawls	  explicitly	  champions	  a	  position	  committed	  to	  (2):	   ‘It	  is	   a	   fundamental	   error	   of	   a	   Theory	   of	   Justice	   that	   it	   identifies	   the	   first	  principles	   of	   justice	   with	   the	   principles	   that	   we	   should	   adopt	   to	   regulate	  society’	   (Cohen	  2008:	  265).	  This	  putative	  error	  goes	  back	  to	  Rawls’s	  (TJ:	  5)	  basic	  distinction	  between	  a	  concept	  and	  a	  conception	  of	  justice.	  According	  to	  Rawls,	  the	  concept	  of	  justice	  is	  defined	  by	  a	  problem:	  what	  the	  fair	  terms	  of	  social	  cooperation	  are	  in	  a	  society	  in	  which	  every	  one	  has	  similar	  capacities	  and	  cooperates	  to	  the	  same	  extent.	  A	  conception	  of	  justice,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	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is	  formed	  by	  principles	  to	  solve	  this	  problem.	  The	  character	  of	  the	  problem	  as	  defined	   by	   the	   concept	   of	   justice	   (finding	   principles	   to	   regulate	   the	  institutions	   of	   the	   basic	   structure	   of	   society)	   commands	   the	   careful	  consideration	   both	   of	   facts	   about	   human	   nature	   and	   society,	   as	   well	   as	   of	  other	   important	   values	   that	   must	   guide	   the	   distribution	   of	   burdens	   and	  benefits	   of	   social	   cooperation	   such	   as	   Pareto	   optimality,	   publicity	   and	  stability.	  	   As	  I	  said,	  Cohen	  thinks	  that	  while	  it	  is	  indeed	  correct	  to	  consider	  facts	  about	   human	   nature	   and	   society	   —as	   well	   as	   values	   other	   than	   justice	  itself—	  to	   justify	  principles	  of	   regulation	   for	   the	   institutions	  of	   society,	   it	   is	  incorrect	   to	   take	   into	   consideration	   such	   things	   to	   justify	   fundamental	  principles	  of	   justice.	  Whatever	   fundamental	   principles	  of	   justice	   are,	   Cohen	  2008:	  281	  claims,	  they	  must	  be	  the	  result	  of	  considerations	  of	   justice	  alone.	  According	   to	   Cohen,	   then,	   there	   are	   two	   conditions	   that	   fundamental	  principles	   of	   justice	   must	   fulfil.	   Let	   me	   call	   them,	   respectively,	   the	   fact-­‐
insensitivity	  condition	  and	  the	  single-­‐value	  condition:	  
The	   fact-­‐insensitivity	   condition:	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   justice	   are	  not	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  certain	  empirical	  facts	  are	  the	  case.38	  
	  
The	   single-­‐value	   condition:	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   justice	   are	  justified	  by	  appealing	  exclusively	  to	  considerations	  dependent	  on	  the	  value	  of	  justice.39	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  38	  This	   is	   only	   one	  way	  of	   framing	   this	   condition.	   Several	   passages	   in	  Cohen’s	   text	   suggest	  this	   formulation.	  Consider,	   for	   instance:	   ‘I	  argue	  that	  a	  principle	  can	  respond	  to	  (that	   is,	  be	  grounded	  in)	  a	  fact	  only	  because	  it	  is	  also	  a	  response	  to	  a	  more	  ultimate	  principle	  that	  is	  not	  responding	   to	   a	   fact:	   accordingly,	   if	   principles	   respond	   to	   facts,	   then	   the	   principles	   at	   the	  summit	  of	  our	  conviction,	  are	  grounded	  in	  no	  fact	  at	  whatsoever’	  (Cohen	  2008:	  229).	  39	  Again,	   this	   is	  only	  one	  way	  of	   framing	   this	  condition.	  The	   following	  passage	  comes	  quite	  close	  to	  it:	  ‘I	  believe	  that,	  whatever	  their	  content	  might	  be,	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  justice	  are	  in	  no	  way	  dependent	  on	  the	  character	  of	  any	  facts,	  or,	  indeed,	  and	  equally	  important	  for	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  Let	  me	  refer	  to	  the	  principles	  meeting	  these	  two	  conditions	  as	  pure	  principles	  of	  justice	  (since	  they	  are	  pure	  of	  facts	  and	  non-­‐justice	  considerations)	  and	  to	  the	  principles	  that	  do	  not	  meet	  these	  two	  conditions	  as	   impure	  principles	  of	  justice.	  Using	   this	   terminology,	  we	  can	  say	   that	  Cohen’s	  discussion	   is	  about	  whether	  impure	  principles	  can	  be	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  justice	  or	  not.	  He	  thinks	   they	   cannot.	   Furthermore,	   the	   original	   position,	   being	   a	   procedure	  explicitly	  designed	  to	  deliver	  impure	  principles	  of	  justice	  to	  regulate	  the	  social	  cooperation	   of	   a	   liberal	   society,	   cannot	   deliver	   fundamental	   principles	   of	  justice.	   It	  may	  well	   be	   that	   the	   impure	  principles	   of	   justice	  delivered	  by	   the	  original	  position	  are	  the	  correct	  principles	  for	  regulating	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	   society.	   However,	   that	   is	   irrelevant	   to	   the	   question	   of	   which	   are	   the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  justice	  (see	  Cohen	  2008:	  291).	  	   Be	  that	  as	   it	  may,	   it	   is	  striking	  that	  Cohen’s	  critique	  only	  applies	  to	  a	  view	  holding	   (2)	  —and	   thus	   that	   the	  principles	  of	   regulation	  of	   society	   are	  fundamental	   principles	   of	   justice.	   Nothing	   is	   said	   about	   (1)	   —the	   first	  commitment	  of	  a	  constructivist	  view	  that	  Cohen	  identifies	  in	  his	  definition	  of	  constructivism.	   In	   fact,	   Cohen	   reiterates	   that	   his	   critique	   of	   what	   he	   calls	  constructivism	  will	  focus	  exclusively	  on	  the	  commitment	  to	  (2)	  of	  such	  views:	  I	   argue	   in	   what	   follows	   that	   the	   constructivist	   approach	   to	   social	   justice	  mischaracterizes	   justice	   both	   because	   it	   treats	   justice	   as	   sensitive	   to	   certain	  sorts	   of	   facts	   and	   because	   it	   fails	   to	   distinguish	   between	   justice	   and	   other	  virtues.	  The	  two	  errors	  reflect	  the	  single	  disfigurement	  by	  constructivism	  from	  which	   I	   seek	   to	   rescue	   justice,	   and	   that	   is	   constructivism’s	   identification	   of	  
principles	   of	   justice	   with	   the	   optimal	   set	   of	   principles	   to	   live	   by,	   all	   things	  
considered	   […]	  The	  present	  chapter	  is	  an	  extended	  defence	  of	  the	  claim	  that	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  my	  purposes,	  on	  any	  consideration	  of	  value	  or	  principle	  that	  are	  not	  considerations	  of	  justice	  	  (Cohen	  2008:	  281).	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constructivist	  approach	  to	  social	   justice	   is,	   for	  that	  particular	  and	  transparently	  
simple,	  reason,	  misguided.	  (Cohen	  2008:	  275)	  In	   this	   passage	   Cohen	   himself	   states	   that	   his	   real	   and	   only	   target	   is	   what	  follows	  from	  accepting	  (2),	  for	  notice	  that	  the	  problems	  that	  Cohen	  identifies	  in	  a	  view	  accepting	  (2)	  do	  not	  hold	  for	  a	  view	  exclusively	  accepting	  (1).	  This	  is	   because	   there	   can	   be	   a	   constructivist	   view	   as	   defined	   in	   (1)	   that	   simply	  does	   not	   identify	   principles	   of	   regulation	   with	   fundamental	   principles	   of	  justice	   —and,	   therefore,	   does	   not	   claim	   that	   impure	   principles	   can	   be	  fundamental	  principles.	  	   For	  instance,	  let	  us	  grant	  that	  the	  luck/choice	  principle,	  understood	  as	  ‘inequalities	   are	   just	   if	   and	   only	   if	   certain	   facts	   about	   responsibility	   obtain	  with	   respect	   to	   those	   inequalities’	   (Cohen	   2008:	   300)	   —or	   perhaps	   as	  inequalities	  are	  just	  if	  and	  only	  if	  they	  are	  due	  to	  the	  voluntary	  choices	  of	  the	  people	   affected	   by	   them—,	   is	   a	   pure	   principle	   of	   justice	   (i.e.,	   it	   is	   fact-­‐insensitive	   and	   derived	   exclusively	   from	   considerations	   of	   justice).	   A	  constructivist	   committed	   to	   (1)	   would	   claim	   that	   this	   principle	   holds	   its	  normative	   credentials	   because	   it	   withstands	   the	   appropriate	   normative	  procedure	   (whatever	   such	   a	   procedure	   happens	   to	   be,	   e.g.,	   an	   original	  position,	   a	   reasonability	   test,	   selection	   by	   fully	   rational	   creatures,	   approval	  from	  an	  ideal	  observer).	  Contrarily,	  someone	  not	  committed	  to	  (1)	  —a	  non-­‐constructivist	   such	   as	   Cohen—	   could	   claim	   that	   this	   principle	   holds	   its	  normative	   credentials	   exclusively	   from	   the	   analysis	   of	   our	   considered	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intuitions.40	  But	  notice	  that	  here	  the	  disagreement	  between	  the	  constructivist	  and	  the	  non-­‐constructivist	  is	  not	  about	  whether	  this	  fundamental	  principle	  is	  independent	   of	   facts	   and	   non-­‐justice	   considerations.	   Both	   agree	   on	   that.	  Rather,	  the	  disagreement	  is	  about	  what	  renders	  the	  normative	  credentials	  to	  this	  fundamental	  principle	  so	  defined.	  	   Likewise,	   just	   as	   there	   can	   be	   a	   constructivist	   view	   (again,	   if	   we	  understand	  constructivism	  as	  in	  (1))	  about	  pure	  principles,	  there	  can	  also	  be	  a	  non-­‐constructivist	   view	  of	   impure	  principles	  of	   justice	   (i.e.,	   principles	   that	  are	  fact-­‐sensitive	  and	  derived	  from	  non-­‐justice	  considerations).	  The	  practice-­‐dependent	   conception	   of	   justice	   set	   forth	   by	   Sangiovanni	   2008	   is	   at	   least	  compatible	  with	   this	   view.	   By	   being	   practice-­‐dependent,	   this	   conception	   of	  justice	  assumes	   that	   fundamental	  principles	  are	   impure,	   for	  all	   the	   relevant	  facts	  of	  the	  practice	  they	  are	  to	  regulate	  must	  be	  considered	  when	  proposing	  them.	  However,	  Sangiovanni	  remains	  silent	  on	  whether	  the	  principles	  of	  his	  conception	   of	   justice	   gain	   their	   normative	   credentials	   by	   their	   being	   the	  result	  of	  a	  specified	  procedure	  or	  by	  the	  analysis	  of	  our	  considered	  intuitions	  (or	  by	  any	  other	  metaethical	  or	  justificatory	  strategy).41	  	   Accordingly,	  because	  both	  a	  constructivist	  view	  about	  pure	  principles	  of	   justice	   and	   a	   non-­‐constructivist	   view	   of	   impure	   principles	   are	   perfectly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  See	  Cohen	  2008:	  4:	  ‘In	  this	  conception,	  the	  one	  favoured	  by	  many	  Oxford	  types	  like	  me,	  we	  determinate	   the	   principles	   we	   are	   willing	   to	   endorse	   through	   an	   investigation	   of	   our	  individual	  normative	  judgements	  on	  particular	  cases	  […]	  In	  my	  philosophically	  conservative	  view,	  that	  is	  the	  only	  way	  to	  go.	  And	  when	  we	  go	  that	  way,	  we	  refine,	  and	  thereby	  reach,	  our	  deepest	  normative	  convictions’.	  41	  Notice,	  however,	  that	  other	  practice-­‐dependent	  conceptions	  of	  justice	  are	  not	  silent	  in	  this	  regard	  and	  explicitly	  endorse	  a	  constructivist	  view	  of	  normative	  justification	  as	  in	  (1).	  This	  is	  the	  case	  of	  James	  2005	  and	  Mackled-­‐Garcia	  2008.	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intelligible,	  Cohen’s	  critique	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  impure	  justice	  is	  not	  a	  critique	  of	   constructivism.	   To	   show	   that	   there	   is	   no	   need	   to	   engage	   with	   Cohen’s	  critique	  itself.	  Such	  a	  critique	  has	  as	  a	  target	  a	  particular	  understanding	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  justice	  (i.e.,	  (2)),	  an	  understanding	  that	  is	  not	  necessarily	  linked	  to	  the	  metaethical	  or	  normative	  methodology	  of	  constructivism	  (i.e.,	  (1)).	  	   Let	  me	  now	  turn	  to	  Cohen’s	  critique	  of	   the	  concept	  of	   impure	   justice	  itself.	   As	   we	   have	   seen,	   the	   critique	   claims	   that	   fundamental	   principles	   of	  justice	   are	   to	   meet	   two	   conditions:	   the	   fact-­‐insensitivity	   condition	   and	   the	  
single-­‐value	   condition.	   Since	   the	   principles	   that	   result	   from	   the	   original	  position	   do	   not	   meet	   these	   two	   conditions,	   Cohen	   argues,	   they	   are	   not	  fundamental	   principles	   of	   justice.	   I	   will	   make	   one	   observation	   about	   each	  condition.	  	   Remember	   what	   the	   fact-­‐insensitivity	   condition	   states:	   fundamental	  principles	  of	  justice	  are	  not	  justified	  on	  the	  basis	  that	  certain	  empirical	  facts	  are	   the	   case.	   This	   claim	   is	   supposed	   to	   threaten	   Rawls’s	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  and	   other	   practice-­‐dependent	   conceptions	   of	   justice,	   as	   these	   conceptions	  assign	  a	  serious	  role	  to	  considerations	  of	  empirical	  fact	  in	  the	  justification	  of	  their	  principles.	  But	  this	  threat	  is	  merely	  apparent.	  For	  these	  conceptions	  can	  indeed	   presuppose	   further	   fact-­‐insensitive	   principles	   without	   conceding	  anything	  substantial	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  justice.	  	  These	  conceptions	   typically	  hold	   that	  a	  given	  principle	  P	   is	  adequate	  to	   regulate	   a	   practice	   partly	   because	   certain	   facts	  F	   of	   the	   practice	   are	   the	  case.	  Practice-­‐dependent	  conceptions	  can	  meet	  the	  fact-­‐insensitivity	  condition	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by	  stating	  that	  this	  latter	  claim	  commits	  them	  to	  the	  following	  fact-­‐insensitive	  principle:	  	  (i)	  Nec,	  if	  F	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  P	  	  This	   principle	   fulfils	   the	   requirement	   established	   by	   the	   fact-­‐insensitivity	  
condition,	  for	  it	  can	  be	  affirmed	  and	  justified	  regardless	  of	  whether	  F	  obtains	  (see	  James	  2011:	  7).	  As	  an	  illustration,	  let	  us	  consider	  Rawls’s	  claim	  (TJ:	  109-­‐112)	  that	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice	  is	  conditional	  on	  whether	  the	  facts	  that	  he	  groups	  under	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  circumstances	  of	  justice	  obtain.	  Using	  the	  necessity	  operator	  as	  in	  its	  deontic	  interpretation	  (a	  standard	  way	  of	   stating	   that	   something	   is	   obligatory),	  we	   can	   formulate	   this	   principle	   as	  follows:	  	  (ii)	  It	  is	  obligatory	  that	  if	  the	  circumstances	  of	  justice	  arise	  in	  a	  society	  with	  a	  liberal	  political	  culture,	  then	  such	  a	  society	  be	  regulated	  by	  the	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness.	  	  This	  further	  principle	  fulfils	  the	  fact-­‐insensitivity	  condition.	  It	  can	  be	  affirmed	  or	   justified	   regardless	  of	  whether	   the	   circumstances	  of	   justice	  are	   the	   case.	  	  So,	  even	  when	  within	  Rawls’s	  theory	  the	  principles	  of	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  are	  affirmed	   partly	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	   importance	   of	   considering	   the	  circumstances	  of	  justice,	  such	  a	  framework	  gives	  rise	  to	  a	  commitment	  to	  (ii).	  Rawlsians	  and	  defenders	  of	  similar	  practice-­‐dependent	  conceptions	  of	  justice	  (either	   domestic,	   global,	   or	   for	   other	   domains)	   can	   accept	   that	   their	  conceptions	  are	  ultimately	  based	  on	  fact-­‐insensitive	  principles	  like	  (i)	  and	  (ii)	  without	   conceding	   anything	   substantial	   on	   the	   debate	   about	   the	   nature	   of	  justice.	  If	  any	  single	  normative	  conception	  of	  justice	  can	  be	  ultimately	  based	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on	   fact-­‐insensitive	   conditional	   principles	   of	   this	   sort,	   then	   the	   fact-­‐
insensitivity	   condition	   does	   not	   illuminate	   anything	   particularly	   relevant	  either	   in	   the	   debate	   of	   the	   nature	   of	   justice	   or	   at	   the	   level	   of	   normative	  justification	   or	   meta-­‐ethics.	   Pogge	   2008:	   458-­‐461,	   after	   stating	   a	   similar	  observation,	   argues	   that	   Cohen’s	   victory	   is	   ‘Pyrrhic’:	   ‘Why	   do	   I	   call	   this	   a	  Pyrrhic	   victory?	   Because	   Cohen’s	   metaethical	   triumph	   comes	   without	   the	  announce	  rescue	  of	  justice’	  (see	  also	  Raz	  2011	  for	  a	  similar	  point).	  	  	   So	   let	  me	  turn	  to	  Cohen’s	  single-­‐value	  condition.	  Remember	  what	   the	  condition	  states:	  fundamental	  principles	  of	   justice	  are	  justified	  by	  appealing	  exclusively	   to	   considerations	   dependent	   on	   the	   value	   of	   justice.	   It	   is	   quite	  surprising	  that	  Cohen	  endorses	  this	  condition,	  as	  he	  is	  perfectly	  clear	  that	  the	  considerations	  he	  offers	  as	  a	  way	  of	  justifying	  his	  own	  preferred	  fundamental	  principle	   of	   justice	   (i.e.,	   the	   luck/choice	   principle)	   are,	   in	   the	   end,	   entirely	  dependent	  on	  the	  value	  of	  fairness:	  My	  own	  animating	  conviction	  in	  political	  philosophy	  with	  respect	  to	  justice	  is	  a	  conviction	   about	   distributive	   justice	   in	   particular.	   It	   is	   that	   an	   unequal	  distribution	  whose	   inequality	  cannot	  be	  vindicated	  by	  some	  choice	  of	   fault	  or	  desert	   on	   the	   part	   of	   (some	   of)	   the	   relevant	   affected	   agents	   is	   unfair,	   and	  therefore,	  pro	   tanto,	   unjust,	   and	   nothing	   can	   remove	   that	   particular	   injustice.	  (Cohen	  2008:	  7.	  Italics	  in	  the	  original,	  bold	  added)	  In	   this	   passage	   Cohen	   states	   that	   distributive	   justice	   requires	   compliance	  with	  the	  value	  of	  fairness.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  remark,	  there	  are	  two	  interpretative	  options	  that	  create	  what	  I	  call	  Cohen’s	  dilemma.	  Either	  Cohen	  is	  collapsing	  the	  value	   of	   fairness	   with	   that	   of	   justice	   or	   he	   is	   not.	   If	   he	   is,	   then	   Cohen	   is	  offering	   a	   circular	   consideration	   as	   a	   way	   of	   justifying	   why	   his	   preferred	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  justice	  is	  correct:	   justice	  requires	  the	  alleviation	  of	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all	  inequalities	  that	  are	  not	  the	  result	  of	  choice	  because	  not	  doing	  so	  would	  be	  unjust.	   If,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   Cohen	   is	   not	   collapsing	   the	   values	   of	   fairness	  and	  justice,	  then	  he	  is	  appealing	  to	  another	  value	  rather	  than	  justice	  alone	  in	  order	   to	   justify	   the	   fundamental	  principle	  of	   justice	  he	  prefers,	  and	   thus	  he	  violates	  the	  single-­‐value	  condition.	  	  One	  may	  think	  that	  Cohen	  has	  simply	  made	  a	  mistake	  in	  the	  previous	  quote	  —i.e.,	   appealing	   to	   a	   further	   value	   rather	   than	   justice	   to	   defend	   his	  preferred	   fundamental	   principle	   of	   justice—,	   a	   mistake	   that	   can	   be	   easily	  removed	   from	   his	   defence	   of	   the	   luck/choice	   principle.	   However,	   Cohen	  repeatedly	  mentions	  the	  importance	  of	  the	  value	  of	  fairness	  in	  support	  of	  the	  luck	  egalitarian	  understanding	  of	   justice.	   In	  the	   introduction	  of	  his	  book,	  he	  says	   again:	   ‘The	   Rawlsian	   approach	   to	   justice	   denatures	   justice,	   since	   it	  cannot	   recognize	   that	   if	  something	  is	  unfair,	  then	  it’s	  to	  that	  extent	  of	  unjust’	  (Cohen	   2008:	   7-­‐8.	   Italics	   added).	   Similar	   remarks	   about	   why	   fundamental	  principles	   of	   justice	   must	   comply	   with	   the	   value	   of	   fairness	   are	   made	   in	  Cohen	   2011b:	   5,	   2011a:	   120,	   124-­‐146.	   In	   fact,	   in	   one	   of	   the	   most	  comprehensive	   studies	   on	   Cohen’s	   luck	   egalitarianism,	   Michael	   Otsuka	  (2010)	  defends	  precisely	   the	   idea	   that	   at	   the	   core	  of	   such	  a	   view	   there	   are	  two	  impulses,	  both	  of	  them	  dependent	  on	  the	  value	  of	  fairness:	  the	  alleviation	  of	   exploitation	   and	  of	   brute-­‐luck.	   I	   have	   exemplified	   the	  dependence	  of	   the	  latter	  (alleviating	  brute-­‐luck)	  on	  the	  value	  of	  fairness.	  Otsuka	  makes	  the	  task	  of	   most	   of	   his	   paper	   to	   prove	   the	   dependence	   of	   the	   former	   (alleviating	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exploitation)	  on	  the	  commitment	  to	  such	  a	  value.	  Otsuka	  summarises	  this	  by	  stating	  his	  main	  claim:	  I	   shall	   conclude	   that	   Cohen’s	   account	   of	   distributive	   justice	   has	   a	   non-­‐egalitarian	   as	   well	   as	   an	   egalitarian	   aspect.	   The	   non-­‐egalitarian	   aspect	   is	   his	  impulse	   to	   extinguish	   the	   influence	   of	   exploitation	   on	   the	   distribution	   of	  benefits,	   whereas	   the	   egalitarian	   aspect	   is	   his	   impulse	   to	   extinguish	   the	  influence	  of	  brute	   luck.	  Each	  impulse	  arises	  from	  an	  underlying	  commitment	  to	  
fairness.	  (Otsuka	  2010:	  218.	  Italics	  added)	  All	  this	  evidence	  supports	  the	  claim	  that	  Cohen’s	  defence	  of	  the	  luck/choice	  principle	   depends	   on	   the	   value	   of	   fairness.	   In	   light	   of	   this,	   how	   are	   we	   to	  understand	  Cohen’s	  endorsement	  of	  the	  single-­‐value	  condition?	  	  There	   are	   two	   ways	   for	   Cohen	   to	   avoid	   Cohen’s	   dilemma:	   either	   he	  abandons	   the	   single-­‐value	   condition	   or	   he	   renounces	   the	   ‘underlying	  commitment	  to	  fairness’	  from	  which	  the	  impulse	  to	  support	  his	  fundamental	  principle	  of	  justice	  arises.	  It	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  first	  option	  is	  preferable.	  In	  fact,	   it	   seems	   that	   if	   we	   cannot	   use	   other	   values	   in	   order	   to	   define	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  justice,	  we	  cannot	  define	  principles	  of	  justice	  at	  all.	  In	  Rawls’s	  case,	  he	  makes	  use	  of	  the	  normative	  understanding	  of	  society	  as	  a	  fair	   system	   of	   social	   cooperation	   between	   free	   and	   equal	   persons;	   he	  may	  also	  suppose	  further	  fact-­‐insensitive	  conditional	  principles	  as	  (i)	  and	  (ii).	  As	  we	   saw,	   these	   are	   normative	   considerations	   for	   which	   Rawls	   offers	   no	  justification	  and	  on	  which	  his	  conception	  of	   justice	  depends,	   just	  as	  Cohen’s	  justification	   of	   the	   luck/choice	   principle	   depends	   on	   the	   value	   of	   fairness	  without	  further	  defence	  either.	  Summing	  up,	   in	   this	   section	   I	   have	   defended	   three	   points:	   first,	   that	  Cohen	  is	  mistaken	  in	  thinking	  that	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  impure	  justice	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is	  a	  critique	  of	  constructivism.	  Second,	  that	  Cohen’s	  fact	  insensitivity	  condition	  is	  trivial.	  Lastly,	  that	  Cohen’s	  single-­‐value	  condition	  creates	  Cohen’s	  dilemma.	  
5.2	  A	  Constitutive	  VS	  an	  Indicative	  Account	  of	  Correctness	  In	  this	  section	  I	  will	  defend	  that	  there	  is	  a	  substantial	  difference	  in	  advancing	  constructivism	   as	   a	  metaphysical	   view	   and	   as	   an	   epistemic	   view	   regarding	  the	  correctness	  of	  normative	  principles	  (that	  is,	  a	  difference	  in	  holding	  that	  a	  given	  standard	  of	  correctness	  is	  constituted	  by	  being	  the	  result	  of	  a	  specified	  procedure	   and	   holding	   that	   satisfying	   a	   given	   standard	   of	   correctness	   is	  
indicated	   by	   being	   the	   result	   of	   such	   a	   procedure).	   I	   will	   also	   defend	   that	  there	  can	  be	  normative	  justifications	  that	  are	  metaethically	  neutral.	  Finally,	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  the	  epistemic	  understanding	  of	  constructivism	  just	  mentioned	  states	  a	  trivial	  claim	  about	  normative	  justification.	  	   Constructivist	   accounts	   stating	   the	   metaphysical	   claim	   of	   the	  constitutive	   structure	   of	   correctness	   are	   straightforwardly	   committed	   to	   a	  particular	   metaethical	   view,	   a	   view	   that	   is	   incompatible	   with	   other	  explanations	  of	  what	   it	  is	   for	  a	  principle	  to	  be	  correct	  —such	  as	  the	  various	  forms	   of	   moral	   realism,	   expressivism,	   fictionalism,	   and	   error	   theories.	  Contrarily,	   constructivist	   accounts	   stating	   the	   epistemic	   claim	   about	   the	  indication	  of	  correctness	  are	  not	  committed	  to	  a	  particular	  metaethical	  view	  in	   this	   regard.	   Instead,	   these	   accounts	   hold	   an	   understanding	   of	   normative	  justification	   that	   may	   be	   compatible	   with	   the	   usual	   list	   of	   metaethical	  options.	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   Of	  course,	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  normative	  justification	  can	  be	  metaethically	  neutral	  (as	  the	  epistemic	  understanding	  of	  constructivism	  is	  characterised	  to	  hold)	   has	   been	   contested.	   Some	   of	   the	   most	   powerful	   and	   paradigmatic	  critiques	  to	  such	  an	  idea	  can	  be	  found	  in	  authors	  as	  different	  as	  Rorty	  1982:	  xvi,	  Dworkin	  1996:	   87-­‐139,	   and	  Blackburn	  1998:	   295.	   Conversely,	   an	   early	  defence	   of	   the	   independence	   of	   normative	   justification	   from	   metaethical	  questions	  can	  be	  found	  in	  authors	  as	  different	  as	  Mackie	  1977:	  16,	  Rawls	  (CP:	  287-­‐288),	   and	   Korsgaard	   1996a:	   363-­‐398	   (although	   her	   own	  work	   shifted	  later	  towards	  the	  opposite	  position).42	  	   We	  can	  try	  to	  show	  the	  logical	  independence	  of	  normative	  justification	  by	  presenting	  what	  appears	  to	  be	  an	  extreme	  case:	  we	  can	  imagine	  a	  view	  of	  normative	   justification	   that	   is	   merely	   based	   on	   the	   coherence	   of	   all	  judgements	   regarding	   a	   specific	   discourse	  —for	   instance,	   moral	   discourse.	  This	  view	  would	  state	  that	  what	  justifies	  taking	  a	  judgement	  as	  correct	  is	  the	  very	  and	  only	  fact	  that	  it	  coheres	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  judgements	  made	  by	  the	  same	  agent	  within	  moral	  discourse.	  On	   this	   view,	  nothing	   is	   said	   regarding	  the	  constitutive	  structure	  of	  the	  correctness	  of	  moral	  discourse’s	  judgements.	  Because	  of	  that,	  this	  coherentist	  view	  of	  normative	  justification	  is	  compatible	  with	  a	  robust	  form	  of	  moral	  realism	  about	  moral	  discourse	  (i.e.,	  the	  view	  that	  the	  truth	  of	  moral	  judgements	  is	  constituted	  by	  whether	  they	  refer	  to	  a	  mind-­‐independent	   order	   of	   values	   or	   facts	   —see	   Shaffer-­‐Landau	   2003:	   13-­‐18,	  Enoch	  2007:	  21-­‐51	  and	  FitzPatrick	  2008:	  159-­‐207).	  It	  is	  also	  compatible	  with	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  42	  For	   a	   recent	   defence	   of	   the	   independence	   of	   metaethics	   from	   views	   about	   normative	  justification	  see	  Hussain	  &	  Shah	  2006:	  267	  and	  Bloomfield	  2009.	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an	   error	   theory	   about	   moral	   discourse	   (i.e.,	   the	   view	   that	   all	   moral	  judgements	  are	   false	  since	  there	   is	  no	  mind-­‐independent	  order	  of	  values	  or	  facts	  to	  which	  they	  refer	  —see	  Mackie	  1977).	  	  To	  see	  why	  this	  is	  so,	  it	  is	  only	  needed	  to	  show	  that	  an	  agent	  can	  hold	  
the	  same	  view	  about	  normative	  justification	  in	  two	  discourses	  for	  which	  such	  an	   agent	   holds	   different	   metaethical	   views.	   For	   instance,	   it	   is	   perfectly	  plausible	   to	   imagine	   an	   agent	   holding	   a	   coherentist	   view	   of	   normative	  justification	  (as	  the	  one	  just	  outlined)	  for	  both	  moral	  and	  scientific	  discourse	  while,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  endorsing	  realism	   in	  the	  scientific	  discourse	  and	  an	  
error	  theory	  in	  the	  moral	  discourse:	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  this	  agent	  would	  believe	  that	  what	  justifies	  taking	  as	  correct	  judgements	  in	  the	  two	  discourses	  is	  the	  very	  and	  only	  fact	  that	  they	  cohere	  with	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  judgements	  made	  in	  each	  respective	  discourse.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   this	  agent	  would	  also	  believe	  that,	  while	  the	  scientific	  judgements	  that	  are	  justified	  in	  such	  a	  way	  also	  refer	  to	  a	  mind-­‐independent	  order	  of	   facts,	   the	  moral	   judgements	   justified	   in	   the	  very	  same	  way	  do	  not	  refer	  to	  a	  mind-­‐independent	  order	  of	  facts.	  That	  there	  is	  nothing	   irrational	   or	   incoherent	   about	   an	  agent	   adopting	   these	  beliefs,	   it	  seems	  to	  me,	  proves	  the	  logical	  independence	  of	  normative	  justification	  from	  metaethical	  commitments.	  In	   fact,	   a	   quite	   common	   interpretation	   of	   Rawls’s	   reflective	  equilibrium	  also	  assumes	  the	  independence	  of	  normative	  justification.	  Rawls	  (PL:	  95-­‐96)	  himself	   states	   that	  such	  a	  method	  of	   justification	   is	  used	  by	  his	  
political	  constructivism,	  by	  Kantian	  constructivism,	  and	  by	  that	  form	  of	  moral	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realism	  that	  he	  calls	  rational	  intuitionism.	  For	  now,	  suffice	   it	   to	  say	   that	   the	  last	  two	  are	  defined	  as	  opposed	  metaethical	  views	  regarding	  the	  constitution	  and	  origin	  of	  moral	  values.43	  Despite	  this	  opposition,	  Rawls	  claims,	  both	  use	  the	  same	  method	  of	  normative	  justification.	  Having	   defended	   the	   idea	   that	   there	   can	   be	   metaethically	   neutral	  normative	   justifications,	   let	  me	   come	   back	   to	   our	   discussion	   regarding	   the	  two	  understandings	  of	  constructivism.	  For	  the	  purpose	  of	  clarity,	  let	  me	  refer	  to	  the	  metaethical	  understanding	  as	  constructivism	  ME	  and	  to	  the	  normative	  justification	  understanding	  as	  constructivism	  NJ.	  Recall	  what	  defines	  them:	  
Constructivism	  ME:	   Satisfying	  a	  given	  standard	  of	   correctness	   for	   the	  principles	  and	  judgements	  of	  a	  given	  discourse	  is	  constituted	  by	  being	  the	  result	  of	  a	  specified	  procedure.	  	  
Constructivism	  NJ:	   Satisfying	   a	   given	   standard	   of	   correctness	   for	   the	  principles	   and	   judgements	  of	   a	   given	  discourse	   is	   indicated	  by	  being	  the	  result	  of	  a	  specified	  procedure.	  	  Notice	   that	   constructivism	   ME	   is	   a	   much	   more	   robust	   claim	   than	  
constructivism	   NJ.	   Constructivism	   NJ	   is	   only	   a	   claim	   regarding	   normative	  justification	   for	   the	  principles	  of	   a	  given	  discourse:	   the	   fact	   that	  a	  principle	  would	   be	   issued	   by	   a	   given	   procedure	   indicates	   its	   correctness	   and	   thus	  justifies	   it.	   In	   contrast,	   constructivism	  ME	   is	   both	   a	   claim	   about	   normative	  justification	   and	   an	   explanation	   of	   the	   constitutive	   structure	   of	   correctness	  for	   a	   given	   discourse:	   the	   fact	   that	   a	   principle	  would	   be	   issued	   by	   a	   given	  procedure	   not	   only	   indicates	   its	   correctness.	   It	   is	   also	   constitutive	   of	   the	  correctness	  of	  such	  a	  principle	  that	  it	  is	  issued	  by	  the	  procedure.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  In	   §	   5.3	   we	   will	   see	   that,	   pace	   Rawls	   (PL:	   102-­‐130),	   political	   constructivism	   is	   also	   a	  metaethical	  view	  in	  this	  regard.	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   Now,	   recall	   that	   Cohen	   2008:	   274	   defines	   constructivism	   as	   (1)	   ‘the	  view	  that	  a	  principle	  gains	  its	  normative	  credentials	  through	  being	  the	  result	  of	   a	   sound	   selection	  procedure’	   and	   (2)	   the	   view	   ‘that	   proceeds	   by	   putting	  and	  answering	  the	  question	  “What	  rules	  of	  governance	  are	  to	  be	  adopted	  for	  our	  common	  social	  life”?’.	  In	  	  §	  5.1	  we	  saw	  that	  a	  constructivist	  view	  need	  not	  necessarily	   try	   to	   answer	   the	   question	   posed	   by	   (2)	  —as	   a	   constructivist	  view	   of	   pure	   principles	   of	   justice	   is	   perfectly	   intelligible.	   Considering	   the	  previous	  remarks,	  we	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  disambiguate	  the	  meaning	  of	  (1)	   and,	   in	   particular,	   of	   the	   phrase	   gaining	   normative	   credentials:	   it	   may	  either	   imply	   a	   commitment	   to	  constructivism	  ME	   or	   to	  constructivism	  NJ.	   In	  fact,	  Cohen	  himself	  seems	  to	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  existence	  of	  these	  two	  different	  understandings	  of	  constructivism,	  as	  it	  is	  clear	  from	  the	  following	  passage:	  I	   should	   acknowledge,	   here,	   a	   distinction	   that	   is	   of	   the	   first	   importance	   in	  philosophically	  but	   that	  will	  have	  no	  bearing	  on	  my	  own	  proceedings.	   I	  mean	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  view	  that	  what	  it	  is	  for	  a	  principle	  to	  be	  valid,	  is	  that	  it	   is	   the	   product	   of	   some	   favored	   constructivist	   procedure;	   and	   a	   view	  according	   to	   which	   the	   constructivist	   procedure	  merely	  makes	   this	   principle	  valid	  […]	  The	  stated	  distinction	  is	  at	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  metaethics,	  a	  pinnacle	  that	  my	  discussion	  does	  not	  reach.	  (Cohen	  2008:	  275-­‐276.	  Italics	  in	  the	  original)	  This	  passage	  makes	   clear	   that	  Cohen	  himself	  was	   aware	  of	   the	   fact	   that	  he	  was	  simply	  avoiding	  a	  discussion	  with	  constructivism	  throughout	  his	  critique	  of	  the	  concept	  of	   impure	  justice.	  However,	  Cohen’s	  remarks	  here	  are	  helpful	  for	  clarifying	  that	  the	  issues	  concerning	  constructivism	  are	  ‘at	  the	  pinnacle	  of	  metaethics’.	   Instead	   of	   being	   a	   view	   of	   how	   to	   understand	   the	   concept	   of	  justice,	   constructivism	   can	   either	   be	   a	   metaethical	   view	   or	   a	   view	   about	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normative	   justification.	   Neither	   of	   these	   two	   understandings	   is	   reached	   by	  Cohen’s	  critique.	  	   The	   reception	   of	   constructivism	   has	   always	   oscillated	   between	   the	  two	  ways	  of	  understanding	  it	  (for	  recent	  discussion	  see	  O’Neill	  2003,	   James	  2007,	   Korsgaard	   2008,	   Galvin	   2010).	   Moreover,	   sometimes	   both	  understandings	   are	   confusingly	   conflated	   into	   a	   putatively	   single	   position.	  Ronzoni	  &	  Valentini	  2008,	  and	  Ronzoni	  2010	  neatly	  exemplify	  this.	  For	  these	  authors	   argue,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	   that	   constructivism	   is	   a	   view	   about	   the	  normative	   justification	   of	   moral	   principles	   that	   is	   agnostic	   regarding	   the	  existence	  of	  mind-­‐independent	  moral	  facts.	  Ronzoni	  holds:	  Constructivists	   believe	   that	   the	   authoritative	   normative	   principles	   can	   be	  justified	   —through	   the	   appeal	   to	   certain	   constraints	   of	   reason,	   and	  consequently	   to	   specific	   constructivist	   procedures,	   rather	   than	   to	   an	  independent	  order	  of	  facts	  […]	  the	  most	  plausible	  stand	  one	  can	  take	  regarding	  the	   existence	   of	   independent	   moral	   truths	   is,	   I	   contend,	   one	   of	   agnosticism.	  (Ronzoni	  2010:	  74,	  78.	  Italics	  in	  the	  original)	  This	   passage	   explicitly	   endorses	   constructivism	   NJ,	   for	   it	   says	   that	  constructivism	  is	  a	  normative	  justification	  strategy	  that	  is	  neutral	  regarding	  metaethical	   discussions.	   However,	   on	   the	   other	   hand,	   these	   authors	   also	  endorse	  the	  constitutivist,	  non-­‐metaethically	  neutral	  claim	  that	  characterises	  
constructivism	   ME:	   ‘From	   the	   standpoint	   of	   constructivist	   theory,	  intersubjective	   justifiability	   simply	   is	   the	   only	   form	   of	   objectivity	   available’	  (Ronzoni	  2010:	  74).	  A	  mixed	  conception	   like	   this	  cannot	  be	  coherent.	   If	  we	  make	   the	   metaphysical	   claim	   regarding	   the	   constructivist	   nature	   of	   moral	  principles’	  objectivity	  (that	   is,	  of	  what	   it	  is	  for	  a	  principle	  to	  be	  correct),	  we	  cannot	  remain	  neutral	  or	  agnostic	  regarding	  the	  nature	  of	  moral	  principles’	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objectivity.	   This	   is	   incompatible	  with	   constructivism	  NJ	   since,	   by	   definition,	  such	  a	  view	  is	  an	  epistemic	  claim	  neutral	  regarding	  the	  nature	  and	  structure	  of	  objectivity	  and	  correctness.	  	   So	  we	  must	  keep	  the	  two	  understandings	  separate.	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  say	  that	  only	  constructivism	  ME	  can	  be	  a	  distinctive	  constructivist	  account	  proper.	  Sharon	  Street	  advances	  this	  position:	  For	   notice	   that	   any	   view	   in	   ethics	   can	   say	   that	   the	   results	   of	   reasoning	  according	  to	  a	  certain	  procedure	  are	  correct.	  What	  makes	  a	  view	  constructivist	  is	   its	   claim	   that	   the	   results	   of	   reasoning	   according	   to	   a	   certain	  procedure	   are	  correct	   because	   they	   issue	   from	   that	   procedure	  —that	   to	   be	   correct	   just	   is	   to	  issue	   from	   that	   procedure.	   In	   other	   words,	   what	   is	   distinctive	   about	   a	  constructivist	   view	   is	   that	   they	   understand	   correctness	   to	   be	   constituted	   by	  emerging	   from	   certain	   procedure,	   and	   not	   merely	   coincident	   with	   it.	   (Street	  2008:	  212.	  Italics	  in	  the	  original)	  Street	   is	   right	   in	   stating	   that	   constructivism	   can	   only	   be	   taken	   as	   a	   full-­‐fleshed	  distinctive	  view	  when	  is	  understood	  in	  a	  metaethical	  way.	  This	  is	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  constructivism	  NJ	  is	  problematic.	  	  There	   is	   a	   common	   objection	   (which	   goes	   back	   as	   far	   as	   Plato’s	  
Euthyphron	   problem)	   that	   this	   view	   cannot	   overcome.	   Constructivists	   NJ	  views	  always	  proceed	   in	   three	   stages:	   first,	   they	   specify	  a	  given	  procedure;	  second,	   they	   give	   arguments	   to	   support	   that	   certain	   principles	   would	   be	  issued	   by	   that	   procedure;	   finally,	   they	   conclude	   that,	   because	   of	   the	  arguments	   provided	   in	   the	   second	   stage,	   the	   principles	   would	   indeed	   be	  issued	  by	   the	  procedure.	  Crudely	   stated,	   the	  objection	   is:	  what	   justificatory	  work	   is	   being	   done	   by	   the	   third	   stage?	   In	   other	   words,	   what	   justificatory	  work	  does	   it	   take	   to	  stipulate	   that	  certain	  principles	  would	  be	   the	  result	  of	  the	  procedure?	  It	  seems	  that	  what	   justifies	  the	  principles	  are	  the	  arguments	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provided	   in	   the	   second	   stage	   to	   show	   that	   they	   would	   be	   issued	   by	   the	  procedure.	  These	  arguments,	  if	  based	  on	  true	  premises	  and	  valid,	  prove	  that	  the	   principles	   are	   justified.	   Thus,	   it	   seems	   that	   what	   constructivists	   NJ	   are	  really	   stating	   is	   something	   like	   the	   following:	   ‘because	   these	   principles	   are	  
justified	   by	   correct	   arguments,	   they	   would	   be	   issued	   by	   the	   proposed	  procedure’.	   However,	   this	   claim	   is	   clearly	   irrelevant	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	  normative	   justification.	   Constructivism	  NJ	   seems	   to	   be	   compatible	  with	   any	  view	  in	  ethics,	  as	  Street	  holds	  in	  the	  passage	  quoted,	  precisely	  because	  it	  is	  a	  trivial	  claim	  about	  normative	  justification.	  	   In	   fact,	   Rawls’s	   theory	   is	   a	   perfect	   example	   of	   this	   problem.	   If	   the	  original	   position	   is	   interpreted	   in	   constructivist	   NJ	   fashion,	   then	   Rawls’s	  theory	  holds	  that	  the	  two	  principles	  of	  justice	  are	  justified	  because	  they	  issue	  from	   the	   original	   position.	   Rawls	   then	   exclusively	   focuses	   on	   providing	  arguments	  to	  show	  why	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness’s	  principles	  would	  be	  chosen.	  But	  notice	   that	   all	   the	   arguments	   to	   that	   effect	   can	   be	   provided	   and	   accepted	  without	   appealing	   to	   the	   original	   position	   at	   all.	   Take	   some	   paradigmatic	  cases	   for	  some	  of	   the	  principles:	  Rawls’s	   (TJ:	  62-­‐63)	  argument	  showing	   the	  normative	   arbitrariness	  of	   one’s	   gender,	   sexual	  preference,	   social	   class	   and	  upbringing,	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  fair	  equality	  of	  opportunity;	  Rawls’s	  (TJ:	  90-­‐91)	  argument	  stating	  that	  the	  ideal	  of	  fraternity	  is	  better	  respected	  by	  the	  difference	  principle;	  Rawls’s	  (TJ:	  259-­‐263)	  argument	  defending	  that	  time-­‐preference	  is	  unjust	   in	  favour	  of	  the	  principle	  of	   just	  savings.	  Someone	  who	  rejects	   the	   putative	   justificatory	   force	   of	   constructivism	   NJ	   can	   still	   fully	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accept	  all	  these	  arguments	  without	  showing	  incoherence.	  The	  fact	  that	  this	  is	  possible	   suffices	   to	   show	   the	   independent	   justificatory	   force	   of	   such	  arguments	  from	  the	  original	  position.	  	   Perhaps	  constructivists	  NJ	  would	  like	  to	  say	  that	  there	  is	  another	  way	  of	   understanding	   their	   view	   that	   differs	   from	   the	   three-­‐staged	   structure	   I	  have	  mentioned,	  and	  which	  can	  avoid	  the	  objection	  stated.	  I	  doubt	  that	  there	  is	   an	   alternative	   way.	   This	   is	   so	   because	   there	   is	   only	   one	   way	   in	   which	  
constructivists	   NJ	   can	   show	   (without	   begging	   the	   question	   against	   their	  opponents)	  that	  the	  principles	  they	  prefer,	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  ones	  they	  do	  not	  prefer,	  would	  be	  issued	  by	  their	  procedure:	  by	  providing	  arguments	  in	  favour	  of	  their	  principles.	  Thus,	  we	  are	  back	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  all	  the	  justificatory	  work	  is	  done	  in	  the	  second	  stage—i.e.,	  by	  the	  arguments	  themselves.	  Because	  of	  this	  objection,	  constructivism	  ME	  has	  better	  prospects	  than	  
constructivism	   NJ.44	  When	   assessing	   constructivist	   ME	   views,	   it	   is	   useful	   to	  keep	   in	  mind	  Street’s	  2008:	  208-­‐209	  distinction	  of	  what	  she	  calls	  restricted	  
constructivism	   and	   metaethical	   constructivism.	   However,	   although	   the	  distinction	   is	   useful,	   the	   terminology	   employed	   is	  misleading	   for,	   as	   Street	  2008:	   217-­‐219	   herself	   states,	   both	   subtypes	   of	   constructivism	   affirm	   a	  metaethical	  claim.	  The	  difference	  between	  them	  is,	  rather,	  that	  the	  first	  one	  is	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  44	  It	   may	   still	   be	   that	   constructivism	   ME	   is	   also	   prey	   to	   the	   same	   objection	   I	   made	   to	  
constructivism	  NJ	  —aside	  from	  other	  important	  weaknesses	  (see	  Shafer-­‐Landau	  2003:	  29-­‐51	  and	  Enoch	  2009).	  Here	   I	  will	  not	  analyse	   this	   further.	  For	   the	  purpose	  of	   this	  chapter,	   it	   is	  only	  relevant	  to	  show	  the	  inadequacy	  of	  constructivism	  NJ	  as	  a	  distinctive	  form	  of	  normative	  justification,	   and	   thus	   to	   show	   the	   inadequacy	   of	   interpreting	   the	   original	   position	   in	  
constructivist	  NJ	  fashion.	  Moreover,	  in	  the	  next	  section	  I	  will	  argue	  that	  we	  should	  also	  avoid	  interpreting	   the	   original	   position	   in	   constructivist	   ME	   fashion	   too,	   forcing	   a	   deflationary	  interpretation.	   Therefore,	   it	   is	   ultimately	   irrelevant	   to	   this	   chapter	  whether	   constructivism	  
ME	  is	  a	  successful	  metaethical	  explanation	  or	  not.	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an	  account	  attempting	  to	  explain	  what	  it	  is	  for	  a	  specific	  set	  of	  principles	  and	  normative	   judgements	   to	   be	   correct	  —such	   as	   those	   of	   distributive	   justice	  (e.g.,	  CP:	  304)	  or	  moral	  wrongness	  (e.g.,	  Scanlon	  1998).	  Contrarily,	  the	  other	  subtype	  of	  constructivism	  is	  an	  account	  attempting	  to	  explain	  what	  it	  is	  for	  all	  principles	  and	  normative	  judgments	  to	  be	  correct	  (e.g.,	  Korsgaard	  1996b).	  In	  this	   sense,	   a	   less	   misleading	   terminology	   would	   label	   the	   two	   subtypes	  simply	   as	   restricted	   constructivism	   ME	   and	   unrestricted	   constructivism	   ME.	  These	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  follows:	  
Restricted	   constructivism	   ME:	   Satisfying	   a	   given	   standard	   of	  correctness	   for	   a	   specific	   subset	   of	   normative	   principles	   and	  judgements	   is	   constituted	   by	   their	   being	   the	   result	   of	   a	   specified	  procedure.	  	  
Unrestricted	   constructivism	   ME:	   Satisfying	   a	   given	   standard	   of	  correctness	  for	  all	  normative	  principles	  and	  judgements	  is	  constituted	  by	  their	  being	  the	  result	  of	  a	  specified	  procedure.	  	  Notice	  that	  while	  restricted	  constructivism	  ME	  is	  a	  metaethical	  explanation	  of	  the	  correctness	  of	  a	  specified	  set	  of	  principles	  and	  normative	  judgements,	   it	  remains	  silent	   regarding	   the	  metaethical	   status	  of	   the	  grounding	  normative	  principles	   used	   in	   its	   procedure	   of	   construction.	   So,	   for	   instance,	   if	   Rawls’s	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   is	   interpreted	   in	  restricted	  constructivism	  ME	   fashion,	   the	  result	   of	   the	   original	   position	   is	   thought	   of	   as	   constituting	   what	   it	   is	   for	  
impure	  principles	  of	  justice	  to	  be	  correct,	  even	  though	  (as	  we	  saw	  §	  5.1)	  it	  is	  not	   specified	   what	   is	   constitutive	   of	   the	   correctness	   of	   the	   grounding	  normative	   principles	   and	   judgements	   used	   in	   the	   original	   position	   —paradigmatically,	  of	  the	  normative	  idea	  of	  society	  understood	  as	  a	  fair	  system	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of	   social	   cooperation	   between	   free	   and	   equal	   persons.	   Taking	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  as	  a	  form	  of	  restricted	  constructivism	  ME	  makes	  it	  unproblematic	  to	  assume	  the	  correctness	  of	  such	  an	   idea	  since,	   in	   this	   interpretation,	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  pretends	  only	  to	  be	  a	  metaethical	  explanation	  of	  the	  correctness	  of	   impure	   principles	   of	   justice,	   and	   not	   a	   metaethical	   explanation	   of	   all	  normative	  principles	  and	  judgements,	  including	  the	  one	  stating	  that	  a	  liberal	  society	  must	  be	  understood	  as	  a	   system	  of	   social	   cooperation	  between	   free	  and	  equal	  persons.	  A	  metaethical	  explanation	  for	  all	  normative	  principles	  and	  judgements	  (i.e.	  unrestricted	  constructivism	  ME)	  would	  resemble	  more	  what	  Rawls	   (TJ:	   15,	   95-­‐96)	   calls	   ‘rightness	   as	   fairness’.	   However,	   Rawls	   is	   clear	  regarding	  his	   lack	  of	  engagement	  with	  such	  a	  project.	  Rather,	  this	  project	   is	  closer	  to	  Korsgaard’s	  1996b:	  122	  explicit	  aims.45	  	   Summing	   up,	   in	   this	   section	   I	   have	   defended	   three	   points:	   first,	   that	  there	   are	   metaethically	   neutral	   normative	   justifications.	   Second,	   that	   we	  must	   distinguish	   constructivism	   ME	   (be	   it	   restricted	   or	   unrestricted)	   from	  
constructivism	  NJ.	   Finally,	   that	   constructivism	  NJ	   states	   a	   superfluous	   claim	  about	  normative	  justification.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  45	  More	   recently,	   such	   a	  project	   has	  been	   the	   concern	  of	   authors	  defending	  what	   it	   is	   now	  tellingly	  called	  constitutivist	  views	  in	  metaethics.	  These	  views	  pretend	  to	  prove	  the	  existence	  of	   normativity	   (i.e.,	   that	   certain	   normative	   predicates	   are	   true)	   by	   appealing	   to	   certain	  aspects	   of	   what	   it	   is	   constitutive	   of	   being	   an	   agent.	   For	   instances	   and	   defences	   of	  constitutitivist	  views	  in	  metaethics	  see	  Korsgaard	  2009,	  Velleman	  2009:	  135-­‐146.	  For	  recent	  attacks	  see	  FitzPatrick	  2005,	  Hussain	  &	  Shah	  2006,	  and	  Enoch	  2006.	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5.3	  A	  Comprehensive	  VS	  a	  Political	  Conception	  of	  Justice	  For	  the	  late	  Rawls	  (i.e.	  PL),	  the	  relevant	  standard	  of	  correctness	  is	  not	  truth	  but	   reasonableness.	   If	   the	   principles	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   prove	   to	   be	  reasonable,	  they	  are	  to	  be	  considered	  the	  correct	  principles	  for	  regulating	  the	  basic	   institutions	   of	   a	   liberal	   society.46	  Importantly,	   even	   if	   the	   standard	   of	  correctness	  for	  a	  position	  is	  reasonableness	  rather	  than	  truth,	  such	  a	  position	  can	  still	  hold	  a	  constructivist	  view	  regarding	  what	   it	  is	   for	  a	  principle	   to	  be	  reasonable	   —i.e.,	   what	   is	   constitutive	   of	   a	   principle’s	   reasonableness	   (as	  opposed	  to	  what	  merely	  indicates	  that	  a	  principle	  is	  reasonable).	  	  	   As	   Street	   2008:	   212	   states,	   it	   is	   an	   open	   interpretative	   question	  whether	   the	   late	   Rawls	   is	   claiming	   that	   reasonableness	   is	   constituted	   or	  merely	  indicated	  by	  being	  the	  result	  of	  the	  original	  position:	  This	   raises	   a	   thorny	   interpretative	   question,	   with	   textual	   evidence	   on	   both	  sides.	  But	   the	   important	  point	   for	  our	  purposes	  is	   this.	   If	  Rawls	   is	  not	  making	  the	   constitutive	   claim,	   then	   justice	   as	   fairness	   does	   not	   qualify	   as	   a	  constructivist	  view	  […]	  Regardless	  of	  whether	  Rawls	  is	  making	  the	  constitutive	  claim	  in	  Political	  Liberalism,	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  he	  is	  making	  it	  in	  his	  earlier	  ‘Kantian	  Constructivism	  in	  Moral	  Theory’,	  so	  his	  view	  there	  still	  stands	  as	  an	  example	  of	  restricted	  constructivism.	  	  (Street	  2008:	  212)	  Street	   is	   referring	   to	   Rawls’s	   clear	   constructivist	   ME	   passages	   such	   as	   the	  following:	   ‘What	   distinguishes	   Kantian	   constructivism	   is	   essentially	   this:	   it	  specifies	  a	  particular	  conception	  of	  the	  person	  as	  an	  element	  in	  a	  reasonable	  procedure	   of	   construction,	   the	   outcome	  of	  which	  determines	   the	   content	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  46	  This	   idea	   has	   been	   contested.	   See	   Raz	   1990	   and	   Cohen	   2009	   for	   an	   attack	   on	   the	  dispensability	   of	   truth	   in	   the	   justification	   of	   a	   conception	   of	   justice	   and	   in	   the	   domain	   of	  public	   reason.	   See	   Estlund	   1998	   and	   Quong	   2011	   for	   a	   defence.	   For	   the	   purposes	   of	   this	  chapter,	  it	  is	  irrelevant	  whether	  Rawls	  is	  mistaken	  on	  his	  claim	  that	  the	  adequate	  standard	  of	  correctness	  for	  a	  conception	  of	  justice	  must	  be	  reasonableness	  and	  not	  truth.	  In	  both	  cases,	  as	  we	  will	  see,	  a	  constructivist	  account	  can	  be	  provided.	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first	   principles	   of	   justice’	   (CP:	   304.	   Italics	   added).	   However,	   the	   final	  statement	   of	   his	   theory	   oscillates	   between	   the	   constructivist	   ME	   and	   the	  
constructivist	  NJ	  interpretation.	  In	  fact,	  as	  we	  will	  now	  see,	  such	  an	  oscillation	  creates	  a	  tension	  in	  Rawls’s	  late	  work	  that	  needs	  to	  be	  resolved.	  I	  will	  argue,	  
pace	  Street	  2008,	  that	  the	  elements	  of	  Rawls’s	  late	  work	  pulling	  towards	  the	  
constructivist	   ME	   interpretation	   must	   be	   excluded	   from	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness,	  since	   the	   constructivist	  NJ	   interpretation	   suits	  much	   better	   the	   purposes	   of	  political	  liberalism.	  This	  is	  so	  because,	  according	  to	  political	  liberalism,	  it	  is	  of	  first	   importance	   to	   avoid	  metaethical	   controversies.	   Crudely	   stated,	   a	   view	  holding	   that	   being	   the	   result	   of	   the	   original	   position	   is	   constitutive	   of	   the	  correct	   principles	   of	   justice	   (i.e.,	   constitutive	   of	   having	   the	   property	   of	  reasonableness)	   is	   a	   comprehensive	   view,	   whereas	   the	   view	   holding	   that	  being	  the	  result	  of	  the	  original	  position	  is	  an	   indication	  of	  being	  correct	  (i.e.	  an	  indication	  of	  having	  the	  property	  of	  reasonableness)	  is	  not.	  Therefore,	  so	  long	   as	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   pretends	   to	   be	   a	   political	   rather	   than	   a	  comprehensive	   conception	   of	   justice,	   the	   constructivist	   NJ	   interpretation	   is	  preferable.	  	  Having	   said	   that,	   remember	   that	   in	   §	   5.2	   I	   presented	   an	   objection	  against	   the	   claim	   that	   constructivism	   NJ	   is	   a	   successful	   view	   of	   normative	  justification.	   Accordingly,	   I	   will	   ultimately	   propose	   that	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  should	   not	   be	   interpreted	   either	   as	   a	   form	   of	   constructivism	   ME	   or	   of	  
constructivism	  NJ,	   but,	   rather,	   in	   deflationary	   fashion.	   First,	   let	  me	   contrast	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some	  of	  the	  clearly	  incompatible	  elements	  associated	  with	  each	  of	  those	  two	  interpretations.	  	  	   Let	  us	  briefly	   remember	   that	  Political	  Liberalism	   has	   two	  main	  aims,	  each	  of	  them	  being	  sensitive	  to	  a	  particular	  fact	  about	  liberal	  societies.	  First,	  (as	  I	  have	  already	  mentioned)	  sensitive	  to	  the	  fact	  of	  reasonable	  pluralism	  of	  comprehensive	   doctrines	   (i.e.,	   pluralism	  of	   doctrines	   that	   disagree	   on	   their	  metaphysical	  views	  regarding	  the	  nature,	  structure	  and	  source	  of	   the	  realm	  of	   value),	   political	   liberalism	   aims	   at	   presenting	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   as	   a	  political	   conception	   of	   justice.	   Rawls	   (PL:	   11-­‐15)	   states	   that	   such	   a	  conception	   must	   fulfil	   three	   characteristics:	   (i)	   it	   must	   regulate	   only	   the	  political	   domain;	   (ii)	   it	   must	   be	   presented	   as	   freestanding	   from	  comprehensive	  views;	  and	  (iii)	  it	  must	  be	  justified	  on	  ideas	  acceptable	  to	  all	  reasonable	   comprehensive	   doctrines,	   that	   is,	   ideas	   already	   present	   in	   the	  shared	  political	  culture	  of	  liberal	  societies.	  Second,	  sensitive	  to	  the	  fact	  of	  the	  pluralism	  of	  political	  conceptions	  of	  justice	  in	  liberal	  societies	  (where	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  is	  just	  one	  amongst	  many),	  political	  liberalism	  aims	  at	  presenting	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  as	  the	  most	  reasonable	  conception	  of	  such	  a	  family	  (see	  PL:	  xlvi-­‐xlix,	  95-­‐96).	  	   Now,	  perhaps	   two	  elements	  are	   the	  most	   significant	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  
constructivist	  NJ	   interpretation.	  The	  first	  one	  is	  stated,	  precisely,	  by	  the	  very	  second	  aim	  of	  political	  liberalism.	  For,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  Rawls	  claims	  that	  by	  being	   the	   result	   of	   the	   original	   position	   the	   two	   principles	   of	   justice	   are	  reasonable	  and	  thus	  correct.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  Rawls	  also	  claims	  that	  other	  
5	  	  	  Practice-­‐Dependence,	  Constructivism	  and	  Liberalism	  
	  
	  
	   194	  
conceptions	  of	   justice,	  which	  by	  definition	  are	  not	   the	   result	  of	   the	  original	  position,	   are	   reasonable	   as	   well.	   This	   shows	   that	   being	   the	   result	   of	   the	  original	  position	  is	  not	  constitutive	  of	  having	  the	  property	  of	  reasonableness,	  rather,	  a	  mere	  indication	  of	  having	  such	  a	  property.	  	   The	   second	   element	   favouring	   the	   constructivist	  NJ	   interpretation	   is	  Rawls’s	   (PL)	   idea	   that	   his	   political	   constructivism	   is	   different	   to	   Kantian	  constructivism	   and	   compatible	   with	   rational	   intuitionism.	   Rawls’s	   ideas	  regarding	   the	   latter	   are	   summarised	   in	   the	   following	   passage:	   ‘Justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  does	  not	  deny	  what	   [rational	   intuitionists]	  want	   to	   assert:	   namely,	  that	  the	  order	  of	  values	  displayed	  by	  constructivism	  [by	  the	  original	  position]	  is	  backed	  up	  by	  an	  independent	  order	  of	  values	  that	  constitutes	  itself’	  (PL:	  95.	  Italics	   added).	   In	   turn,	   Rawls’s	   ideas	   regarding	   Kantian	   constructivism	   are	  summarised	  in	  the	  following	  passage:	  Another	   and	   deeper	   meaning	   of	   autonomy	   says	   that	   the	   order	   of	   moral	   and	  political	   values	   must	   be	   made,	   or	   itself	   be	   constituted	   by	   the	   principles	   and	  conceptions	  of	  practical	  reason.	  Let	  us	  refer	  to	  this	  as	  constituted	  autonomy.	  In	  contrast	   with	   rational	   intuitionism,	   constituted	   autonomy	   says	   that	   the	   so-­‐called	   independent	  order	  of	  values	  does	  not	  constitute	   itself	  but	   is	  constituted	  by	   the	   activity,	   actual	   or	   ideal,	   of	   (human)	   practical	   reason.	   I	   believe	   this,	   or	  something	   like	   it,	   is	  Kant’s	  view	  […]	  Political	   liberalism	  must,	  of	  course,	  reject	  Kant’s	  constitutive	  autonomy.	  (PL:	  99-­‐100.	  Italics	  added)	  This	  second	  element	  on	   its	  own,	   it	   seems	  to	  me,	  rules	  out	   the	  constructivist	  
ME	   interpretation;	   it	   seems	   sufficient	   for	   showing	   Rawls’s	   intention	   of	  presenting	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   as	   a	   constructivist	   NJ	   view	   compatible	   with	  several	   and	   opposite	   metaethical	   explanations	   regarding	   the	   origin,	  structure,	   and	   source	   of	   the	   realm	   of	   value.	   This	   is	   also	   consistent	   with	  Rawls’s	   further	   and	   recurrent	   idea	   holding	   that	   the	   original	   position	   is	   the	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most	   suitable	   form	   of	   ‘public	   justification	   on	   questions	   of	   political	   justice	  given	  the	  fact	  of	  reasonable	  pluralism’	  (PL:	  100).	  	  	   However,	   there	   are	   well-­‐developed	   elements	   in	   Rawls’s	   final	  understanding	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   pulling	   towards	   exactly	   the	   opposite	  interpretation.	  Perhaps	   two	  of	   them	  are	   the	  most	   significant:	   the	  mirroring	  ideas	  of	  full	  autonomy	  (see	  PL:	  77-­‐81)	  and	  political	  constructivism	  (see	  PL:	  89-­‐125).	   I	   will	   show	   how	   these	   ideas	   (against	   Rawls’s	   very	   intention)	   make	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  comprehensive	  and	  thus	  inadequate	  for	  fulfilling	  the	  first	  aim	  of	  political	  liberalism	  mentioned	  above.	  	   Leif	  Wenar	   (see	  Wenar	  1995:	  52-­‐57)	  has	  already	  defended	  a	   similar	  view	  regarding	  political	  constructivism.	  Wenar	  claims	  that	   the	  constructivist	  account	   of	   objectivity	   is	   not	   compatible	   with	   the	   plurality	   of	   metaethical	  views	  in	  this	  regard,	  so	  that	  by	  endorsing	  a	  ‘divisive	  account	  of	  the	  source	  of	  objective	  reasons,	  Rawls	  has	  recreated	  the	  problems	  of	  pluralism	  at	  a	  higher	  level’	   (Wenar	  1995:	  57).47	  I	   completely	   agree	  with	   this	  diagnosis.	  However,	  Wenar	  does	  not	  mention	  that	  the	  idea	  of	  full	  autonomy	  mirrors	  exactly	  that	  of	  the	   objectivity	   proper	   to	   political	   constructivism.	   Therefore,	   he	   misses	   an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  47	  In	   fact,	   Wenar	   points	   at	   three	   comprehensively	   Kantian	   elements	   of	   Rawls’s	   political	  liberalism	   (1)	   the	   burdens	   of	   judgement,	   (2)	   the	   reasonable	   moral	   psychology,	   and	   (3)	  
political	  constructivism.	  These	  elements	  are	  comprehensively	  Kantian,	  Wenar	  holds,	  because	  at	   bottom	   they	   state	   that	   the	   free	   exercise	   of	   practical	   reason	   is,	   respectively,	   (1)	   the	  explanation	   of	   the	   fact	   of	   reasonable	   pluralism,	   (2)	   the	   source	   of	   motivation	   to	   follow	  political	  principles,	  and	  (3)	  the	  source	  of	  the	  normativity	  of	  political	  principles.	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important	   point:	   that	   if	   political	   constructivism	   must	   go	   (so	   long	   as	   the	  political	  understanding	  of	  liberalism	  is	  to	  succeed),	  so	  must	  full	  autonomy.48	  	   The	   main	   purpose	   of	   full	   autonomy	   is	   to	   reject	   the	   previous	  interpretation	   of	   the	   original	   position	   as	   an	   extension	   of	   Kant’s	   categorical	  imperative	   (see	  TJ:	   §	   40).	   According	   to	  Kant	   (see	  G:4:441),	   an	   autonomous	  will	  is	  one	  that	  gives	  a	  law	  to	  itself;	  the	  autonomous	  will	  does	  that	  by	  acting	  on	   maxims	   that	   spring	   from	   and	   respect	   the	   different	   formulations	   of	   the	  categorical	   imperative.	   This	   seems	   to	   imply,	   at	   least	   according	   to	   the	  constructivist	  interpretation	  of	  Kant	  put	  forward	  by	  Rawls	  (CP:	  303-­‐358)	  and	  Korsgaard	  1996b49,	  that	  the	  autonomous	  will	  itself	  is	  the	  source	  of	  all	  moral	  values	   and	   principles	   or,	   alternatively,	   that	   being	   the	   outcome	   of	   correct	  practical	  reasoning	  is	  constitutive	  of	  all	  the	  moral	  values	  and	  principles	  there	  are.	   For	   clarity	   purposes,	   let	   me	   refer	   as	   Kantian	   autonomy	   to	   this	   form	  
unrestricted	  constructivism	  ME.	  	   Now,	   since	   Kantian	   autonomy	   is	   a	   comprehensive	   claim	   about	   the	  nature	   of	   value	   as	   a	   whole,	   it	   needs	   to	   be	   avoided	   if	   the	   political	  understanding	  of	   liberalism	   is	   to	  succeed.	  Rawls	   thinks	   this	  can	  be	  done	  by	  restricting	   his	   political	   liberalism	   to	   a	   narrow	   claim	   regarding	   the	   relevant	  scope	  of	  practical	  reasoning:	  a	  full	  politically	  autonomous	  person	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  the	  source	  of	  a	  subset	  of	  moral	  principles,	  namely,	  the	  source	  of	  principles	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  48	  In	  fact,	  Wenar	  does	  not	  mention	  the	  idea	  of	  full	  autonomy	  in	  his	  paper	  at	  all.	  This	  is	  also	  the	  case	  of	  Scheffler	  1994,	  who	  makes	  very	  similar	  observations.	  Partly	  because	  of	  this,	  I	  centre	  my	  discussion	  on	  such	  an	  idea	  rather	  than	  on	  political	  constructivism.	  49	  For	  a	  critique	  of	  such	  interpretation	  of	  Kant’s	  moral	  philosophy	  see	  Wood	  2008:	  282-­‐283.	  He	  now	  interprets	  Kant	  as	  defending	  a	  form	  of	  moral	  realism	  instead.	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for	  regulating	  the	  institutions	  of	  society	  —the	  source,	  that	  is,	  of	  the	  principles	  of	   justice.	   The	   original	   position	   is	   thus	   a	   way	   of	   fleshing	   out	   what	   is	  constitutive	   of	   principles	   of	   justice	   for	   the	   political	   domain.	   Along	   with	  Kantian	  lines,	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  it	  is	  constitutive	  of	  such	  principles	  that	  they	  are	  the	  outcome	  of	  correct	  practical	  reasoning.	  Rawls	  says:	  Note	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  parties	  but	  the	  citizens	  of	  a	  well-­‐ordered	  society	  in	  their	  public	  life	  who	  are	  fully	  autonomous.	  This	  means	  that	  in	  their	  conduct	  citizens	  not	   only	   comply	   with	   the	   principles	   of	   justice,	   but	   they	   also	   act	   from	   this	  principles.	   Moreover,	   they	   recognize	   this	   principles	   as	   those	   that	   would	   be	  adopted	  in	  the	  original	  position	  […]	  Thus,	  full	  autonomy	  is	  realized	  by	  citizens	  when	   they	   act	   from	   principles	   of	   justice	   that	   specify	   the	   fair	   terms	   of	   social	  
cooperation	  they	  would	  give	  to	  themselves	  when	   fairly	   represented	  as	   free	  and	  equals.	  (PL:	  77.	  Italics	  added)	  Notice	   how	  well	   this	   description	   of	   citizens’	   full	  autonomy	  mirrors	  Kantian	  
autonomy.	   According	   to	   Kant,	   an	   action	   that	   expresses	   moral	   value	   needs	  both	   to	   comply	   with	   moral	   requirements	   and	   be	   done	   because	   of	   those	  requirements	  (that	  is,	  from	  what	  Kant	  calls	  the	  motive	  of	  duty	  —see	  G:4:399).	  Likewise,	   as	  we	  have	   seen,	  Kant	   claims	   that	   an	   autonomous	  will	   is	   the	  one	  that	  gives	  a	  law	  to	  itself	  which,	   in	  turn,	  requires	  of	  such	  a	  will	  that	  it	   follow	  maxims	   springing	   from	   correct	   practical	   reasoning	   (i.e.,	   the	   different	  formulations	   of	   the	   categorical	   imperative).	   In	   this	   passage,	   Rawls	   follows	  closely	   these	   characteristics	   of	   Kantian	   autonomy.	   The	   only	   modification	  made	  by	  Rawls	  is	  that	  such	  characteristics	  are	  restricted	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  political,	  so	  that	  an	  agent	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  fully	  autonomous	  because	  she	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  principles	  regulating	  that	  domain	  and	  only	  when	  she	  acts	  from	  those	  principles.	  Contrary	  to	  what	  Kantian	  autonomy	  holds,	  a	  person	  can	  be	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fully	  autonomous	  even	  if	  she	  does	  not	  comply	  with	  principles	  springing	  from	  correct	  practical	  reason	  in	  all	  other	  aspects	  of	  her	  moral	  life.	  	   However,	  the	  idea	  of	  full	  autonomy	  creates	  problems	  for	  the	  success	  of	  the	   political	   understanding	   of	   liberalism.	   For	   one	   thing,	   the	   thesis	   that	  practical	   reason	   is	   the	   source	   of	   political	   principles	   is	   a	   straightforward	  metaethical	  claim.	  To	  see	  this,	  let	  me	  set	  into	  use	  the	  terminology	  deployed	  in	  the	  previous	  section.	  As	  we	  saw,	  constructivist	  ME	  views	  can	  be	  restricted	  or	  
unrestricted.	  The	  former	  states	  what	  it	  is	  constitutive	  of	  a	  subset	  of	  principles	  and	  judgements’	  correctness	  (e.g.,	  principles	  of	  distributive	  justice	  or	  of	  what	  we	   own	   to	   each	   other).	   The	   latter	   states	   what	   is	   constitutive	   of	   all	   moral	  principles	   and	   judgements’	   correctness.	   However,	   both	   restricted	   and	  
unrestricted	   forms	   of	   constructivism	   are	   of	   a	   same	   metaethical	   kind.	   They	  propose	  the	  same	  explanation	  for	  principles’	  correctness	  that	  is	  incompatible	  with	   those	   proposed	   by	   other	   metaethical	   theories	   such	   as	   the	   distinctive	  forms	   of	  moral	   realism,	   expressivism,	   fictionalism,	   and	   error	   theories.	   It	   is	  doubtful	  that	  a	  moral	  realist	  or	  an	  error	  theorist	  would	  accept	  that	  the	  will	  is	  the	  source	  of	  the	  principles	  regulating	  the	  political	  domain,	  i.e.,	  that	  being	  the	  outcome	  of	  correct	  practical	  reasoning	   is	  constitutive	  of	  such	  principles.	  All	  such	   theorists	   believe	   in	   different	   and	   incompatible	   explanations	   in	   this	  regard	  (as	   long	  as	  political	  principles	  are	  a	  subset	  of	  moral	  principles	  more	  generally),	   all	   of	   them	   just	   as	   comprehensive	  as	   the	  one	  offered	  by	  Rawls’s	  
restricted	  constructivism	  ME	  recreated	  by	  the	  idea	  of	  full	  autonomy.	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   If	   it	   is	   indeed	   the	   case	   that	   full	  autonomy	  provides	   a	   comprehensive	  explanation	  of	  the	  source	  of	  political	  principles,	  then	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  reason	  to	  abandon	  it	  if	  the	  political	  understanding	  of	  liberalism	  is	  to	  succeed.	  50	  The	  easiest	   way	   of	   doing	   this	   is	   by	   interpreting	   the	   original	   position	   in	  
constructivist	   NJ	   fashion	   —that	   is,	   as	   a	   way	   of	   offering	   a	   normative	  justification	   to	   the	   principles	   that	   are	   to	   regulate	   the	   political	   domain.	  However,	  as	  we	  have	  seen	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  this	  interpretation	  is	  also	  problematic	  for,	  as	  I	  have	  argued,	  constructivists	  NJ	  views	  seem	  to	  be	  stating	  a	  superfluous	  claim	  about	  normative	  justification:	  ‘because	  these	  principles	  are	  
justified	   by	   correct	   arguments,	   they	   would	   be	   issued	   the	   proposed	  procedure’.	   In	   light	   of	   this,	   I	   think	   we	   should	   opt	   for	   a	   third	   way	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	  Let	  me	  distinguish	  my	  critique	  of	  full	  autonomy	  from	  a	  very	  usual	  critique	  of	  Rawls’s	  ideas	  on	   autonomy	   in	   light	   of	   his	   political	   liberalism.	   Many	   erred	   criticisms	   of	   Rawls’s	   political	  liberalism	  are	  based	  on	  the	  incorrect	  interpretative	  claim	  that,	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  of	  reasonable	  pluralism,	  Rawls	  argues	  that	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  must	  renounce	  the	   importance	  of	   the	  value	  of	  autonomy.	  Kymlicka	  1992	  is	  the	  most	  prominent	  example	  of	  this	  incorrect	  interpretative	  claim.	   Such	   a	   claim	   rests	   on	   equivocation	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   term	  autonomy.	   According	   to	  Kymlicka	  1989:	  12-­‐13,	  autonomy	  can	  be	  roughly	  understood	  as	  citizens’	  capacity	  to	  choose	  amongst	  different	  conceptions	  of	  a	  good	  way	  of	  life.	  Autonomy	  thus	  stresses	  the	  importance	  that	  liberals	  place	  on	  the	  idea	  that	  a	  person’s	  life	  is	  of	  value	  only	  when	  lived	  ‘from	  the	  inside’.	  A	   very	   similar	  understanding	  of	   autonomy	   can	  be	   found	   in	  Raz’s	  1986:	  369	   remarks:	   ‘The	  ruling	   idea	   behind	   the	   ideal	   of	   personal	   autonomy	   is	   that	   people	   should	  make	   their	   own	  lives.	  The	  autonomous	  person	  is	  (part)	  author	  of	  his	  own	  life’.	  In	  similar	  fashion,	  Wall	  1998:	  128	  states	  that	  persons’	  autonomy	  involves	  ‘making	  something	  out	  of	  their	  lives	  according	  to	  their	  own	  understanding	  of	  what	  it	  is	  valuable	  and	  worth	  doing’.	  Following	  the	  lead	  of	  these	  authors	   typically	   opposed	   to	   the	   political	   understanding	   of	   liberalism,	   let	   me	   assume	   the	  simple	   understanding	   of	   autonomy	   as	   the	   exercise	   of	   the	   capacity	   to	   choose	   amongst	   and	  reassess	   different	   ways	   of	   life.	   Call	   this	   understanding	   of	   the	   value	   of	   autonomy	   liberal	  
autonomy.	  There	   is	  nothing	   in	  Rawls’s	  political	   liberalism	  arguing	  against	   liberal	  autonomy.	  In	  fact,	  many	  fundamental	  features	  of	  his	  conception	  of	  justice	  support	  it.	  The	  most	  relevant	  feature	   in	   this	   respect	   is	   Rawls’s	   (PL:	   19)	   definition	   of	   persons’	   second	  moral	   power:	   the	  capacity	   to	  pursue,	   revise	  and	  abandon	  a	  conception	  of	   the	  good.	   In	  Rawls’s	   liberal	   theory,	  thus,	   liberal	  autonomy	   is	   fleshed	  out	  as	   the	  second	  moral	  power	  of	  persons.	  So	   long	  as	   the	  institutions	  of	  the	  basic	  structure	  of	  society	  are	  concerned	  with	  the	  distribution	  of	  primary	  goods,	   and	   these	   goods	   are	   preconditions	   for	   the	   development	   of	   the	   two	  moral	   powers,	  Rawls’s	   theory	   endorses	   the	   commitment	   that	   the	   State	   should	   promote	   liberal	   autonomy	  amongst	   its	   citizens.	   Kymlicka	   1995:	   158	   also	   mistakenly	   holds	   that	   Rawls’s	   political	  liberalism	   is	   an	   attempt	   to	   respond	   to	   putative	   communitarian	   critiques.	   Textual	   evidence	  favours	  the	  opposite	  claim	  (see	  PL:	  xxx,	  xxxii).	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interpreting	  the	  original	  position	  that	  is	  not	  constructivist	  in	  either	  of	  the	  two	  senses.	   Call	   it	   the	   deflationary	   interpretation.	   Such	   view	   can	   be	   defined	   as	  follows:	  
Deflationary	  interpretation:	   the	  original	  position	   is	   a	  heuristic	  device	  whose	   function	   is	   to	   order	   all	   relevant	   reasons	   and	   arguments	   for	  justifying	  the	  principles	  that	  are	  to	  regulate	  the	  institutions	  of	  a	  liberal	  society.	  	  Notice	  that,	  by	  taking	  the	  original	  position	  merely	  as	  a	  heuristic	  device	  for	  the	  exposition	   all	   relevant	   liberal	   reasons	   in	   favour	   of	   principles	   of	   justice,	   the	  
deflationary	  interpretation	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  claim	  that	  those	  reasons	  can	  also	   be	   presented	   without	   appealing	   to	   such	   a	   procedure.	   Therefore,	   this	  interpretation	   is	   based	   on	   the	   idea	   that	   all	   the	   justificatory	   work	   of	   the	  principles	  is	  done	  by	  the	  liberal	  reasons	  and	  arguments	  themselves.	  In	   fact,	   this	   third	   understanding	   of	   the	   original	   position	   is	   not	   new.	  Rawls	   himself	   sometimes	   speaks	   in	   favour	   of	   it,	   as	   when	   he	   says	   that	   the	  original	  position	  is	  merely	  a	  model	  of	  the	  reasons	  we,	  here	  and	  now,	  think	  are	  relevant	  for	  the	  justification	  of	  liberal	  principles	  (see	  JF:	  17,	  PL:	  25).	  This	  idea	  implies	   that,	  while	   the	  model	   is	  dispensable,	   the	   reasons	   that	   it	  models	  are	  not.	   Therefore,	   in	   opposition	   to	   its	   constructivist	  ME	   rival,	   the	   deflationary	  
interpretation	   holds	   that	   the	   original	   position	   is	   not	   an	   explanation	   of	   the	  constitutive	   structure	  of	  principles	  of	   justice’s	   correctness	  or	  objectivity.	   In	  turn,	  in	  opposition	  to	  its	  constructivist	  NJ	  rival,	  the	  deflationary	  interpretation	  holds	  that	  nothing	  is	  added	  to	  the	  normative	  justification	  of	  the	  principles	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  principles	  would	  be	  agreed	  upon	  the	  original	  position.	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   Perhaps	  constructivists	  NJ	  would	   like	   to	  push	  a	  more	   robust	   claim	  of	  justification	  than	  the	  one	  made	  by	  the	  deflationary	  interpretation,	  while	  still	  trying	   to	  remain	  metaethically	  neutral.	  They	  could	  say	   that	   the	  only	   correct	  understanding	   of	   justification	  —given	   the	   fact	   of	   reasonable	   pluralism	   (PL:	  99)	  or	  given	  the	  fact	  of	  disagreement	  in	  metaethics	  (Ronzoni	  2010:	  79)—	  is	  the	  constructivist	  understanding.	  This	  is	  tantamount	  to	  claiming	  that	  the	  only	  way	  of	   justifying	  principles	  of	   justice	  is	  by	  appealing	  to	  the	  original	  position	  —regardless	  of	  whether	   it	   is	   constitutive	  of	   them	  to	  be	   the	  result	  of	   such	  a	  procedure.	  If	  this	  claim	  is	  correct,	  we	  could	  not	  interpret	  the	  original	  position	  in	  a	  deflationary	  fashion.	  	  However	   I	   find	   this	   claim	  puzzling	   for	   three	   reasons.	   First,	   it	   flies	   in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  objection	  I	  presented	  in	  §	  5.2.	  As	  we	  saw,	  we	  can	  accept	  all	  the	  arguments	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	   and	   reject	  
Constructivism	  NJ	  without	  showing	  incoherence.	  Second,	  stating	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  way	  of	  justifying	  principles,	  and	  that	  such	  a	  way	  is	  constructivist	  in	  nature,	  seems	  tantamount	  to	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  in	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  objectivity	  of	  those	  very	  principles	  to	  be	  issued	  by	  a	  procedure	  of	  construction.	  But,	  as	  we	   saw	   in	   §	   5.2	   regarding	   Ronzoni	   and	   Valentini’s	   mixed	   conception,	   this	  claim	   about	   objectivity	   is	   straightforwardly	   metaethical	   and	   thus	  incompatible	   with	   the	   other	   usual	   explanations	   of	   principles’	   objectivity.	  Finally,	  stating	  that	  there	  is	  only	  one	  way	  of	  justifying	  principles	  seems	  to	  go	  against	   the	   spirit	   of	   the	   very	   idea	   of	   an	   overlapping	   consensus	   about	   such	  principles	   (PL:	   131-­‐168).	   According	   to	   such	   an	   idea,	   there	   can	   be	   many	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different	  moral	  reasons	  in	  support	  of	  the	  principles	  of	  justice.	  It	  sounds	  quite	  implausible	   to	   interpret	   this	   idea	   as	   stating	   that	   there	   are	   many	   moral	  reasons	   to	   accept	   the	  one	  and	  only	   correct	   justification	   of	   the	   principles	   of	  justice.	  Rather,	  a	  more	  plausible	  interpretation	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  an	  overlapping	  consensus	  is	  that	  there	  are	  many	  moral	  justifications	  to	  endorse	  and	  comply	  with	   the	  principles	   of	   justice	  —so	   long	   as	   these	   are	  based	  on	  moral	   rather	  than	  prudential	  reasons.	  Only	  in	  this	  way,	  it	  seems	  to	  me,	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  ‘can	  win	  its	  support	  by	  addressing	  each	  citizen’s	  reason,	  as	  explained	  within	  its	   own	   framework’	   (PL:	   143),	   as	   the	   idea	   of	   an	   overlapping	   consensus	  states.51	  	   Summing	   up,	   in	   this	   section	   I	   have	   defended	   two	   claims.	   First,	   that	  because	  of	  the	  two	  aims	  of	  political	  liberalism	  (i.e.,	  that	  justice-­‐as-­‐fairness	  is	  a	  political	   conception	   of	   justice	   and	   the	   most	   reasonable	   one	   within	   such	   a	  family	   of	   conceptions),	   the	   constructivist	   NJ	   interpretation	   of	   the	   original	  position	   is	   preferable	   to	   its	   constructivist	   ME	   rival	   (and	   thus	   we	   should	  abandon	  Rawls’s	  idea	  of	  full	  autonomy).	  Second,	  that	  because	  of	  the	  internal	  problems	  of	   any	  constructivist	  NJ	   position,	   the	  deflationary	  interpretation	  of	  the	  original	  position	  is	  preferable	  to	  its	  constructivist	  NJ	  rival.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  51	  Something	   similar	   to	   this	   point	   is	   defended	   by	   Scheffler	   1994:	   15-­‐22.	   He	   conclusively	  claims:	   ‘if	   an	   overlapping	   consensus	   on	   liberal	   principles	   can	   be	   achieved	   in	   modern	  democracies,	  then	  accepting	  any	  of	  the	  doctrines	  included	  in	  such	  a	  consensus	  must	  give	  one	  reason	   to	  support	  a	   liberal	  scheme.	   In	  other	  words,	   the	  distinctive	  contribution	  of	  political	  liberalism	  may	  be	  to	  suggest	  that	  there	  are	  many	  ways	  to	  arrive	  to	  at	  liberal	  principles	  and	  that	  that	  very	  fact	  is	  a	  source	  of	  liberalism’s	  strength.’	  (Scheffler	  1994:	  22)	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5.4	  Conclusive	  Remarks	  This	   concludes	   my	   assessment	   and	   defence	   of	   Rawls’s	   practice-­‐dependent	  conception	  of	  domestic	  justice.	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  while	  such	  a	  conception	  can	  overcome	   Cohen’s	   recent	   criticisms,	   it	   must	   nevertheless	   refrain	   from	   a	  commitment	  to	  a	  particularly	  robust	  understanding	  of	  constructivism	  either	  at	  the	  meta-­‐ethical	   level	  or	  at	  the	  level	  of	  normative	  justification;	  otherwise	  the	   project	   of	   offering	   a	   political	   conception	   of	   justice	   for	   the	   regulation	   of	  liberal	  institutions	  would	  not	  succeed.	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